




Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
United Nations



# Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings  
on acute food insecurity  
June to October 2024 outlook



**Global Network  
Against Food Crises**  
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS



**Funded by  
the European Union**

## REQUIRED CITATION

WFP and FAO. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: June to October 2024 Outlook*. Rome.

<https://doi.org/10.4060/cd0979en>

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The report is developed jointly by the FAO Global Information Early Warning System Team (GIEWS), FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience (OER), FAO Regional and Country Offices, WFP Office of the Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Executive Director (DED-COO), WFP Analysis, Planning and Performance Division (APP). Its preparation is also supported by the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC).

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# Early warning hunger hotspots

## June to October 2024


### Key drivers and aggravating factors



- Hotspots of highest concern<sup>1</sup>
- Hotspots of very high concern<sup>2</sup>
- Hotspots<sup>3</sup>

An icon applies both if the shock (for example, dry conditions) is forecast to take place during the outlook period, or if the shock already occurred, but will impact food security over the outlook period.

The displacement icon applies when it is a key driver of food insecurity or a significant factor underlying vulnerability. It applies to internally displaced people, migrants and refugees.



<sup>1</sup> This category includes hotspots with Famine or Risk of Famine, with populations already in Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH]); and hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severely worsening contextual drivers and access constraints, which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

<sup>2</sup> These are hotspots where sizeable populations – over 500 000 people or more than 10 percent of the population analysed (when at least 50 percent of the population have been analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or are identified as severely acute food insecure as per the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology; the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe acute food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period as based on latest data available; and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

<sup>3</sup> Other countries/territories, in which acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further during the outlook period, and which were identified as hunger hotspots.

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to October 2024)*. Rome. Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2023. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 13 May 2024]. <https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1>

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# Abbreviations

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<b>CARI</b>	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
<b>CH</b>	Cadre Harmonisé
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>FEWS NET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
<b>GDP</b>	gross domestic product
<b>GNAFC</b>	Global Network Against Food Crises
<b>HNO</b>	Humanitarian Needs Overview
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan
<b>HNRP</b>	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>MONUSCO</b>	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>NSAG</b>	non-state armed group
<b>rCARI</b>	remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
<b>SBA</b>	Sana'a based authorities
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations Refugee Agency
<b>WASH</b>	water, sanitation and hygiene
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme



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# Executive summary

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The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 18 hunger hotspots, including a total of 17 countries or territories and one regional cluster which comprises 4 countries, during the outlook period from June to October 2024. **Mali, Palestine, South Sudan and the Sudan remain at the highest concern level. Haiti was added to the list of countries/territories of highest concern due to escalating violence by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).** This category includes hotspots with Famine or Risk of Famine, or with populations already in Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions during the outlook period. These countries/territories require the most urgent attention.

**Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (eastern provinces), Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen** are hotspots of very high concern. All these hotspots have a high number of people facing or projected to face critical levels of acute food insecurity, coupled with worsening drivers that are expected to further exacerbate life-threatening conditions in the coming months. Since the October 2023 edition, the **Central African Republic, Lebanon, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia** have been added to the list of hunger hotspots, while **Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Somalia and Zimbabwe** remain hunger hotspot countries.

The countries/territories covered in this report highlight the most significant, likely deteriorations of acute hunger expected in the outlook period **but do not represent all situations with high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Armed violence and conflict remain the primary causes of acute food insecurity across numerous hunger hotspots. In these situations, widespread displacement, destruction of food systems and reduced humanitarian access are likely to worsen food availability and access. In the Near East and North Africa region, the ongoing conflict in **Palestine** is expected to further aggravate the unprecedented death toll, widespread destruction and displacement of nearly the total population in the Gaza Strip. As of mid-March 2024, famine was projected to occur by the end of May in the two northern governorates of the Gaza Strip. Broader regional ramifications are emerging, which could exacerbate already high food security needs in **Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.** Conflict and displacement also continue at an alarming pace and magnitude in the **Sudan**, deepening the burden on neighbouring countries hosting a steadily growing number of refugees and returnees – especially in South Sudan and Chad. In **Yemen**, anticipated increases in freight and insurance costs, due to the Red Sea crisis, are expected to push up the cost of staple foods and other imports. This will aggravate the ongoing economic crisis, compounded by increasingly low and unpredictable humanitarian assistance.

The Central Sahel region continues to experience disruptive instability, with rising violence leading to increased civilian targeting and displacement. The withdrawal of UN peacekeeping missions in **Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia** is expected to create security vacuums, which could be exploited by NSAGs – further exposing civilians to violence. In the rest of the Horn of Africa, conflict in **Ethiopia** will continue affecting agricultural livelihoods. The intensified conflict in **Myanmar** is likely to drive further displacement and restrict access to food and assistance. This is likely also to be the case in **Haiti**, where NSAGs force the population to leave their homes and livelihoods, including the abandonment of cropland, amid continued uncertainties about the timing of the deployment of the United Nations-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission.

Conflict and instability are compounded by a **contraction of economic growth in emerging markets and developing economies.** Many countries worldwide continue struggling with high debt levels – preventing many governments from protecting their most vulnerable populations – while there are no clear signs of relief from the high costs of debt. Geopolitical tensions in the Near East and North Africa region and potential new escalations remain a major risk for the global economy in 2024. Increased energy and transportation costs, currency depreciation and challenges in financing food imports could exert upward pressure on domestic prices in numerous vulnerable countries in 2024.

**Weather extremes**, such as excessive rains, tropical storms, cyclones, flooding, drought and increased climate variability, remain significant drivers of acute food insecurity in some countries and regions. **La Niña is expected to prevail between August 2024 and February 2025**, significantly influencing rainfall distribution and temperatures. This phenomenon might improve agricultural prospects, but also increases the risk of flooding, in parts of South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Chad, Mali and Nigeria, as well as the Sudan. Due to the uncertainty of current forecasts, continuous monitoring of forecasts and their impacts on agricultural production and livelihoods remains critical.

Ongoing or planned reductions and gaps in emergency agriculture, food and livelihood assistance will continue to affect several hunger hotspots. **Urgent and scaled-up assistance is therefore required in all 18 hunger hotspots to protect livelihoods and increase access to food.** Decision-makers should not wait for further deterioration of food insecurity before scaling up assistance in areas classified as being in Crisis or Emergency (IPC/CH Phases 3 or 4), or which already have higher-than-average levels of excess mortality and morbidity for a sustained period. Earlier intervention can reduce food gaps and protect assets and livelihoods at a lower cost than late humanitarian response.

Further starvation and death are likely in Mali, Palestine, South Sudan, the Sudan and Haiti, without humanitarian actions and concerted international efforts that help to unblock severe humanitarian access constraints. To address and prevent famine, more investments are needed in integrated solutions that span a number of areas that do not traditionally fall within one organizational mandate, but whose end goal is to reduce

food insecurity or remove vulnerable persons from a reliance on emergency food assistance.

This report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response, as well as anticipatory actions to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.





# Introduction

For the outlook period of June 2024 to October 2024, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in 18 hunger hotspots, including a total of 17 countries/territories and one regional cluster which comprises 4 countries. In the hunger hotspots, parts of the population will likely face a significant deterioration of already high levels of acute food insecurity, putting lives and livelihoods at risk.

Identified through forward-looking analysis, these hotspots have the potential for acute food insecurity to rise significantly during the outlook period, under the effects of multiple overlapping drivers, interlinked or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of conflict and organized violence, economic shocks, weather extremes and climate variability.

**The countries/territories covered in this report highlight the most significant, likely deteriorations of acute hunger expected in the outlook period but do not represent all situations with high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in all 18 hunger hotspots. In Palestine, South Sudan, Mali, the Sudan and Haiti, humanitarian action is critical to prevent starvation and death.

To this end, the present report provides hotspot-specific recommendations on priorities for:

- anticipatory action – short-term protective interventions to be implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; and
- emergency response – actions to address existing and emerging humanitarian needs.

## Rationale for the inclusion of anticipatory action recommendations

Anticipatory actions are short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented during the critical time window between an early-warning trigger – the point in time when forecasts show that a hazard is likely to occur in the future – and the actual impact of the forecast hazard on lives and livelihoods. The objective is to protect the most vulnerable people and their livelihoods from the expected impacts of the hazard.

This report features recommendations for anticipatory actions and emergency response actions, tailored to the flagged risks. Anticipatory action recommendations are only included if the risk analysis indicates a hazard/shock that has yet to materialize in the near future. When a hazard/shock has already affected agricultural livelihoods and food security,

the window of opportunity for anticipatory action is usually considered closed, even if the impacts of the hazard/shock are expected to continue in the present and the future. In such cases, only emergency response recommendations are made in this report.

Recognizing the role that anticipatory action can play in protracted crises, anticipatory action recommendations are included in such contexts, when appropriate, if the aim of the actions is to mitigate the impact of a new hazard or shock, rather than addressing pre-existing humanitarian needs and underlying vulnerabilities.

Considering the long outlook period of five months featured in this report, the anticipatory actions listed are indicative and would only be suggested for implementation if a trigger was reached or clear early-warning signs manifested. Some recommendations also refer to preparedness activities, which are always critical for the effective and timely implementation of anticipatory actions.

The selection of hunger hotspots is based on consensus among food security experts and conflict, economic and natural hazards analysts from FAO and WFP, both Rome and field-based. The process is informed by an initial prioritization, using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators that include:

- latest absolute figures (projections, where available) of people in Crisis or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of levels of acute food insecurity among the population analysed, as well as the year-on-year trend of both absolute figures and prevalence;
- forward-looking risk analysis of key drivers of acute food insecurity, namely conflict and political violence, economic shocks and natural hazards;
- ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the outlook period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by the above-mentioned contextual risks; and
- aggravating factors, such as humanitarian access constraints, levels of acute malnutrition, lack of national coping capacity and displacement.

When recent IPC/CH data are not available, acute food insecurity estimates are derived from IPC-compatible Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analyses, or categorization of WFP's Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Insecurity (CARI), where populations that face "moderate acute food insecurity" and "severe acute food insecurity" as per this methodology are

reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. This also stands for its application to remotely collected data (rCARI). Other sources utilized are Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP).

The acute food insecurity figures presented in this report for Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic are extracted from HNO/HRP estimates of people in need of food and livelihood assistance. For the Syrian Arab Republic, these are based on WFP's CARI methodology. For Ethiopia, acute food insecurity figures are based on a combination of Household Economy Analysis,

Displacement Tracking Matrix and Village Assessment Survey. For Myanmar, 2023 IPC-equivalent data are based on a pre-analysis conducted under the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024. For Zimbabwe, the figures are based on FEWS NET's projected population in need of urgent food assistance. For all the other countries where data are available, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC/CH.

The cutoff date for the analysis and information contained in this report was 17 May 2024.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In April 2024, the GNAFC, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the Global Report on Food Crises 2024, which reports the number of people estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these numbers within the population analysed in 59 countries/territories with food crisis situations for 2023. The report is available at [www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024](http://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024).

### IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR</li> <li>• Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.</li> </ul>	<b>URGENT ACTION REQUIRED</b> to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR</li> <li>• Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.</li> </ul>	<b>URGENT ACTION REQUIRED</b> to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	<b>URGENT ACTION REQUIRED</b> to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

\* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual\\_en](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en)).

A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

# Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity drivers

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key drivers of acute food insecurity are likely to evolve and their potential combined effects across countries/territories in the coming months; the related risks of deterioration were also gauged. Below is an overview of key findings.

## Organized violence and conflict risks

Organized violence and armed conflict are key drivers of deteriorating acute food insecurity in the majority of the hunger hotspots, in 17 out of 21 countries/territories. These are: **Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, the Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan and Yemen**. In all, the multiple impacts of conflict, including population displacements, destruction of food systems and shrinking humanitarian access, are likely to further restrict people's availability of, and access to, food.

