



# IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response

Prepared on behalf of the Inter-Agency  
Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group

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# CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	1
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	4
<b>1. Introduction to the evaluation</b> .....	15
1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation.....	15
1.2 Country Context.....	16
1.3 Emergence Response and Strategic Response Plan.....	16
<b>2. Methodology</b> .....	18
<b>3. Results: Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster? .....</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1 Strategic Response Objective One.....	21
3.2 Strategic Response Objective Two.....	23
3.3 Strategic Response Objective Three.....	26
3.4 Strategic Response Objective Four.....	29
3.5 Strategic Response Objective Five.....	31
3.6 Relevance.....	32
3.7 Timeliness of responses.....	32
3.8 Key lessons and issues.....	37
<b>4. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster RESPONSE? .....</b>	<b>38</b>
4.1 Needs assessment and planning.....	38
4.2 Coordination and implementation of the international response.....	40
4.3 Factors which strengthened national systems.....	44
4.4 The transition from emergency response to recovery.....	45
4.5 International response engagement with national civil society.....	46
4.6 Key lessons and issues.....	47
<b>5. Coordination: Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof? .....</b>	<b>48</b>
5.1 Coverage.....	48
5.2 Cross cutting issues.....	50
5.3 Collective management and leadership.....	54
5.4 Key Lessons and Issues.....	55
<b>6. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied? .....</b>	<b>56</b>
6.1 Preparedness.....	56
6.2 The Assessment Tools.....	56
6.3 The Planning tools.....	57
6.4 The Response Monitoring and Results Measurement tools.....	61
6.5 The Evaluation tools.....	62
6.6 The impact of L3 status.....	62
<b>7. Conclusions and recommendations</b> .....	<b>65</b>

## List of Annexes

<b>Annex 1:</b> Matrix of findings and recommendations (summary).....	73
<b>Annex 2:</b> IAHE Terms of reference.....	77
<b>Annex 3:</b> Detailed Methodology.....	87
<b>Annex 4:</b> Evaluation matrix.....	96
<b>Annex 5:</b> IAHE Itinerary .....	103
<b>Annex 6:</b> Evaluation tools.....	108
<b>Annex 6.5:</b> Humanitarian country team survey.....	130
<b>Annex 7:</b> List of persons interviewed.....	135
<b>Annex 8.1:</b> Strategic response plan - outcome and output data.....	150
<b>Annex 8.2:</b> Needs assessment processes.....	157
<b>Annex 8.3:</b> Cluster Systems - Government of Philippines and Haiyan response.....	158
<b>Annex 8.4:</b> Maps to show the inter-agency activities with details of damage and pre-existing poverty.....	160
<b>Annex 8.5:</b> Timeline of Haiyan response - application of HPC tools (first six weeks).....	162
<b>Annex 8.6:</b> Community survey-analysis.....	164
<b>Annex 8.7:</b> Community Survey - Further analysis of the survey by group.....	269
<b>Annex 8.9:</b> Cluster and funding.....	277
<b>Annex 8.10:</b> Haiyan UN-CMCoord AAR Report - Executive Summary.....	278
<b>Annex 9:</b> Bibliography of documents relevant to the evaluation.....	283

## List of Figures

<b>Figure 1:</b> Community feedback loop.....	33
<b>Figure 2:</b> Government and Inter-agency assessment and planning processes and timelines.....	41
<b>Figure 3:</b> Comparison of numbers of international and national staff in response (UNDSS).....	43
<b>Figure 4:</b> Emergency response and recovery linkages.....	45
<b>Figure 5:</b> Humanitarian Programme Cycle.....	58
<b>Figure 6:</b> A possible revised HPC planning cycle for a large-scale sudden-onset disaster.....	60
<b>Figure 2:</b> Overall survey sample age structure.....	177
<b>Figure 3:</b> Per barangay survey sample age structure.....	178
<b>Figure 4:</b> Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents.....	185
<b>Figure 5:</b> Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents by barangay.....	186
<b>Figure 6:</b> Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by all respondents.....	255
<b>Figure 7:</b> Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by respondents by barangay.....	256

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made landfall in the Central Visayas region of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. Over 6,000 people were killed and some 4 million were left homeless, in an area that already suffered high levels of poverty. On 12 November 2013, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) formally activated an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the typhoon.

## Country context and response

The Philippines is a middle income country with a well-developed national disaster management system. In advance of landfall, the Government activated its system, pre-deploying a senior team to Tacloban and then initiating a major relief effort. The Government of the Philippines (GPH) accepted the offer of international assistance and declared a State of Calamity across the affected areas. The GPH developed its plan - entitled Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda (RAY) - based on rapid, local level and sectoral assessments which it launched on 16 December.

## The inter-agency response

In coordination with the Government of the Philippines, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) began preparations for response in advance of Haiyan making landfall. UNDAC was pre-deployed to Manila ready for travel to the affected areas. Within four days of the typhoon, the HCT released a Humanitarian Action Plan. A massive response was launched with 462 surge personnel deployed within three weeks. The 12-month Strategic Response Plan was published on 10 December 2013. Its total budget of US\$ 788 million was 60% funded.

The inter-agency response forms only part of a larger set of responses to the emergency including that of the GPH, the private sector, Filipino and broader Asian civil society and the Filipino diaspora. On 4 July 2014, the announced the end of the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response. Largely in response to this, the HCT took a decision to close the SRP on 31 August 2014.

## The evaluation

The inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) aims to provide an independent assessment of the extent to which planned collective objectives set in the SRP have been met. It also assesses the extent to which response mechanisms of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and Transformative Agenda have successfully supported the response.

The evaluation considers the overall inter-agency response within the scope of HCT coordination. It does not evaluate the government response nor is it intended to replace agency or sector-specific evaluations. Rather it aims to add value by a focus on the collective results and learning from the overall inter-agency response. Following preliminary data gathering in July-August, a four-person evaluation team spent three weeks in the Philippines in August-September 2014 to undertake field work across the three regions covered by the SRP as well as in Manila. Methods included systematic, inclusive community consultations, key informant interviews and group discussions. Three feedback and validation workshops in Tacloban and Manila with government representatives, humanitarian agencies, HCT and the IAHE in-country advisory group were important opportunities to refine emerging findings.

# Findings

*Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?<sup>1</sup>*

The inter-agency response effectively contributed to emergency needs being met through a timely and relevant immediate response. Initial assistance was appropriately prioritised with a focus on key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection. Key cross-cutting challenges were also identified early on, including problems of land rights and supply chain bottlenecks, though strategies to address these have taken time to develop. However, the extent to which the inter-agency response contributed to the overall results is difficult to assess in the absence of more data on assistance outside of the inter-agency coordinated system.

## Key interventions included:

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- pre-deployment of UNDAC and considerable support from domestic and international militaries which enabled a rapid response and access to remote areas
  - early restoration of water supplies including in Tacloban
  - rapid gearing up of health and surveillance services as well as re-establishment of the immunisation service
  - development of a differentiated approach to food security combining cash, food and NFI distributions relevant to local market conditions
  - large-scale provision of emergency employment which also helped to re-establish public infrastructure such as drainage canals, roads and public spaces
  - timely distribution of rice seed and associated agricultural inputs enabling local food production to resume with some crops back to normal and even higher levels in 2014
  - early identification of key protection issues such as loss of legal documentation
  - rapid establishment of temporary learning spaces for girls and boys.
- 

The response was characterised by the rapid self-recovery of the Filipino people who, within days, mostly returned home and were rebuilding at least makeshift shelter and seeking to rebuild their livelihoods, though often via use of high cost credit. The IAHE found that the agency response needed to be better able to adapt and customise its activities to support early recovery. While blanket, standard responses to food, water, health and shelter needs were appropriate and effective in the immediate phase of the response, it became apparent that there was a need for more tailored responses that go beyond enabling households to meet immediate basic needs but also to restore livelihoods quickly.

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<sup>1</sup> During the inception phase of the evaluation the IAHE guidelines were adapted to ask “To what extent are SRP objectives appropriate and relevant to meet humanitarian needs, and have systems been established to measure their achievement? To what extent are the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?” This broader question is addressed through the evaluation in EQ1 and EQ4.

Communities were dissatisfied with the range of beneficiary targeting systems used by agencies, and wanted more consistent and transparent systems across agencies and the response. Vulnerable groups were given some priority in the distribution of assistance. But, with some exceptions e.g. protection and health programmes focused on women and children, there was limited evidence of early phase programmes being designed to meet the particular needs of vulnerable groups particularly older people and people with disabilities.

When the SRP ended on 31 August 2014 the key remaining humanitarian need was made up of 5,400 households (24,785 individuals) displaced by Haiyan and still living in tents, evacuation centres or bunkhouses. In addition a further 95,000 households remained particularly vulnerable because of the poor quality of their shelter, though these poor conditions may pre-date Haiyan.

The significant results of the response cannot yet be considered sustainable, due to the vulnerability of some of the affected population to new extreme weather events, and delay in sustainable livelihood and shelter solutions. The success of the recovery phase now will be key to ensure their sustainability.

## Engagement with national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response

The international community engaged well with Government disaster response and risk reduction systems at the preparedness stage and in the immediate days following the typhoon. However, the overall magnitude of the disaster and the strength of the inter-agency response overwhelmed some government units, and, as a result, the international and national coordination mechanisms diverged along separate paths for quite some time. While there are many examples of excellent cooperation, and government officials at all levels appreciated both the assistance and the extra technical and coordinating capacity provided by the international community, there was also a strong sense that some international surge staff did not understand national systems or capacity and instead bypassed them.

The inter-agency surge did deliver an effective response, but one that side lined many in-country staff, failed to adequately join up with national systems, and ended up creating parallel structures for *planning and coordination*. Strong leadership, practical measures such as co-location, former institutional working relationships and a focus on practical solutions helped bring the national and international systems back together for some very successful cooperation in *implementation*. While inter-agency operational priorities drove the response, its structures and processes were not adjusted sufficiently nor early enough to take account of the international community's complementary role in this middle income country with an established albeit stretched government disaster management system. In addition, the IAHE found limited evidence of effective engagement between the international response, and national and local civil society.

## Transition

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Transition includes change in (a) the nature of affected people's needs (emergency to early recovery); (b) the type of programme approaches to meet changing needs (humanitarian to recovery to development); and (c) structures and systems for coordination of assistance (HCT to UNCT, closure of clusters).

Lack of familiarity with the capacities of a middle income country, differences between the international and national planning timeframes, and different views on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, all contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. The transition to recovery was complicated by the fact that sectors and regions recovered at different paces, and by uncertainty regarding the government's capacity and timetable to begin large-scale recovery programmes. Furthermore, underlying this is a conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The culmination was the Government's announcement in July of the end of the humanitarian phase and closure of humanitarian clusters.

The international system's limited range of programming modalities to flexibly support early recovery are a shortcoming. Transition was further complicated in the Haiyan response by the absence of a full assessment of the remaining humanitarian needs before the HCT decision to close the SRP early. The focus of transition planning in Haiyan was on coordination structures.

