

# OPERATION EVALUATIONS SERIES

## Regional Synthesis 2013-2017

Latin America and the Caribbean Region

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Policy and Institutional Context**

1. Major contextual shifts, including climate change, increasing inequality, more frequent natural disasters and increasingly protracted conflicts, have influenced global policy reforms. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2016, calls for collective action to support country-led efforts in achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

2. The WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 sought to reposition WFP from a “food aid” to a “food assistance” agency. The subsequent WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021 places WFP firmly in support of the 2030 Agenda, and particularly in contributing to the achievement of SDG 2: “End Hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”. It focuses on reaching those in greatest need first, while ensuring that no one is left behind.<sup>1</sup>

3. To meet the demands of this new environment, WFP has launched the Integrated Road Map (IRM). This redefines the organization’s architecture as well as its country strategic planning process under the WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021.

### **1.2 Operations Evaluations**

4. The WFP series of operations evaluations supports its corporate objective of accountability and learning for results. Since mid-2013, the series has generated fifty-eight evaluations of operations across the six regions in which WFP operates. The evaluations assess the appropriateness of WFP operations, their results, and the factors explaining these results. The series will close in mid-2017.

5. Within the Latin America and Caribbean region seven operations evaluations (OpEv) were conducted between 2014 and 2017 in seven countries, all in which WFP is currently active: Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua.

- Evaluations covered 7 operations out of 29 operations in the region which corresponds to 24 percent of the regional portfolio and 54 percent of the regional operational budget.<sup>2</sup>
- Operations evaluated included: three country programmes (CP),<sup>3</sup> one development programme (DEV),<sup>4</sup> and three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRRO), two of which were single country operations<sup>5</sup> and one regional operation covering four countries in Central America.<sup>6</sup>
- The seven evaluated operations targeted a population of more than 6 million beneficiaries with combined requirements of USD 389 million.

### **1.3 Purpose and objectives**

6. This Synthesis of Operations Evaluations for the Latin America and Caribbean Region aims to:

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<sup>1</sup> WFP (2017) Strategic Plan 2017-2021 WFP/EB.2/2016/4-A/Rev.2.

<sup>2</sup> Operations Evaluations Factsheet, WFP 2017.

<sup>3</sup> Cuba, Honduras and Nicaragua.

<sup>4</sup> Haiti.

<sup>5</sup> Ecuador and Haiti.

<sup>6</sup> El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

- Enhance efficient and effective use of evaluation evidence and learning in programme development
- Help facilitate the country strategic plan process for the Regional Bureau of Panama
- Create a concise, regional-friendly ‘body of evidence’ analysis to inform the upcoming development of the regional evaluation strategy.<sup>7</sup>

#### 1.4 Contexts of the operations evaluated

7. The Latin America and Caribbean sub-continent is a vast and exceptionally biodiverse territory of over 19 million square kilometres, 19 countries and a population close to 170 million.<sup>8</sup> It is traditionally divided in three sub-regions - Caribbean, Central America and South America - which, over recent decades experienced consistent socio-economic development, political stability and sub-regional integration. Key features of the region are:

- **Middle-income countries:** With the exception of Haiti (low-income country) economic growth over the past decades has resulted in sharp reductions of poverty and the development of a middle class in the region. The recent global economic crisis has halted development with one quarter of the population considered to be poor<sup>9</sup> (living on less than USD 4/day) and nearly 39 percent of Latin Americans vulnerable to a return to poverty.<sup>10</sup>
- **Inequalities and structural poverty:** Despite macroeconomic development, the region is also the most unequal in the world. Hunger affects more than 53 million people. The region is affected by the double burden of malnutrition, with 9 million children under five suffering chronic undernutrition, and increasing levels of child and adult obesity. Anaemia is the most widespread nutritional problem in the region, affecting 22 million preschool children, 33 million women of reproductive age and 3.6 million lactating women.<sup>11</sup> According to the Global Hunger Index 2016, levels of hunger in the seven countries evaluated range from “alarming” levels in Haiti, “serious” in Guatemala, “moderate” in Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua and “low” in Cuba.<sup>12</sup>
- **Citizen insecurity:** Security is a concern in the region that accounts for more than 100,000 violent deaths per year, entailing huge human and social costs. As indicated in the *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013-2014 Human Development Report for Latin America*, most countries in the region have homicide rates considered by World Health Organisation to be at epidemic levels, and countries show large deficits in capacities concerning justice and security, which result in alarming levels of impunity.
- **Exposure to natural disasters and climate change:** Both slow- and rapid-onset natural disasters regularly threaten the region. Drought, often related to *El Niño*, particularly affects the area known as *Corredor Seco* in Central America;<sup>13</sup> hydro-meteorological events related to *El Niño y La Niña*, such as heavy rains and floods, landslides, drought, frost and cold fronts are

<sup>7</sup> Terms of Reference.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-subregion/>

<sup>9</sup> Latin America and Caribbean Equity Lab, World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/overview>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>

<sup>11</sup> Resources for Post Disaster Support, WFP: [http://cdema.org/post\\_dis\\_supp/WFP\\_-\\_Post\\_Disaster\\_Support.pdf](http://cdema.org/post_dis_supp/WFP_-_Post_Disaster_Support.pdf)

[http://cdema.org/post\\_dis\\_supp/WFP\\_-\\_Post\\_Disaster\\_Support.pdf](http://cdema.org/post_dis_supp/WFP_-_Post_Disaster_Support.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> The Global Hunger Index 2016: <http://ghi.ifpri.org/>

<sup>13</sup> El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.

recurrent in the Andean countries.<sup>14</sup> Governments work to address these threats through national disaster risk reduction and management (DRR/DRM) mechanisms at national, regional and international levels such as CEPREDENAC<sup>15</sup> and the Sendai Framework.

- **Social protection systems:** Over the last decade, governments have developed social policies to foster sustainable and equitable growth. Many countries have developed highly institutionalized social protection systems to address the needs of the most vulnerable; this is evident in the growth of public social investment in the region from 15 percent in 2000 to 19.1 percent in 2012.<sup>16</sup> Cash-based programmes have massively expanded as cornerstones of Latin America social protection non-contributory systems to fight poverty.<sup>17</sup>

## 1.5 WFP in the Latin America and Caribbean Region

8. WFP currently works in 12 countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region through five CPs,<sup>18</sup> two PRROs, one DEV, one emergency operation (EMOP), one special operation (SO) and 11 trust funds. The total budget requirements of the WFP portfolio in the region exceed USD 987 million of which 10 percent is covered by trust funds.<sup>19</sup>

9. According to its regional strategic vision for 2012-2013<sup>20</sup> and the most up-to-date strategic orientation,<sup>21</sup> the main objective of WFP in the region is to strengthen national governments' capacity, improve food and nutrition security, and reduce the impact of natural disasters and climate change on vulnerable populations. These objectives are sought through the following approaches:

- Assisting governments to broaden the scope of their social protection programmes (including education, health and nutrition, small scale agricultural production, etc.) to reduce food and nutrition insecurity
- Supporting governments and communities to improve disaster cycle management in order to withstand natural disasters and climate change
- Establishing further links between emergency response and resilience building.

10. In addition, WFP emphasises its work on innovation, cross-cutting evidence generation and added value strategies.

## 1.6 The Evaluated Operations

11. The operations evaluated in this synthesis were implemented across a wide range of contexts and conditions:

- **Drought:** Drought in *Corredor seco* worsened the vulnerability of two million people considered severely or moderately food insecure in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua during 2014-2015.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

<sup>15</sup> Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres Naturales en América Central.

<sup>16</sup> UN Economic Commission for LAC (ECLAC), 2015.

<sup>17</sup> *Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Oxford Policy Management and WFP, 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador are the three countries of the Latin America and Caribbean Region to have approved CSPs in February 2017 as part of Wave 1 of the Integrated Road Map process.

<sup>19</sup> Document Revision Tracking Sheet, RBP 2017.

<sup>20</sup> *Visión Estratégica Regional PMA para América Latina y Caribe 2012-2013*, May 2012, RBP [http://es.wfp.org/sites/default/files/es/file/estrategia\\_para\\_america\\_latina\\_y\\_el\\_caribe.pdf](http://es.wfp.org/sites/default/files/es/file/estrategia_para_america_latina_y_el_caribe.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> The Regional Strategic Vision dates 2012-2013 and has not been reviewed; however, exchanges with RBP indicate some strategic evolution as indicated in the text.

<sup>22</sup> WFP Regional PRRO 200490 Evaluation Report, 2016.

- **Food production and availability challenges:** Food production challenges affect all seven countries evaluated. Challenges include lack of access to assets and credit, price increases, low productivity and weak value chains. These factors result in food import dependency, poor dietary diversity and weak nutritional status of the most vulnerable in the long term.
- **Refugees fleeing conflict:** More than fifty years of internal conflict in Colombia has resulted in 327,000 Colombians fleeing the country seeking protection in neighbouring countries. The displacement particularly affects indigenous and afro-descendant populations.
- **Gender challenges including gender based violence:** With the exception of Cuba, despite progress and political commitment to attain gender equality, six of the seven countries rank in the lower half of the Gender Inequality Index with positions between 85 (El Salvador) and 142 (Haiti) out of 159 countries. High rates of gender-based violence, including to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community, are particularly worrying in five out of the seven countries evaluated.<sup>23</sup>
- **Outliers in the Caribbean region:** Haiti is the only fragile state in the region; beset by precariously weak economic and institutional capacity, it struggles to address the needs of the poor (58 percent) and extremely poor (24 percent) as well as recurrent natural disasters. Highly exposed to recurrent disasters, Cuba is well known for its strong and highly institutionalised approach to disaster risk management, but faces challenges in the form of drought management and the sustainability of its social programmes.

12. To address the needs of the 7 million people targeted by the operations, WFP managed to raise a total average of 68 percent of the USD 388 million required at the time of evaluation.

13. **Activities/modalities:** The operations comprised a range of activities and modalities. All seven operations were multi-component. Four operations (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP) included four project activities; three operations (Cuba CP, Haiti DEV and Regional PRRO) included three activities. Specifically:

- Capacity strengthening was the most common activity planned in all seven operations whether as a specific activity of the operation or mainstreamed under other activities. Three countries focused on national emergency preparedness response (EPR), disaster risk management and national food security monitoring mechanisms (Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO, Regional PRRO).
- Five operations planned for food for assets and food for training (FFA/FFT)<sup>24</sup> and in each case, activities aimed at community resilience-building objectives.
- School Feeding (SF) figured in five operations.<sup>25</sup> WFP directly implemented school feeding activities to support national systems and in all cases combined delivery of food<sup>26</sup> with capacity strengthening of national systems.

<sup>23</sup> Ecuador (in relation with refugee population), El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras.

<sup>24</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>25</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>26</sup> In the case of Cuba CP, WFP implementing role focused on importing food and handing over to the Government who was in charge of conducting food distribution in schools.

- Four operations<sup>27</sup> included nutrition activities accompanied by nutrition-related capacity strengthening activities.<sup>28</sup> Three of them (Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP) planned to address needs of HIV patients. In addition, one operation (Haiti DEV) included a nutrition-sensitive activity in the education sector (micronutrient powder distribution to schoolchildren in the context of a broader school feeding programme).
- General distribution (GD) appeared in three operations. General distribution was targeted at the refugee community and most food insecure communities affected by droughts and natural disasters.
- In-kind food was planned in all seven operations, and it combined with cash and vouchers transfers in three.<sup>29</sup> Six operations (all but Haiti PRRO) planned for local purchase of goods.