In the Near East region, the ongoing conflict in **Palestine** – likely to continue in the outlook – is expected to further aggravate an unprecedented death toll, widespread destruction and displacement of nearly the total population in the Gaza Strip; this is particularly the case if ongoing military operations inside Rafah governate are further expanded.<sup>1</sup> Broader regional ramifications are emerging, with the potential to further exacerbate emergency food security needs in other countries. In **Lebanon**, in particular, hostilities are increasing across the southern border and have already interrupted trade flows, reduced access to markets and resulted in internal displacements.<sup>2</sup> A scenario where hostilities escalate would entail dire humanitarian and food insecurity consequences. The **Syrian Arab Republic** is at risk of localized conflict escalation across the north,<sup>3</sup> while in **Yemen** security remains volatile against the backdrop of hostilities in the Red Sea.<sup>4</sup>

Instability and conflict persist in Central Sahel, stretching from **Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger**, as well as **northern Nigeria** where civilians are targeted by the intensifying violence of non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Already high levels of displacements are poised to increase, in addition to disruptions of agricultural livelihoods and markets. Moreover, in dozens of conflict-affected localities in Burkina Faso and Mali, civilians remain blocked as NSAGs restrict movements,<sup>5,6</sup> access to essential goods and agricultural activities. This trend is likely to aggravate, especially in Mali, after the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission pulled out in late 2023.

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia**, concerns about the effects of drawdowns of peacekeeping operations are rising, as a more permissive security environment for NSAGs exposes civilians to increased violence.<sup>7,8</sup> Meanwhile, high-intensity conflict is spreading further into South Kivu, one of the three conflict-affected provinces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,<sup>9</sup> and NSAGs

in Somalia continue to expand territorial gains.<sup>10</sup> In the rest of the Horn of Africa, armed conflict and communal violence in **Ethiopia** are likely to persist, particularly in Amhara, Oromia and southern parts of Tigray,<sup>11</sup> where ongoing restrictions and curfews will likely impact livelihoods, access to markets and trade flows.

In the **Sudan**, in the absence of a political solution, high-intensity conflict involving an increasing number of NSAGs and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are likely to escalate in multiple states and spread to the northeast.<sup>12</sup> This will exacerbate internal displacements, already the largest globally with over 6.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs),<sup>13</sup> and push more people into neighbouring countries – heightening pressure on already limited resources.<sup>14</sup>

In the Asia and the Pacific region, the conflict in **Myanmar**, among the most violent and fragmented conflicts due to the presence of hundreds of NSAGs, is expected to continue its rising trend, while the spread of intercommunal violence is a growing concern.<sup>15</sup>

In Latin America, amid a slow political transition in **Haiti**, NSAGs are expected to continue using violence as a pressure tactic – expanding control over new areas while the deployment of an UN-authorized mission is facing difficulties.<sup>16</sup>

## Natural hazard risks

According to the latest forecast, La Niña is predicted to dominate from August to October 2024, and persist through December 2024 to February 2025.<sup>17</sup> This phenomenon is set to significantly alter global weather patterns. It is expected to influence rainfall distribution and temperatures, critically impacting regions already facing climate-related food security challenges. Concurrently, the La Niña phenomenon might also offer beneficial relief to certain regions, improving agricultural prospects, while it heightens the risk of flooding in the Sahel and other vulnerable areas globally. However, this forecast comes with uncertainties given the typically reduced accuracy of the April forecasts.

In **South Sudan**, the eastern and southern regions, including Pibor, have experienced severe flooding due to above-average rainfall. Although La Niña typically leads to drier conditions in these areas, current forecasts predict continued above-average rainfall and further flooding in the coming months, extending to northern parts of the country.<sup>18</sup> This increased flooding risk could hinder humanitarian and market access and lead to additional displacement of communities, worsening the food insecurity situation for populations already facing critical challenges. Meanwhile, in southern and eastern areas, rainfall is expected to be average from July onwards.

**Somalia** has experienced a series of droughts and floods in recent years, which drove high levels and prevalence of acute food insecurity. Recent seasonal forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall that contributed to the recent floods is set to persist, heightening risks of further flooding in the months ahead. The areas of Bardere in the south and of Jowhar, Beled Weyne and Bulo Burti in the centre are particularly at risk. These floods could cause significant crop and livestock losses, with a negative impact on food security.

In **Ethiopia**, climate-related issues encompass both droughts and floods, driven by variations in rainfall across its diverse landscapes. The onset of La Niña could exacerbate these variations, potentially resulting in above-average rainfall<sup>19</sup> in key cropping zones in the west that are reliant on the June–September *Kiremt* rains. It could also trigger dry spells in agropastoral and pastoral areas that depend on the March–May *Gu/Genna* and October–December *Deyr/Hageya* rainy seasons, increasing vulnerabilities in areas already affected by high levels and prevalence of acute food insecurity, notably in southern Oromia and the Somali region.

**Haiti** is on the brink of a critical period, with an anticipated above-average hurricane season running from June to November.<sup>20</sup> While above-average rainfall could be beneficial overall for crops, it also increases the risk of flash floods and river flooding, threatening the food security of vulnerable populations. The shift from El Niño to La Niña could intensify this year’s hurricane season, further hampering agricultural activities and increasing flood risks. La Niña conditions typically correlate with heightened hurricane activity in the Atlantic, presenting substantial challenges to Haiti’s agricultural sector – already compromised by previous storm impacts.

In the **Sahel region**, including parts of **Chad, Mali, Nigeria**, as well as in the **Sudan**, climatic extremes range from severe droughts to sporadic heavy rainfall. The upcoming La Niña phenomenon is likely to enhance the probability of above-average rainfall already forecast from June to October.<sup>21</sup>

## Economic risks

The International Monetary Fund, in its April 2024 update, expects the global economy to grow at a similar pace in 2024 as in 2023, at a rate of 3.2 percent. While growth in advanced economies is expected to accelerate in 2024, emerging markets and developing economies are expected to contract. The International Monetary Fund warned that the pace at which poor countries are catching up to higher living standards had slowed, meaning that global disparities are expected to persist for longer.<sup>22</sup> One out of three of the 75 economies – home to 1.9 billion people – eligible for low-interest loans and grants from the World Bank’s International Development Association, is poorer than it was before the pandemic.<sup>23</sup>

Many countries worldwide continue to struggle with high debt levels. In 2024, 54 percent of low-income countries and 16 percent of emerging markets remain in debt distress or are at high risk thereof.<sup>24</sup> Unbalanced governmental budgets continue to increase these debt burdens, while debt-related payments have increased. Alone on interest payments, low-income countries are expected to use as much as 14 percent of governments’ revenues in 2024, nearly twice as much as 15 years ago.<sup>25</sup> This prevents many governments from investing in sustainable growth and protecting their most vulnerable populations. At the same time, there are no clear signs of relief to the high costs of debt. Still-elevated inflation in the United States of America, the issuer of the predominant currency for settling international transactions, has diminished the likelihood of significant cuts of policy interest rates by the Federal Reserve in the coming months.<sup>26</sup> High borrowing costs

are likely to continue to constrain access of vulnerable countries to international credit markets and exacerbate existing debt vulnerabilities.<sup>27</sup> These financial strains will have negative effects on currency values and the affordability of critical imports such as food and energy in the affected countries.

Geopolitical tensions in the Near East and North Africa and potential escalations remain a major risk for the global economy in 2024. The insecurity has supported a rise in hydrocarbon prices;<sup>28</sup> as of April, oil prices have increased by 14 percent since the start of 2024. Elevated energy costs would contribute to global inflationary pressures and pose additional macroeconomic challenges to developing countries reliant on energy imports. The ongoing tensions in the Red Sea have also compromised the security of global supply chains. This in turn has prompted an increase in insurance costs for shipping companies and/or rerouting from the Suez Canal – one of the trade chokepoints critical to global movements of goods and an important source of foreign exchange earnings for Egypt – to longer alternative routes, to avoid risk being subject to attacks from Yemen.<sup>29, 30</sup> This adjustment not only increases transportation costs and time but, in the long run, could heighten the susceptibility of global trade to new shocks, potentially inflating prices even more. Additionally, if prolonged, such disruptions pose serious risks in terms of increased costs and diminished availability of deliveries to countries bordering the Red Sea.

Although the FAO Food Price Index experienced a 7 percent year-on-year decrease as of March 2024, it remains 18 percent above the pre-COVID levels recorded in December 2019.<sup>31</sup> To a different extent depending on a country, factors such as increased energy and transportation costs, currency depreciation and challenges in financing food imports could exert upward pressure on domestic prices in numerous vulnerable countries in 2024. In several cases, this could more than offset the year-on-year decline seen by international commodity prices. Domestic food prices are continuing to rise rapidly in many countries. In 25 countries, where food inflation exceeds 10 percent, poor households are struggling to afford the food they need.<sup>32</sup>

The political landscape in 2024 is marked by an unprecedented number of elections,<sup>33</sup> heightening the risk of political instability and with potential repercussions for both the respective economies and international trade. Expansionary fiscal policies adopted by some governments, seeking to build consensus ahead of national elections, may exacerbate macroeconomic risks in countries already burdened with high debt levels.<sup>34</sup> While these policies might temporarily enhance household purchasing power, they could lead to increased macroeconomic distress post election, with potential risks including currency depreciation and further economic difficulties that ultimately affect household purchasing power.

On the trade side, governments in major food-producing countries might be more likely to implement or escalate export restrictions to stabilize local markets ahead of elections. For example, India’s ongoing rice export ban, anticipated to endure until after the elections, has contributed to a global surge in rice prices since its implementation in July 2023.<sup>35, 36</sup>

## Regional ramifications of the crisis in the Sudan – update

With no political solution in sight, the armed conflict and subsequent displacement are expected to continue throughout 2024, driving and expanding high levels of acute food insecurity inside the Sudan and in refugee-hosting areas of its neighbouring countries. One year into the conflict, the magnitude and pace of displacement remain alarming, making the Sudan the largest and fastest-growing displacement crisis in the world, with **8.8 million people displaced** as of May 2024.<sup>37</sup> The vast majority, **6.8 million people, are displaced internally**. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), **1.8 million people have been displaced to neighbouring countries**, the large majority being Sudanese refugees moving to Chad and Egypt, and South Sudanese returning to South Sudan.

Conflict is expected to continue and is likely to further expand geographically in the coming months, amid severe food shortages as the lean season deepens. This would be compounded by severe humanitarian access constraints and humanitarian funding shortfalls. Since December 2023, the conflict has further escalated with episodes of likely atrocities and intense fighting. This has heavily impacted the densely populated central areas as well as southern and western parts of the Sudan, with severe destruction of basic infrastructure, agricultural production and the agrifood system driving internal displacement and cross-border movements.<sup>38,39</sup> The growing number of armed actors involved in the conflict, and high levels of violence against civilians by these actors, are likely to drive further displacement.


As a result, movements of refugees, returnees and third-country nationals to the Sudan's neighbouring countries are projected to continue, reaching **2.3 million by the end of 2024**, according to UNHCR December 2023 projections.<sup>40</sup> Overall, past trends are expected to continue, with South Sudan and Chad receiving the largest influx of people fleeing the Sudan – South Sudan primarily receiving returnees and Chad receiving largely refugees. In South Sudan and Chad, critical services and resources in areas receiving and hosting refugees are already at a breaking point – a trend that is likely to continue. A total of **1.2 million people are expected to cross the border into Chad**, up from the almost 580 000 displaced as of April 2024. Similarly, the current pace and magnitude to **South Sudan** is projected to continue, with the **total 447 500 refugees and third-country nationals, in addition to a total 820 000 returnees, moving to South Sudan by the end of the year – up from 660 356 as of April 2024**. Further, a total **371 700 are expected to leave for Egypt** by the end of the year – up from 500 000 already displaced in April 2024. In addition, it is anticipated that 168 400 people will arrive in Ethiopia, an increase from 53 572 in April, and 43 300 will arrive in the Central African Republic – up from 29 444 in April, by the end of 2024.<sup>41,42</sup>

In addition to high humanitarian needs among arrivals from the Sudan, including catastrophic conditions in the case of South Sudanese returnees,<sup>43</sup> the influx is expected to further exacerbate already severe pressure on resources, disrupt existing trade and supply chains, drive inflation, and increase costs of humanitarian response; this will create additional hardship for already vulnerable host communities. As a result and in addition to displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance, **over 400 000 people from host communities in Egypt, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance by the end of the year**.<sup>44</sup> Increasing risks of social, economic and political instability, amid escalating needs in both South Sudan and Chad, are also posing challenges to the cross-border response to the crisis inside the Sudan.