## Coordination within the inter-agency response

Coordination mechanisms were well-funded and rapidly established, and the cluster system functioned as planned. Excellent civil-military coordination greatly assisted the early stage of the response. While there is some unevenness in the geographic distribution of assistance in relation to needs, the IAHE found no evidence of serious, sustained coverage gaps.

Coordination processes and tools were helpful in guiding agencies to avoid duplication, but were resource-intensive and struggled to deal with the range of organisations working in the Philippines outside of the SRP and its coordination mechanisms. Lighter coordination mechanisms were most effective. At times, agencies' own agendas complicated the process of forming a common cluster approach. The response demonstrated the value of thematic advisers when they provide practical input to the operations and work as a team supporting inter-cluster functions. Building on this experience, additional preparedness measures which build national capacity in thematic areas and partnerships with the private sector will be valuable for future responses.

Four features of the Haiyan response highlight the value of inter-cluster coordination beyond the conventional cluster system: the extensive use of cash by several clusters, the dynamic needs of communities moving rapidly into early recovery, the multiple challenges (access to services, livelihoods, protection) faced by families without a shelter solution, and the success of Communication with Community (CwC) and Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) mechanisms at gathering community-wide (rather than sector or agency-specific) feedback.

In dealing with tough, cross-cutting housing, land and property issues, the HCT leadership was assisted by the provision of solid, technical advice from the outset. The HCT was slow to take action but, nevertheless, HCT advocacy and guidance did eventually go on to have a positive impact on the overall response.

## Cash

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Cash transfer programming was employed on an unprecedented scale. At least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented cash transfer programmes (CTP) within the inter-agency response. Considerable levels of cash were also distributed by government agencies, private companies, civil society organisations, and individuals, including Filipinos overseas. Four agencies alone in the inter-agency response distributed around \$34 million, benefiting 1.4 million disaster-affected people. The experience confirmed the effectiveness of CTPs as a flexible means to support people's own recovery when conditions are favourable. At the same time, the use of cash approaches across clusters in the same regions and markets presented coordination challenges to ensure collective positive impacts. Further work is needed to understand best how to harmonise cash approaches across sectors, as well as on effective targeting and conversion to sustainable livelihoods.

## Application of IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance

The components of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) were applied rigorously, and in many cases newly-developed tools were applied for the first time. Under exceptionally tight timeframes they were produced on time, and with high quality. However, interlocutors questioned their suitability to the realities of a large-scale sudden onset disaster, and whether the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them, particularly in the SRP, was justified. The HPC outlines a logical sequence for the response, starting with needs assessment, which then leads to identification of strategic priorities and an overall results framework. Cluster plans are then derived from this framework, projects developed, and costed. In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated and some tools were developed in isolation. In particular, assessment and planning documents were not causally connected and the SRP was issued before the results framework was fixed, contributing to the challenge of reporting the results. The L3 status significantly supported the rapid scaling-up and resourcing of the response. Greater attention to adapting to local conditions and collective approaches would have further strengthened it. The concept of empowered leadership was new, and not universally understood.

## Factors contributing to results and performance

A number of characteristics of the Philippines created highly favourable conditions for an effective disaster response. These include its lower middle-income country status, relatively good health and education indicators, a vibrant local economy, an established and experienced national disaster management system and a government which accepts its responsibility to protect the rights of citizens. Furthermore, in the affected areas, there was an absence of significant civil conflict. Key external factors included large-scale public sympathy, media coverage, significant diaspora support, long-standing links with important aid donors, and the absence of a high profile "competing" disaster at that time. The combination of these underlying contextual factors contributed to its high level of funding and to the effectiveness of the early response.

## Assessment of the inter-agency response by SRP objective

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>2</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
1. Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production, and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.	High	There is clear evidence that people have met their food needs and avoided nutritional deterioration. The mixed response of cash and food was appropriate and followed a differentiated approach according to market conditions. Early support to restart agricultural production notably in rice was an important contribution. Current progress is vulnerable to future shocks if livelihoods are not restored to pre-Haiyan levels quickly.
2. Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.	Medium-Low	The response addressed emergency shelter needs, and has improved the quality of shelter for people in transitional housing. The focus on self-recovery was appropriate, but more attention was needed to the supply of quality materials, and to measures to ensure that the well-crafted shelter cluster messages to support safer building techniques translated into safer shelter. Overall, the response was underfunded and fell short of its targets.
3. Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.	Medium-Low	The response addressed immediate needs through extensive emergency employment programmes which enabled people to meet urgent household needs and also contributed to restoring basic infrastructure and access. But long-term use of such programmes is not appropriate and it does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods. The development of programmes to support more sustainable, non-agricultural livelihoods beyond emergency employment has been slow and under-funded. Direct support for farming and fishing helped a portion of the affected population begin to resume their livelihoods though numbers are below target. A lack of sustainable livelihood options is a key obstacle to the relocation of families in displacement centres.

<sup>2</sup> Ratings are based on the IAHE team's judgement, taking into account IAHE findings on inter-agency response effectiveness, relevance and timeliness. Ratings go in order of High/high-medium/medium/medium-low/low.

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>2</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
4. Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and health services.	Medium	The response addressed emergency health and sanitation needs, successfully contributing to the prevention of outbreaks of any communicable diseases despite the high risk environments. Early recovery targets are behind schedule, although ambitions go beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues.
5. Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.	High-Medium	The initial education response was effective at getting girls and boys back to school in temporary learning spaces two months after Haiyan, but consolidation with teacher training and government-led permanent construction has since lagged. The initial protection focus on resolving lost documentation as well as Child Protection and GBV was appropriate, but insufficient attention was accorded at the outset to land and property rights – which have emerged as one of the main obstacles to both protection and durable solutions for a significant population.

## Recommendations

	Priority <sup>3</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<b>1. Remaining humanitarian needs</b> In coordination with the government, maintain an overview of the remaining humanitarian needs, with a particular focus on the 5,400 households in tents and displacement centres, and be ready to offer assistance if needed.	Critical	HCT	Immediate
<b>2. Cash transfer programming</b> Set up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large scale use of cash-transfer programme approaches in the Haiyan response.	Learning opportunity	IASC Working Group	Short-term

<sup>3</sup> Recommendations are categorized as Critical (top urgent priority), Important (high priority), or Learning Opportunity.



	Priority <sup>3</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>3. Restoring livelihoods</b></p> <p>Build up livelihoods capacity in the international response system e.g. through a roster of livelihoods experts, to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods. Focus on transfer from emergency employment to sustainable livelihoods, and on solutions for non-agricultural contexts. Develop a range of flexible assessment and programme instruments.</p>	Important	EDGs	Medium term
<p><b>4. Preparedness for major emergencies (L3)</b></p> <p>In middle-income countries which are highly vulnerable to sudden onset disasters and have strong national capacity in disaster management, international actors should prepare together with the government for major disasters and a possible L3 response. Use detailed scenario planning to work through how the international response needs to adapt in order to play its complementary role in these contexts. Start with and document the Filipino scenario planning and in it clarify, among other factors, the roles of international personnel e.g. as cluster co-leads, gaps in the capacity of national systems to take on their coordination responsibilities, mechanisms to trigger scaling down of international personnel, and information resources and mechanisms to brief surge personnel on national response systems and capacities.</p>	Critical	EDGs and HCT	Medium term, and short-term in the Philippines
<p><b>5. Transition</b></p> <p>Transition needs to be considered in responses from the outset. Develop measures including practical global guidance to support HCTs on a) how to ensure transition is considered and addressed from the beginning of a response, particularly in L3 emergencies, and b) how to manage transition as a collective HCT and in cooperation with government. Include consideration of how to manage issues such as potential tensions between national government's sovereignty in disaster management, and the international community's (and governments') principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC Team	Medium term
<p><b>6. Preparedness and the private sector</b></p> <p>As part of Philippines preparedness process, set up agreements with private sector actors to ensure that systems are in place before the next emergency for a more coherent and linked-up response, including agreements to facilitate cash transfer programming, the establishment of a basis for partnerships between clusters and private sector partners, and support for supply chains for the most commonly-needed relief and early recovery supplies.</p>	Important	HCT	Short-term

	Priority <sup>3</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>7. Housing, land and property</b></p> <p>In large-scale, sudden-onset natural disasters, place a higher strategic and operational priority on working with national authorities, to anticipate and resolve property rights and land issues that could stall early recovery and stand in the way of durable solutions. Housing, land and property rights and solutions should figure prominently in the SRP, and HLP legal and technical expertise should be fielded early to support the HCT. As part of preparedness planning at country level, consider how a response will cope with property and land issues for at least transitional measures to meet humanitarian needs.</p>	Important	EDGs, Global Protection and Shelter clusters	Medium term
<p><b>8. HPC and planning in large-scale sudden onset emergencies</b></p> <p>Review HPC guidance to further differentiate between the planning and reporting processes of protracted emergencies vs sudden onset large scale disasters. In sudden onset emergencies (especially natural disasters) modify the pathway for the HPC assessment and planning tools with (a) a lighter, more analytical SRP at around the 20-day mark (following a preliminary response plan in line with the current HPC guidance), followed by (b) a suite of (connected) cluster response plans at the 60-day mark, based on (c) operationally-oriented needs assessments conducted in the 15-45 day period.</p>	Important	IASC Working group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>9. HPC and needs assessments</b></p> <p>Redesign assessment processes to ensure they support operational planning. In a sudden onset emergency, after an initial “scale and scope” assessment (preferably conducted in conjunction with the national government) such as the MIRA, needs assessments should be conducted collectively and on a cluster basis, with a clear view to informing operational planning.</p>	Critical	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>10. HPC and empowered leadership</b></p> <p>Further develop the guidance on empowered leadership to reflect the respective authorities and responsibilities of IASC members, Emergency Directors, the HC, and sub-national managers in an L3 emergency. Be clear if the mandate of surge capacity is to support and not replace the HC/HCT, and if the concept of empowered leadership extends below the national level.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group	Short-term