14. **Policy frameworks:** WFP operations in the region engaged with a range of policy platforms and initiatives for food and nutrition security. These included policies and frameworks on food security, nutrition, disaster risk management/disaster risk reduction (DRM/DRR) and early warning systems and safety nets (see ‘Findings’ below).

15. **Strategic partnerships:** Operations also engaged with a wide range of strategic partnerships in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including at national, sub-regional levels and global levels. These included central ministries (e.g. of education, health, agriculture and food security, social welfare, etc.) as well as decentralised government functions, national vulnerability assessment mechanisms, national nutrition platforms and disaster risk management authorities. Partnerships were also planned with a broad spectrum of United Nations agencies and donors and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Annex 1 lists the strategic partnerships identified per country within evaluations (though recognising that these date back in some cases to 2011).

16. Table 1 presents the operations’ main features.

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<sup>27</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>28</sup> Haiti PRRO capacity strengthening activities for nutrition component were conducted by the partner Action Against Hunger under the joint project Kore Lavi and results were not assessed by the evaluation.

<sup>29</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO.

**Table 1: Features of operations**

Date of Evaluation	Operation									Activities <sup>30</sup>					Modalities		
	Country	Category	No.	Duration	Value (USD million)	% funded at evaluation	Funded overall <sup>31</sup>		Target beneficiaries <sup>32</sup>	General distribution	Nutrition <sup>33</sup>	School feeding	Food assistance for assets / training	Capacity development	Local purchase	Food	Cash-based transfers
							%	US\$									
2014	Haiti	DEV	200150	2012-2015	63,240,517	71.2%	76.2	126,110,519	685,000		◊ <sup>34</sup>	√		√	√	√	
	Honduras	CP	200240	2012-2017	29,100,000	92.0%	75.3	49,876,974	910,905		√*	√	√	√	√	√	
2015	Ecuador	PRRO	200275	2011-2014	16,504,628	68.0%	68.1	11,248,891	160,365	√		√	√	√	√	√	√
2016	Haiti	PRRO	200618	2014-2017	118,561,950	50.1%	51.7	199,556,442	2,030,000	√	√*		√◊	√		√	√
	Nicaragua	CP	200434	2013-2018	33,114,412	71.5%	96.9	33,538,949	413,000		√*◊ <sup>35</sup>	√	√◊	√	√	√	
	Regional: El Salvador, Honduras Guatemala, Nicaragua	PRRO	200490	2014-2016	110,750,869	50.0%	50.8	188,812,146	2,247,291 <sup>36</sup>	√			√	√	√	√	√
2017	Cuba	CP	200703	2015-2018	17,532,831	76.0%	100.9	13,202,084	896,500		√	√		√	√◊	√	
	<b>Total</b>				<b>388,805,207</b>			<b>622,346,005</b>	<b>7,343,061</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>

<sup>30</sup> Cells with √ and shading denote activities that were planned and implemented. ◊ Denotes planned but not implemented or implemented to a very limited degree in terms of beneficiary numbers or duration.

<sup>31</sup> As at the time of this synthesis for ongoing operations or as at the end of the operation for already completed operations. Note that some of the operations may have had budget revisions after the evaluation was completed. This information is therefore intended to illustrate the volatility of funding environment. The source of this information is Resource Updates found in the WFP Operations Database. (<http://www.wfp.org/operations/database>).

<sup>32</sup> Planned beneficiaries throughout the project's lifetime.

<sup>33</sup> \*Denotes HIV/AIDS activities that are analysed/reported under nutrition.

<sup>34</sup> The Haiti DEV includes a nutrition sensitive activity in the education sector (micronutrient powder distribution to schoolchildren in the context of a broader school feeding programme) which is not accounted for as nutrition activity properly.

<sup>35</sup> Only nutrition activities addressed to people living with HIV patients were not implemented.

<sup>36</sup> As per Operations Evaluations 2015-2016 Annual Synthesis Report.



## 1.7 Methodology

17. The individual evaluations analysed here applied mixed-methods approaches, including documentary analysis, review of financial data and statistics, interviews and focus groups with key informants, and other relevant methods. All methodologies were checked for quality and reliability through the operations evaluations process.

18. This regional operations evaluations synthesis applies a structured analytical framework and systematic data extraction. Evidence was rated for validity and reliability on a scale of 1 (low) to 4 (high), with only reliable evidence – scoring at least 2 – included. Findings were validated by the WFP Office of Evaluation and by the Regional Bureau for Panama.

19. Limitations of this regional synthesis include:

- The evidence is mixed between recent and earlier periods with two evaluations conducted in 2014, one in 2015, three in 2016 and one in 2017.
- Evidence arises from three final evaluations and four mid-term evaluations, limiting final results data available.
- Evidence arises from seven countries that are mostly concentrated in two sub-regions: Central America<sup>37</sup> and Caribbean,<sup>38</sup> and only one country from South America.<sup>39</sup>
- The sample does not include EMOPs and trust funds, limiting analysis per typology of operation.

20. Therefore, although themes identified may have wider relevance, they cannot be extrapolated to the WFP wider portfolio. Nonetheless, the breadth and depth of the information presented in this synthesis constitutes a relevant, and hopefully useful, evidence base to inform the Integrated RoadMap and country strategic planning processes in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

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<sup>37</sup> El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

<sup>38</sup> Cuba and Haiti.

<sup>39</sup> Ecuador.

## 2. FINDINGS

### QUESTION 1: How appropriate was the operation's design?

(relevance, strategic positioning and coherence)

#### Summary findings: relevance/appropriateness

WFP operations were found to be fit for purpose to address the needs of the food insecure population. WFP played a relevant enabling role seeking to strengthen governments' work and capacities in areas relevant to addressing chronic vulnerabilities in countries highly exposed to natural hazards. WFP activities as a direct implementer generally occurred as part of national social protection plans led by governments.

The use of evidence to inform the operation's design, including gender analysis and capacity assessments, was not systematic; still, some operations were based on solid assessments. Quality of designs were globally assessed as good, with strong synergies across components in some occasions, though design flaws in FFA/FFT activities and sustainability/transition were detected. Intended coverage and choice of activities were generally appropriate; however, weak geographical targeting appeared in some instances.

### 2.1 How appropriate was WFP strategic positioning in the region?

Evaluations found that WFP played a relevant enabling role, seeking to strengthen governments' work and capacities in areas relevant to the fight against chronic vulnerabilities in countries highly exposed to natural hazards. In addition, WFP planned appropriate social protection activities as part of broader national social protection plans under the leadership of national authorities in the fields of school feeding, nutrition and general distribution. Evaluations viewed positively WFP efforts to enhance food security evidence and analysis in the operations evaluated in the region.

21. Evaluations concluded that, in common with other regions evaluated through this series,<sup>40</sup> WFP rightly opted to play an enabling role in this region. It did this by consistently including activities oriented that strengthen government action in areas relevant to fighting against chronic vulnerability, in particularly disaster-prone zones. Specifically:

- Capacity strengthening and knowledge transfer was planned as the cornerstone of all seven operations, some of which included more than one focus. Five operations planned capacity strengthening on nutrition programmes (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO,<sup>41</sup> Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP); three operations on commodity management and supply chain (Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP); three operations on local production and value chain (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Nicaragua CP); three operations on emergency preparedness and response and disaster risk management (Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO) and three on resilient livelihoods (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Honduras CP).
- WFP positioned itself as an expert agency in the generation of food-security evidence and analysis in five operations<sup>42</sup> on issues such as use of cash and voucher transfers, food security and vulnerability analysis. Innovation activities

<sup>40</sup> See regional operation evaluation syntheses for East and Central Africa; Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe; Southern Africa; Asia and the Pacific; and West Africa.

<sup>41</sup> Capacity strengthening activities for nutrition component were conducted by the partner Action Against Hunger under the joint Project Kore Lavi and results were not assessed by the evaluation.

<sup>42</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO

were identified across the seven operations, including local purchase modelling (further described in ‘Findings’).

- WFP supported the development of national emergency preparedness and response/disaster risk management mechanisms in three countries highly exposed to natural hazards (Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO).
- With the exception of Haiti DEV, operations did not include explicit activities aiming at policy enhancing objectives in the countries assessed.

22. An enabling role was combined in all seven operations with direct implementation of activities in areas where governments praised WFP expertise (school feeding, nutrition, FFA/ FFT and general distribution activities). Specifically:

- In the seven operations, direct implementation occurred totally or partially (in the case of Haiti DEV and Regional PRRO) through national institutions under the coordination and leadership of national authorities, geared towards helping governments implement national plans. In the Honduras CP the evaluation found that WFP could have done more to support the leading role of local authorities.
- In common with other regions reviewed through this series, all seven operations built on solid partnerships with national governments and various administrative entities, from central to municipalities, working together to address identified problems and conduct joint programming, including beneficiary targeting. Five evaluations note that WFP operations addressed explicit demands from governments to intervene<sup>43</sup>.

23. With the exception of the Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO and the Regional PRRO, operations’ direct implementation were, in common with operations in some other regions,<sup>44</sup> designed as part of existing social protection mechanisms that included nutrition, small holder farmer support and school feeding activities. This was assessed as highly appropriate given the existence of strong social protection policies and frameworks in four countries<sup>45</sup>. In Haiti, the PRRO and DEV contributed to their development. Specifically:

- Five operations supported national school feeding protection programmes (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Honduras PRRO and Nicaragua CP).
- Three operations were designed to support national nutrition protection mechanisms (Cuba CP, Honduras PRRO, Nicaragua CP).
- One operation was designed to support national social protection to Colombian refugees on education and health (Ecuador PRRO).
- One operation supported the development of a “national safety nets targeting system” to identify and assist vulnerable populations (Haiti PRRO).
- One operation was fully designed to fit into the national social protection programme (Cuba CP).

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<sup>43</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>44</sup> See regional syntheses for Asia and the Pacific, West Africa and Southern Africa.

<sup>45</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

## 2.2 How rigorous was the operation design?

Operations' designs varied in their use of evidence, leaving room for improvement. Capacity assessment and gender analysis were not conducted to inform decisions at design stage systematically. WFP used solid assessments both from vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) units and from governments in four of seven operations. Evaluations generally did not find major weaknesses or inaccuracies in operations' theories of change, however some design flaws were raised related to FFA/FFT and school feeding activities and sustainability/transition aspects. Operations presented strong internal synergies between food assistance for assets and purchase for progress (P4P) activities with school feeding activities or general distributions planned in six.

24. In common with wider findings from this series, evaluations found variable depth in the extent to which operations designs were evidence-based:<sup>46</sup>

- Four operations<sup>47</sup> systematically used assessments conducted either by the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit of WFP or by other agencies, including governments, to reach thorough understandings of existing vulnerabilities and inform decisions during the design process (Box 1 indicates the main sources used). In the case of the Regional PRRO, the evaluation found that needs changed significantly over the course of the operation, namely in Guatemala, and the operation was not adjusted to the most up-to-date available data on needs.
- Two operations<sup>48</sup> refer to food security studies; the extent to which these informed the operation is unclear.
- Evaluation of one operation<sup>49</sup> does not refer to the issue.
- Also in line with wider findings from the series, and despite all operations including capacity strengthening activities, only two (Cuba CP and Haiti DEV) assessed government capacity gaps prior to the design of the operations. Haiti DEV conducted a capacity assessment of the Government's school feeding capacities and the design of capacity development activities of the Cuba CP was based on the results of participatory consultation with stakeholders and institutions involved in national programmes/processes that the operation intended to strengthen.