# Number of people in acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

in 2024 (where available, most recent data<sup>1</sup>), in millions



Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to October 2024)*. Rome.

<sup>1</sup> The data presented are the most recent projection, data are from 2024 except for Ethiopia and the Syrian Arab Republic (all 2023).

<sup>2</sup> Population coverage is 92 percent.

<sup>3</sup> Population coverage is 96 percent.

<sup>4</sup> No severity disaggregation is available. This estimate corresponds to the upper-bound of a range. Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 11.

<sup>5</sup> Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 11.

<sup>6</sup> HNO 2024. Data are from 2023. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance. No severity disaggregation is available. Acute food insecurity figures are based on a combination of Household Economy Analysis, Displacement Tracking Matrix and Village Assessment Survey.

<sup>7</sup> IPC equivalent. Based on the Addendum to the Myanmar HNRP 2024 (forthcoming).

<sup>8</sup> Based on WFP CARI. Data are from 2023. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance. This includes 1 million people severely acute food insecure based on WFP's CARI methodology, and 2.1 million IDPs in camps, who are fully dependent on assistance.

<sup>9</sup> Population coverage is 91 percent.

<sup>10</sup> Population coverage is 91 percent excluding N'Djamena, it also includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.

<sup>11</sup> Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 11.

<sup>12</sup> Population coverage is 49 percent.

<sup>13</sup> No severity disaggregation is available. This estimate corresponds to the upper-bound of a range.

<sup>14</sup> Population coverage is 47 percent.

<sup>15</sup> Populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

<sup>16</sup> Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual\\_en](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en).

## Reduction of humanitarian assistance

Since 2010, 2023 is likely to mark the first year in which humanitarian funding has declined compared to the previous year, but still represents the second highest funding level ever for humanitarian assistance. The 2023 Global Humanitarian Overview initially called for USD 51.5 billion to assist 230 million people in need. Requirements increased significantly due to major crises during the year, with an ultimate appeal for a record high USD 56.7 billion to assist 245 million people, while 40 percent had been funded.<sup>45</sup>

In 2024, the UN and partner organizations are appealing for USD 48.6 billion to assist a targeted 188 million people across 72 countries.<sup>46</sup> Decision-makers should not wait for further deterioration of food insecurity before scaling up assistance in areas classified as being in Crisis or Emergency (IPC/CH Phases 3 or 4), or which already have higher-than-average levels of excess mortality and morbidity for a sustained period. Earlier intervention can reduce food gaps and protect assets and livelihoods at a lower cost than late humanitarian response.<sup>47</sup>

**Further starvation and death are likely in Mali, Palestine, South Sudan, the Sudan and Haiti**, without humanitarian actions and concerted international efforts that help to unblock severe humanitarian access constraints. To address and prevent famine, emergency agriculture, in addition to in-kind and cash assistance must be provided in a balanced manner. Additionally, more investments are needed in integrated solutions that span a number of areas that do not traditionally fall within one organizational mandate, but whose end goal is to reduce food insecurity or remove vulnerable persons from a reliance on emergency food assistance.<sup>48</sup>



# Highest concern: Hotspots with catastrophic conditions

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This category includes:

- countries/territories with Famine or Risk of Famine;
- countries/territories with populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5); and
- countries/territories at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severely worsening contextual drivers and access constraints, which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

In **Palestine**, over 1 million people – half of the population of the Gaza Strip – is expected to face death and starvation (IPC Phase 5) by mid-July. This is under the devastating impact of the ongoing conflict, the heavy restrictions on access and goods, and the collapse of local agrifood systems. In two of the northern governorates, with all evidence pointing towards a major acceleration of malnutrition and death, the Famine Review Committee alerted in March 2024 that famine was considered imminent and projected to occur by May – unless hostilities end, full access is granted to provide food, water and medicine, and essential services including electricity and water are restored.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, the southern and middle governorates are at risk of famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July, in a reasonable worstcase scenario.<sup>50</sup> The conflict has resulted in an unprecedented death toll, destruction and mass displacement, combined with heavy restrictions on commercial goods, while humanitarian assistance faces extreme access constraints. In the outlook, this is likely to continue, especially in light of expanding military operations in Rafah governorate as of 17 May 2024.<sup>51</sup> In the absence of a cessation of hostilities and increased access, the impact on mortality and the lives of the Palestinians now, and in future generations, will increase markedly with every day, even if famine is avoided in the near term.<sup>52</sup>

In **South Sudan**, the number of people facing starvation and death will almost double between April and July 2024, compared to the same period in 2023. Tight domestic food supplies and sharp currency depreciation are driving soaring food prices, compounded by likely floods and recurrent waves of subnational conflict. This is causing new displacement and hampering access to markets, livelihoods and humanitarian assistance.<sup>53</sup> A projected further rise of returnees and refugees from the Sudan is likely to increase pressure on scarce resources, further increasing acute food insecurity among both new arrivals and host communities.<sup>54</sup> Between April and July 2024, 2.3 million people are projected to face

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 79 000 people will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) acute food insecurity, in Pibor and Aweil East counties and among returnees from the Sudan.<sup>55</sup>

In **Mali**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to further increase, driven primarily by an intensification of conflict and compounded by the full withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Of key concern are the around 3 000 people who are estimated to face death and starvation (CH Phase 5) by August 2024 in conflict-affected Ménaka region.<sup>56</sup> A further increase in violence is expected, while the use of blockades as tactic by NSAGs continues to severely hamper the movement of goods and people, disrupt livelihoods and severely restrict humanitarian access.<sup>57, 58</sup> In addition, the country's announced withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) risks driving further livelihood losses and price hikes of essential goods.<sup>59</sup> Between June and August 2024, 121 000 people are projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>60</sup>

In the **Sudan**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity could deteriorate towards catastrophic outcomes, driven by the escalating conflict, its devastating socioeconomic impact and heavily restricted humanitarian access. In the absence of a political solution, the conflict could further intensify and expand to new areas, driving further internal displacements and pushing more people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. A major food deficit is expected this year as violence, looting and disruptions severely lower agricultural production, while increasing challenges in receiving and financing imports escalate shortages and result in soaring prices. An IPC alert in March 2024 called for urgent action to prevent famine in certain areas, as populations are at risk of facing total collapse of livelihoods and starvation.<sup>61</sup> Back in December 2023, IPC forecast almost 5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) for February 2024 – during the harvest – a staggering increase compared to preconflict levels.<sup>62</sup>

In **Haiti**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to deteriorate as rising violence by NSAGs further disrupts supplies, increases internal displacement and affects humanitarian access.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, the persistent economic crisis and the risk of above-average rainfall threatening crops, coupled with a forecast of an above-average hurricane season, compound the challenges. In the outlook period, there is a risk of catastrophic conditions reemerging. Between March and June 2024, 1.6 million people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity.<sup>64</sup> Haiti now ranks among the countries with the highest prevalence of acute food insecurity globally.



# Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme hunger or death. These are countries/territories/regional clusters where:

- sizeable populations – over 500 000 people or more than 10 percent of the population analysed (when at least 50 percent of the population have been analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or are identified as severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology;
- the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe acute food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period as based on latest data available; and
- contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

The classification in this category has been refined since the October 2023 edition, with a focus on expected deteriorations of acute food insecurity and likely deteriorations of contextual drivers.

**Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen are hotspots of very high concern.**

In **Chad**, acute food insecurity might deteriorate due the persistent refugee influx from the Sudan and high food prices, while clashes in N'Djamena in early 2024 have raised security concerns.<sup>65, 66</sup> Between June and August 2024, 534 000 Chadians residents and over 122 000 Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees are projected to be facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.<sup>67, 68</sup>

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, 2.9 million people were assessed to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) between January and June 2024.<sup>69</sup> Armed conflict in eastern provinces will likely worsen, causing more displacement and worsening food insecurity. Increased fighting involving NSAGs and government forces, especially in South Kivu, indicates rising violence and displacement.<sup>70, 71</sup>

Intensified conflict in **Myanmar** is expected to persist in the coming months, driving displacement, destroying livelihoods, limiting access to food, and consequently driving critical levels of acute food insecurity. Between June and August 2024, 2.7 million people are projected to face Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).<sup>72</sup> This revised figure takes into account the intensified conflict since October 2023, and represents a deterioration compared to the initial 2.4 million people projected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the same period.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, a further deterioration of the economy is likely to underpin increasing levels of acute food insecurity. The

situation will be exacerbated by a spate of hostilities in northwest Syrian Arab Republic and the risk of conflict escalation within the broader regional crisis, as well as substantial funding cuts. Between August and September 2023, 12.9 million people (55 percent of the population) were facing high levels of acute food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology.<sup>73, 74, 75</sup>

The food security situation is expected to deteriorate in **Yemen**, as a result of the protracted economic crisis, worsened by hostilities in the Red Sea and reduced humanitarian assistance. In areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, nearly 1.3 million people (13 percent of the population analysed) were estimated to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between October 2023 and February 2024. In several areas, 20 percent of the population was projected to be critically acute food insecure.<sup>76</sup> As of the cutoff date of this report, no recent IPC data was available for Sana'a based authorities (SBA)-controlled areas.



## Other countries or situations that require monitoring

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- i) countries or situations where data was insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions on the basis of other evidence, as described below; and
- ii) countries or situations in protracted crisis with high numbers of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots.

Such situations of concern include, but are not limited to, the following countries:

High levels of acute food insecurity in **Afghanistan** persist, driven by a protracted economic crisis,<sup>77,78</sup> increasing Afghan returnees from Pakistan,<sup>79</sup> and an uncertain cereal production outlook due to weather-related shocks. Moreover, emergency assistance is expected to halt until November 2024 in most areas.<sup>80</sup> That said, the scale of humanitarian food and emergency agricultural assistance through the 2023 winter, marginal forecast improvements of the 2024 winter wheat harvest, increased livelihood opportunities and some recovery in household purchasing power are estimated to lead to an improvement in acute food insecurity between May and October 2024, when about 12.4 million people (28 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), of which 2.4 million will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>81</sup>

About 582 000 people, or 60 percent of the Rohingya refugees hosted in **Cox's Bazar** and **Bhashanchar, Bangladesh**, are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and October 2024, with 20 percent of the Rohingya refugee population (191 000 people) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Needs are also high among the host community in Cox's Bazar.<sup>82</sup> Funding shortfalls projected for the outlook period are a major driver of needs, as households are highly dependent on assistance. The intensified conflict in Rakhine State, Myanmar, could lead to an additional influx of refugees, further increasing needs.<sup>83</sup> In addition, there is a moderate risk of extreme weather events during the monsoon season.<sup>84</sup>

Acute food insecurity in **Pakistan** remains of concern, due to economic downturn and subsequent high food prices limiting access to food.<sup>85</sup> While subsidies on essential items were already reduced in 2022, authorities might introduce new austerity measures, which could further limit the purchasing power of vulnerable households.<sup>86,87</sup> Moreover, localized floods in April 2024 led to human casualties, disrupted livelihoods and damaged or destroyed houses, infrastructure, crops and livestock.<sup>88,89</sup> About 7.9 million people (22 percent of the population analysed) are

projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between July and November 2024.<sup>90</sup>

Between May and September 2024, 364 000 people (27 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity in **Timor-Leste** – a sharp deterioration compared with the same period in 2023.<sup>91</sup> Food insecurity may worsen due to the impact of dry weather conditions on 2024 main crop production, which is forecast at below-average levels. This will exert additional upward pressure on already multiyear high prices, further reducing household purchasing power.<sup>92</sup> The nutrition situation is also alarming. In 2023, the cost of a nutrient-dense diet was already 78 percent higher than in 2019.<sup>93</sup>

Acute food insecurity in **Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua)** remains of concern, due to the potential impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production and livelihoods. Above-average rainfall is forecast between June and September 2024, associated with La Niña phenomenon.<sup>94,95</sup> Although this could promote crop growth, excessive rains could elevate the risk of localized flooding and affect the main maize crop by diminishing yields and favouring pest infestation. In addition, an above-average hurricane season is forecast between June and November 2024.<sup>96</sup> This would threaten the agricultural livelihoods of vulnerable smallholder farmers – whose food stocks are already reduced due to dryness-induced crop losses in 2023 – with a potentially detrimental impact on food security and nutrition.<sup>97</sup>

In the **Niger**, 3.4 million people (13 percent of the population) are projected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2024,<sup>98</sup> and more than 2.3 million children are projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024.<sup>99</sup> The lingering economic repercussions<sup>100</sup> of sanctions on trade with ECOWAS, a key trade partner,<sup>101</sup> have led to persistent shortages of essential food and non-food items, along with inflationary pressures.<sup>102</sup> These challenges are compounded by the reduced 2023 cereal output, a fodder deficit affecting livestock-based livelihoods, and continued conflict-related disruptions to trade and agriculture.<sup>103,104</sup> This situation will likely exacerbate food insecurity.


## Acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of highest and very high concern

2020–2024<sup>1</sup> peak numbers and prevalence


● NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT (IN MILLIONS)<sup>2</sup>

○ PREVALENCE IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT<sup>3</sup>

### Hotspots of highest concern



### Hotspots of very high concern



Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to October 2024)*. Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Data for 2024 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of April 2024. For the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic no peak data are available for the expected peak period in 2024.

<sup>2</sup> Populations that are classified as "moderately acute food insecure" and "severely acute food insecure" as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

<sup>3</sup> Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

<sup>4</sup> Data for 2023 and 2024 come from IPC analyses. Data before 2023 are from HNOs, applying different methodologies which limits comparability.

<sup>5</sup> No peak data are yet available for the expected peak period in 2024 (July–September). IPC Alert pointed towards the deterioration of acute food insecurity in 2024 amid escalating conflict.

<sup>6</sup> 2024 figure includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Data for 2023 come from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024, and are IPC equivalent.

Data for 2024 are based on the Addendum to the Myanmar HNRP 2024 (forthcoming) and are IPC equivalent.

<sup>8</sup> Based on WFP CARI. No peak data are yet available for 2024.

<sup>9</sup> Data for 2020–2022 come from IPC; data for 2023 and 2024 come from FEWS NET. The 2024 estimate corresponds to the upper-bound of a range.

While a general trend is apparent over time, comparability issues arise due to:

#### (i) Variations in coverage

- The Sudan witnessed an increase in total population estimates between 2020 and 2023.
- Chad's coverage expanded from 90 percent in 2020 to 100 percent in 2023, stabilizing at 91 percent in 2024.
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo saw an increase from 65 percent coverage in 2020 to 96 percent in 2024.

#### (ii) Differences in analysis time periods

- Analysis time periods differ for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine and Yemen.
- In Haiti, the peak in 2022 spans the period from September 2022 to February 2023, while other peaks refer to the March–June period.
- Myanmar's coverage periods were September–October for 2023, and June–August for 2024.

# Country risk narratives

## Asia and the Pacific

### Myanmar

#### Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis

A further deterioration of acute food insecurity is likely in the outlook period, due to intensified conflict and the economic crisis, compounded by a below-average rainy season.

Intensified conflict is likely to persist, amid growing concerns over the spread of intercommunal violence in Rakhine State.<sup>105</sup> Since late October 2023, conflict between the military and NSAGs has further intensified in the northwest, northeast, southeast and Rakhine State.<sup>106</sup> As of April 2024, the surge in fighting has triggered a spike in displacement, with over 900 000 people newly displaced since the end of October 2023.<sup>107</sup> Since the February 2021 military takeover, nearly 2.6 million people have been displaced.<sup>108</sup>

Conflict is likely to further drive elevated food inflation, as witnessed throughout 2023. As of March 2024, the cost of the basic food basket was 62 percent higher compared to the same period in 2023 and 274 percent higher compared to pre-February 2021.<sup>109</sup> Economic deterioration and conflict are likely to be compounded by forecast below-average rainfall during the monsoon season

between May and October, likely impacting the 2024 harvest.<sup>110</sup> This will further affect farmers' severely limited financial resources due to conflict, after two consecutive seasons of below-average rice production. This in turn will limit their access to agricultural inputs and markets.

Between June and August 2024, 13.3 million people (24 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.7 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).<sup>111</sup> This updated figure, which takes into account the intensified conflict since October 2023, represents a deterioration compared to the initial 12.9 million people projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above) during the same period.<sup>112</sup> Around 428 000 children are projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024, a 54 percent increase compared to 2023.<sup>113</sup> Humanitarian response is facing extreme constraints due to fighting and limited access.<sup>114</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

##### Anticipatory actions

- Provide storage containers to safeguard seeds and fertilizers, ensuring their protection and longevity for agricultural activities.
- Implement erosion prevention measures (cash for work) to safeguard agricultural land and preserve soil quality – thereby ensuring continued farming practices and productivity – targeting host communities of IDPs and returnees.
- Support subsistence to smallholder livestock and poultry owners, by providing animal feed, vaccinations and animal health services, particularly for households anticipated to be affected by escalating conflict.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

##### Emergency response

- Humanitarians require USD 994 million to reach 5.3 million people who have been prioritized for urgent assistance, out of 18.6 million people in need.
- Protect, rehabilitate and restore livelihoods through provision of agricultural inputs – to bolster food production capabilities, livestock input and animal health support – and of fishing inputs for small-scale fisheries.
  - Rehabilitate community assets and enable the most vulnerable households to meet their immediate needs through cash transfers.
  - Maintain and scale up emergency food and nutrition assistance to reach displaced populations, including in inaccessible areas.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

##### Other actions

- Improve coordination between humanitarian organizations, civil society, resources partners, international governments and relevant stakeholders, to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access for executing and overseeing emergency aid initiatives, in adherence to principled guidelines.
- Establish interagency contingency arrangements and rapid response mechanism for displaced populations.
- Advance collective advocacy with resource partners, humanitarian organizations, civil society, regional and international governments and bodies, and all relevant stakeholders, to expand access for and acceptance of humanitarian assistance and to diversify means of delivering humanitarian assistance, in adherence to principled guidelines.
- Advance preparedness actions for the cyclone season and potential further large-scale displacement.

# East Africa

## South Sudan

### Key drivers of food insecurity: inflation, flooding, conflict

High levels of acute food insecurity will likely remain widespread, affecting over half of the population, including people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Pibor and Aweil East counties and returnees from the Sudan.<sup>115</sup>

Between February and March 2024, prices of maize and sorghum, the main cereal staples, respectively surged by about 40 percent in the capital, Juba, on top of the 90 and 70 percent yearly increase.<sup>116</sup> Prices soared after a further sharp depreciation of the currency, which followed a significant reduction in oil exports caused by a rupture of a pipeline in the Sudan in February. The pipeline transports a large share of South Sudanese oil exports, which accounts for nearly all of its foreign earnings.<sup>117, 118</sup> As of April 2024, oil exports remained disrupted by the ongoing conflict.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, an ongoing tax dispute threatens the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations.<sup>120</sup> Despite above-average cereal production in 2023, mainly due to reduced flooding, a substantial cereal deficit is forecast for 2024.<sup>121</sup> Tight domestic supplies and currency depreciation will continue to underpin food prices.

Heavy rains, associated with El Niño conditions in Lake Victoria Basin in 2023, heighten the risk of substantial river overflows and extensive floods in flood-prone areas of Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and in Greater Pibor Administrative Area in 2024. This is likely to prompt displacements and constrain access to markets, along with

outbreaks of waterborne diseases, driving acute food insecurity. Forecast above-average rains between March and May in most areas of the country are expected to benefit crop production but are also likely to exacerbate floods.<sup>122</sup>

Subnational conflict and frequent episodes of intercommunal conflict, including cattle raids, ambushes and resource-based retaliatory attacks, are likely to continue, hampering access to markets, livelihoods and humanitarian assistance.<sup>123</sup> South Sudan hosts 650 000 primarily returnees and refugees from the Sudan as of April 2024.<sup>124</sup> This number is expected to rise further, with 820 000 returnees and 447 000 refugees projected to arrive from the Sudan by end of 2024,<sup>125</sup> increasing acute food insecurity both among new arrivals and host communities.<sup>126</sup>

Between April and July 2024, 7.1 million people (56 percent of the total population) were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), which includes 2.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 79 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).<sup>127</sup> While this represents a slight improvement in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), compared to the same period in 2023, the number of people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is projected to almost double. By June 2024, over 1.6 million children under 5 years of age and 870 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to be acutely malnourished.<sup>128</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

An estimated 9 million people, including refugees in South Sudan, will experience critical needs in 2024. The HRP calls for the targeting of 6 million people with some form of humanitarian support, depending on the resources available.

- Continue providing unconditional food and cash transfers, along with emergency livelihood support, to vulnerable populations, including returnees and IDPs, with a special focus on women and children, to boost access and availability to locally produced food. This assistance is crucial for areas where populations are experiencing Emergency or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity (IPC Phases 4 and 5).
- Provide livelihood kits to boost local food production (livelihood crop, vegetable and fishing kits).
- Restore and enhance livestock production and reduce mortality through vaccination campaigns and the provision of treatment.
- Plan for contingency and repositioning for famine-prone regions, in anticipation of floods, and develop alternate delivery mechanisms to allow physical access in the wet season.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Continue to support returnees and newly arriving refugees from the Sudan and Ethiopia.
- Ensure conflict-sensitive programming and pursue improved humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas.
- Enhance preparedness for continued inflows from the Sudan, including the provision of sufficient assistance to populations at crossing points, transit centres and refugee camps.
- Strengthen preparedness for further macroeconomic and societal instability, including related to preparations for elections and disruption to oil exports.

## Somalia

### Key drivers of food insecurity: flooding, lingering effects of drought, conflict

High levels of acute food insecurity are expected to remain widespread, with large parts of the population facing critical levels of acute food insecurity due to the lingering effects of the 2020–2023 drought, widespread flooding and flash floods in lowlying areas, conflict and high food prices.

Continued above-average rainfall is forecast for the April to June 2024 *Gu* rainy season, driven by El Niño conditions and positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), resulting in a high risk of flooding in riverine and lowlying areas. Particularly at risk are the Shabelle and Juba River basins, likely leading to reduced plantings, crop losses, infrastructure damage and post-harvest losses. There is also an increased risk of breeding and spreading of desert locusts, with swarms already reported in northwest Somalia. These conditions are likely to drive displacement and limit food production.<sup>129, 130</sup>

While food prices have declined since 2023, locally produced cereal prices remain high compared to the five-year average, with maize and sorghum prices expected to be higher than the five-year average throughout most of the outlook period.<sup>131</sup>

Conflict and insecurity are likely to persist, driving new displacement, disrupting market food supply, and limiting access to

farmlands and agricultural employment. Continued territorial gains by NSAGs, presidential elections in four states between June and November 2024, and the ongoing drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia – which will be completed by the end of 2024 – will likely result in a more volatile security situation. Humanitarian access, already facing very high constraints, will be further impeded.<sup>132, 133, 134, 135</sup> In some markets of Jubaland and Galmudug, supplies already decreased due to ongoing insecurity.<sup>136</sup> Conflict and climate shocks will likely further drive displacement in the outlook period, on top of 3.8 million IDPs as of April.<sup>137</sup>

Between April and June 2024, 3.4 million people (18 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including more than 714 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>138</sup> Acute malnutrition levels remain high, due to poor food access, inadequate childfeeding practices and low coverage of health and nutrition services. Exacerbated by food insecurity and disease outbreaks, an estimated 1.7 million children aged 6 to 59 months are facing acute malnutrition in 2024, including 430 000 who are likely to be severely malnourished. This is a slight improvement from 1.8 million in 2023.<sup>139</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

In 2024, USD 1.6 billion, 40 percent less compared to 2023, is required to assist an estimated 4.8 million people in Somalia, a 32 percent reduction compared to the number of people targeted in 2023. This follows a strict prioritization for the HNRP, with the response focusing on assisting populations at greatest vulnerability and risk – living in extreme and catastrophic levels of need – as defined at sector level, and being streamlined to centre on life-saving efforts.