# ACRONYMS

<b>AAP</b>	Accountability to Affected Populations	<b>L3</b>	Level 3
<b>AAR</b>	After Action Review	<b>LGU</b>	Local Government Unit
<b>BFAR</b>	Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources	<b>MIRA</b>	Multi-Cluster/Sector Integrated Rapid Assessment
<b>CaLP</b>	Cash Learning Partnership	<b>MSWD</b>	Municipal Social Welfare and Development
<b>CCCM</b>	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	<b>NDRRMC</b>	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
<b>CRRP</b>	Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan	<b>NFO</b>	Non-Food Items
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation	<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>CTP</b>	Cash Transfer Programmes	<b>NINGO</b>	National Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>DHC</b>	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator	<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>DSWD</b>	Department for Social Welfare and Development	<b>OPARR</b>	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
<b>EDG</b>	Emergency Directors Group	<b>OPR</b>	Operational Peer Review
<b>EQ</b>	Evaluation Question	<b>PCA</b>	Philippine Coconut Authority
<b>ERC</b>	Emergency Relief Coordinator	<b>PDRRMC</b>	Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
<b>ERL</b>	Early Recovery and Livelihoods	<b>PMR</b>	Periodic Monitoring Report
<b>FSAC</b>	Food Security and Agriculture	<b>PRP</b>	Preliminary Response Plan
<b>GBV</b>	Gender Based Violence	<b>QA</b>	Quality Assurance
<b>GPH</b>	Government of Philippines	<b>RAY</b>	Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda
<b>HAP</b>	Humanitarian Accountability Project	<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator	<b>SoP</b>	Standard Operating Procedures
<b>HCT</b>	Humanitarian Country Team	<b>SRP</b>	Strategic Response Plan
<b>HLP</b>	Housing, Land and Property	<b>TA</b>	Transformative Agenda
<b>HPC</b>	Humanitarian Programme Cycle		
<b>IAHE</b>	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation		
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee		
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person		

Map of the path of Typhoon Haiyan and of the Affected Population



# 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION

## 1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation

1. Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made landfall on the Central Visayas regions of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. While the wind speeds were unprecedented and highly damaging, most destructive of all for some areas was the storm surge which followed. Over 6,000 people were killed and some 4 million were left homeless, in an area that already suffered high levels of poverty. Responding to the offer from the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), the Government of the Philippines (GPH) formally accepted international assistance through Presidential Proclamation No 682 on 11 November 2013. On 12 November 2013, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) activated an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the typhoon.<sup>4</sup>
2. An Inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) is mandatory for all declared L3 system-wide emergencies. The objectives of the IAHE are:
  - To provide an independent assessment of the extent to which the collective objectives set in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) to respond to the needs of affected people have been met
  - To assess the extent to which response mechanisms, including the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) and other key pillars of the Transformative Agenda (TA) have successfully supported the response, and recommend improvement-oriented actions.
3. The evaluation considers the overall inter-agency response within the scope of HCT coordination. It does not evaluate the government response or that of other agencies. It is not intended to replace agency or sector-specific evaluations, but rather aims to add value by a focus on the collective results and learning from the overall inter-agency response. The primary audience of the evaluation is the Humanitarian Coordinator and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). It also aims to contribute to the evidence base for decision-making and judgments about future humanitarian action, policy development and reform by the IASC Principals, IASC Working Group, Emergency Directors and other international and national stakeholders.
4. The evaluation addresses the following four questions:
  1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?<sup>5</sup>
  2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?
  3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?
  4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?

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<sup>4</sup> Five criteria are used by the IASC Principals to determine whether a level 3, system wide response is required: namely scale, urgency, complexity, combined national and international capacity to respond, and reputational risk.

<sup>5</sup> During the inception phase of the evaluation the IAHE guidelines were adapted to ask “To what extent are SRP objectives appropriate and relevant to meet humanitarian needs, and have systems been established to measure their achievement? To what extent are the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?” This broader question is addressed through the evaluation in EQ1 and EQ4.

## 1.2 Country Context

5. The Philippines is a lower middle income country with a human development index ranking of 117 out of 187.<sup>6</sup> The typhoon's impact was concentrated on some of the poorest provinces in the country, average household income in the severely affected provinces being only 75 percent of the national average (2012 data). Over 50 percent of household incomes in the affected provinces were largely dependent on agriculture and remittances.<sup>7</sup> While the Philippines regularly experiences typhoons, those regions most strongly hit by Haiyan had not experienced disasters with any regularity and, rarely if ever, had experienced the kind of storm surge that affected Guiuan and Tacloban in Region VIII.
6. As one of the most hazard prone countries in the world, the Philippines has dedicated significant resources to strengthening response capacity and disaster management mechanisms. In 2007, the Philippines National Disaster Coordinating Council (since replaced by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council: NDRRMC) established a sectoral cluster system for preparing and responding to disasters in the Philippines. In 2010, the Republic Act 10121 was passed which set out the national disaster risk reduction and management framework. The act defines the roles and responsibilities of government departments at different levels.
7. At the time of Haiyan, the government and international community were already responding to a number of emergencies in the Philippines, including the Bohol province earthquake in central Philippines, which struck on 15 October 2013. Support was also being provided to the displaced population in Zamboanga City and Basilan, caused by conflict in September 2013.

## 1.3 Emergence Response and Strategic Response Plan

### The wider response

8. The Government provided substantial relief assistance to families in the nine affected regions. President Aquino declared a State of Calamity on 11 November 2013, covering all Haiyan-affected provinces. The government's strategic plan to guide the recovery and reconstruction was laid out in the document 'Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda' (RAY) published on 16 December 2013. The total RAY budget was for US\$ 8.17 billion, with US\$ 2.83 billion identified as critical immediate needs or short-term interventions, i.e. for first twelve months (2014). In December, the government announced the creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR). On 4 July 2014, the government declared the humanitarian phase over and that coordination of the further response would be under OPARR's structures rather than through humanitarian clusters. The RAY at this point was folded into the newly finalised Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP).
9. Other actors made significant contributions to the response. The private sector played a considerable role, but there is no overall figure available for its contribution. It included national private sector groups such as the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR), which all play active roles in disaster response, coordinating members' support and supporting emergency preparedness, alongside small scale, local businesses directly providing charitable donations in their local community. Charitable foundations working directly with local government and communities also played an important role, for example one agency alone, the Taiwan-based Tzu Chi Foundation, announced that it provided assistance worth \$12 million in the first two weeks of the response, and has contributed significant further assistance

<sup>6</sup> [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/PHL.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PHL.pdf) access 2 Oct 2014

<sup>7</sup> Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda (RAY), Government of the Philippines, 2013, p4.

since then including cash assistance, medical, non-food item supplies.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the diaspora played possibly the most direct and important role for many affected communities. In a year-on-year comparison, remittances to the Philippines rose by \$600 million in the first three months following Haiyan.<sup>9</sup> Finally, Filipino civil society consisting of both national NGOs and local civil society organisations played an important role, notably faith-based organisations and other national networks.

### Humanitarian Country Team inter-agency response

10. From a total of nine regions hit by the typhoon, the Government identified a priority corridor covering 171 municipalities in 14 provinces and four regions, and these were the focus of the inter-agency response. Within four days of Haiyan's landfall, the HCT produced the Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan). A major response was mounted by the international community including the deployment of 462 surge staff within three weeks. The Strategic Response Plan was launched on 10 December 2013, and designed to complement the government's RAY plan. The overall goal of the Strategic Response Plan was that communities and local governments recovered from the disaster, built back safer and avoided relapses, while strengthening resilience. The SRP is organised around five inter-sectoral objectives. The total budget for the SRP was US\$ 788 million. The SRP was intended to be a 12-month plan, but largely in response to the Government of the Philippines' announcement of the end of the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response the HCT took a decision to close the SRP on 31 August 2014. By the time of its closure, \$468 million had been received against the plan, making it 60.2% covered.<sup>10</sup>

## 1.4 The Report

11. The report is laid out as follows. Section two includes a summary of the methodology (with a more detailed methodology in Annex 3). The subsequent four sections address each evaluation question in turn. The report concludes with overall assessment, conclusions and recommendations.

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<sup>8</sup> [http://www.tzuchi.org.ph/newsite/TC\\_Phils\\_Yolanda\\_Efforts\\_Summary/index.html](http://www.tzuchi.org.ph/newsite/TC_Phils_Yolanda_Efforts_Summary/index.html);

<http://www.roc-taiwan.org/PH/ct.asp?xItem=515190&ctNode=4695&mp=272>

<sup>9</sup> Source: Central Bank of the Philippines: <http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm> This is a comparison of Nov 2012-Jan 2013 remittances with Nov 2013-Jan 2014 remittances.

<sup>10</sup> FTS accessed 2 Oct 2014. Annex 8.9 has details of funding by cluster.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

12. An inception phase in June/July 2014 included a country visit by the IAHE team leader and OCHA's Chief, Evaluation. The inception phase consultations played an important role in identifying the areas of focus for the evaluation. The evaluation is designed around the four questions detailed in the terms of reference, and an evaluation matrix developed by the IAHE team with sub-questions and criteria for assessment (Annex 4).
13. Following the inception process, a survey team visited 19 communities in Region VI to gather preliminary data on the response (Annex 8.6 and 8.7). An online survey was sent to all current and former members of the HCT and cluster coordinators to gather feedback on Humanitarian Programme Cycle processes and HCT performance (Annex 6.5). Initial key stakeholder interviews also took place. In addition, a document review was undertaken including review of available agency evaluations, reviews and surveys for data relevant to the IAHE evaluation matrix (Annex 10-bibliography).
14. The final and main field visit, by the full four-person IAHE team, took place in the Philippines from 21 August to 10 September 2013 and involved:
  - 18 systematic community consultations across Regions VI, VII and VIII using qualitative methods to assess relevance, timelines and effectiveness of assistance (Annex 8.8). An additional nine communities took part in project visits, interviews and group discussions (IAHE itinerary Annex 5).
  - Key informant interviews (KII) with humanitarian agency staff, donors and government officials from a range of involved departments and structures, including disaster risk reduction and management councils at national, regional and local levels (full list in Annex 7).
  - Facilitated and structured focus group discussions with national NGOs, humanitarian agency staff and government representatives at national and regional levels (full list in Annex 7).
  - Over 210 people participated in key informant interviews and group discussions from government departments, NGOs, humanitarian agencies and donors.
  - Three feedback and validation workshops in Tacloban and Manila for humanitarian agency staff, government representatives, the HCT and IAHE in-country advisory group (96 participants in total).
15. Community consultations have included men, women, older people, youth, children and people with disabilities. Communities visited included coastal, inland, highland, rural and urban locations. Data was analysed against the criteria laid out in the evaluation matrix.
16. **Quality assurance (QA)** processes included the use of standard templates for data collection, triangulation of data findings through the use of a mixed range of methods without reliance on any one data source for findings, and internal and external peer review. In addition, the team adhered to an ethical approach in evaluation methods.<sup>11</sup> Important QA roles were fulfilled by a country evaluation advisory group<sup>12</sup> and an inter-agency Evaluation Management Group.<sup>13</sup> The three feedback and validation workshops held in Manila and Tacloban at the end of the fieldwork were an important opportunity for the team to check and refine emerging findings.