### Box 1: Sources of food security evidence applied to operation design

- Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analyses
- Emergency food security assessments
- Emergency nutrition security assessments
- Livelihood seasonal assessments
- Joint assessment missions
- Rapid assessment

<sup>46</sup> See operations evaluations syntheses for 2014, 2015 and 2016.

<sup>47</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO.

<sup>48</sup> Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>49</sup> Haiti DEV.

- National surveys and assessments (nutrition, food security, market analysis, education and demographic) including from early warning systems
- Household economy assessment
- Context analysis, seasonal analysis and community planning (in line with the WFP Three-Pronged Approach)
- System Approach for Better Education Result) assessments

25. With the exception of the Haiti PRRO, evaluations did not detect weaknesses or inaccuracies in the construction operations' theories of change. For Haiti, the evaluation concludes that the "scope of activities, targets set and geographic coverage lacked prioritization and proved unrealistic with regard to capacities within the CO, government entities and CPs and to donors' interests (such as resilience)." In addition, the operation was designed with the assumption that major disasters would happen between 2014 and 2015 but these did not occur and general distribution figures had to be drastically reduced.

26. Reflecting an issue raised repeatedly across this series, four evaluations raised design flaws of operations: (i) Honduras school feeding activities were designed to cover fewer days than needed, (ii) some food assistance for assets activities in Ecuador were not designed to benefit the most vulnerable rural population exposed to recurrent droughts, (iii) two evaluations (Haiti PRRO and the Regional PRRO) indicate design flaws in FFA/FFT activities affecting the quality of assets created, such as lack of advance consideration of maintenance costs, lack of community mobilization and ownership-building and inadequate timeliness of projects.

27. Three evaluations pointed to learning from previous evaluations or experiences (but only the Ecuador PRRO finds that lessons influenced the operation's design), specifically.

- Ecuador PRRO: Findings from the WFP evaluation in 2013 of the food security of Colombian refugees in Ecuador and a joint evaluation UNHCR-WFP informed the design of the operation.
- Regional PRRO: The *Central America: An Evaluation of WFP's Regional Portfolio (2007-2011)* report is mentioned but the evaluation does not indicate if it informed decisions during the design.
- Haiti PRRO: The previous PRRO was not evaluated, missing an opportunity to improve the design of the next PRRO.

28. Analysis of internal synergies was conducted in six evaluations. In common with wider findings from the series, two evaluations (Cuba CP and Ecuador PRRO) found the operations established strong conceptual synergies between its components. Three evaluations (Haiti DEV, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO) found operations to partially foster intra-operation synergies and one (Haiti PRRO) lacked internal synergies. Issues noted included:

- Strong synergies between food for assets or purchase for progress (P4P) activities with school feeding, general distributions and nutrition activities were planned in six cases (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP, and Regional PRRO) with the aim of enhancing local markets for small farmers' production.

- Geographic dispersion hindering convergence between nutrition and school feeding activities was found in Nicaragua CP (for example, prevention of chronic malnutrition and school feeding activities).
- Lack of synergies in nutrition activities were found in Haiti PRRO, particularly between activities channelled through Kore Lavi project and other components of the PRRO.

29. Similarly to findings from other regions evaluated through this series, gender analysis to inform the operations' designs was absent in all operations evaluated - with the exception of one component (P4P) of the Nicaragua CP. Three evaluations (Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP) commend the efforts made by WFP to improve gender sensitivity of the operation's design throughout the implementation of the operation by revisiting the needs with a gender lens. Such efforts resulted in highly gender-sensitive operations in the case of Ecuador PRRO and Honduras CP and one component (P4P) in Nicaragua, which integrated activities addressed specifically at gender transformation in the communities covered by the programme.

### **Box 2: Improving of gender-sensitive design**

- Ecuador PRRO: At the time of the design a gender analysis was not conducted but during the implementation WFP sought guidance of UN Women to conduct a gender analysis. The programme was then adjusted to mainstream gender in activities and training materials
- Nicaragua CP: During implementation, with the support of Headquarters, WFP conducted an assessment of gender empowerment and gender based violence that recommended training farmers associations on how to conduct a gender needs assessment; by the time of the evaluation nine associations had conducted gender needs assessments

### **2.3 How responsive were operations to needs?**

Evaluations found operations fit for purpose and appropriately designed to respond to priority needs of food insecure populations and governments. While intended coverage and choice of activities generally addressed needs, the appropriateness of geographical targeting varied, with some evaluations finding weak grounding or use of inadequate criteria. With a few exceptions, activity level targeting and transfer modalities were found to be generally appropriate, based on robust evidence, and evaluations highlighted the benefits of cash-based transfers.

30. In line with findings from across this series, the seven operations were fit for purpose in their respective country contexts. All seven evaluations found operation objectives and overall intent to be well-aligned and designed to respond to the priority needs of food insecure populations and government needs.

31. Five evaluations<sup>50</sup> found the intended coverage of WFP appropriate for assessed needs. Two operations were partially appropriate: (i) in the Regional PRRO, needs proved to be significantly higher in Guatemala; (ii) the Haiti PRRO set figures for food assistance for assets and nutrition beneficiaries too high, considering the financial possibilities.

<sup>50</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP

32. Relevance at activity level was more consistent than in some other regions evaluated through this series. Three evaluations (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO) found the choice of individual activities to be fully appropriate to the needs of the food insecure population. Four found the choice of activities predominantly adequate but leaving the following gaps:

- Two evaluations raised concerns regarding appropriateness of activities addressed at people living with HIV/ AIDS: In Haiti PRRO, in the light of the previous PRRO's poor recovery rates, the evaluation raised questions on the appropriateness of this activity. Similarly, in the case of the Nicaragua CP, the relevance of the HIV component could not be confirmed, due to insufficient information on the adherence of people living with HIV to anti-retroviral treatment/explanatory factors.
- Two evaluations raised questions regarding nutrition activities. Whilst nutrition activities were justified by the high levels of malnutrition in Nicaragua, planning food assistance for 180 days was neither appropriate to the needs nor coherent with the objective of adequate nutrition during the first 1,000 days. The evaluation of the Honduras CP found that the lack of national programmes geared to children aged 2-5 years threatened the gains made by targeted groups (through activities focused on the first 1,000 days), particularly following exit by WFP. This raised concerns over the approach taken and suggested the need for a more coherent approach with national institutions.
- One evaluation (Haiti DEV) noted an issue with school feeding: the meal served in the middle of the morning did not solve the problem of immediate hunger of children who do not have a breakfast before arrival to school.
- One evaluation (Haiti PRRO) raised concerns regarding appropriateness of some specific emergency preparedness and response activities. It questioned the use of food contingency pre-positioned stocks in the light of food shortage in Haiti and suggested other security reserve options such as the Emergency Food Security Reserve Agency of Ethiopia.

33. Evaluations found geographical targeting to be appropriate in four operations (Cuba CP, Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Ecuador PRRO) and only partially appropriate in three operations. The following concerns emerged:

- Haiti PRRO: The selection of regions was not coherent with food security assessments and was excessively oriented toward hurricane-prone areas; a focus on the level of vulnerability to natural disaster rather than the specific type of hazard should have prevailed.
- Nicaragua CP: Geographic targeting used vulnerability data from food security data obtained five years before the start of the operation, raising validity concerns of the targeting.
- Regional PRRO: The evaluation raised several concerns over the targeting process, such as the use of different methodologies per country, government interference<sup>51</sup> and old data (i.e. census).

34. Activity level targeting is analysed in all evaluations except in that of Honduras CP. Fewer concerns are raised here than in other regions evaluated through this series,

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<sup>51</sup> The term used in the original version in Spanish of the Regional PRRO Evaluation Report is "injerencia" which is typically translated as "interference".

with targeting found appropriate in four operations,<sup>52</sup> and partially appropriate in two, as follows:

- Haiti DEV: Results and sustainability of school feeding activities were compromised due to changes in targeting of schools from one year to another with over 40 percent changing, resulting in reduced impact of actions and significant increased costs.
- Haiti PRRO: The operation selected communes for one round of food assistance for assets activities, rather than implementing successive activities in the same locations. This reduced the potential impact of asset building.

### **Box 3: Beneficiary targeting**

- Regional PRRO: the evaluation found that WFP made considerable efforts to base its decisions on evidence; for instance, during the design phase, the integrated context analysis (ICA), findings of the emergency food security assessments, and government requirements informed targeting decisions for vulnerable populations
- Haiti PRRO: In 2015, targeting of households affected by the drought in Kore Lavi areas was done using the vulnerability database, hence allowing its use during slow-onset disasters. The evaluation found that combining safety nets and emergency response proved a promising approach

35. All operations used in-kind transfers and three (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO) combined food with cash and/or vouchers. All evaluations, with the exception of the Cuba CP, discuss the appropriateness of transfer modality choice and, in common with operations in other regions assessed through this series, the majority of evaluations found positively. Four (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and the Regional PRRO) considered the transfer modality choice adequate to needs. The other two raised the following challenges:

- Nicaragua CP: Despite a pilot cash programme and feasibility study that concluded that cash-based transfers were viable, the Government only allowed WFP to use in-kind transfers.
- Haiti PRRO: The evaluation found that a combination of food and cash transfer modalities should have been implemented in extremely vulnerable communes with no access to local markets. This would have decreased beneficiary spending on transport to markets to meet basic food needs.

### **Box 4: Transfer modalities**

- Ecuador PRRO: The decision to shift from dry rations to vouchers was highly appropriate to the context and needs. Evidence indicates positive effects of vouchers on the local economy and reduction of tensions between host communities and refugees, given the lower visibility of a voucher system versus food distribution
- Regional PRRO: A range of pilots was conducted across countries in the region to ensure that conditions were in place for the successful application of cash-based transfers. The introduction of this modality is considered a major strength of the operation that has increased ownership and stimulated the interest of government counterparts and beneficiaries

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<sup>52</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.



## **QUESTION 2: What were the results of the operations?**

### **Summary findings: results**

Evaluations reflect efforts to improve monitoring and evaluation systems, yet these do not systematically collect output and outcome information. This limits visibility of results obtained by operations, including capacity-strengthening outcomes.

Results varied across operations that tended to perform better at output level than outcome, however, lack of sufficient evidence limits analysis. Evaluations report on extensive capacity-strengthening activities, generation of evidence and analysis conducted on numerous topics judged relevant to the context and needs. Operation designs often lacked a strategic vision of capacity strengthening based on robust assessments of stakeholders' strengths and weaknesses.

Evaluations reported positive outcomes on resilience building and capacity strengthening of emergency preparedness and response/disaster risk management mechanisms. Purchase for progress was also praised as a successful approach with positive results, although three evaluations called on WFP to solve the cost-efficiency challenges. All operations mainstreamed gender-sensitive activities to varying degrees and sought parity in participation. Some evaluations found promising examples of transformation of gender roles in the community.

Where assessed, evaluations judged WFP collaboration with national government agencies as excellent or good, while collaboration with United Nations agencies was mixed; it missed opportunities for greater synergies, namely in school feeding programmes. Timeliness varied with operations reporting delays on some occasions. Operations were generally cost-efficient and proved adaptive, in some cases thanks to budget flexibility. Commodities were distributed as planned and evaluations found general satisfaction with transfer modalities.

Transition processes were not systematically addressed in the operations with only three including a plan for transfer of responsibilities; only one evaluation reported effective transfer. The likelihood of sustainability was confirmed in four operations.