- Expand the provision of comprehensive life-saving emergency services, encompassing food aid, cash assistance and emergency livelihood support, to increase food production at a local level. This effort should specifically aid populations experiencing acute food insecurity and facing the threat of reaching Emergency or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity (IPC Phases 4 or 5).
- Target vulnerable rural communities severely affected by the drought and floods, aiming to quickly restore their devastated livelihoods (protection of agriculture, livestock and fisheries assets).
- Extend the distribution of vital food and nutrition assistance to communities residing in remote or previously inaccessible regions, using integrated and swift response mechanisms.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Invest in early warning and in anticipatory action capacities ahead of predictable shocks, to mitigate their impact and enhance households' capacities to cope and adapt.

# Ethiopia

## Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, climate shocks, inflation

Food insecurity will likely remain high, due to armed conflict and communal violence, localized crop production shortfalls and a risk of flooding, especially in Amhara and Tigray.

Armed conflict and communal violence are likely to persist, especially in Amhara, Oromia and southern parts of Tigray.<sup>140</sup> Hostilities between federal forces and NSAGs, as well as attacks against civilians, continued throughout the first quarter of 2024 in these regions, which prompted the extension of the state of emergency until June 2024.<sup>141</sup> Curfews and restrictions on people's movement will affect livelihoods, access to markets and trade flows in the outlook period.

The long-lasting impact of prolonged drought in the south and southeast, between late 2020 and early 2023, and the 2020–2022 conflict in northern Ethiopia, persists. Despite an overall favourable performance of the *Meher* harvest, insufficient rains in northeastern Amhara and Tigray resulted in localized but significant crop production shortfalls.<sup>142</sup>

The 2024 *Belg/Gu* season is seeing above-average rains across central, southern and southeastern Ethiopia, pointing to the third consecutive near-average to above-average rainfall season.<sup>143, 144</sup> While enhanced rains will bring temporary relief to pastoralists in drought-affected areas,<sup>145, 146</sup> rising water levels could result in localized floods, displacement, reduced access to services and markets, and increased incidences of waterborne diseases and pests. Southern Ethiopia, which also recorded floods during the last seasonal rains, remains of concern for new flooding.<sup>147</sup>

Food inflation remained at 31.6 percent in February 2024. It is likely to remain high in the outlook period due to reduced output, rising production and transportation costs and currency depreciation.<sup>148</sup>

For 2024, 15.8 million people were estimated to need emergency food assistance.<sup>149</sup> Food needs will peak in the third quarter of 2024, with the exhaustion of stocks by poor households located in *Meher* areas. Malnutrition rates also remain high, mainly in Afar, Amhara and Tigray.<sup>150</sup>

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Emergency response

Ethiopia continues to face a major humanitarian crisis caused by climate shocks, disease outbreaks, conflict and insecurity, aggravated by economic and financial challenges. To address these needs, the 2024 HRP requires USD 3.2 billion to target over 15 million people, including 4 million IDPs.

- Support crop production (seeds, tools and fertilizers), to assist households in recovering or mitigating the effect of multiple shocks and increase access to food.
- Provide food and cash to the most food-insecure households, to mitigate the risk of selling productive assets during the lean season and reinforce food access at household level.
- Maintain and scale up nutrition assistance to crisis-affected populations and vulnerable groups.
- Scale up livestock interventions, such as animal health initiatives (livestock vaccinations), restocking programmes, provision of animal feed and forage seeds, as well as the rehabilitation of water points, to safeguard the wellbeing of livestock, especially in regions impacted by drought.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Other actions

- Continue to improve needs-based targeting, assurance measures and efficiency measures, given the large and growing gap between humanitarian needs and resources.

# Latin America and the Caribbean

## Haiti

### Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis, above-average rainfall and hurricane season

Escalating violence by NSAGs, the protracted economic crisis, the likelihood of extreme rainfall and an above-average hurricane season are likely to further deteriorate already critical levels of food insecurity and malnutrition,<sup>151</sup> with a risk of catastrophic conditions reemerging.

Amid a slow political transition led by the new presidential council, NSAGs are expected to continue using violence as a pressure tactic, expanding control over new areas. The deployment of the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission could face further delays due to persistent hurdles, including low funding.<sup>152</sup> Displacements, particularly in the urban centres, will increase, adding to the record 362 000 people reached in March 2024,<sup>153</sup> alongside disruptions to economic activities, food supply and humanitarian access.

With insecurity adding to pressure on prices by impairing the functioning of key markets and hampering trade flows, rampant inflation continues to affect poor households. Following six consecutive years of double-digit inflation,<sup>154</sup> the annual food inflation rate stood at 28 percent in February 2024.<sup>155</sup> Haiti's economy contracted between 2019 and 2023, recording one of the largest gross domestic product (GDP) contractions globally. Zero growth is forecast in 2024.<sup>156</sup>

Insecurity also caused abandonment of cropping areas in the key cereal-producing Artibonite department in 2023,<sup>157</sup> adding to overall

below-average maize and paddy production in that year.<sup>158</sup> While above-average rainfall forecasted for April to June 2024 may be overall favourable for crop prospects, it raises the risk of flooding, with a potential negative impact on crops and animal health. Forecasted above-average temperatures could also lead to pest infestations.<sup>159</sup> The 2024 hurricane season (June–November) is forecast to be above average,<sup>160</sup> further raising risks of crop losses and damages to livelihoods and infrastructures.

Half of Haiti's population (5 million people) is projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between March and June 2024,<sup>161</sup> – an increase of 500 000 people compared to an earlier projection for the same period<sup>162</sup> and a slight increase compared to 2023.<sup>163</sup> About 1.6 million people, (17 percent of the population) are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Haiti's food-security situation has steadily deteriorated in recent years, and the country ranks among those with the highest prevalence of acute food insecurity globally. Acute malnutrition prevalence exceeds 10 percent in certain locations of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan areas.<sup>164</sup> With only 6.3 percent of the required funding for food security and nutrition under the 2024 HRP confirmed,<sup>165</sup> immediate action is imperative to prevent the risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, considering the very volatile situation.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Anticipatory actions

- Assist with establishing robust drainage channels to manage floodwaters effectively, alongside flood-resistant water harvesting and irrigation systems, and flood-tolerant crop varieties. This aims to fortify farming households against flood risks, minimize vulnerability to inundation and bolster coping mechanisms during flood incidents.
- Strengthen urban community gardens and community seed banks, focusing on providing crop seeds and fertilizers, primarily to women-led associations, to enhance local food production resilience.
- Preposition agricultural inputs and equipment in vulnerable regions prone to flooding and hurricanes, ensuring timely distribution to protect the livelihood assets of smallholder farmers ahead of anticipated natural disasters.
- Implement cash assistance programmes targeting the most vulnerable individuals in both rural and urban areas, aiming to alleviate the anticipated impact of rising food prices on food security.
- Support the provision of timely alerts and guidance to vulnerable communities on evacuation routes, emergency shelters and preparedness measures, and develop specific contingency plans for hurricanes.
- Provide early warning messages with tailored advice, if a hurricane is expected to make landfall.
- Distribute anticipatory cash to protect lives and food security in case a hurricane or flood early warning trigger is reached.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Emergency response**

Key drivers of food insecurity include increased gang violence, an unstable sociopolitical environment, rising prices and low agricultural production. The 2024 HRP calls for USD 340 million for food security and USD 32.5 million for nutrition interventions.

- Guarantee that emergency humanitarian aid reaches individuals encountering Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including the scale-up of life-saving food assistance to IDP communities.
- Expand efforts to prevent and treat acute malnutrition in regions showing an increasing prevalence of malnutrition, emphasizing integration with food security, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health partners.
- Safeguard livestock assets and revive production by supplying goats, roosters, hens and materials for constructing chicken coops, as well as providing treatment and vaccination for livestock.
- Improve staple food and vegetable production, by distributing crop and vegetable seeds, and providing training on good agricultural practices.
- Implement cash transfer programmes for buying food and agricultural inputs.
- Provide immediate emergency response and livelihood recovery support to smallholder farmers affected by hurricanes, including restocking livestock, promoting rainwater harvesting, and rehabilitating critical infrastructure such as seed-processing facilities, storage units and irrigation systems.
- Develop contingency strategies to address natural calamities like floods and droughts, ensuring prompt and efficient emergency response.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Other actions**

- Provide immediate humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, clean water and healthcare services, to IDPs affected by violence and natural disasters.

## Near East and North Africa

### Palestine

**Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic restrictions**

As of mid-March 2024, famine was projected to occur by the end of May in the two northern governorates of the Gaza Strip, driven by the intensity of the conflict, highly restricted access to essential goods and humanitarian assistance, and the collapse of local agrifood systems. It is highly likely that the rest of the Gaza Strip would be facing a risk of famine through July 2024, in a worst-case scenario.<sup>166</sup>

The conflict in the Gaza Strip is likely to continue in the outlook period, with military operations expanding into Rafah governorate as of 17 May 2024.<sup>167</sup> The conflict has resulted in an unprecedented death toll, heavy destruction and mass displacement. By mid-May, over 35 000 Palestinians had been killed in the Gaza Strip, while about 1.7 million (75 percent of its population) were internally displaced.<sup>168</sup> As of end of January 2024, the cost of direct damage inflicted on infrastructure in the Gaza Strip was equivalent to 97 percent of the total GDP of West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2022.<sup>169</sup> This has been compounded by heavy restrictions leading to severe shortages of fuel, electricity and imported commercial goods, including food and water.<sup>170</sup> The conflict has led to an

increase of 120.3 percent in the consumer price index in the first quarter of 2024,<sup>171</sup> while GDP in the Gaza Strip collapsed by over 80 percent year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2023.<sup>172</sup>

Humanitarian access faces extreme constraints both into the Gaza Strip and within the territory, particularly to northern Gaza and Gaza governorates.<sup>173</sup> Humanitarian assistance remains the primary source of essential items since early October, given ongoing heavy restrictions on imports of commercial goods.<sup>174</sup>

The conflict in the Gaza Strip is also directly affecting the West Bank and East Jerusalem.<sup>175</sup> In the West Bank, a drastic increase in violent incidents, mobility restrictions and border closures has contributed to a 22 percent year-on-year contraction of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2023.<sup>176, 177</sup>

Between mid-March and mid-July, half of the population of the Gaza Strip (1.1 million people) is expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), and the entire population of the Gaza Strip is expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food

insecurity.<sup>178</sup> According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, as of March 2024, all evidence pointed towards a major acceleration of starvation-related death and malnutrition.<sup>179</sup> Malnutrition rates had doubled since January 2024 in the northern governorates, with 1 in 3 children under 2 years of age being affected.<sup>180</sup> As of March 2024, famine was projected and imminent in the North Gaza and Gaza

governorates, in the absence of an immediate cessation of hostilities, unrestricted humanitarian access and a restoration of health, water, sanitation and electricity. Moreover, for the southern and middle governorates, the IPC Famine Review Committee concluded that there was a risk of famine during the projection period of mid-March to mid-July, in a reasonable worst-case scenario.<sup>181</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Emergency response**

The Flash Appeal for Palestine requests USD 2.8 billion for April to December 2024. This funding will aim to address the needs of 2.3 million people in the Gaza Strip and 800 000 people in the West Bank. Approximately USD 782.1 million is to be allocated for food security interventions.