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<sup>11</sup> Adapted from DFID Ethics and Principles for Research and Evaluation, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Members are USAID, Canada, Japan, and Australia, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNDP, National and International NGOs (PINGON), Plan, UNCSAC, Representatives from the Philippines government (DSWD)

<sup>13</sup> Members are UNICEF, WFP, FAO, OCHA

## Constraints

17. The evaluation faced a number of constraints. These included:

- A lack of available data for some SRP objectives particularly in relation to outcomes. In addition, changes in indicators and targets over the course of the response challenged evaluation assessments.
- The inter-agency response itself only contributes to the strategic response objectives, but these are not objectives that are held or reported on by any other organisation, making it difficult to weigh the contribution of the inter-agency response vis-a-vis the wider response. In addition, stakeholders, including communities, do not always differentiate between the different sources of assistance.
- The evaluation took place in month ten of the response. This had advantages in terms of being a time when it was possible able to see more clear some of the results of the overall response, phases of implementation and how the response had evolved. It meant that respondents provided a more reflective perspective on some of the issues that were important in the early months and maybe lost some of the detail of the early phases. Timing of IAHEs is something being considered by the IAHE steering committee.
- A cluster performance monitoring exercise was already under way through an independent process at the time of the IAHE. This parallel process excluded the possibility of the IAHE undertaking another cluster survey as originally planned due to “survey fatigue”, however not all clusters completed the independent process so there are gaps in that data. Monitoring data of some clusters was shared with the IAHE (education, shelter, nutrition).
- Although all communities in the Region VI survey had received some assistance, low levels of certain types of assistance limited the extent of the statistical analysis that was possible.
- The response rate to the IAHE HCT online survey was sufficient only to provide guidance for areas to probe in more depth during field work, rather than providing statistically significant data.
- Accessing staff who were active in the early phase of the response and who had left was time consuming and difficult. Nonetheless, the team secured sufficient interviews with personnel involved in the early stages of the response and reviewed available exit reports, enabling the team to gain a good picture of the initial phase as well as the overall response.
- Finally, even though much of the coordination and programming was co-led and implemented by Government entities, the evaluation did not assess Government performance.

**Picture: IAHE consultation with children and assistance timeline developed by them**



## Evaluation team

18. The evaluation was carried out by Valid International through a 4-person IAHE team made up of two Filipino and two international team members. The team collectively brought a wide range of experience in humanitarian and development work from roles in national and international NGOs, Government of Philippines, donor governments, UN organisations and the Red Cross Movement. All team members are independent of IASC organisations.
19. Team members focused on specific sectors/clusters and issues as far as possible, but on the whole adopted a flexible approach to data gathering given logistical challenges presented by the geographical spread of the response and stakeholders. Rustico (Rusty) Binas and Balthazar (Baltz) Tribunalo respectively led the community consultation processes in Regions VI/VII and VIII. They both brought community facilitation skills and considerable knowledge of government and civil society roles in Filipino disaster risk reduction and management in general, as well as in the Haiyan response in particular. Team member Julian Murray, bringing extensive humanitarian experience including from a donor agency and UNHCR, focused on question one (shelter and protection) as well as evaluation question four on the Humanitarian Programme Cycle. The team leader, Teresa Hanley with more than twenty years humanitarian, development as well as evaluation experience with the Red Cross Movement, UN, DFID and a range of international NGOs focused on evaluation question one regarding results (food security, livelihoods and WASH) and evaluation questions two and three regarding international/national coordination and internal SRP coordination. The IAHE's overall analysis, conclusions and recommendations were developed collectively. In addition, a Filipino team survey specialist, Ernest Guevarra, helped with the design, implementation and analysis of the Region VI survey. The survey team was managed in-country by Danny Carranza who also participated in the inception field visit. The team was supported by the Valid International project and administrative team.

**Picture: IAHE consultation with children and assistance timeline developed by them**



## Evaluation Management

20. The evaluation is managed by OCHA's Evaluation Unit and the Philippines IAHE Management Group led by OCHA, and comprised of WFP, FAO and UNICEF on behalf of the IAHE Steering Group. This is the first IAHE conducted by the IAHE Steering Group, and it constitutes an opportunity to test out the IAHE guidelines and the IAHE process more broadly. In addition, an in-country Advisory Group<sup>14</sup> was formed to represent in-country stakeholders.



<sup>14</sup> Members are USAID, Canada, Japan, and Australia, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNDP, National and International NGOs (PINGON), Plan, UNCSAC, Representatives from the Philippines government (DSWD)

### 3. RESULTS: WERE THE RESULTS ARTICULATED IN THE SRP ACHIEVED AND WHAT WERE BOTH THE POSITIVE AND POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE OUTCOMES FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTER?

*The inter-agency Haiyan response contributed through relevant and timely actions to emergency needs being met. Immediate assistance was appropriately prioritised with key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection addressed. Consideration of how best to support people's self-recovery and other early recovery measures have been slower and achieved a lower rate of success so far, partly because of the need to tailor approaches according to geographical area and population group, but also because of resource constraints and unclear institutional jurisdictions. The sustainability of the significant results of the emergency response depends now on the effectiveness of the recovery phase, notably in the restoration of livelihoods, shelter and physical reconstruction of facilities particularly schools and health centres.*

21. The IAHE considered the first evaluation question concerning results by reviewing the response's effectiveness, relevance and timeliness.<sup>15</sup> This section is structured by:
- Analysis of each objective and its progress to date<sup>16</sup>
  - Relevance of the response
  - Timeliness of the response
  - Key lessons and issues
22. All outcome and output data available in September 2014 is attached in Annex 8.1.<sup>17</sup>

#### 3.1 Strategic Response Objective One

**SRO1: Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build for food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.**

- Outcome: Percentage of target population with a minimum household food consumption score >42
- Outcome: Level of rice, maize, vegetable production compared to a normal year in affected areas
- Outcome: Prevalence of global acute malnutrition in girls and boys 6-59 months

<sup>15</sup> This focus was agreed in the inception phase.

<sup>16</sup> While this report comments on all objectives in a general sense, it was agreed, at the inception phase, that the team would look more closely at the results of the five clusters that make up the vast majority of expenditures: food security and agriculture, shelter, early recovery and livelihoods, protection and WASH. Constraints including changing targets and lack of data availability on outcomes and targets are detailed in the methodology section.

<sup>17</sup> Outcome and output data was provided by OCHA, and was being collected for the third and final periodic monitoring report. OCHA validates data with the agencies and clusters supplying it.

## The approach

23. The immediate response to meet food needs in the first days was overwhelmingly local, with communities sharing available food amongst themselves until the first external supplies arrived from local government. It took 4-5 days for the first supplies from outside to arrive - which included high energy biscuits and specialized nutrition products for vulnerable children and mothers - and ten days or more before the international food pipeline was fully established 'at scale' and reaching communities. Once up and running, there was good cooperation between the inter-agency response and government distributions, including in efforts to reach more remote inland and island areas. The military assets proved vital for surveillance, food drops and gaining access to remote areas.
24. One distinctive feature of the food security response was the scale of cash transfers. As early as November, cash transfers were being set up in Western Visayas where market conditions supported this approach. By April, all major inter-agency food distributions ended and WFP closed its food pipeline. The government continued targeted food distributions until July, and carried out assessments to target further distributions. A second distinctive feature was the early focus upon supplying certified seed and related agricultural inputs, so that farmers could maintain their usual production cycle and meet regional food needs through normal market supply from April 2014 onwards.

## The results

25. The inter-agency food security response targeted 3 million people out of an estimated affected population of 5.6 million. The latest data indicates the response successfully achieved its targets. The percentage of households with a minimum household food consumption level greater than 42 was 92.7%, up from 68% in December 2013.<sup>18</sup> The prevalence of acute malnutrition is 4.1% in regions VI, VII and VIII - deemed globally acceptable. IAHE interviews with the Department of Agriculture also indicated that some crop yields in the affected areas are up as a result of timely planting and increased use of fertilisers. There was no indicator developed or tracked to see if the approaches that were used successfully stimulated markets. MIRA 2 observed the re-emergence of markets at the six week point, but there is no evidence to attribute this to the response.
26. In terms of outputs, blanket supplementary feeding targets were surpassed, but nutrition cluster targets for counselling on breast-feeding and infant/young child feeding only reached half the planned numbers, due partly to lack of capacity in government services and local partners. Targets for supplementary feeding for severe and moderately malnourished children were also not reached. However, this was in part due to initial over-estimation of the prevalence of severe malnutrition, based on outdated baseline data from government sources. Additional positive results of the humanitarian response included the establishment of a more robust nutrition surveillance system, and more reliable data on the prevalence of moderate and severe malnutrition.

## Key finding:

- ➔ Food security cluster partners contributed to meeting immediate food needs and avoiding nutritional deterioration. The role of the community and local government in meeting food needs in the first few days highlights the importance of preparedness measures. The cluster adoption of a mixed response combining cash and food was appropriate. The sustainability of these positive food security findings is now largely dependent on how effectively livelihoods are restored. Given the high rates of poverty in the Visayas before Haiyan, any success is vulnerable to future shocks.

<sup>18</sup> The food consumption indicator is a proxy for household food security and is a measure of dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance of the food consumed.

## 3.2 Strategic Response Objective Two

### **SRO 2: Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.**

- Outcome: Number of households that sustained house damage that are currently living in safe, habitable emergency shelter
- Outcome: Number of households that sustained house damage from the typhoon that are currently living in safe, habitable dwelling
- Outcome: Percentage of population living in displacement sites with improved shelter, living conditions and displacement management

### The approach

27. In the first week, the vast majority of immediate shelter needs were met by family and friends. An estimated 3.8 million displaced people stayed with family and friends, while 384 evacuation centres provided temporary shelter for over 100,000 people. The speed with which people affected by the typhoon returned home and started to rebuild their homes or at least a make-shift shelter was notable.
28. The inter-agency response is limited to the provision of emergency and transitional shelter, while the government has responsibility for permanent housing solutions (limited to IDPs in displacement centres whose homes were destroyed and in unsafe areas). At the same time, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster provided support for camp management and improvement of living conditions in evacuation centres, tent cities and bunkhouses. No shelter support was offered to families living with other families.
29. The initial focus of the shelter strategy was on support to self-recovery, primarily by supplementing emergency tarpaulin distributions with more durable roofing solutions in the form of 'shelter self-recovery' (SSR) kits.<sup>19</sup> A second element of the strategy was support to transitional shelter in temporary settlement sites. As well as the direct provision of assistance, shelter cluster activities included information campaigns promoting safe-building measures, the establishment of common standards for self-building and agency interventions, monitoring of the shelter situation through regular, systematic assessments, and advocacy on behalf of displaced populations who continue to remain vulnerable.

### The results

30. The SRP targeted 300,000 households for emergency assistance, 500,000 for housing self-recovery, as well as aiming to ensure that 100% of people in displacement sites have adequate shelter and basic services.
31. In terms of outputs, the inter-agency response surpassed its targets in the emergency phase with distributions of tarpaulins and tents (though this was with a reduced level of assistance than that planned i.e. one tarpaulin rather than two, so in effect this is on track with the original target); with the reach of information campaigns; and with the allocation of shelter kits.

<sup>19</sup> CGI (corrugated galvanized iron) sheets, nails, tools, hurricane straps, timber

All displacement sites were fully staffed and gaps in service have been effectively monitored and followed up.