### **2.4 What evidence of results is available?**

Evaluations recognize on-going efforts to improve monitoring and evaluation systems and the quality of monitoring data. However, only one operation praises a solid and performing monitoring and evaluation system. Challenges on completeness and reliability of output and outcome monitoring data were common to all evaluations; concerns regarding adequacy of indicators were raised, including to capture capacity strengthening outcomes. With one exception, the extent to which monitoring data was used to inform management decisions was not apparent.

36. Evaluations in this series have found shortcomings in the WFP monitoring systems being gradually addressed over time. Findings from the operations evaluated in the Latin America and the Caribbean region reflect these findings. All seven evaluations discuss aspects related to the quality of monitoring and evaluation systems and the level of evidence available to assess the operations. Most evaluations highlighted progress made in the monitoring and evaluation systems but also identified continuing challenges with the data produced, and/or noted weaknesses in the monitoring systems themselves.

37. In Honduras, the evaluation commended the performance of the monitoring and evaluation system in the country, noting the rigour with which it's applied to monitor the operation. In addition, five evaluations (all but Ecuador PRRO and Honduras CP) highlighted the efforts and progress made by the country office and regional bureau in

improving the monitoring and evaluation systems. The following aspects received positive mention:

- Development of tools, guidelines and protocols for data collection: four evaluations<sup>53</sup>
- Re-designed monitoring and evaluation system: one evaluation (Cuba CP)
- Enhanced presence in the field and partner capacity building: one evaluation (Cuba CP)

38. Two evaluations (Haiti DEV and Nicaragua CP) found weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation systems:

- Nicaragua CP: The evaluation echoed the WFP mid-2015 internal audit, which pointed out limitations in the monitoring and evaluation system as a high risk for WFP in the country, notwithstanding limited access to official data.
- Haiti DEV: The evaluation found weaknesses in the process of data consolidation between partners and WFP system<sup>54</sup>.

39. In terms of data availability two evaluations (Haiti DEV and Nicaragua CP) showed positive examples of how country offices incorporated relevant indicators throughout the implementation of the programme to capture further results from operations. However, in all evaluations, data availability concerns were raised as follows:

- Absence of/lack of access to baseline, targets and/or regular/complete output and outcome monitoring data (for example, by sex, age, region, type of beneficiary) from field assessments and post-distribution reports: all evaluations.<sup>55</sup>
- Indicators to track progress on outcomes not adapted to the context, activity or nature of the change sought, including in capacity-strengthening activities: three evaluations (Cuba CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO). (For example, Regional PRRO: “Despite considerable investments in capacity strengthening there is no guarantee that the capacity strengthening investment is worthwhile since no evidence exists on the extent to which capacity strengthening results are being applied, nor are there indicators that measure the effects”).
- Inconsistencies between the logical framework indicators included in the project document and those of the monitoring tools (standard project report and post-distribution monitoring reports): three evaluations (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO and Nicaragua CP).
- Lack of comparable data due to varying indicators per country impeding aggregation at regional level: one evaluation (Regional PRRO).

### **Box 5: Monitoring and evaluation systems**

- Nicaragua CP: WFP has defined complementary indicators that cover agricultural productivity aspects, including: post-harvest management, access to productive assets, quality and marketing standards, risk management, institutional and organizational capacity, access to finance, gender and food/nutrition insecurity at

<sup>53</sup> Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>54</sup> COMPAS – commodity movement processing and analysis system

<sup>55</sup> Although Honduras CP evaluation praised a solid and performing M&E system, it also notes a gap in the setting of targets for two components of the operation limiting the quantitative analysis on performance at outcome level.

family level. This system of indicators is valued for its ability to analyse detailed processes and effects, thus promoting relevant project adaptation

- Honduras CP: The monitoring and evaluation system allows the country office to produce reports on food delivery at all levels - from school, health centre or community level to national consolidated level - and are validated at all levels, thus reducing the margin for error
- Regional PRRO: The evaluation praised continuous efforts to improve and harmonize monitoring and evaluation systems, which resulted in improved quality of reporting

40. Two evaluations (Haiti DEV and Regional PRRO) – fewer than in other regions evaluated through this series - raised data reliability concerns. In the case of Haiti DEV, concerns refer to the data collected through third party monitoring, while in the case of the Regional PRRO, evaluators found inconsistencies between data reported in different sources.

41. As for the utility of monitoring data, one evaluation (Haiti DEV) noted that changes incorporated in the monitoring and evaluation system allowed managers to make mid-course corrective measures. Two evaluations (Haiti PRRO and Nicaragua CP) raised the following challenges of monitoring data to support programme implementation:

- Absence of consolidated analysis of outputs and outcomes (as each was conducted by different units) limited the overall understanding of operational results. The country office adopted a new tool to enhance joint analysis, thus helping overcome fragmented results analysis: Haiti PRRO
- Lack of quality hampered the use of monitoring data for management purposes: Nicaragua CP

## 2.5 What output and outcome results have been achieved, per theme/sector?

- **General Distribution:** Operations reached targeted beneficiaries on two occasions out of three where general distribution was applied. Although outcome targets set in the project document were not attained in the three operations, progress was perceived in two evaluations.
- **Nutrition:** Two operations out of four with nutrition components reached beneficiary targets and two reached them partially. Corporate outcome indicator targets were only reached on one occasion and partially in another.
- **Education:** Output-level results were positive in three operations out of five, while two operations managed to reach target beneficiaries in the second year of implementation. Only two operations track WFP corporate outcome indicators and in both cases targets were met or almost met.
- **Livelihoods:** Four operations that implemented food assistance for assets / food assistance for training (FFA/ FFT) activities did not reach planned beneficiary targets and two had substantial output data gaps. Only one evaluation reported partially on WFP corporate indicators; it could not reach a conclusion on explanatory factors of food consumption score and dietary diversity score outcomes.

42. All operations contained multiple components (Table 1, above). Results varied across operations, with a tendency to perform better at output level than outcome, however lack of sufficient evidence limits analysis. Achievement of beneficiary targets

varied significantly across the operations. Four operations (Haiti DEV, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO) reached, or nearly reached, beneficiary targets. Two operations (Cuba CP and Ecuador PRRO) met beneficiary targets in some of their activities and one evaluation (Haiti PRRO) fell short of targets in all components. Reasons given for underperformance are delays in launching activities, pipeline breaks, underfunding of operations and lengthy government procedures.

43. Results against activity areas were as follows:

### **General Distribution**

44. Three PRROs (Haiti PRRO, Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO) implemented general distribution activities over the evaluation period with evaluations reporting the following effects:

45. **Output results:** General distribution is highly dependent on contextual factors and in two cases (Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO) beneficiary targets were reached. In the case of Haiti PRRO, general distributions aimed to assist people in anticipation of major natural hazards, but these did not take place. This resulted, in a drastic reduction (down to 38 percent of planned beneficiaries) of general distributions.

46. **Outcome results:** Corporate indicators food consumption score (FCS) and dietary diversity score (DDS) were not met in the three evaluations; the Regional PRRO evaluation raised reliability concerns of the outcome data. However, the evaluation of the Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO qualitative data collected suggested progress was made in terms of increased food consumption, diet diversification and decreased negative coping strategies.

### **Nutrition**

47. WFP planned nutrition interventions in four operations.<sup>56</sup> For the Nicaragua CP, a two-year delayed start of activities occurred as a result of changes at the Government's implementing agency. Three out of four operations<sup>57</sup> planned to address needs of HIV patients with implementation in two cases (Haiti PRRO and Honduras CP).

48. **Output results:** Two of four operations that implemented nutrition activities (Honduras PRRO and Nicaragua CP) reached and exceeded beneficiary targets. The Honduras PRRO, aided by increased donor support, reached over 200 percent of planned beneficiaries. Two evaluations partially reached the targets: (i) regarding moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) treatment, Haiti PRRO performed better reaching U-2 children (80 percent of planned) than pregnant and lactating women (PLW) (30 percent) during the first year, but while pregnant and lactating women results improved in the second year (40 percent), U-2 dropped drastically to 7 percent.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the Cuba CP, anaemia prevention activities for U-2 children reached targets set, as were targets for pregnant and lactating women during the first year of implementation; for the latter, beneficiaries dropped to 21 percent in the second year with no reasons provided in the evaluation.

49. **Outcome results:** The Honduras CP met all WFP corporate targets set. Each of the other three operations that implemented nutrition activities did not meet targets:

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<sup>56</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>57</sup> Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>58</sup> The evaluation is not conclusive on the reasons for these results but suggests that interruption of MAM treatment by one cooperating partner or caretakers' lack of motivation to walk long distances and inability to buy prescribed medicines as potential explaining factors.

one mid-term evaluation (Cuba CP) reported modest progress towards prevalence of anemia targets half way through the implementation of the programme; one evaluation (Haiti PRRO) reported varying results with first year implementation reaching all targets, while second year performance worsened particularly on recovery and non-response rates; and one evaluation (Nicaragua CP) could not report on corporate indicators due to lack of information. However, mothers consulted did report higher milk production and greater satisfaction of nursing children during periods of ration distribution (they also reported greater weight recovery as a result of consuming the ration).

### **Education (School feeding)**

50. School feeding was implemented in five operations with the following results:

51. **Output results:** Output-level achievement was positive in three operations (Haiti DEV, Ecuador PRRO and Nicaragua CP) with WFP meeting or exceeding beneficiary targets. In two operations (Cuba CP and Honduras CP), WFP did not meet targets in the first year of implementation, due to delayed start of activities, but fully met targets in the second year. In addition, the Nicaragua CP evaluation reported the following outputs: creation of school gardens, distribution of toolkits and seeds and training in vegetable cultivation.

52. **Outcome results:** Three operations (Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP) report on WFP corporate indicators linked to school feeding activities. In all cases targets were met or almost met. In one case (Haiti DEV), quantitative indicators were not produced but the evaluation nevertheless captured qualitative information indicating the operation contributed to retention and attendance of children to school and beneficiaries highly valued school meals, as many children do not have breakfast in the morning. In the case of Cuba CP, WFP corporate indicators were not pursued nor set in the project document.

### **Box 6: Home- grown school feeding**

**Ecuador PRRO:** A pilot home-grown school feeding project was launched in Putumayo and the evaluation found that it allowed parents of schoolchildren to plant and harvest vegetables for self-consumption. The production was also used to supply food to the schools and parents receive vouchers in exchange, which they could use to purchase food in local shops. The model was considered successful and was expanded throughout the other schools in *Sucumbíos*

### **Livelihoods (Food assistance for assets/food assistance for training)**

53. Five<sup>59</sup> out of seven operations planned FFA/FFT activities. The Nicaragua CP's activities were not implemented due to lack of agreement with the Government.

54. **Output results:** Out of the four operations that implemented FFA/FFT activities, none reached planned beneficiary targets. The Regional PRRO performed well with 85 percent of planned beneficiaries reached. Honduras CP, after reporting only 40 percent achievement in the first year (this due to government cooperating partners' lack of resources), managed to exceed its target in the second year. Two evaluations presented data limitations: during the first two years of the Ecuador PRRO beneficiary data were not reported, while in the third and fourth years the operation reached an

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<sup>59</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO

average of 60 percent of planned beneficiaries. The Haiti PRRO evaluation found unreliable output data with major differences in beneficiary data depending on the sources, which in any case reported results below 40 percent of planned targets.

**55. Outcome results:** One of four operations that implemented FFA/FFT activities partially reported on WFP corporate indicators: Haiti PRRO evaluation presented food consumption scores and dietary diversity scores, but could not reach conclusions on factors explaining changes. All four evaluations provide a description of contribution to resilience-building objectives (see section 2.6.2 Results in resilience-building).