- Sustain fuel and cooking gas supply to support humanitarian efforts and keep vital services, such as mills and bakeries, operational in the Gaza Strip. The intervention will help to rehabilitate the agriculture, livestock and fishing sectors, to ensure sustained food production.
- Establish a secure humanitarian corridor for uninterrupted access, to ensure delivery across the Gaza Strip.
- Scale up life-saving food assistance (food parcels, wheat flour, hot meals and specialized nutritional supplement) to conflict-affected populations in response to escalating violence. Introduce cash transfers when feasible.
- Support rehabilitation in agriculture and livestock sectors to ensure stable food supply, empowering communities to rebuild and sustain livelihoods.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Other actions**

- Advocate for sustained access into all areas of the Gaza Strip, to provide assistance and mitigate potential famine conditions.

## Sudan

### Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis

Already critical levels of acute food insecurity could deteriorate further towards catastrophic outcomes in certain areas, driven by the escalating conflict and its devastating socioeconomic impact.

In the absence of a political solution, hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, supported by a growing number of NSAGs, are likely to further intensify and expand to the northeast.<sup>182</sup> Following the Rapid Sudan Force's advances in central and eastern Sudan, the conflict has taken a new turn since January 2024, with fighting escalating in several states and armed groups and local communities mobilizing.<sup>183, 184</sup> Displacement will continue to rise, adding to the 6.8 million IDPs and 1.8 million who crossed into neighbouring countries since April 2023.<sup>185</sup>

The Sudan faces a major food deficit in 2024.<sup>186</sup> Productive capacities have been heavily compromised as a result of damage, looting and the destruction of critical infrastructure and markets, bringing economic activities to a halt in key areas.<sup>187</sup> Widespread insecurity and lack of agricultural inputs due to trade disruptions severely reduced cereal production in 2023, estimated at 40 percent below the average of the previous five years.<sup>188</sup> As a result, the lean season started in March, two months earlier than usual,<sup>189</sup> while prices of main cereal staples have

more than doubled compared to pre-conflict levels.<sup>190</sup> The decline in domestic food production further increased the Sudan's dependency on imports,<sup>191</sup> while the Red Sea crisis has reduced vessel availability and created much higher freight costs and insurance premiums.<sup>192</sup>

The conflict has also impacted the country's exports and access to foreign revenues. Increasing difficulties in receiving and financing imports, as well as a decrease in domestic food production, will likely escalate shortages and underpin further price increases.<sup>193</sup> A risk of localized flooding due to above-average rainfall will be a compounding factor.<sup>194, 195, 196</sup>

The March 2024 IPC alert called for urgent action to prevent famine. It warned that some populations in Khartoum and Gezira states, as well as Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, could face total collapse of livelihoods, starvation and death (Catastrophe [IPC Phase 5]) during the lean season, without the cessation of hostilities and a significant deployment of humanitarian assistance.<sup>197</sup> The last IPC update (December 2023) projected that between October 2023 and February 2024, during the harvest season, 17.7 million people in the Sudan (37 percent of the population) would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)

levels of acute food insecurity, including 4.9 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – a staggering increase of 21 percentage points compared to pre-conflict levels.<sup>198</sup> Malnutrition levels remain critical,

with around 3.7 million children expected to be acutely malnourished – a 22 percent increase from 2023.<sup>199</sup> Humanitarian access faces extreme constraints.<sup>200</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Emergency response**

The 2024 humanitarian response requires USD 2.7 billion to accelerate and scale up life-saving and protection assistance, and avert further deterioration of the humanitarian situation for 14.7 million people.

- Deliver and expand urgent, life-saving aid to IDPs, refugees and vulnerable individuals from host communities. This encompasses general food assistance and preventive and nutritional treatment for children under 5 years of age, as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls.
- Provide emergency agriculture input for the main planting season in June–July. If provided in time, quality sorghum, millet and other crop seeds will enable smallholder vulnerable farming families to grow sufficient quantities of cereals to feed themselves and gain income from surplus sales preventing the worst levels of food insecurity in 2024–2025.
- Undertake feed and animal health treatments, vaccination and restocking where appropriate, to safeguard livestock assets.

## Lebanon

### Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict

Acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate amid economic stagnation, diminishing humanitarian assistance and the risk of a military escalation in southern Lebanon.

Since 2020, Lebanon has experienced a severe economic crisis.<sup>201</sup> Despite relative improvements in recent months, headline inflation stood still at a high level of 123 percent in February 2024.<sup>202</sup> Also, the cost of the survival minimum food expenditure basket in December 2023 was 164 percent higher in Lebanese pound terms, compared to the same period in 2023.<sup>203</sup> Economic challenges are expected to persist amid heightened regional security tensions. The anticipated end of bread subsidies in September 2024, expected following the exhaustion of the World Bank loan currently financing them, is likely to raise prices for essential items.<sup>204</sup>

Additionally, the gradual and continued reduction in humanitarian assistance, for Syrian and Palestinian refugees as well as Lebanese citizens, is expected to aggravate the situation further. Since November 2023, agricultural livelihoods have been disrupted due to farmers' inability to safely access their fields and production losses.

Finally, hostilities at the southern Lebanese border have interrupted trade flows and reduced access to markets. According to a recent survey, 39 percent of affected farmers living in the south have been displaced, affecting their productivity and safe access to fields, and resulting in harvest loss.<sup>205</sup> Since late February 2024, the hostilities have displaced over 90 000 people.<sup>206</sup> A scenario where hostilities escalate into all out conflict would entail dire humanitarian and food insecurity consequences.

Looking ahead, 1.3 million people (23 percent of the population), encompassing Lebanese citizens, and Syrian and Palestinian refugees, are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between April and September 2024. Specifically, 18 percent of Lebanese residents are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, along with 34 percent of Syrian refugees, as well as 31 percent of Palestinian refugees who have been in Lebanon since before the Syrian conflict, and 45 percent of Palestinian refugees who were previously residing in the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>207</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Emergency response**

The Lebanon Response Plan 2024, which remains under finalization, has replaced the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the Emergency Response Plan. The strategy of the Food Security and Agriculture sector responds to high food insecurity levels in Lebanon.

- Ensure the most vulnerable and food-insecure populations living in Lebanon receive assistance to reduce their food gaps and diversify their intake, primarily through the provision of cash-based assistance and in-kind food parcels and meals, through community kitchens, school snacks and meals to Lebanese and refugee students.
- Implement integrated pest management strategies, early detection systems and training programmes for farmers, on pest and disease control, to help prevent significant losses.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Other actions**

- Coordinate and respond to the needs of agricultural households affected by the conflict in southern Lebanon, through assessing the impact of the conflict on agricultural livelihoods, supporting the early-recovery needs of agricultural households, and identifying priority interventions.
- Coordinate and provide technical support to public institutions at national and decentralized levels, and humanitarian organizations, to strengthen service-delivery capacities in food security, agriculture and social protection.

## Syrian Arab Republic

**Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict**

The economic situation is likely to further deteriorate in the outlook period, exacerbating already high levels of acute food insecurity. This is amid a recent spate of hostilities in the northwest, east and south of the country, and the risk of escalation of regional conflict fueled by developments in the Gaza Strip.

Rising prices of essential goods are likely to continue affecting household purchasing power, restricting access to food and other necessities. Agricultural production, especially wheat, is vulnerable to weather anomalies, poor services and a sharp rise in the prices of quality production inputs, resulting in a continued decline in production and productivity. In 2023, although rainfall was better than in previous seasons, domestic wheat production was less than two-thirds of national food needs, with the rest satisfied by imports that need to be financed by dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Macroeconomic distress has also led to multiple currency devaluations, which took place four times in 2023 alone. The weakening currency coupled with scarcity of energy, especially fuel and electricity, lead to significant increases in production and transportation costs, and thus significant hikes in food prices.<sup>208</sup> In January 2024, the cost of a food basket for a family of five in

Syrian pound terms rose by over 100 percent compared to the beginning of 2023.<sup>209</sup> The monthly minimum wage covered less than 20 percent of this total basket cost.<sup>210</sup>

The risk of localized conflict escalation remains across the northern Syrian Arab Republic, amid growing tensions reverberating across the region from the conflict in the Gaza Strip.<sup>211</sup> In October 2023, at least 68 000 civilians were displaced in Idlib and Aleppo governorates as a result of the largest campaign of air and artillery strikes in three years.<sup>212</sup>

The impact of economic deterioration is likely to be exacerbated by the complete cessation of WFP's general food assistance programme in the country, as of January 2024, resulting from funding shortfalls and ending assistance to more than 3.5 million people among the most vulnerable segment of the Syrian Arab Republic's population.<sup>213</sup> The cuts are likely to contribute to the worsening of food insecurity in the outlook period. Between August and September 2023, 12.9 million people (55 percent of the population) were facing high levels of acute food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology.<sup>214, 215, 216</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Emergency response**

- Following the identification of severely acute food-insecure and moderately acute food-insecure groups based on the HNO 2024, provide support and assistance to households facing food insecurity, prioritizing the severe acute food-insecure groups and followed by the moderate, who might slide into severe acute food insecurity during 2024 and 2025.
- Prioritize emergency food assistance, critical and time-sensitive agriculture assistance (inputs for crops, livestock and food processing) and agriculture-based livelihood support, including light rehabilitation of irrigation systems and infrastructures, bakeries, animal feed production and other income-generation activities, through the most feasible and contextually appropriate modality, mainly FAO Farmer Field and Farmer Business schools.
- Continue to provide in-kind, and cash and voucher assistance, or a combination based on the feasibility of the assessment modalities, and market functionality.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Other actions**

- Improve integration and coverage of assistance, to ensure that households receive a diverse package of interventions that meets their differential needs.

# Yemen

## Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, localized conflict, floods

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate amid the protracted economic crisis, exacerbated by ongoing hostilities in the Red Sea. The security situation is likely to remain volatile,<sup>217</sup> but a return to high-intensity conflict is unlikely. Lack of progress in the ongoing peace process is likely to preclude economic relief, prolonging the country's economic crisis.<sup>218</sup>

Anticipated increases in freight and insurance costs, resulting from hostilities in the Red Sea, are expected to push up the cost of staple foods and other imports over the outlook period.<sup>219</sup> In addition, the Yemeni rial is likely to continue depreciating in areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, where the currency lost 24 percent of its value year-on-year as of February 2024.<sup>220</sup> Given that Yemen is 90 percent dependent on imports for its domestic food needs, elevated import costs could lead to a further increase in the cost of the minimum food basket in government-controlled areas, from its all-time high level in February 2024.<sup>221</sup>

Very high access constraints remain a key impediment to humanitarian operations.<sup>222</sup> In addition, humanitarian assistance has also become increasingly low and unpredictable. The HRP for 2024 was funded only at 14 percent as of April 2024,<sup>223</sup> and the general food assistance had been paused in areas under Sana'a

based authorities (SBA) since December 2023, resulting in an increasing prevalence of poor food consumption of beneficiaries.<sup>224</sup>

In addition, above-average rainfall is expected to exacerbate flood risk between June and August, with some flood-prone areas affected as early as April.<sup>225</sup> Floods are likely to result in displacement, damage to infrastructure and disruption of essential services.