32. The recovery-oriented targets of the shelter sector have much lower levels of success, with only 24% of the target number of households demonstrating safety features;<sup>20</sup> 61% of households have a dwelling considered as adequate;<sup>21</sup> and only 27% of the target number of households have a durable roofing solution. Overall, less than 50% of IDPs have a sustainable return or relocation site. Monitoring by cluster partners in the first three months observed that household self-build efforts were usually “building back worse” with potentially dangerous dwellings being rebuilt. Monitoring data showed that, by August 2014, over two-thirds of the population still believed they could not cope in meeting their shelter needs without external assistance.
33. At the time of the IAHE, 5,083 individuals remain in tents or evacuation centres and 19,702 individuals in transitional shelters (bunkhouses) making a total of 24,785 (5,441 households). There is also concern for 95,000 households living in unsafe or makeshift shelter though the extent to which this is caused by Haiyan cannot be assessed, many were in poor quality shelter before the typhoon.<sup>22</sup> While everyone is optimistic that the IDPs in tents and evacuation centres will have a transitional shelter by the end of November, the bunkhouse populations will likely remain there for some time, possibly one or two years, pending the construction by the government of “permanent shelter” making a total of 5,441 households (24,785 individuals) a remaining humanitarian need. It is important to note that at the time of the IAHE field visits the government had not yet started its own emergency shelter programme at scale. With insufficient resources to meet all the needs, the cluster has constantly wrestled with finding the balance between quality and coverage, in the absence of a government programme to address the needs.
34. Consistent with the Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) community feedback,<sup>23</sup> the IAHE region VI survey and community consultations found low levels of satisfaction among evaluation participants regarding shelter assistance.
35. Key challenges facing the shelter cluster included:
- a. Lack of high quality materials to support self-building approaches that met safety standards.
  - b. Lack of clarity regarding permanent relocation solutions for IDPs.

**Picture: Makeshift shelter used by a family for weeks after the typhoon**



<sup>20</sup> Safe being defined as percentage of households exhibiting one or more observed construction features that will reduce the risk of catastrophic failure (wind, storm surge, seismic) - shelter cluster definition.

<sup>21</sup> Percentage of households exhibiting one or more design features that promote privacy (partitions) and security for the family (lockable door) - shelter cluster definition.

<sup>22</sup> Report from the Philippines HCT: Analysis of Remaining Humanitarian Needs from Typhoon Haiyan as of 31 August 2014 (14 October 2014).

<sup>23</sup> OCHA set up a system to collect feedback from communities on the response (see 3.6.2).

- c. Shifting government policy regarding support to people living in the coastal zone deemed unsafe by the government.
  - d. Problems of land tenure, services and livelihood opportunities at numerous “transitional” settlements, typically semi-durable low-cost housing developments built with humanitarian funding on land that has been borrowed or leased for a limited period, and from which the IDPs could be evicted at a future time.
  - e. Funding for the shelter cluster has been low, with only 43% of its budget covered. However, the presence of over 30 shelter actors operating outside of the SRP suggests that considerable funds are being invested in shelter through different channels.
  - f. Shifting Government policy on its own shelter programmes.
36. Despite these many challenges, the inter-agency response on shelter has several **key success stories:**
- Advocacy on bunkhouses helped improve conditions for IDPs, particularly in terms of space allocation and WASH facilities.
  - Advocacy on the “unsafe” zone policy helped to clarify ambiguities and unblocked services to some highly vulnerable populations.
  - Key information tools were developed, to support best practices in construction and repairs by agencies and self-recovery efforts. With wide-reaching communication campaigns, these reached most affected populations - though results in the REACH survey of the safety of housing suggest there is significantly more to do to support their application.
  - The Shelter cluster contracted a third party, REACH, to conduct periodic assessments which coincided to match the PMR cycle, and as a result the Shelter cluster was able to provide very solid data on the quality of construction and on the evolving character of shelter needs, even in the absence of a clear count of the scope of the needs.

## Key findings:

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- The inter-agency response was effective in meeting the emergency shelter needs of a significant portion of the affected population. It has supported the affected population to attain better shelter solutions, particularly through management of displacement centres, provision of services and advocacy for good conditions and rights of IDPs including in displacement centres and relocation sites. A focus on self-build was an appropriate response in a country where self-recovery rates by households are rapid.
  - Shelter needs remain for both IDPs and people who have returned to their places of origin in wholly inadequate shelter. 5400 households remain in tents, evacuation centres and transitional shelter (bunkhouses). An estimated 95,000 households remain vulnerable to future shocks, particularly this typhoon season, due to the poor quality of their shelter or location - though many of these 95,000 are likely to have been in poor quality shelter before Haiyan. An unknown number of families are living temporarily with other families and are not supported by the shelter cluster.
-

### 3.3 Strategic Response Objective Three

**SRO 3: Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.**

- Outcome: Percentage reduction of affected people in vulnerable employment (Includes own-account workers and contributing family workers as defined by ICSE)
- Outcome: Percentage of affected women and men in rural areas who have regained pre-typhoon livelihoods (farming/fisheries)

#### The approach

37. The main components of the inter-agency livelihoods strategy are threefold: (a) emergency employment; (b) skills training; and (c) focussed training and material support to farmers and fisher-folk, including inter-cropping, seeds and tools, and distribution of fishing boats and equipment. The vast majority of the livelihood strategy implementation to date, particularly for non-agricultural livelihoods, has been through emergency employment.
38. After three months, following the OPR recommendation, the early recovery and livelihoods strategy was revisited. Inter-agency discussions held jointly with the government correctly analysed some areas for closer attention, including: identifying priority groups; potential risks of oversupply of skills which planned training programmes would provide;<sup>24</sup> and the importance of a focus on activities that dovetail the early recovery response with more sustainable economic development plans and the UNDAF. This analysis has taken quite some time to translate into action, with skills development activities only beginning at scale very recently.
39. In relation to agricultural livelihoods, a longer term strategy for the recovery of agricultural livelihoods is now well under way, led by the two relevant government units under the Ministry of Agriculture - Philippines Coconut Authority (PCA) and Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). Farmers face particular challenges, due to continued problems of debris and the time for tree crops to reach harvest, particularly coconut crops that take 5-8 years. Support to restocking livestock and non-rice crops has been slower to be provided, and while considerable numbers were assisted with rice seed in the first phase of distributions, needs for inputs continued well into 2014. The fisheries strategy has not been without its challenges either, notably in targeting boat and gear distributions accurately. A thorough assessment led by BFAR is helping to address this issue. Partners agree that the full results of current and ongoing inputs to agricultural livelihoods will not be seen until 2015.
40. Coordination challenges have affected the development and implementation of the livelihoods strategy. Two separate clusters, early recovery and livelihoods (ERL), were brought together into one cluster in the response. Responsibility for agricultural livelihoods has not always been clear with overlap in interventions from the ERL and food security and agriculture (FSAC) clusters. Added to this, the ERL cluster has achieved low levels of funding, with only 33% coverage at the time of the closure of the SRP. It is not clear what are the targets and anticipated results of early recovery in relation to sustainable livelihoods within the timeframe of the SRP, beyond the provision of emergency employment.

<sup>24</sup> Exacerbated by a lack of data on labour markets since Haiyan.

41. In addition, delays in implementation of the government livelihoods strategy have made linkage to this difficult. The GPH approach to livelihoods as outlined in the RAY describes measures to restart agriculture, provide short-term employment including emergency employment, skills training, preparation for self-employment and to “re-energise enterprise” as a key to promote employment. In January 2014 the livelihoods cluster was established under the government rehabilitation and recovery coordination structure OPARR, which began work to further elaborate its livelihoods strategy. However, the pace of implementation of this has been slow.

### The results

42. Unfortunately, the IAHE was not able to find complete outcome level data for livelihoods. Data showed there were some reductions in the vulnerable employment figures as shown by the Labour Force Survey, but data was only available for Central and Western Visayas, not eastern Visayas (Region VIII), however attribution of this change to the inter-agency response is not possible. Furthermore, only 26% of rural livelihood assets are identified as restored, against a target of 77%. The fact that livestock restocking and non-rice crops lagged behind rice seed distributions is likely to have contributed to this. That said, the emergency employment data shows very high levels of people employed during the response, and that this contributed to reaching targets for rehabilitation of public infrastructure, such as drainage canals, roads and public spaces. The MIRA 1 suggested that emergency employment could provide people with the means to buy materials to rebuild their homes, livelihoods and support the local economy, but post -distribution monitoring, agency reviews and IAHE interviews and community consultations consistently found that while cash-for-work interventions successfully enabled people to meet their basic needs, but rarely were adequate to enable the rebuilding of shelter and livelihoods. The evidence suggests that cash for assets, and those cash transfer programmes (CTPs) which included elements of training such as carpentry, have been more successful in supporting people to regain livelihoods. However, overall, the IAHE found that people were also experiencing higher levels of debt, having struggled to rebuild their own shelters and livelihoods.

**Picture: Sari sari store re-opened by female owner three days after Typhoon Haiyan, using high interest credit to re-stock and repair**



43. The IAHE found that, since the early stage of the response, there had been consistent calls from people to move from a reliance on emergency employment to support for more sustainable and customised solutions, including access to credit, support for micro-enterprise and skills development. Indeed, the sustained nature and level of cash for work schemes has had some negative impact on labour markets, with some employers reporting a lack of available labour for certain agricultural tasks earlier this year and increases in daily wages. The extent of these distortions is unclear and seemed to be levelling out by the end of the SRP period.
44. Support to fisher-folk has been complex, with so many donations of boats from independent donors that the Bureau for Fisheries asked for these to be stopped in January 2014. At the same time, there was inadequate distribution of fishing nets and other equipment. As a result, the IAHE community member interviews heard that income from fishing (without the gear) was only at 20% its pre-Haiyan levels. Overall, evidence from IAHE focus group discussions and community consultations suggests livelihoods have recovered to between 15-50% of pre-Haiyan levels. This is in line with other data available from agencies' own monitoring, but to confirm these estimates would require much greater investigation.
45. While the IAHE heard from across communities of their continuing need for sustainable livelihoods, there are gender differences. Higher levels of debt have been found among women borrowing both for household expenses and to restart livelihoods. IAHE consultations confirmed AAP findings that women and also older people reported a continued need for more tailored livelihood support than has so far been available.

46. **Key success stories:**

the Typhoon Haiyan response emphasised adherence to international labour standards, and ensured a regional minimum wage to worker beneficiaries, as well as personal protective and safety equipment, social protection and health benefits to reduce vulnerability among workers. It is too early to say if this will have lasting effect but it provided an opportunity to increase workers' and agencies' awareness of labour rights.

**Picture: Fishing household at work in Region VI**



## Key finding:

- Emergency employment was successful in enabling households to meet their immediate needs. Some early interventions to support rural livelihoods were also timely and well-coordinated with government departments, notably the replanting of rice and support to fisheries. There was a need for more customised approaches earlier, particularly for non-agricultural livelihoods and also coconut farmers, and in particular for a move away from cash for work towards approaches leading to sustainable livelihoods. Affected people report high levels of debt.