## 2.6 What other results have been generated, beyond WFP standard indicators?

Evaluations reflect strong investment made by WFP on capacity strengthening of national authorities at central and decentralized levels and in communities. Evaluations also report on extensive capacity-development activities, generation of evidence and analysis conducted on numerous subjects judged relevant to the context and needs. Yet WFP frequently lacked a strategic vision of capacity strengthening based on robust assessments of stakeholders' strengths and weaknesses. Four evaluations where FFA/FFT activities were applied report positive outcomes on resilience building and two out of three with emergency preparedness and response/disaster risk management activities show successful examples of effective emergency management following support from WFP. Purchase for progress is also praised as a successful approach with positive results, although three evaluations called on WFP to solve the cost-efficiency challenges.

### 2.6.1 Improving policy environments<sup>60</sup>

56. Given generally strong policy frameworks for food security and nutrition in the region, only the Haiti DEV evaluation identified contributions to enhancing national policy environments with the following results: drafting of a policy framework for the formulation of a school feeding policy, draft legislation for the creation and organization of the national programme of school meals, and drafting of a note on institutional anchoring. Despite these relevant contributions, policy objectives set in the design of the programme (development of a national school feeding policy, legal status of the national programme of school meals, and minimum standards for the operation of canteens) were not achieved.

### 2.6.2 Building national capacities

57. All seven evaluations record improvements in national capacities arising from WFP support to governments and communities. Table 2 contains results by sector.

**Table 2: Capacity strengthening results**

Sector	Contribution/Country
<i>Food and Nutrition analysis</i>	Food security assessments (Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO) Context and trend analysis, vulnerability analysis, including Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) and targeting of vulnerable (Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO)

<sup>60</sup> Policy development

	Food security and nutrition monitoring (Haiti PRRO and Honduras CP)
<i>Resilience building</i>	Sustainable agroforestry techniques (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP) Rehabilitation of watersheds (Ecuador PRRO)
<i>Emergency preparedness and response /disaster risk management</i>	Emergency preparedness and response plans and contingency plans including to droughts (Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO) Inclusion of food security analysis into disaster risk management tools (Cuba CP and Haiti PRRO) Damage assessment needs assessment (Regional PRRO) Georeferential Realtime Acquisition of Statistics Platform (Regional PRRO) Inclusion of emergency response management tools into national programmes (Regional PRRO) Reinforcement of national prevention and mitigation system (Regional PRRO) Pre-positioning of food (Cuba)
<i>Local production</i>	Support to local farmers' associations, including women's associations (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Nicaragua CP) Value chain (Cuba CP) Use of certified seeds (Cuba CP)
<i>Nutrition</i>	Support to the development of networks of health security at community level (Honduras CP) Training on nutrition strategies (Cuba CP) Design and implementation of nutrition programmes (Nicaragua CP) Prevention of anaemia (Cuba CP) Healthy nutrition, cooking and childcare (Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP)
<i>School Feeding</i>	Management of school feeding programmes (Cuba CP and Nicaragua CP) Technical assistance for implementation of SABER (Cuba CP and Haiti DEV) Health, nutrition, hygiene and food diversification (Ecuador CP and Honduras PRRO)
<i>Food distribution, commodity management and supply chain</i>	Improved food distribution modalities, commodity management and supply chains in school feeding (Nicaragua CP) and nutrition (Honduras and Nicaragua CPs)

58. Notwithstanding results described above, evaluations still found weaknesses and missed opportunities in capacity-strengthening work, such as:

- Cuba CP: Evaluation found a missed opportunity to strengthen the gender approach in vulnerability-to-drought analysis tools.
- Haiti DEV: Despite a strong capacity-strengthening focus, the evaluation noted that objectives were not met on institutional and coordination capacities, design and implementation of programmes and participation of communities in school feeding programmes.
- Haiti PRRO: There was no specific capacity building of government technical services for quality and technical standards pursuant to assets built through FFA/FFT activities. Regarding capacity strengthening for the national targeting of vulnerability system and stunting prevention, the evaluation found insufficient institutional anchoring and ownership by the Government, risking sustainability of results.
- Nicaragua CP: Just one training conducted on school gardens did not result in effective learning of planting and growing vegetables.
- Regional PRRO: Governments lacked knowledge of how to move from emergency response to recovery phases. The evaluation urged WFP to strengthen capacities to ensure sustainability of emergency preparedness and response oriented activities.

59. Despite the strong focus on capacity-strengthening objectives in all seven operations,<sup>61</sup> only two (Cuba CP and Haiti DEV) based their design on assessments of national capacities. WFP frequently lacked a strategic vision of objectives based on robust assessments of stakeholders' strengths and weaknesses.

### **Box 7: Capacity strengthening**

- Nicaragua CP: Logistics and supply chain technical assistance for the Ministry of Education partner, the *Programa Integral de Nutrición Escolar* (PINE), started in 2010. It contributed to the PINE's high quality performance on planning quarterly distributions to schools and contracting transportation for food to schools
- Cuba CP: Multi-sectoral coordination mechanisms were established which increased the multi-dimensional understanding of food security in disaster risk management and social protection programmes
- Haiti PRRO: WFP capacity-strengthening activities produced significant improvements in the capacity of the national agency for food security<sup>62</sup> to assess and monitor the food security situation. In addition, a national agency<sup>63</sup> staff member in charge of emergency preparedness and response was trained on needs assessment and targeting, received equipment to improve the DPC's telecommunication capacity and the early warning system's efficiency, resulting in data on disasters and their consequences reaching decision-makers twice as fast as in the past

### **2.6.3 Results in evidence generation**

60. Evaluations commended WFP support to national agencies in the generation of food security evidence and analysis in six operations (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti

<sup>61</sup> In Haiti PRRO, a comparison of the current operation with the previous one shows an increase of capacity strengthening investment from UD 836,500 to USD 4.7 million.

<sup>62</sup> The National Council for Food security - *Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire* (CNSA)

<sup>63</sup> The Civil Protection Directorate - *Direction de la Protection Civile* (DPC)



DEV, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Regional PRRO) on issues such use of cash and voucher transfers, food security and vulnerability analysis.

**Box 8: Evidence generation**

- In Ecuador, a joint study conducted with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on the use of cash and vouchers informed a decision to introduce cash based transfers in the programme
- In Haiti through the PRRO, WFP supported the Government’s capacities to conduct the Integrated Phase Classification and the Food Security Assessment studies
- In Cuba and Honduras, the operation contributed to integrating food security into vulnerability studies conducted by the governments
- In Central America, through the Regional EMOP, WFP conducted a joint study with International Organization of Migration (IOM) to understand the relation between migration, violence and food insecurity

**2.6.4 Results in resilience building and emergency preparedness and response /disaster risk management (EPR/DRM)**

61. Four evaluations of operations that identified resilience objectives captured results produced by FFA/FFT and capacity building activities.<sup>64</sup> As reported above, one operation (Nicaragua CP) did not implement intended resilience-building activities (FFA/FFT) due to lack of agreement with the Government.

**Table 3: Resilience-building results**

<b>Results</b>	<b>Evaluation</b>
Use and replication of ecological agroforestry production techniques	Honduras CP
Use of ecological stoves and reduction of firewood use up to 40%	Honduras CP
Adaptation of community development plans to avoid areas prone to landslide and flooding	Honduras CP
Local governments have incorporated elements of agroforestry and resilience to climate change and committees of resilience to climate change have been formed	Honduras CP
Water volume and quality increased after rehabilitation of watersheds, with positive implications for local residents, beneficiaries and for people in more remote areas receiving indirect benefits	Ecuador PRRO
Social cohesion within communities and between refugee and host communities	Ecuador PRRO Haiti PRRO
Higher investment in education, clothes, food, funerals and small livestock thanks to cash earned. Also stimulation of local markets.	Haiti PRRO
Rise of aquifers in areas prone to droughts	Haiti PRRO

<sup>64</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Regional PRRO.

Stone and plant barriers have helped to reduce soil erosion, preserving topsoil and improving access to land	Haiti PRRO
P4P, school feeding and nutrition activities contribute to increased resilience of beneficiaries	Regional PRRO

62. From three evaluations focused on EPR/DRM activities, two report the following results:

- Cuba CP: Pre-positioning of food in early 2016 allowed for a timely and efficient response to Hurricane Matthew, which was highly appreciated by the Government. Support to integrated drought-management activities is considered highly relevant but experienced some delays, making it too early to appreciate results.
- Haiti PRRO: The 2014 national disaster preparedness capacity index exercise, confirmed that national agencies for emergency preparedness and response were operational, even if national policies and procedures were not yet official, and highlighted the capacity of these agencies to coordinate actions with partners. The floods in the north in November 2014 confirmed the capacity of the Government to respond to disasters and coordinate actions with partners.

### 2.6.5 Results in local purchase

63. With the exception of the Haiti PRRO, all evaluations planned to purchase local food either through a P4P component of the operation or through another local/regional procurement programme in the country. One of them (Cuba CP) had not started activities due to an in-kind donation from Brazil and ongoing discussions with the Government on the approach. Another operation (Honduras CP) was not able to create synergies between the operation and the P4P programme due to lack of geographic convergence. The other four operations (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO) successfully introduced locally produced food into operations' activities, with Haiti DEV and Nicaragua reporting 37 percent and 82 percent respectively of the operation's share of local purchase. All four evaluations describe the positive effects of local purchase on local producers and economies. Evaluations raised the following aspects for future improvement:

- Regional PRRO: Enhanced medium-term joint planning with local producer organisations to consolidate partnership for supply of food in the recovery phase.
- Cost-efficiency criterion challenge: Three evaluations (Haiti DEV, Honduras CP -attempting to introduce local purchase - and Nicaragua CP) raised the issue of higher costs of locally produced products and encouraged WFP to solve the contradiction between purchasing at the lowest price with prioritising local production, even at higher cost. The Nicaragua CP evaluation notes that "Applying fully competitive process rules to small farmers could discourage them from participating in the buying processes"

## 2.7 Gender, protection and accountability to affected populations

All operations mainstreamed gender-sensitive activities to varying degrees and sought parity in participation. Some evaluations found good examples of transformation of gender roles in the community. Operations did not systematically report on protection outcomes;

only two evaluations noted positive results. Accountability to affected populations indicators are only reported in two operations, one of them partially meeting targets. Only three of seven evaluations refer to the existence of complaint mechanisms.

64. **Gender:** All operations report on participant results disaggregated by sex and all report achieving parity targets. While all operations emphasize participation, the region is notable for more transformational results emerging, with four operations (Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO) reporting on gender empowerment results as follows:

- Two evaluations reported progress on decision-making: (i) the Honduras CP resulted in enhanced decision-making of women in committees, enhanced involvement in commodity management tasks, and enhanced roles as community representatives; it also reported an improved perception of the role of men in caring for and feeding the family. (ii) within the regional PRRO, regarding decision-making over the use of cash, vouchers, or food, goals have been achieved in Guatemala and Honduras and exceeded in El Salvador, however no data is available for Nicaragua.
- Two evaluations noted progress regarding economic empowerment: Nicaragua CP and Ecuador PRRO promoted economic development and social integration of women through creation/promotion of women's producer groups.

65. **Protection:** Three evaluations (Haiti PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO), included WFP corporate indicators in the design of the operation with two reporting on them: (i) Haiti PRRO met or almost met targets set and (ii) the Regional PRRO evaluation reported positive results attaining targets in Guatemala and Honduras, partially attained in El Salvador and not tracked in Nicaragua. Four operations (Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV and Honduras CP) do not include WFP corporate indicators on protection.