Between October 2023 and February 2024, approximately 4.6 million people (45 percent of the population analysed) in government-controlled areas were estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) – including more than 1.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This represents a significant deterioration compared to a similar period the year prior.<sup>226</sup> While an IPC analysis of SBA-controlled areas is being finalized, up to 18 million people (55 percent of the total population of the country) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in October 2024, according to FEWS NET.<sup>227</sup> The malnutrition situation countrywide is likely to deteriorate, with 2.4 million children expected to be acutely malnourished in 2024 – a 9 percent increase from 2023.<sup>228</sup>

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 1.4 billion for food security and agriculture and USD 194 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency livelihood support and season-specific cash transfers to protect and restore livelihoods, while stimulating economic recovery to increase availability and access to secure, safe and life-saving food for the most vulnerable households.
- Maintain the delivery of life-saving food and/or cash assistance to IDPs impacted by both natural and human-caused shocks, and to refugees and mixed migrants.
- Sustain nutrition, school feeding, and resilience and livelihood activities.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Other actions

- Continue advocacy and engagement with local authorities for the resumption of general food assistance in SBA-controlled areas.
- Establish a better targeted and prioritized food assistance programme in Yemen, prioritizing the most vulnerable with limited resources.
- Continue donor advocacy for increased funding.

# Southern Africa

## Democratic Republic of the Congo – eastern provinces (North and South Kivu, Ituri)

### Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict

Armed conflict in eastern provinces is likely to further intensify in the outlook period, driving new displacement and leading to a deterioration of already critical levels of acute food insecurity.

Increased fighting between various NSAGs and with governmental, regional and international forces,<sup>229</sup> as well as the expansion of high-intensity conflict into South Kivu province,<sup>230</sup> point towards increasing levels of violence and conflict-driven displacement. Out of the 7.1 million IDPs across the country, 6.3 million are concentrated in eastern provinces.<sup>231</sup> Against this background, the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) from these provinces creates a serious gap in the protection of civilians,<sup>232</sup> particularly those displaced, who have been increasingly exposed to violence within and around camps.<sup>233</sup> In a context of already high food prices, conflict-induced displacements and restricted access to agricultural areas will likely impact food availability in the outlook.<sup>234, 235</sup> In South Kivu, the impact of floods between November 2023 and January 2024 likely affected sowing, growing and harvesting of critical staple crops.<sup>236, 237</sup>

Countrywide, a total of 23.4 million people (22 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from January to June 2024, including 2.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>238</sup> While this marks an improvement compared to the same period in 2023, the projection does not fully account for the conflict intensification that has taken place in eastern provinces since end 2023, and which is highly likely to continue amid MONUSCO withdrawal – further increasing acute food insecurity in the outlook period. These provinces already rank among ones with the highest number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Malnutrition is expected to deteriorate through June 2024,<sup>239</sup> with 2.9 million children projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024 – an 11 percent increase from 2023.<sup>240</sup> This is compounded by the ongoing cholera outbreak in eastern provinces, which also creates additional burden for an already stretched health system.<sup>241</sup>

RECOMMENDATIONS

### Anticipatory actions

- Preposition cereal and vegetable seeds and tools to be distributed in the event of new conflict outbreaks, targeting the most vulnerable IDPs, returnees and host communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

- Increase food and livelihood assistance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to respond to growing needs resulting from heightened conflict, with a specific emphasis on North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces.
- Provide cash assistance and training to the most vulnerable individuals, in regions where markets are operational.
- Distribute small ruminants, poultry or fishing kits to support the livelihoods of those affected by conflict and food insecurity.
- Maintain and adjust conflict-sensitive strategies to ensure the uninterrupted provision of humanitarian aid to populations experiencing severe acute food insecurity.
- Strengthen emergency coordination and humanitarian efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Set up a system to monitor the evolution of recurrent shocks (for example conflicts and floods) for anticipatory actions.

## Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe

### Key drivers of food insecurity: El Niño-induced drought, economic shocks

A food security crisis is unfolding across Southern Africa as an El Niño-induced drought brings about harvest failures and immediate needs, exacerbated by ever-increasing food prices and ongoing macroeconomic challenges.

During February 2024, over large parts of Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, an extensive dry spell affected crops at the time when water was most critical for crop development.<sup>242</sup> It was accompanied by a month-long heat wave, with temperatures 5 degrees above average.<sup>243, 244</sup> Below-average cereal harvests are expected in 2024, with potential for extensive crop failures in some areas.<sup>245</sup> Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have declared national drought disasters.<sup>246, 247, 248</sup>

Where harvests fail, affected households will require immediate assistance. Needs will increase dramatically as more communities deplete their provisions ahead of the next harvest. Over 9 000 drought-related cattle deaths have been reported in the region between October 2023 and February 2024, a period when pasture and water availability should be plentiful.<sup>249</sup>

Double-digit annual food inflation rates were recorded in Zimbabwe (84 percent), Malawi (42 percent) and Zambia (16 percent) in February/March 2024.<sup>250</sup> Prices of maize, which represents the biggest share of total calories consumed, were extremely high in all countries during the last lean season (2023/24).<sup>251</sup> Due to food production shortfalls, further hikes in food prices are likely during

the outlook period.<sup>252</sup> This could put the affordability of adequate diets beyond the reach of many low-income households, and increase the risk of malnutrition among vulnerable populations.<sup>253, 254</sup> Governments in the region are constrained in their ability to support due to significant economic challenges. These include the unsustainable debt burden and other social priorities such as responding to the cholera outbreaks, which are restricting their budgets.<sup>255</sup>

In Mozambique, the conflict in the northern province of Cabo Delgado has recently seen an increase in attacks by NSAGs and related population displacements.<sup>256</sup> The recent spike in violence, coupled with the planned withdrawal of the South African Development Community mission in Mozambique by July 2024,<sup>257</sup> raises concerns for the outlook period.

The drought is hitting during a time of already alarming levels of food insecurity. In March, at the end of the last lean season, 4.4 million people in Malawi,<sup>258</sup> 3.3 million in Mozambique,<sup>259</sup> 2 million in Zambia<sup>260</sup> and up to 3.5 million in Zimbabwe (IPC compatible, projected to reduce to 3 million during harvest until October)<sup>261, 262</sup> were estimated to be facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including at least 266 000 in Malawi, 220 000 in Mozambique and 58 000 in Zambia in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). No disaggregation by phase is available for Zimbabwe.<sup>263</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

- Provide food and/or cash to drought-affected populations.
- Provide critical agricultural inputs, including drought-tolerant, short-cycle cereal seeds, legumes and vegetable seeds, and fertilizers.
- Implement livestock restocking, supplementary feeding, and monitor and control interventions, to sustain and improve livestock health and productivity.
- Establish emergency school feeding and nutrition-specific programmes to reduce the burden of the drought on children and vulnerable populations.
- Scale up smallholder farmers' access to improved grain storage facilities, post-harvest technologies and equipment, and water harvesting and management techniques.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Assist governments in providing timely and reliable information on food security and nutrition situation.

# West Africa and the Sahel

## Burkina Faso

### Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, trade disruptions

Already critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist, driven by conflict and disruption to trade and agriculture.

Conflict is likely to persist, further affecting livelihoods and food security in northern and eastern parts of the country. In the first quarter of 2024, the number of violent events and associated fatalities decreased compared to the same period last year.<sup>264</sup> The situation remains concerning in dozens of localities that are besieged by NSAGs,<sup>265</sup> which restrict population movement and humanitarian access, and control the main supply routes.<sup>266</sup> Markets and trade routes in conflict-affected areas record minimal or no activity, leading to high prices and limited availability of food and non-food items in markets.<sup>267</sup> Despite indications that some IDPs have returned to their areas of origin, the country continues to face a major displacement crisis with over 2 million IDPs.<sup>268</sup> In spite of a slight recovery, agricultural production in conflict-affected areas remains below normal due to lack of access to land and inputs.<sup>269, 270</sup>

Over 2.7 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity during the June–August 2024 lean season, including 423 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), with four provinces in northern and eastern Burkina Faso classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>271</sup> While this is a reduction compared to 2023, very high concerns remain, in particular for populations in blockaded areas. According to the latest IPC analysis of Acute Malnutrition, which covered only 37 out of 45 provinces due to access restrictions, 480 000 children and almost 132 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to be acutely malnourished during the same period, including 114 000 cases of severe acute malnutrition.<sup>272</sup> Humanitarian access has significantly deteriorated, reaching extreme levels of constraints, and is of particular concern in the north and east, particularly in over 30 municipalities that remain under siege by NSAGs.<sup>273</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Anticipatory actions

- Establish production sites and provide home-gardening supplies to the most vulnerable households, including IDPs and host communities, to facilitate agricultural activities with limited mobility and safeguard agropastoral livelihoods.
- Enhance seasonal vaccination campaigns for livestock, to lessen the risk of disease outbreaks ahead of the rainy season.
- Preposition agricultural inputs and promptly distribute them, or offer unconditional cash transfers, to displaced populations and host communities in anticipation of and response to new conflict outbreaks. This aims to mitigate the immediate impact on livelihoods and food security. When possible, these cash transfers may be facilitated through social protection systems.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

- Increase livelihood support for farmers in preparation for the main agricultural season, by providing seeds and tools.
- Expand life-saving assistance to address the critical requirements of households experiencing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), prioritizing their immediate food and livelihood needs, especially in hard-to-reach regions.
- Implement nutritional support programmes, including the distribution of specialized nutritious foods, to prevent and treat malnutrition.
- Provide targeted food assistance to IDP camps and host communities, often integrating these efforts with other services such as sanitation, healthcare and education provided by partner organizations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Preposition food supplies to mitigate the impact of increased food insecurity during periods of heightened conflict or market disruption. WFP proactively to preposition food supplies in strategic locations. This action ensures that food assistance is available and can be distributed quickly in areas that are hard to reach due to insecurity or logistical challenges.
- Provide logistical and operational support to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. This includes air services for the humanitarian community, transport and storage of supplies, and sometimes even communication and coordination support to ensure that aid reaches those in need effectively and efficiently.



## Central African Republic

### Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict

Acute food insecurity is expected to worsen over the outlook period due to rising insecurity.

The Central African Republic is likely to see an aggravation of armed conflict, marked by clashes between security forces and NSAGs, particularly in the northwest and northeast of the country, and often involving the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure.<sup>274, 275</sup>

This deterioration in security conditions is expected to further restrict humanitarian access and contribute to increased levels of displacement.<sup>276</sup> As of March 2024, 522 000 people were internally displaced, marking a slight increase of 2 percent since December 2023.<sup>277</sup>

In central and southern areas, planting of the 2024 maize crop started in mid-March. Weather forecasts between April and June 2024 point to below-average rainfall amounts, which may negatively affect maize yields and therefore adversely affect food availability.<sup>278</sup> Moreover, several subprefectures located in the southeast zone have been affected by floods, while some other agricultural land in the north has been affected by drought, severely impacting livelihoods.<sup>279</sup>

The annual inflation rate moderated to nearly 1 percent in January 2024, down from 10 percent a year ago, due to an improved supply in the country's primary consumer markets.<sup>280</sup> Nonetheless, price levels remain notably elevated, raising concerns regarding affordability for vulnerable populations.<sup>281</sup>

In the absence of assistance, over 2.5 million people (41 percent of the population analysed) will face Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from April to August 2024, including 521 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>282</sup> This marks a slight rise compared to the same period last year, with an increase of 4 percentage points of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), albeit with a decrease in the proportion of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The most food-insecure people (IPC Phase 3 or above) are conflict-affected and displaced populations, as well as poor households in urban and peri-urban areas with limited access to food.<sup>283</sup> More than 177 000 children and 162 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to be acutely malnourished through August 2024, representing a 40 percent decrease in children and 15 percent increase in women compared to estimates during the same period in 2023.<sup>284</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

The 2024 HRP aims to provide a sustained and focused response to centrality of protection, guided by the preferences of affected populations, while preserving their lives and their dignity and strengthening their resilience to shocks in a context where new crises have created new hotspots of humanitarian need. The HRP requires USD 367.7 million to reach a target of 1.9 million people.

- Distribute vegetable seeds with sensitivity to conflict dynamics, prioritizing the most vulnerable groups, especially those affected by conflict and displacement, in response to new conflict outbreaks.
- Distribute small ruminants to aid livelihood diversification among populations affected by conflict and displacement, alongside supporting animal health initiatives.
- Provide unconditional cash transfers to both displaced populations and host communities, in preparation for and response to new conflict outbreaks, aiming to anticipate and alleviate the immediate impact on livelihoods and food security.
- Provide life-saving food assistance for the most vulnerable, crisis-affected people including Sudanese refugees.