## 3.4 Strategic Response Objective Four

### **SRO 4: Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene and health services.**

- Outcome: Percentage of displaced women, men and children of all ages, with access to basic WASH services to maintain public health
- Outcome: Percentage of the population that is functioning poorly and is likely to be in need of services, including those with severe or extreme difficulties in functioning in different aspects of day to day life

#### The approach

47. The inter-agency response included the rapid re-establishment of municipal and community water supplies, emergency sanitation services in displacement centres, communicable disease surveillance, and the re-establishment of treatment and health services, including reproductive health care and immunisation. There was a huge response from foreign medical teams which provided significant support but also placed heavy coordination demands on the Department of Health. Over 150 teams in total responded to Haiyan. Key challenges in the emergency phase were the lack of electricity, particularly for maintaining the cold chain, and problems of access. Particular support provided by the international response to emergency water supplies included the provision of water bladders, trucking operations, a large number of different types of water treatment units, generator sets, repairs of transmission and distribution pipes, distribution of water kits and water harvesting support.
48. The response went beyond meeting humanitarian needs caused by Haiyan: the WASH strategy used the opportunity to reinforce national policy to prevent pre-existing sanitation and health risks caused by open defecation, and the health cluster adopted ambitious targets for mental health services which went beyond pre-existing health service provision.

#### The results

49. The most significant result that the inter-agency response contributed to was the lack of any major outbreak of any epidemic or disease despite the high risk context. While attribution cannot be determined, the extensive damage to water supplies and health services, the large numbers of IDPs in remote areas and also concentrated in urban areas and evacuation centres, all combined to make the outbreak of communicable diseases a high risk following Haiyan. The range of measures taken by the cluster partners was highly appropriate to contribute to efforts to address these risks.
50. There is no current data available for the outcomes identified in the SRP. Initial targets were for 3 million people to have access to WASH facilities and 100% of affected population to have access to basic health services.<sup>25</sup> While there has been considerable progress - 61% of municipalities in affected areas had functioning health facilities by April (up from 49% at the end of January) - this figure is still well under target.<sup>26</sup> No update on this figure was available to the IAHE.

<sup>25</sup> Defined as at least 5 health centres per 10,000 people - later revised to 2.89

<sup>26</sup> Equating to 1.78 facilities per 10,000 people, well below the original target of 5 (which itself was revised to 2.89)

51. Significant successes include:
- The re-establishment of the Tacloban town water supply in the first few days. In the first month, water services in 21 municipalities were restored, serving 600,000 people through the 24 main water service providers.
  - The rapid distribution of hygiene kits (over 100k) and water kits (65K) within the first month.
  - The rapid provision of healthcare for people in the affected areas, especially providing support for women's reproductive healthcare including obstetric and neo-natal care, trauma care, mental health and psychosocial support, chronic conditions and infectious diseases.
  - The establishment, by February, of functioning health facilities at pre-typhoon levels in 49% of municipalities.
  - The rapid gearing up and strengthening of the Philippines emergency communicable disease and epidemic surveillance systems, including training and equipment for staff.
  - Coordination of over 150 foreign medical teams.
52. Unplanned, longer-term results include a national level debate on an expanded primary health care package for all Filipinos across the country, independent of income level. In addition, the government is looking into a national mental health care programme building on the experience in Haiyan. Finally, the Department of Health now has improved information on the health facilities across the affected regions, and stronger skills in mapping these.
53. However, challenges remain: there are concerns regarding WASH facilities at bunkhouse sites (originally designed only for six months and which are likely now to be occupied for much longer) and in the "No Build Zones" in coastal areas; and the rate of restoring health facilities has been slower than planned. It is clear that, after initial emergency response mechanisms were put in place, the rehabilitation of services for the long-term has seen a slower rate of progress.

## Key findings:

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- ➔ The activities to prevent outbreaks of disease were successfully implemented, targeting priority areas for intervention such as municipal water supplies, immediate treatment, surveillance and immunisation. Different healthcare needs of women and children were addressed. Pre-positioning of goods was effective. There was a rapid shift from emergency response to early recovery measures, with an emphasis on community-based sanitation approaches and rehabilitation of healthcare services.
  - ➔ Emergency response targets were effectively reached but progress against recovery targets has been slower. Concerns remain for sanitation conditions in bunkhouses. At the same time the response has provided an opportunity to achieve progress in relation to pre-existing challenges, for instance in sanitation and mental health care services.
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## 3.5 Strategic Response Objective Five

**SRO 5: Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.**

- Outcome: % of affected people who express that they feel secure
- Outcome: % of girls and boys with access to adequate primary and secondary education

### The approach

54. Key components of the strategy to address the education objective included working closely with the Government on classroom reconstruction, teacher training and back-to-school campaigns. This was complemented in the protection domain by the conversion of child-friendly spaces into daycare and temporary learning spaces, after the initial needs for psychosocial assessment and family reunification were met.
55. The protection cluster partners provided protection training for key service providers, including the police and DSWD. A key intervention was support for the locating or re-issuing of key documentation vital for access to benefits and school enrolments. A cross-sectoral approach was taken by protection cluster field teams, for instance in Samar they prioritised difficult to reach areas and provided feedback on a range of concerns to operational agencies. Practical assistance was provided through the provision of solar lighting. Agencies also focused on strengthening child protection mechanisms and protection from trafficking and gender-based violence, through the strengthening of referral systems and measures such as the establishment of women friendly spaces and counselling and advisory services.

### The results

56. With regard to protection, no data was available to the IAHE to show progress at the outcome level, though the protection needs assessment in May shows a slight *increase* in reports of feelings of insecurity since MIRA 2. Women, older people and families living with other families were identified as the groups most at risk. The assessment found far higher reports of protection problems among displaced people than other affected people. Recent feedback through AAP mechanisms shows that communities still express feelings of vulnerability, especially with the beginning of the typhoon season and ongoing shelter and livelihood needs.
57. Output monitoring shows excellent progress in most areas particularly in: provision of training on protection guidelines; child protection and gender based violence services; protection monitoring visits; and ten of the targeted fifteen municipalities have functional gender-based violence (GBV) referral mechanisms. On the education side, after initial high levels of re-enrolment, the rehabilitation of classroom and learning spaces, and the provision of learning materials, there are lower rates of success for children's participation in structured activities, and training for teachers on emergency-related subjects. Though classes resumed immediately, protection issues were raised for both IDPs and students. Some schools were still occupied by IDPs even when classes resumed, resulting in tensions between the IDPs and the students.

58. In terms of identification of risks, the IAHE found that protection risks were well identified and pursued for displaced populations, in particular documentation issues, and risks relating to relocation, no-build zones and bunkhouses. The cluster has flagged the importance of resolving land tenure for IDPs moving to transitional settlement sites and/or back to unsafe zones, and has been very active in the inter-cluster working group taking forward advocacy in this area. However, solutions to these do not seem to be in sight yet. Earlier attention to property and land rights would have been beneficial.
59. The focus was appropriately directed to more remote areas and displacement centres (evacuation centres, bunkhouses, tent cities) at higher risk and vulnerability. There is the potential that insufficient attention was accorded to families living temporarily with other families. In protection needs assessments, the elderly were considered to be at higher risk than children, but there is little evidence of elderly-focussed needs assessment or programming.

## Key finding:

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- There was good early identification of some key issues and risks. Good progress in the provision of temporary learning spaces and materials has helped rebuild sense of “normal life” for children. Strong protection measures were put in place correctly identifying key risks particularly for women and children but possibly overlooking the elderly and people living with other families. In some instances, measures have gone beyond returning services to pre-Haiyan levels, for example in relation to GBV referral pathways. There is slow progress in the government’s permanent rebuilding of schools, which may put the temporary facilities under strain. Key outstanding protection concerns centre on the 5,400 households still displaced with no clear relocation plans.
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## 3.6 Relevance


### 3.6.1 Relation to needs

60. While most clusters did initial rapid assessments which often focused on the extent of damage, deeper assessment and planning rapidly moved to agency- and project-specific processes, resulting in a lack of overall comprehensive needs assessment of the sort needed to set baselines and to inform the more precise location of needs. A baseline study for WASH was carried out only in April 2014, and for Protection in June 2014. Shelter, food security and livelihoods had no comprehensive door-to-door needs assessments (Annex 8.2 holds more information on the needs assessment processes undertaken for each objective). Despite the generally weak link between assessment and planning, the IAHE found that the SRP objectives, strategy and activities on the whole were relevant to the needs of the population affected by Haiyan, although insufficient emphasis was placed on planning, advocacy and funding for livelihoods and shelter.
61. IAHE community consultations found that, on the whole, communities considered the type and content of assistance for emergency response to have been appropriate. The IAHE survey found that women and disabled people were more critical of the assistance in terms of its timeliness and the extent to which it had helped them cope with and recover from the disaster. Communities in urban areas recommended greater use of cash rather than commodities, and earlier support to livelihood training and support for micro-enterprise. Communities repeatedly highlighted their need for more and earlier support to help them move from dependency on emergency employment to more sustainable livelihood and shelter solutions. Thus, while the objectives were relevant, some elements of the strategy - in particular its pace of implementation - did not meet community expectations.

### 3.6.2 Accountability to Affected Populations

62. A significant feature of the Haiyan response was the attention to Accountability to Affected Populations and Communication with Communities (CwC), two related processes intended to enable community participation in the design and monitoring of assistance in order to increase its relevance and effectiveness, as well as accountability. Communication needs and preferred communication channels were assessed as part of the MIRA1, and this supported optimization of communication strategies. CwC and AAP were boosted in this response by the EDGs' adoption of an AAP Plan of Activities, and by the deployment of successive OCHA CwC and AAP advisors to the field and pre-existing in-country CwC capacity. The IAHE found high levels of attention to accountability among agencies, with multiple communication channels, including community committees, listening exercises, hotlines, monitoring processes, complaints boxes, specific outreach projects such as radio programmes providing information, and also opportunities for questions and answers from communities to agencies through radio or text. The consultation processes took gender differences and other community dynamics into account, and set up means for men, women, older people and children to input separately.
63. Somewhat late in the response, systematic OCHA-coordinated community feedback processes were initiated, and these provided non-agency specific mechanisms to gather community feedback on conditions and assistance, which was then analysed and fed back to the relevant agencies, clusters and, if necessary, the HCT for further action and follow-up. The IAHE found evidence that this feedback did influence the activities of agencies and clusters, although this consequence was not usually transmitted back to the originating communities - so the affected populations themselves could not see the whole feedback loop at work. The AAP/CwC feedback loop is shown below.