**Accountability to affected populations (AAP):** Three evaluations (Ecuador PRRO, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO) noted the existence of complaint mechanisms and two of them report on WFP corporate indicators: Haiti PRRO did not meet targets and Regional PRRO partially met targets in the case of Guatemala and Honduras, falling behind target in El Salvador, while Nicaragua failed to track the indicator. Three evaluations (Cuba CP, Haiti DEV and Honduras CP) did not discuss the issue of accountability to affected populations.

### **Box 9: Accountability to affected populations**

Haiti PRRO: Although corporate indicators on accountability to affected populations were not met, the proportion of beneficiaries informed about the programme and about the mechanisms in place to voice complaints improved in 2015. In addition, WFP established an anonymous complaint mechanism for the social protection database whereby community members can report abuse or erroneous targeting at any time. This mechanism is reported to have reduced inclusion errors and exclusion errors

## **2.8 WFP partnerships**

Where WFP implemented operations jointly with government agencies, evaluations typically praised the collaboration, highlighting strong partnership as a success factor of the operation. Collaboration with United Nations agencies was mixed, with most evaluations

indicating that potential synergy was not attained as planned, namely in school feeding programmes. Two evaluations showed examples of positive synergies.

**66. Government partners:** Five out of seven evaluations<sup>65</sup> assessed synergies between WFP and government partners during implementation of operations. All five praised the collaboration in operations, which were jointly implemented with government agencies and in three cases<sup>66</sup> highlighted the strong partnership as a success factor of the operation. The Haiti DEV also notes that the operational limitations of government partners reduced appropriateness of targeting and the effectiveness of the school feeding activities.

### **Box 10: Collaboration with governments**

Ecuador PRRO: The high degree of collaboration achieved between various entities and actors contributed to the development of school feeding activities. The local government together with the producers make a detailed list of each product, its value and status. Prices and products are negotiated each year. Local government and WFP collaborate with teachers to develop a menu for each school. WFP transfers funds to the local government and it pays farmers. Local government also provides necessary infrastructure and kitchen equipment to schools that do not have it. This strong and constant collaboration has been an essential factor for the effectiveness and efficiency of the process of obtaining quality food and in adequate quantities.

**67. United Nations partners:** With the exception of the Regional PRRO, evaluations assessed the relations between WFP and United Nations agencies. Findings reflect the wider inconsistency reflected throughout this series. Two evaluations (Cuba CP and Ecuador PRRO) found that positive synergies, in particular with UNHCR, reinforced an integral approach in the coverage of refugee needs in Colombia and through a jointly implemented programme on disaster risk management with UNDP and UNICEF in the case of the Cuba CP. Four evaluations out of six<sup>67</sup> found that, despite the potential for synergies, these did not materialize as planned and indicated the following gaps:

- Essential package of services to schools: Three evaluations<sup>68</sup> describe the lack of agreement with UNICEF and FAO for this purpose, noting a lack of geographical convergence as one of the reasons in the case of Haiti DEV and Nicaragua CP.
- School gardens: potential synergies with FAO activities for the development of vegetable growing at the family and community levels were not exploited (Nicaragua CP).
- Nutrition: The Haiti PRRO evaluation notes that complementarities between the PRRO and UNICEF could not be established due to a lack of geographic convergence.
- Resilience building: An agreement was reached with FAO to work together on resilience-building activities but lack of funding prevented this collaboration from materializing. (Haiti PRRO).

<sup>65</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>66</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>67</sup> Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>68</sup> Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

## 2.9 Efficiency and agility in implementation

Operations' timeliness varied across the sample with three performing well; but delays occurring due to different reasons such as pipeline breaks or procurement delays. All operations were found to be fully or partially cost-efficient and some evaluations praised a shift to cash-based approaches as a contributing factor. Evaluations noted that all operations had a good adaptive capacity and some pointed to budget flexibility as an element supporting flexible management. Commodities were delivered as planned in terms of frequency and quantity in half of the operations, and beneficiaries generally showed acceptance and satisfaction with the chosen transfer modality.

68. All seven evaluations addressed the timeliness of the operation. Three<sup>69</sup> found the operation's activities to be timely and inputs delivered without delays, evidence of a well functioning of supply chain. One evaluation (Haiti PRRO) indicated that one component (general distributions) was timely and that WFP in coordination with other actors on the ground speedily delivered cooking utensils, stoves and fuel to families in order to prepare the food. Challenges that resulted in delays of the activities included:

- Delays in transferring cash to beneficiaries (Haiti PRRO)
- Slow planning processes with government institutions (Cuba CP)
- Delays in purchase of irrigation schemes (Cuba CP)
- Inadequate timeliness in charging with credit-coded cards for food purchase (Ecuador PRRO).

69. Among the effects reported were: interruptions of food delivered to schools of up to ten days (Haiti DEV); lenders increasing loan rates (Haiti PRRO); increase from 10 to 25 percent of beneficiaries waiting more than five hours to receive food (Haiti PRRO); and yields/production affected by drought (Cuba).

70. All seven evaluations discussed the cost-efficiency of operations. Three found that operations were overall cost-efficient (Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Ecuador PRRO). Three found that operations were partly cost-efficient (Cuba CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO) and one was not found to be cost-efficient (Haiti PRRO). Some challenges were noted, such as:

- Local purchase resulting in higher costs (Haiti DEV, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP)
- Burdens of centralised purchase system (Cuba CP and Nicaragua CP)
- Inaccurate needs assessments and budget forecasts (Haiti PRRO)
- Staff turnover at municipal level resulting in delays in decision-making and allocation of resources (Ecuador PRRO)
- Covering structure costs during a period without programme activities due to delays in the start of operation compromising cost-effectiveness in Nicaragua (Regional PRRO).

71. Evaluations also noted efforts to improve cost-efficiency including: a shift to cash and voucher modalities (Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO); government-led reorganisation of targeted schools, resulting in more children served per school

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<sup>69</sup> Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and the Regional PRRO.

(Ecuador PRRO) and highly competent staff including on technical and logistical issues, as well as in capacity to mobilise resources (Nicaragua CP).

72. With the exception of Cuba CP, evaluations comment on the adaptive capacity of WFP. In common with wider findings from the series, all six praise the country office and regional bureau capacity to adapt to changes in context and needs. Budget flexibility is noted in two evaluations (Ecuador PRRO and Nicaragua CP) as a factor contributing to the adaptability of the operations. This is reflected in the significant use of budget revisions as a tool for adaptation with five such revisions in the case of Ecuador and four in the case Nicaragua.

### **Box 11: Adaptive capacity**

- Honduras CP: The evaluation found a good balance between flexibility and rigidity with the operation applying WFP norms and procedures but with the sufficient flexibility to adapt to community specific needs and partners capacities
- Ecuador PRRO: The use of vouchers was not suitable due to lack of foodstuffs in markets, the operation used mobile selling points to convey food baskets to beneficiaries.
- Regional PRRO: The response was designed flexibly and allowed for different combinations of activities and modalities, so that the specific needs of the country could be addressed. For example, the operation has undergone a rapid shift from in-kind to cash-based transfer modality with an increase of 23 percent of target beneficiaries in 2013 to 77 percent in 2015, with implications for many units in WFP, to which the organisation has responded with agility

73. **Beneficiary entitlements:** Six evaluations (all but Cuba CP), analysed beneficiary entitlements, with varying results: Three evaluations<sup>70</sup> report that operations delivered commodities as planned in terms of frequency and quantity; three<sup>71</sup> report reductions in the number of distributions of food and cash to beneficiaries due to pipeline breaks and delays on cash distributions. In the case of Nicaragua CP, the latter only affected nutrition activities but not school feeding, where distributions occurred as planned. The Cuba CP evaluation, despite describing factors affecting food distributions which resulted in delays, did not analyse the extent to which these affected beneficiary entitlements.

74. **Transfer modalities:** In evaluations of operations that planned and implemented cash and vouchers, two of three (Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO) found that beneficiaries appreciated that modality and described positive effects, such as stimulation of local markets, freedom of choice of purchase and contribution to creation of safety nets. One evaluation (Haiti PRRO) found that most beneficiaries preferred cash to food; those in extremely poor communes where markets are poorly developed preferred to receive a mix of food and cash.

75. **In-kind transfers:** These were used in all seven operations and six evaluations (excepting Cuba CP) <sup>72</sup> addressed the satisfaction of beneficiaries with food distributed. All indicated that food was adapted to local consumption needs and generally well accepted. Two evaluations (Ecuador PRRO and Haiti DEV) raised food

<sup>70</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Haiti PRRO

<sup>71</sup> Haiti DEV, Nicaragua CP and Regional EMOP

<sup>72</sup> The evaluation of the Cuba CP refers to a satisfaction survey conducted in 2016 among PLW assisted by the programme and notes that 90% of them consumed the SuperCereal distributed. However, no analysis is conducted by the evaluators on the satisfaction and acceptability of the food distributed by the programme to beneficiaries.

preparation challenges, while one (Haiti PRRO) noted discontent with the flavour of the rice after cooking.

### **Box 12: SMART system**

The Ecuador PRRO developed and implemented the use of a pre-paid barcoded card - an online system to monitor transfers, prices and consumption patterns. The system specifies the type of products that can be purchased and excludes banned products (such as alcohol, tobacco, sweets, cookies, etc.) from the list of those that can be entered with the barcode. WFP staff regularly monitor prices of products at points of sale and in the market to ensure that the market is not being affected and that the user of the card pays a fair price. The barcoded card has been appropriate and is very successful, since it allows the beneficiaries to choose their own food, reduces tensions with the host population (since the card is less visible than the food distribution) and strengthens local production, reducing the logistical work of WFP and implementing partners

### **2.10 Sustainability/transition**

Transition processes are not systematically addressed in the operations, with only three including a plan for transfer of responsibilities; only one evaluation reported effective transfer. The likelihood of sustainability is also variable across the sample and is highly dependent on a government's commitment, capacity and the extent to which activities are sufficiently anchored in national programmes. Four evaluations assessed full or partial sustainability of activities and three evaluations noted that results' trends are not likely to continue if WFP withdraws assistance on account of government partners' weak technical and financial capacities.

76. In line with wider findings from this series, evaluations reflect that transition processes are not systematically considered in the operation's design or in the evaluations themselves:

- Three operations planned a progressive transition plan in different areas: Nicaragua CP regarding nutrition activities, and Ecuador PRRO and Haiti DEV regarding school feeding activities. One of them (Ecuador PRRO), in one region, developed and implemented an effective transfer of school feeding activities to the government. Haiti DEV did not develop the foreseen transition plan due to the lack of progress in development of a national policy and institutional framework for school feeding. Nicaragua CP evaluation did address the results of the operation regarding this objective.
- Two operations did not foresee transition plans: In the Haiti PRRO, a handover process was not foreseen and the evaluation questions the capacity of the Government to take over in the case of the vulnerability targeting system. Although a handover strategy was not foreseen, the Regional PRRO evaluation found that governments progressively took over emergency preparedness and response activities.
- The Cuba CP and Honduras CP evaluations did not assess how transition issues were considered and approached in the operations, although Honduras CP did include it as a theme in the recommendations.

77. Likelihood of sustainability also varied across the sample and is highly dependent on a government's commitment, capacity and the extent to which activities are sufficiently anchored in national programmes. For example:

- Two evaluations (Cuba CP and Nicaragua CP) found that the sustainability of operations is likely to occur thanks to the existing commitment of governments with social protection programmes and strong capacities.
- Evaluations of three operations<sup>73</sup> found that the activities and results obtained are not likely to continue if WFP withdraws assistance. Government partners' weak technical and financial capacities are factors most commonly raised, limiting continuity of operations.
- Two evaluations found sustainability of operations' activities likely to be partially attained: the Ecuador PRRO evaluation found that the Government will need further support from WFP and other actors to attain full social and economic integration of the refugee population in Ecuador, while school feeding activities will be sustainable thanks to the progressive integration of students into the strong national school feeding programme. The evaluation of Honduras CP considered that school feeding and nutrition activities are likely to be sustainable, while resilience-oriented agroforestry activities do not receive sufficient government financial support.