## Chad

### Key drivers of food insecurity: insecurity, high food prices

High levels of acute food insecurity are expected to deteriorate due to the impact of conflict in the Sudan, insecurity and high food prices.

As the conflict in the Sudan is likely to worsen, the arrival of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees in Chad – reaching 715 000 as of March 2024, with most located in the Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira regions – is projected to reach 910 000 by the end of 2024.<sup>285</sup> This will lead to a further depletion of livelihoods and food stocks in host communities, driving increased humanitarian needs.<sup>286</sup>

In the Lac region, deteriorating livelihoods and local production shortfalls in 2023, amid limited humanitarian assistance, recurrent climate shocks, including flooding and drought,<sup>287</sup> have aggravated acute food insecurity.<sup>288</sup> In N'Djamena, violent clashes in February 2024, amid tensions ahead of the presidential election scheduled for May 2024, have restricted the movement of goods and people. These tensions raise concerns around political instability and a potential deterioration of the security situation.<sup>289, 290</sup>

Food prices are likely to remain high,<sup>291</sup> due to the reduced 2023 cereal output, high transport costs, limited imports from the Sudan

and Libya, and rising local demand, especially in refugee-hosting areas.<sup>292, 293, 294</sup>

Almost 3.4 million Chadian residents (20 percent of the population) are projected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2024 lean season, including 534 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4),<sup>295</sup> a 7 percentage points increase in the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) and a 2 percentage points increase in the population facing Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>296</sup> In addition, during the 2024 lean season, 419 800 refugees and returnees (34 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 122 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>297</sup> Furthermore, a recent nutrition survey points to a global acute malnutrition prevalence of 10 percent among Sudanese refugees, reaching 16 percent in refugee camps in Iriba.<sup>298</sup> Across the country, over 1.7 million children under 5 years of age are expected to be acutely malnourished between October 2023 and September 2024, including 480 000 children facing severe acute malnutrition.<sup>299</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Anticipatory actions

- Distribute home-gardening inputs to IDPs and host populations in the Lac region, to support low-mobility agricultural activities.
- Distribute agricultural inputs for the upcoming cereal planting season by providing access to seeds and fertilizers, especially for vulnerable farmers.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

Chad continues to face a protracted and multidimensional humanitarian crisis, with 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, compared with 7.6 million in 2023. To deliver adequate emergency assistance to the most vulnerable of the population, humanitarian partners need around USD 1.125 billion.

- Support flood-receding crop cultivation to boost agricultural production, taking advantage of potentially higher-than-average rainfall.
- Assist targeted persons in need, including refugees, IDPs, host communities and food-insecure populations. This includes general food assistance and livelihood-restoration support activities, as well as prevention and treatment of malnutrition for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Scale up the early detection and treatment of wasting at community level to mitigate the expected increase in the number of wasted children, especially in areas with limited access to basic social services.

# Mali

## Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic shocks

Pockets of population facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) are likely in the outlook period, due to ongoing conflict, economic shocks and humanitarian access constraints.

Conflict will likely drive new displacements, adding to the existing number of over 354 000 IDPs as of December 2023.<sup>300</sup> This is particularly important given an intensification of violence targeting civilians in the country, with 468 fatalities recorded in such incidents in January–March 2024, compared to 279 in the same period in 2023.<sup>301</sup> This trend is likely to continue, especially after the full withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, completed in December 2023.

Ongoing blockades by NSAGs on populations in Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka are major drivers of food insecurity, including Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) levels of food insecurity in the case of Ménaka.<sup>302</sup> Blockades compromise the transport of food to local markets, access to humanitarian supplies and the movement of people, the latter also serving to disrupt agricultural activities.<sup>303, 304</sup> Mali's announced withdrawal from ECOWAS, together with Burkina Faso

and the Niger, risks driving livelihood losses and price hikes of essential goods.<sup>305</sup> This would result from the impact of trade disruptions, triggering food and energy shortages, especially given Mali's status as a landlocked country. The withdrawal would also reduce remittance inflows and cut off access to ECOWAS-ruled regional financial institutions.<sup>306</sup> This comes in the context of a reported early depletion of stocks due to drops in agricultural production in conflict-affected areas.<sup>307</sup>

The March 2024 CH analysis projects that around 3 000 people in Ménaka province will face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in June–August 2024.<sup>308</sup> Almost 1.37 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), of which 121 000 people are projected in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal.<sup>309</sup> This is a slight increase compared to one year ago.<sup>310</sup> The nutrition situation remains concerning, especially in conflict-affected areas, with high global acute malnutrition prevalence above 10 percent and reaching 19.4 percent in Ménaka.<sup>311</sup> In 2024, more than 1.4 million children are projected to be acutely malnourished.<sup>312</sup>

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Anticipatory actions

- Establish production sites and provide home-gardening supplies to the most vulnerable households, including IDPs and host communities, to facilitate agricultural activities with limited mobility and safeguard agropastoral livelihoods.
- Preposition agricultural inputs and promptly distribute them, or offer unconditional cash transfers, to displaced populations and host communities in anticipation of and response to conflict outbreaks. This aims to mitigate the immediate impact on livelihoods and food security. When possible, these cash transfers may be facilitated through social protection systems.
- Initiate preparedness for post-harvest intervention for farmers and pastoralists to prevent the deterioration of their living conditions (distribution of materials for the conservation of agricultural products, cash-for-work programme).

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Emergency response

- Increase livelihood support for farmers in preparation for the main agricultural season, by providing seeds and tools.
- Expand life-saving aid to address the critical requirements of households experiencing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), prioritizing their immediate food and livelihood needs, especially in hard-to-reach regions.
- Support existing social protection programmes, targeting most-at-risk households in high-risk areas during the lean season.
- Ensure access to a nutritious and affordable diet, and to adequate services and practices for pregnant and breastfeeding women, infants and young children, through actions in the food, health, WASH and social protection systems.
- Scale up the early detection and treatment of wasting at community level, to mitigate the expected increase in the number of wasted children, especially in areas with limited access to basic social services.

## Nigeria

### Key drivers of acute food insecurity: macroeconomic challenges, high food prices, insecurity

Food insecurity will likely remain highly concerning, due to a multidimensional crisis driven by weakening macroeconomic conditions, heightened insecurity and subdued agricultural production.

In March 2024, the inflation rate exceeded 33 percent year-on-year,<sup>313</sup> eroding the frail purchasing power of households in a country where 38 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line.<sup>314</sup> On top of that, the naira has been strongly fluctuating, registering a yearly depreciation of 60 percent in February 2024.<sup>315</sup> Due to below-average cereal production in 2023 and high transport costs, prices of major staples such as rice and maize were 105 and 241 percent higher, respectively, on a yearly basis, in February 2024.<sup>316</sup> During the outlook, import restrictions amid abating foreign reserves,<sup>317</sup> increasing farming costs, and high levels of conflict in the North East, North West and parts of the North Central zones will likely impact the 2024 agricultural season. This will cause reduced yields and elicit further inflationary pressures.<sup>318</sup>

The security situation is likely to continue to deteriorate, exacerbating population displacement. This is a particular concern

for the northern states, which have already seen an uptick in insurgency, banditry and kidnapping in the first quarter of 2024.<sup>319</sup> The latter increased 44 percent in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023.<sup>320</sup> Insecurity has been disrupting agricultural livelihoods and affecting the functionality of markets.<sup>321</sup> Insecurity results in high humanitarian access constraints, particularly in the northeast, restricting the delivery of assistance to government-controlled towns and their immediate surroundings.<sup>322</sup>

Between June and August 2024, 31.8 million people (16 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, with nearly 1 million people projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>323</sup> This represents a 3 percentage points increase in the number of acutely food insecure people compared to the same time in the previous year. Acute malnutrition levels remain high, above 10 percent, in the northern states (Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara), with 4.4 million children and 585 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024.<sup>324</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Anticipatory actions

- Preposition and promptly distribute agricultural inputs or offer unconditional cash transfers to displaced populations and host communities in anticipation of and response to conflict outbreaks.
- Provide an anticipatory cash advance to people likely to be most impacted by floods. In addition, distribute flood-proof storage equipment to pre-identified people.
- Distribute double rations in flood-prone areas in case access to populations is affected.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

- To fully implement the HRP, humanitarian partners require USD 1.3 billion to assist 6 million people prioritized for humanitarian assistance.
- Enhance livelihood assistance for farmers in anticipation of the upcoming agricultural season, by supplying seeds and tools.
- Improve the timeliness, coordination and integration of food security analysis and response efforts to boost local capacity, and foster collaboration with other sectors and interventions.
- Scale up the production and distribution of locally produced supplementary food for improved nutrition, such as Tom Brown.
- Sustain humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas in the northeast, northwest and northcentral parts of the country, allowing for the lean season scale-up.
- Provide conditional cash-based transfers to conflict-affected populations, using the rapid response registry and the national social register where appropriate to establish a predictive, shock responsive, social protection mechanism.
- Scale up acute malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes in the northeast and northwest, in coordination with government, nutrition, food security, WASH and health partners.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Other actions

- Create a digital social registry for populations in flood-prone areas, to enable timely response and better targeting.

## Sierra Leone

### Key drivers of food insecurity: macroeconomic challenges, high food prices

Acute food insecurity is likely to worsen over the outlook period due to the difficult macroeconomic situation, including persistently high food and non-food inflation, mostly leading to high fuel prices, transportation costs and sustained currency depreciation.

The economic situation remains very volatile in Sierra Leone, with a headline inflation rate of 43 percent. Annual food inflation reached 45 percent in February 2024 – the highest in the West African region.<sup>325</sup> This represents a significant increase in basic food prices, continuing to limit households' access to food, although the markets are sufficiently supplied. Prices of local and imported rice, being the most consumed cereal, were up by 33 and 38 percent, respectively, above their elevated year-earlier levels as of February 2024, while prices of cassava recorded year-on-year increases of up to 122 percent.<sup>326, 327</sup>

Headline inflation is projected to slow down in 2024, reflecting sustained monetary tightening and more stable domestic utility costs. Nevertheless, high global prices for fuel (a major import) are expected to maintain upward pressure on transport costs, which would also translate into increasing food prices. New taxes to be implemented under the 2024 budget, including a 5 percent import duty on rice and cooking gas, are expected to drive up price pressures even further.<sup>328</sup>

Approximately 1.6 million people (about 20 percent of the population) are projected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June to August 2024 lean period, including over 31 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).<sup>329</sup> This represents an increase of 4 percentage points in the number of acutely food-insecure people compared with the same period in 2023.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

### Emergency response

- Scale up the provision of agricultural inputs and support for the main season, focusing on the most vulnerable population.
- Provide assistance to the most food-insecure districts and populations vulnerable to shocks by implementing shock-responsive social protection programmes, and revise transfer values to align with the current costs of Minimum Essential Needs.
- Support existing social protection programmes targeting most-at-risk households in the high-risk areas during the lean season.



# Glossary

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## Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration. The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases of severity, ranging from IPC/CH Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC/CH Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

## Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption required for an active and healthy life.

## Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

## Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

## Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food-consumption gaps – which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food-consumption gaps by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity. Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

## Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5).

## Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

## Famine Likely – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine Likely is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale (Phase 5), used to classify situations when Famine is likely occurring. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification, usually because either nutrition or mortality data are lacking, but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called Famine Likely. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe; the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

## Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

## Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

### Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

### Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

## Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

## Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

## Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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The Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is a multistakeholder initiative of humanitarian and development actors, united by a commitment to tackle the root causes of food crises and to promote sustainable solutions. GNAFC produces and shares analyses and knowledge, and strengthens the coordination of evidence-based responses across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. It operates at national, regional, and global levels.


Within GNAFC’s approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is part of a series of GNAFC’s analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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