Figure 1. Community feedback loop



64. The IAHE identified three key areas for improvement in AAP:
- a. **Start and scale up earlier** - the response would have benefited from the establishment of a response-wide, community-level feedback mechanisms at an earlier point, which would have enabled more community participation in the design of response and early recovery programmes.
  - b. **Feedback to communities** - the communities consistently reported to the IAHE that they got no response to their complaints. The inter-agency response did make good use of the After-Action Reviews coordinated by OCHA to share community feedback with government officials.
  - c. **Clarify the relationship between Communication with Communities and AAP** - CWC and AAP started with overlapping mandates and parallel structures in the Haiyan response, but in the end they combined to work together in a more integrated way. The IAHE found there is sufficient common ground for the two areas to be brought together for greater effect. This would be particularly important in a less well-resourced response, where the same people often combine both functions together with monitoring and evaluation.<sup>27</sup>

### 3.6.3 Beneficiary targeting

65. The most frequent complaint heard by the IAHE in community consultations related to beneficiary targeting. After blanket distributions of initial food assistance and NFIs, the IAHE found that agencies (including those which operated outside the inter-agency response) used a range of methods including:
- a. Poverty approach - using government data based on who was already part of the government social protection programme (the 4Ps or Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program)
  - b. Poor and newly-vulnerable approach - using government 4Ps data and supplementing this with agency's own assessments of "new vulnerable"
  - c. Poor and needs approach - using lists drawn up by barangay captains
  - d. Validated needs approach - using agency's own criteria for beneficiaries and identifying them often with community or barangay council involvement
  - e. Community priorities approach - engaging communities in targeting e.g. through comment on initial beneficiary lists. This approach was seen more frequently in later assistance
  - f. Prior relationship approach - there were some instances where programmes targeted specific stakeholders, for example affected employees of a company or of an organization; members of a local saving institution for small loans; or members of a religious community.
66. Communities were generally unhappy with any type of targeting, arguing that they were all victims and therefore all needed assistance, and additionally that it was not traditional to exclude people in the community from assistance. In particular, community dissatisfaction was strongest about agencies' use of different approaches to selection, noting that it was not always clear what criteria were being used and that there was a lack of community participation in defining the criteria. Many people were critical of certain criteria, seeing them as too blunt (for example, assistance for multi-child families where other families with fewer children were known also to have great need). At the same time, both local government and communities also

<sup>27</sup> The CwC and AAP working group sees a close inter-relationship between CwC as a mechanism to mainstream AAP, and that AAP strengthens CwC's efforts to empower affected communities. The working group advocates for the mainstreaming and merging of AAP and CwC at the operational level for future emergency responses.

pointed to the politicisation and perceived abuse of assistance by some barangay officials, and thereby confirmed the value of independent assessment. Despite efforts for more harmonised approaches to targeting, such as the inter-agency guidance produced on this (though not until February 2014), there was a strong overall message from communities on the need for more consistency and transparency in targeting approaches.

### 3.6.4 Differentiation of needs

67. A key factor influencing the relevance and effectiveness of assistance is the extent to which it can take account of the different needs of the affected population. Response measures to address this included the provision of gender advisors, AAP processes and protection mechanisms, all of which highlighted the needs of particularly vulnerable groups. There were also significant initiatives to highlight the perspectives of particular communities, notably, children's voices were heard through an assessment by an inter-agency group on children's perspectives.<sup>28</sup> Because MIRA 1 was designed to quickly capture barangay-level information rather than data at household- or individual-level, it did not collect sex- and age-disaggregated data. MIRA 2 took more account of gender, and included men and women. More gender-disaggregated data earlier would have been valuable, given that there can be differential impact of a disaster on different groups, and this is an important factor to inform the design of responses.
68. Nevertheless, OCHA's analysis of the application of the gender marker showed that over half of the projects reviewed had the intention to contribute significantly to gender equality, and that the different needs of boys and girls, men and women had been analysed and integrated into programme design. Some interventions, such as reproductive healthcare services and other measures to address gender-based violence, focussed on women's needs. The IAHE could not validate this, but on the whole it seems that many agency assessments and programme designs used gender-analysis.
69. The IAHE findings from the survey and community consultations were consistent with the findings of the AAP consultations and other monitoring process. Key findings were:
  - a. Vulnerable groups were given some priority in the distribution of assistance. But, with some exceptions, there was limited evidence of programmes being designed to meet the particular needs of vulnerable groups, particularly older people and people with disabilities.
  - b. Assessment processes and early consultation processes were limited in gathering the perspectives and needs of particular vulnerable groups. Communities reported that consultations focused more on identifying beneficiaries and whether people met programmes' selection criteria.
  - c. Monitoring processes, AAP and IAHE interviews and focus group discussions found there was a need for more tailored approaches to livelihoods, including those of women and older people. Research found women were more likely to be in debt and were more likely to be working in the informal economy.

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<sup>28</sup> After Yolanda: What Children Think, Need and Recommend by Save the Children, Plan, UNICEF, World Vision, December 2013

## Key findings:

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- The range of approaches used by agencies to identify beneficiaries caused confusion and high levels of community dissatisfaction.
  - There was a lack of systematic approaches to identify and differentiate between different groups' needs at the initial stage of the response. Later, individual agencies built in processes to consult with communities and prioritised assistance to vulnerable groups - but even then there was little evidence of tailoring assistance to meet specific groups' needs.
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## 3.7 Timeliness of responses

70. For the vast majority of communities, the first hours and days of the response were local, with communities and then local government providing immediate assistance. Initial inter-agency emergency assistance started arriving on Day 4, and at scale on Day 11 - supported by agency pre-deployments and later the surge capacity. The timeliness of the overall response was greatly facilitated by the deployment of national military assets in the hardest hit areas. The pre-deployment of the UNDAC Team and subsequent deployment of additional UNDAC Members with UN-CMCoord expertise added significant value in liaising with both national and foreign military forces to support humanitarian priorities. The speedy re-establishment of telecommunications for the humanitarian sector was a key contribution to which the GPH, international agencies and private sector all contributed - building on useful preparedness measures and contacts made earlier in 2013.
71. The IAHE community survey found that initial assistance was timely: 12 out of 19 barangays surveyed received assistance within one week of Haiyan, with more inland barangays reporting less timely responses. This first response was usually the government provision of food. However, subsequent IAHE community consultations across 18 communities in Regions VI, VII and VIII found communities more critical, particularly of the pace of assistance after the initial food distributions. Initial assistance had reached these communities somewhere between 2-14 days following landfall of Haiyan, usually food assistance provided by LGU/MSWD. Generally, in terms of timeliness, and linking closely with communities' views on the overall assistance received, communities were more positive about emergency assistance than early recovery support. IDPs who had been in evacuation centres and were now in bunkhouses and tent cities were generally more positive about the timeliness of assistance. This community feedback is consistent with the IAHE analysis of progress against the SRP objectives and targets, which found that emergency response targets had higher rates of success than early recovery targets. The two particular areas of concern highlighted by communities, women and men, and supported by SRP monitoring data, are the slow progress in early recovery of livelihoods beyond emergency employment, and attainment of more durable shelter solutions both within the community and in terms of knowing whether and where relocation will take place.

## Key finding:

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- Emergency assistance was timely, aided by the pre-deployments including those of UNDAC and military assets. Communities were more critical of the pace of the provision of assistance for recovery.
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## 3.8 Key lessons and issues

### 3.8.1 Critical importance of in-country preparedness:

72. Demonstrated by the important role that early warning systems, directed evacuation, pre-positioning of food, and community self-help with shared food and shelter all played in saving lives.

### 3.8.2 Current vulnerability of the response achievements:

73. To external shocks, such as the current typhoon season, due to: the low state of repair of evacuation centres; depletion of people's coping mechanisms, particularly as a result of unsafe shelter and un-restored livelihoods; and uncertainty regarding the timing of components of the government's longer term recovery programmes.

### 3.8.3 Inter-relationship of objectives:

74. Analysis of the SRP's results makes evident that re-establishing sustainable livelihoods is key for the sustainability of other results, particularly food security and shelter for those who have partially self-recovered.

### 3.8.4 Build in speed and flexibility in early recovery response:

75. The IAHE highlights the need for the inter-agency response to be nimble and able to adapt and customise its responses from an early stage. While blanket, standard responses to food, water, health and shelter needs were appropriate and effective in the immediate phase of the response, more customised approaches quickly became important.

Picture: IAHE community consultation – developing the timeline and discussion on assistance



## 4. HOW WELL DID THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ENGAGE WITH AND STRENGTHEN NATIONAL AND LOCAL SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND ACTORS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE?

*The international community's engagement with national and local systems was complex and evolved significantly over time. The magnitude of the disaster and the initial strength of the international response were factors that contributed to an early divergence between international and local planning and coordination processes. The international response and surge mechanisms in particular did not adapt sufficiently to play a complementary role in a middle income country with strong disaster management capacity. However, strong leadership, practical measure such as co-location, former institutional working relationships and a focus on implementation helped bring the national and international systems back together for some very successful cooperation in implementation. Importantly, different planning timeframes and a lack of clarity around linkages between emergency relief and early recovery contributed to difficulties in the coordination and management of transition. The IAHE found limited evidence of effective engagement between the international response and national and local civil society.*

76. The IAHE focused on five aspects of the international response: (a) needs assessment and planning, (b) coordination and implementation, (c) strengthening of national systems, (d) the challenge of transition, and (e) engagement with national civil society.

### 4.1 Needs assessment and planning

77. The Government and HCT had a good working relationship, having cooperated in a number of recent disaster responses. The establishment, in 2011, of the Technical Working Group, bringing together the key coordination mechanism of the government - the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) - with the HCT, provided a forum to discuss and improve effective coordination on issues related to international humanitarian assistance.<sup>29</sup>

78. In advance of Haiyan, the Government and HCT worked closely, meeting on 6 November 2013 as part of the preparedness process (preparedness measures are also covered in section 6.1). In the initial days after the disaster struck, there was frequent contact and good operational coordination between the national government and international actors in Tacloban, but when international surge teams and supplies started to arrive at scale, the planning processes of the international community and GPH began to diverge. The Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan) produced by 12 November was based on initial government data and interviews with key informants. The first MIRA was conducted without significant Government involvement, and soon afterwards the Strategic Response Plan was developed, approved and released, also without significant Government involvement,<sup>30</sup> although the HCT and HC did

<sup>29</sup> NDRRMC Member 05 S 2011: members from NDRRMC - OCD, DOST, DOH, DSWD, DILG, AFP, PNP; from HCT - OCHA, UNICEF, OXFAM, IFRC, WFP, IOM.

<sup>30</sup> The Government was invited, but declined to participate, taking the position that the existing approximate needs assessment was sufficient, and that their energy needed to focus upon immediate service delivery. They did participate as informants in key informant interviews.

encourage liaison by the international co-leads of clusters with their national counterparts - given that Filipino government planning took place at sector level. The SRP was validated with Government cluster leads and line Ministries to ensure that the Government had no objections to its direction.