### QUESTION 3: What factors affected the results?

#### Summary findings: factors

External factors affecting results included climate change effects such as *El Niño* drought and Hurricane Matthew, security and access challenges, funding constraints and government partners' capacity gaps, including technical and financial. Evaluations noted some positive external effects such as a conducive political environment and effective fundraising.

Positive internal factors include the support from the regional bureau, fruitful coordination and collaboration with national stakeholders, good community engagement and professionalism of WFP staff. Internal factors limiting results included insufficient staff allocated to the operation and/or high turnover, poor commodity management and lack of internal synergies.

#### 2.11 Internal and external factors

78. Evaluations identify a combination of internal and external factors which affected results. External factors included:

- The external environment. These include climate change effects such as *El Niño* droughts and Hurricane Matthew (raised in four operations),<sup>74</sup> security and problems of access (two operations),<sup>75</sup> teachers' strikes (two operations),<sup>76</sup> cumbersome national logistical procedures (two operations).<sup>77</sup>
- Funding-related efforts.: Evaluations of the Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO highlight effective fundraising based on a regional approach as a contribution to the operations' results, and note in the case of Nicaragua the positive participation of the private sector and government in the operation's funding. Funding of operations in Haiti show better financial coverage of DEV - focused on school feeding - with satisfactory funding (71 percent), although effective

<sup>73</sup> Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO

<sup>74</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>75</sup> Haiti DEV and Regional PRRO.

<sup>76</sup> Haiti DEV and Honduras CP.

<sup>77</sup> Cuba CP and Nicaragua CP.



transfer of funds occurred very slowly with only 1 percent of requirements transferred the first year, resulting in a late start of activities. The PRRO funding constraints (50 percent of funding requirements were obtained) resulted in the suspension of disaster risk reduction/resilience and HIV/TB related activities.

- National capacity. Two evaluations, in Ecuador and Nicaragua, highlighted the policy framework as a contributing factor to the development of the operation, although in the case of Nicaragua, the same factor is referred as a challenge at times. Four operations<sup>78</sup> were constrained by national government partners' technical and financial capacity gaps.

79. Internal factors included positive and negative factors. Positive factors most frequently raised were:

- Support from regional bureau: Five evaluations<sup>79</sup> highlight the positive role played by the Panama Regional Bureau, which included guidance during design phase, technical support for sector specific and transfer modality aspects, outreach efforts to potential donors, capacity strengthening through workshops, visibility of WFP positioning and work in the region, support to enhance country offices' monitoring and evaluation systems, including development of tools and quality assurance processes.
- Coordination/engagement with governments: Four evaluations found an excellent or good coordination and communication with national governments, including wide consultation processes, joint programming and implementation.
- Good community approach and engagement: Evaluations of three operations<sup>80</sup> commend the ability of WFP to strongly engage with communities, the use of participatory approaches and capacity to adapt to context specificities.
- The professionalism of WFP: Two evaluations<sup>81</sup> praise WFP credibility in the country and the region and two evaluations<sup>82</sup> highlight WFP staff quality and technical capacities as important factors influencing operational results.

80. Although evaluations tend to highlight more positive internal factors, some negative were also noted such as: insufficient staff allocated to the operation and/or high turnover (three evaluations),<sup>83</sup> poor commodity management (two evaluations)<sup>84</sup> and lack of internal synergies (two evaluations).<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO, Honduras CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>79</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>80</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>81</sup> Honduras CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>82</sup> Cuba CP and Ecuador PRRO.

<sup>83</sup> Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV and Haiti PRRO.

<sup>84</sup> Haiti DEV and Haiti PRRO.

<sup>85</sup> Haiti DEV and Nicaragua.

### 3. EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS

81. Over the period 2013-2017, evaluations presented WFP country offices and regional bureau with a series of recommendations for improvement. The most frequently occurring themes are shown in Table 4. In six evaluations,<sup>86</sup> all recommendations were accepted or partially accepted by the country offices and the regional bureau. In one evaluation in Honduras one sub-recommendation was not accepted.

**Table 4: Evaluation recommendations**

1. Improve monitoring and evaluation/information management systems	Five evaluations <sup>87</sup>
2. Increase efforts on capacity strengthening of national stakeholders and cooperating partners as relevant in each case	Four evaluations <sup>88</sup>
3. Enhance internal synergies and complementarities at activity-level, including geographic convergence and/or external synergies with other key stakeholders to improve resilience building results	Four evaluations <sup>89</sup>
4. Enhance sustainability of operational results including financially and/or prepare transition processes to national institutions	Four evaluations <sup>90</sup>
5. Enhance assessment of vulnerabilities, food security and livelihood opportunities to track evolution of context and inform future decisions	Four evaluations <sup>91</sup>
6. Improve gender analysis and programming, in accordance with the WFP gender policy, to address inequality and gender bias	Three evaluations <sup>92</sup>

82. In addition to the themes reflected in Table 4, the following themes were raised twice: (i) enhance the resilience approach of food assistance for assets activities, (ii) support the development of social protection policies, (iii) capitalize and foster lessons learned from pilot/innovation projects, (iv) strengthen human resources of the operation, (v) improve efficiency of operations and (vi) improve food ration (composition or frequency).

83. Aside from the most recurrent theme on the need to improve monitoring and evaluation systems, recommendations focus on strategic dimensions of the operations, calling to reinforce the enabling role of WFP in strengthening capacities, reinforcing analysis and exploring ways to support the technical and financial sustainability of interventions under the leadership of governments. The need to enhance an operation's design with more integrated approaches that maximize resilience results was also a recurrent theme across four evaluations.

<sup>86</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>87</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Haiti DEV, Haiti PRRO and Regional PRRO.

<sup>88</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO, Honduras CP and Nicaragua CP.

<sup>89</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti DEV, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>90</sup> Haiti DEV, Honduras CP, Nicaragua CP and Regional PRRO.

<sup>91</sup> Cuba CP, Ecuador PRRO and Regional PRRO.

<sup>92</sup> Cuba CP, Haiti PRRO and Honduras CP.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS<sup>93</sup>

84. WFP has achieved strategic positioning in middle-income countries. WFP has adapted its role and institutional profile to the specific context and challenges of middle-income countries concerned by the operations evaluated, some of which present strong political leadership, highly centralized administrations and robust national policies. Operations' designs reflect the transition from a predominately 'project delivery' agency towards an enabling role, where WFP seeks to make the most of its added value, striving to strengthen national capacities in technical areas where WFP credibility and expertise are well recognized in the region.

85. WFP works hand in hand with national governments. A key element in the shift towards an enhanced upstream role has been the construction of strong partnerships with governments, frequently building on longstanding collaboration, good understanding of national priorities and clear role-definition. Benefitting from conducive political environments, WFP has aimed to channel its direct implementation activities through national social protection policies and frameworks, thus contributing directly to the realisation of nationally settled and owned objectives, through joint planning and implementation.

86. Evaluations showed the extensive capacity-strengthening investments of WFP in national priority areas fighting chronic food and nutrition insecurity and reinforcing national EPR/DRM systems in a hazard-prone region. However, operations frequently lacked a strategic vision of objectives based on robust assessments of partners' strengths and weaknesses. With the exception of Haiti, and given existing strong food security and nutrition policy frameworks in the region, WFP has not explicitly targeted improvements to institutional and legislative frameworks, though its activities work in support of refining these.

87. There has been limited visibility of results. Despite generally appropriate and balanced combinations of activities adapted to specific contexts, evaluations showed limited capacity to measure and report on results, partially due to incomplete collection of output and outcome data and lack of adequate frameworks to collect results of capacity strengthening. Some country offices have shown initiative to adapt outcome indicators to the operation's specific characteristics, and some important outcomes such as response to Hurricane Matthew in Cuba were reported; but overall, the current situation hinders the ability of WFP to demonstrate the impact of its work and requires increased efforts to improve and adapt monitoring and evaluation systems.

88. Markets are supported through transfer modalities and local purchase. Based on robust results from pilot exercises, studies and technical expertise, WFP has initiated the introduction of relevant transfer modalities to support social programmes with positive results, in particular cash-based transfers and vouchers. In contexts with strong markets and high potential for further development of local production WFP has, by enhancing internal synergies of operations, adequately supported local purchase, expanding the impact of interventions toward small producers.

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<sup>93</sup> As noted in the methodology section, EMOPs and trust funds are not included in the sample of operations evaluated and evidence arises from seven operations evaluations four of which are mid-term evaluations. Therefore, although themes identified may have wider relevance, they cannot be extrapolated to the WFP wider portfolio. Nonetheless, the breadth and depth of the information presented in this synthesis constitutes a relevant, and hopefully useful, evidence base to inform the Integrated RoadMap and country strategic planning processes in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

89. Some design flaws limit results. Evaluations show that approach to resilience/FFA/FFT activities and transition aspects were not always integrated in operations' designs. In the first case, opportunities to create impact were missed due to inadequate planning of activities adapted to the long-term nature of resilience building. In the second case, transition processes towards national authorities were not systematically incorporated in operation's designs, and when foreseen, plans were not always rolled out. Evaluations also noted room for improvement of internal synergies, geographic convergence and geographical targeting approaches.

90. **Gender:** Evaluations captured the gender sensitivity of operations and commended the firm efforts of some country offices to improve interventions' gender approach. However, gender analysis was generally lacking at the design stage of operations, limiting a more strategic approach to gender issues. In terms of results, operations tend to focus on participation issues, although a few examples showed effects on empowerment and attitudinal changes at community and household levels.

91. For individual activity areas:

- **General Distribution:** General distribution was the activity less frequently used in operations. It was used in three of seven evaluations, addressing a refugee population as well as vulnerable communities affected by droughts and natural disasters. Output targets were partially met; although food consumption score and dietary diversity score outcomes were not attained, evaluations report some improvement in the food security situation of targeted groups.
- **Nutrition:** Four operations implemented nutrition activities, applying WFP experience adapted to needs identified in each context (prevention of malnutrition, moderate acute malnutrition treatment, supplementary feeding). In two cases operations included activities addressing people living with HIV. Both output and outcome results varied with cases of excellent, satisfactory and weak results in different operations. Some outcome data gaps limited analysis of results.
- **Education:** Five operations implemented school feeding activities to support national systems and in all cases combined delivery of food with capacity strengthening of national systems. This activity provides the best output results across operations with all targets either being fully met or achieving all beneficiaries in the second year of implementation, following delays in the operation's launch. Outcomes were only reported in two operations, each demonstrating positive results; this limits broader analysis of results across the sample.
- **Livelihoods:** Four operations implemented FFA/FFT activities and in each case activities aimed at community resilience-building objectives; none reported attainment of beneficiary targets. Output and outcome data gaps limit the analysis of results obtained which is partially mitigated by qualitative description of some gains in resilience building.

## 5. LESSONS

92. Lessons arising from these seven evaluations for the Latin America and Caribbean region are:<sup>94</sup>

1. **Consolidate enabling/leveraging role.** The WFP objective to attain “zero hunger”, connects its core functions with national social protection agendas of middle-income countries and instruments focused on poverty reduction. Country strategic planning processes present an opportunity to reaffirm the added value of WFP in enhancing and influencing national protection systems, combined when necessary with direct implementation of activities. Building on regional thinking and commitments and with the support of the regional bureau, WFP could seize the momentum to confirm and expand further its role on evidence generation, capacity strengthening, policy development, technical guidance and operational research on food and nutrition security-related issues and programmes.<sup>95</sup>
2. **Develop capacity-strengthening strategies.** Considering the weight of capacity strengthening work of WFP in the region, country offices could significantly improve the impact of their work by developing more strategic and integrated approaches. These should be supported by robust assessments of strengths and weaknesses of national institutions and underpinned by a strong theory of change. The Regional Bureau of Panama’s regional capacity strengthening strategy (2016) is a timely commitment that could be rolled out as appropriate at country level during the country strategic planning processes.
3. **Increase evidence of WFP added value.** In the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, with competing development agendas and highly specialised and well established national and international actors, WFP should continuously invest efforts in reaching out to governments and potential donors, explaining the impact of its work and added value in order to ensure sustainability of its work. To this end, WFP should enhance its capacity to attain and demonstrate outcomes and report robust results specifically on capacity-strengthening objectives.
4. **Redefine and mainstream gender.** Evaluations have shown country offices’ understanding of and commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment issues in line with national frameworks and political engagement in the gender agenda. More can be done to translate this commitment into more articulated approaches that firmly establish gender transformation gains. Such actions should systematically include analysis of gender needs at the community and targeted group levels; it should ensure that from an operational perspective, relevant actions are undertaken to influence men and women’s attitudes and behaviours, going beyond mere participation objectives.

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<sup>94</sup> As noted in the methodology section, EMOPs and Trust Funds are not included in the sample of operations evaluated and evidence arises from seven operations evaluations, four of which are mid-term evaluations. Therefore, although themes identified may have wider relevance, they cannot be extrapolated to the WFP wider portfolio. Nonetheless, the breadth and depth of the information presented in this synthesis constitutes a relevant, and hopefully useful, evidence base to inform the Integrated RoadMap and country strategic planning processes in the Latin America and Caribbean region

<sup>95</sup> Recent studies such as the Migration and Food Security study, the Study on the Double Burden, the Multipurpose Cash Study in Salvador, the Shock Responsive Social Protection Study, the Study on Nutrition- Sensitive School Meals Programmes in LAC, the Rice Fortification Study and the Urban Food Security Analysis are excellent examples of the approach taken by WFP in the region to enhance knowledge generation which should be sustained and expanded further.

5. **Improve and adapt monitoring and evaluation systems.** Building on existing efforts, WFP should further reinforce monitoring and evaluation systems in order to effectively report outcomes and enhance visibility of results obtained. How corporate indicators adequately capture the nature of upstream-interventions deserves more attention. The mid- to long-term nature of changes expected from capacity strengthening activities, operational research, policy development as well as of resilience building poses a challenge for traditional WFP quantitative indicators. Country strategic planning processes and the new results framework of the WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021 provide an opportunity to motivate reflection on how best to garner results.
6. **Invest in operation designs for increased effectiveness.** In line with evaluations' results, WFP should strategically reinforce the design of programmes, particularly the resilience-oriented activities, the technical and financial sustainability of interventions, the transition to national authorities and the capacity-strengthening activities. Designs could be further grounded in assessment of vulnerabilities, food security and livelihood assessment and, in line with recommendations, enhance internal and external synergies to maximize sustainable development opportunities.

## Annex 1: Partnerships per country<sup>96</sup>

Country	Government	United Nation Agencies	NGOs
<b>Cuba (200703)</b>	<p>Defensa Civil</p> <p>Instituto Nacional de Higiene, Epidemiología y Microbiología (INHEM)</p> <p>Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hidráulicos (INRH)</p> <p>Instituto de Meteorología (INSMET)</p> <p>Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Medio Ambiente (CITMA)</p> <p>Ministerio de Educación Superior (MES)</p> <p>Ministerio de la Agricultura (MINAG)</p> <p>Ministerio de la Industria Alimentaria (MINAL)</p> <p>Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera (MINCEX)</p> <p>Ministerio de Comercio Interior (MINCIN)</p> <p>Ministerio de Educación (MINED)</p> <p>Ministerio de Salud Pública (MINSAP)</p> <p>Ministerio del Transporte (MITRANS)</p> <p>Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI)</p>	<p>FAO</p> <p>IFAD</p> <p>UNDP</p> <p>UNICEF</p>	<p>OXFAM</p> <p>NGO consortium in the framework of the project funded by the European Union-DIPECHO including CARE, CISP, GVC, MPDL and OIKOS.</p> <p>CISP</p> <p>GVC</p> <p>Movimiento por la paz (MPDL)</p> <p>Fundación Mundubat</p> <p>OIKOS</p> <p>Civil society</p> <p>Asociación Cubana de Producción Animal (ACPA)</p> <p>Asociación Cubana de Técnicos Agrícolas y Forestales (ACTAF)</p> <p>Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños (ANAP)</p> <p>Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC)</p>
<b>Ecuador (200275)</b>	<p>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana</p> <p>Ministerio del Medio Ambiente</p> <p>Ministerio de la Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (MAGAP)</p> <p>Ministerio de la Educación</p> <p>Ministerio de Desarrollo Social Ministerio de Salud</p> <p>Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados (GAD) de las provincias de Esmeralda, Imbabura, Sucumbíos y Carchi</p>	<p>UNHCR</p> <p>IOM</p>	<p>Socio ejecutor principal:</p> <p>Organización Hebrea de Ayuda a Inmigrantes y Refugiados</p> <p>Otros socios:</p> <p>The Foundation for the Refugee Education Trust (RET)</p> <p>Socios menores:</p> <p>Fundación Ambiente y Sociedad (octubre-diciembre 2012, Pichincha y Santo Domingo)</p> <p>Socios indirectos (acuerdos con ACNUR):</p>

<sup>96</sup> Source: Operational factsheet of each operation evaluation report.

Country	Government	United Nation Agencies	NGOs
	Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados Municipales de Lago Agrio, Tulcán, Eloy Alfaro, Esmeraldas, San Lorenzo, Mira y Montufar		Fundación Tarabita
<b>Haiti (200618)</b>	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MAST) Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communities (MICT) Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC/MICT) Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) Ministry of Environment, National Coordination for Food Security Unit (CNSA) National Identification Office (ONI) under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) Ministry of Women's Rights (MCFDF) Direction Sanitaire de l'Artibonite (DSA/MSPP) Direction Sanitaire du Nord-Ouest (DSNO/MSPP) (partnership ended November 2014) MARNDR/Northern Development Organization (ODN) Directions Départementales Agricoles (DDA)	FAO IFAD IOM MINUSTA UNDP UNICEF UNFPA UNHCR FEWSNET UN WOMEN UNEP	International NGOs: ACF Welthungerhilfe CARE International Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Food for the Poor Initiative Développement (ID) Missionaries of Charities World Vision International (WVI) National NGOs: Action pour le Développement et la Sante du Nord Ouest (ADESNO) Association des Jeunes en Action pour le Développement (AJAD) Agence de Secours et de Bienfaisance aux Enfants Démunis (ASEBED) Bureau de Nutrition et de Développement (BND) Centre d'Education Spéciale, Fondation pour le Développement et l'Encadrement de la Famille Haïtienne (FONDEFH) Fondation pour la Santé et l'Avancement Communautaire (FOSAC) Groupe de Recherche sur l'Action Sociale Locale (GRASOL) Mouvman Fanm Peyizan Gwos-Wòch (MFPG) Organisation de Développement de la Région Goavienne (ODRG)



Country	Government	United Nation Agencies	NGOs
			Sociéte´ d'Etablissement Des Jardins (SEJA) Sociéte´ d'Information en Communication Sociale et Economique (SIKSE) Others: Haitian Red Cross Society Organisme de Développement du Nord (ODN) Konbit Ayisyen Pou la Vi Miyo, Nou Pa Ka Ret Konsa, Mouvman Fanm Aktif Kafou (MOKFA) Sociéte´ Haïtienne d'Assistance en Scolaire de Médecine Préventive et de Protection de l'Environnement (SHASSMEPPE)
<b>Haiti (200150)</b>	Ministère de l'éducation nationale et de la formation professionnelle (MENFP/PNCS) Ministère de l'agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural (MARNDR) Ministère de la santé publique et de la population (MSPP)	UNICEF WFP UNESCO FAO	ADEMA ALR ASEBED BDE-Nord BDE-NE BND Artibonite BND Centre BND Ouest CAED CAP CARITAS CROSE Fanm Deside MBCH ODRG SIKSE WVI Centre

<b>Country</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>United Nation Agencies</b>	<b>NGOs</b>
			WVI Ouest FONDEFH
<b>Honduras (200240)</b>	Secretaria de Educación Secretaria de Salud Secretaria de Desarrollo Social e Instituto de Conservación Forestal	FAO UNICEF	CARE OXFAM Save The Children
<b>Nicaragua (200434)</b>	Instituto Nicaragüense de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) Ministerio de Salud (MINSA) Ministerio de Educación (MINED) Programa Integral de Nutrición Escolar (PINE)	UNICEF OPS FAO	Project Concern International World Initiative for Soy in Human Health American Nicaraguan Foundation Fundación Padre Fabretto World Vision
<b>Regional (200490)</b>	El Salvador La Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el Desarrollo Humano y la Fundación de Desarrollo y Humanismo Maquilishuatl Ministerio de Gobernación y Desarrollo Territorial División de Asistencia Alimentaria de la Secretaría de Inclusión Social Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (CONASAN) Guatemala Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres (CONRED) Secretaria de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SESAN) Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN) Instituto Nacional de Comercialización Agrícola (INDECA) Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (MIDES) Ministerio de Agricultura	FAO OCHA PAHO UNICEF UNETE	Save the Children Visión Mundial Care y otras El Consejo de Ministros de Agricultura de Centroamérica (CAC) Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres Naturales en América Central (CEPREDENAC)

Country	Government	United Nation Agencies	NGOs
	<p>Ganadería y Alimentación (MAGA) Honduras Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO) Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (SAG) Secretaría de Salud Pública (SESAL) Unidad Técnica de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (UTSAN) Nicaragua Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX) Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención de Desastres (SINAPRED) y las oficinas municipales Coordinadores Locales de Socorros Comisiones Departamentales para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención a Desastres (CODEPRED) Comisión Municipal de Prevención de Desastres (COMUPRED) Comités Locales de Preparación y Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres (COLOPRED) Comités de Barrios de Preparación y Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres (COBAPRED) Gobierno Regional Autónomo Costa Caribe Norte (GRACCN) Consejo Regional Autónomo Costa Caribe Norte (CRACCN) Comisiones de Trabajo Sectorial (CTS) a nivel interno del SINAPRED</p>		

## Acronyms

AAP	accountability to affected populations
CAR	Central African Republic
CO	country office
CP	country pcivilrogramme
CSO	civil society organization
DDS	dietary diversity score
DEV	development programme
DRM	disaster risk management
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EMOP	emergency operation
EPR	emergency preparedness and response
EWS	early warning system
FCS	food consumption score
FFA	food assistance for assets
FFT	food assistance for training
GD	general distribution
IDP	internally displace person
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
IRM	Integrated Road Map
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
M&E	monitoring & evaluation
NGO	non-governmental organization
OEV	Office of Evaluation
PLW	pregnant and lactating women
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
RB	regional bureau
SABER	System Approach for Better Education Results
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TSF	targeted supplementary feeding
UN	United Nations
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WFP	World Food Programme

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