79. Reasons for limited Government involvement in the key early planning phases of the international response included: (a) a Government priority on service delivery, (b) the externally-oriented character of the international assessment and planning instruments, (c) the way HPC tools were mostly prepared by surge personnel who were experts in their respective domains but did not have well-established relationships with the national coordination machinery, and (d) the Government was working on its own plan known as Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda, launched on 16 December 2013.
80. While the international community was working on the HAP, the MIRA and the SRP, the government was undertaking its own planning process, with more of a medium-term emphasis on early recovery. Local government units were instructed to provide initial damage and needs assessments which produced municipal and regional plans by 25th November. These local plans provided the basis for the Government's strategic plan, RAY, which is broken into three separate components. The first two of these (critical immediate needs, and short-term interventions) loosely correlate with the timespan of the SRP although the scope of the RAY is more at the recovery end of the relief to recovery spectrum.
81. The separate planning processes continued the international community conducting MIRA 2 in December, whilst the national Government conducted a PDNA in early 2014, in association with its international development partners, leading to the Government's revised Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan in September 2014.

### The main components of RAY

**US\$ 0.78 billion** critical, immediate needs  
**US\$ 2.05 billion** short- term interventions (2014)  
**US\$ 5.34 billion** medium term needs

**Total US\$ 8.17 billion**

## Key finding:

- Government data informed the early phases of the international response, but then the international community and the government followed largely separate paths of assessment and planning, each with different emphasis on parts of the relief-recovery spectrum. There is little ownership of the SRP by the GPH, though its contents largely complement the direction of the Government's RAY.

## 4.2 Coordination and implementation of the international response

82. The coordination picture across the response has many regional, sectoral and temporal variations. While it is difficult to generalise across the whole response, some clear findings emerge.

### 4.2.1 The cluster system(s)


83. Both the international community and the Government used the cluster system as their main vehicle for coordination. However, there were differences in the cluster system as established in the Philippines with that which has evolved in the global system. (For full details see Annex 8.3). There were some adaptations made to the cluster system in the Philippines e.g. by incorporating the livelihoods cluster which does not feature in the global cluster system though this proved problematic in finding a coherent approach to livelihood support across agencies and clusters. The cluster system rolled out in the Haiyan response placed considerable strain on government departments, notably on DSWD, which was expected to assume leadership of five clusters while also serving as the primary delivery channel for GPH relief. While this large and dual role was one taken on by DSWD in earlier disasters, the scale of the Haiyan disaster and response created a huge strain for one department.
84. The cluster system in the Philippines has a government lead and international agency co-lead(s) but the respective roles and responsibilities of each are largely undefined. The IAHE found that, at the initial stage, government officials – particularly at the provincial and municipal levels – were very appreciative of international technical expertise and management support to coordinate the scaled-up international assistance. However, this then quickly developed to national structures and systems feeling overwhelmed by international staff, most of whom were new to the country and had not established relationships with their counterparts. While some clusters, such as health, agriculture and education, maintained their national government leadership role with international agencies in support, for most clusters in the initial part of the international response, it was the international cluster co-leads who effectively ran their clusters – especially in the hubs where national capacity was most stretched.

### Key finding:

- There is a relatively good alignment between the national and the international cluster systems. Roles and responsibilities in co-leadership were not clearly defined, nor were they adjusted to the scale of the disaster and response.

### 4.2.2 Coordination mechanisms

85. There were a number of fora to bring together the international and national responses including: the inter-cluster coordination mechanism led by OCD initially from November 2013 and then DSWD from February 2014; the OPARR-DSWD-HCT series of meetings from January to June 2014; and regionally based inter-agency meetings. However, the IAHE found that parallel processes for coordination were present from the early stage of the response, for instance inter-cluster meetings were held in Manila, Tacloban and Guiuan only for those international agencies involved in the international response. Similarly, the government, at different levels, held their own coordination and inter-sectoral meetings. These separate processes each had their own constituencies and their own logics, but the IAHE found that over time they became too disparate, especially in Region VIII. This divergent trend is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 2. Government and Inter-agency assessment and planning processes and timelines<sup>31</sup>

A number of factors drove divergence:

- a. The strength of both the scale of the emergency and the international response overwhelmed already stretched government resources
- b. There was limited understanding of each other's systems, particularly among the incoming surge staff (of national system and capacities) and among Government officials (of international systems). While the government system was well understood by government officials at the national level, the cluster system had not been operationalised in these regions before so there was variable understanding of the government system across municipalities, and even less knowledge of the international system at regional level. At the same time, the incoming surge personnel had very limited knowledge of the national disaster response mechanisms and capacity. This lack of knowledge of national systems, combined with a sense of urgency to move ahead with their operations, was often perceived by national counterparts as arrogance and disrespect. Knowledge of national systems that was held in the Manila-based offices of international agencies was not always drawn on by the surge staff in the field

<sup>31</sup> The figure illustrates the processes with the main events, actors and processes undertaken by the government and inter-agency response in assessment and planning which are described more fully in the text above.

- c. For sound operational reasons international coordination structures were set up in locations near the affected areas, even though these did not always coincide with the government's centres of authority e.g. in Guiuan rather than Borongan in Eastern Samar; Roxas rather than Iloilo for Region VI
- d. There was a lack of clarity regarding who was the decision-maker in some settings causing confusion. For instance, the NDRRMC, in effect, relocated to Tacloban in the early stages of the response, overriding the regional, provincial and city structures
- e. Perceptions of politicisation of government priority-setting and complexities of local politics notably in Region VIII led some international actors to "go it alone"
- f. The absence of provincial and regional contingency plans limited the national authorities' ability to direct international assistance
- g. The independence of the humanitarian community was important to maintain, but also an irritant. For example, the HCT created tensions with its advocacy for improved standards of bunkhouse accommodation, for a clear no-build zone policy and for respect of the rights of people awaiting relocation

#### 4.2.3 Regional and sectoral variations

86. Despite the pressures of Haiyan, the IAHE also found numerous examples of successful cooperation, and noted the eventual re-convergence of the national and international coordination systems. This pattern varied between regions and sectors. For example, in region VI, early close coordination was co-led by the Provincial Governor and RDRRMC, with OCHA and the Canadian military contingent in support. The Roxas experience became a model structure for national-international cooperation, as well as civil-military coordination. Politically, Region VIII and particularly Tacloban is far more complex than Regions VI and VII, which hampered a set-up similar to those in Cebu and Roxas.

##### Co-operation in Cebu, Region VII


- In Region VII, the international response was much more clearly located within and under government structures from an early point. The Governor established the Task Force Paglig-on mandated to plan, implement, and monitor rehabilitation programs, projects and activities in the areas of Cebu Province affected by Super Typhoon Yolanda. The Task Force rapidly brought the agencies into a common framework beginning with an 11 December 2013 workshop with UN agencies, INGOs, local NGOs, Government Agencies and Local Government Units, to develop "The Cebu Province Rehabilitation and Recovery Program". Clusters were established, many with clear leadership by government departments, and strong links were drawn between all clusters and the government's regional plan.

87. The IAHE identified key factors enabling closer international-national cooperation:
- Leadership by key figures
  - Practical measures like co-location
  - Staying out of the limelight: the smaller the scale of the response, and therefore the more limited global attention to regions VI and VII, seemed to provide a more conducive environment for close cooperation and coordination
  - Less disrupted provincial and regional government structures and personnel, in places where there was less severe typhoon damage.

88. The IAHE also examined how clusters evolved over time, and identified additional key factors. First, pre-existing cooperation and relationships helped. Coordination was noticeably smoother in sectors where cooperation had a strong track record e.g. in health, agriculture, and education. Secondly, national staff in the international organisations and structures played important roles, due in large part to their knowledge of the national systems. It is noticeable that international-national cooperation improved as the proportion of positions filled by national staff increased, which started to occur after the de-activation of the L3 status as shown in Figure 3 below. And lastly, practical coordination and the creation of customised structures to suit the area and sector helped: for example WASH established a system of municipal-level focal points with representatives from the LGU and an INGO to take responsibility for coordination of activities within that municipality.

Figure 3. Comparison of numbers of international and national staff in response (UNDSS)

### Number of UN Staff Deployed to Yolanda Affected Areas



## Key finding:

- The pressure to diverge is strong. The magnitude of the demands on government services and strength of the international response led to the establishment of separate coordination processes, particularly in areas of intense response activity. While separate processes may have enabled timeliness and met operational priorities for early response, it would have been preferable for there to be more effort to keep parallel mechanisms in tandem, and to bring them together under government leadership as soon as circumstances allowed.

### 4.3 Factors which strengthened national systems

89. Despite some divergences in planning processes and coordination mechanisms, in *implementation* the response was characterised by close cooperation between international actors and Government at many levels. Some of the best examples of strengthening of national systems were when activities were implemented in partnership. These include:
- a. **Use of national systems, standards and protocols** - for example in adherence to minimum wage standards and labour laws, ensuring that seeds met Department of Agriculture certification standards, and the use of national health standards (which match SPHERE standards). Investment in and use of national health and nutrition surveillance systems have also served to strengthen them. Using the Government's 4P program as the basis for targeting poor households is another example.
  - b. **Building on local systems** - There are a number of cases where interventions, in seeking to build sustainability, have given new life to dormant government systems. For example, in some locations the GBV and women-friendly services have catalysed local women to access local government gender and development funds for their longer term support. And in general, the overall response has energized the government's disaster risk reduction and management system, which had a variable pattern of performance. This includes organisations working with Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Councils at different levels right down to the community level. Gaps in structural competencies have also been revealed: for example, in Region VI, revised guidelines are being finalised to deal with international assistance more efficiently.
  - c. **Investment in national systems** - the latter stages of the international response have seen increasing attention to capacity-building, particularly, but not exclusively, at the municipal level. However, the IAHE also found LGUs weary with the requests for staff to be involved in training and workshops - suggesting the need for more creative approaches to capacity-building. There have been steps to learn lessons and prepare better across government structures, for example OCHA is developing a civil-military coordination training package with the government. Likewise, WFP is working with DSWD to develop facilities which will reduce bottlenecks in food distribution and other challenges experienced in the Haiyan response. Investments include a two year project to establish a network of government disaster response centres equipped for efficient food pack distribution, and improved planning systems that can make quicker decisions between assistance options, i.e. food vs cash choices.
- The international response has allocated funds to support government structures e.g. UNICEF support for additional social workers working within DSWD, and USAID/UNDP support for OPARR. However, some of the attempts to build capacity have been blocked by bureaucratic restrictions and inefficiencies: for instance, donations of vehicles have been blocked in some cases, and there are government restrictions on staff numbers stemming from earlier rationalisation processes.
- d. **Joint learning** - the After Action Reviews facilitated by OCHA in Regions VI and VIII provided valuable opportunities for the government to hear feedback collected through the AAP/CWC system on the response, and to reflect on its own performance. They concluded with commitments and plans for improved preparedness for future crises, and in some regions government offices are considering adoption of AAP/CWC systems.
90. There is a note of caution highlighted by the LGUs. AAR reports confirmed reports heard by the IAHE that the scale of the response to Haiyan would cause LGUs problems in future responses, when there would not be the same level of resources to respond, for example with food, cash support and quality of shelter. The concern was that international assistance has created expectations that national authorities could not meet in future.


## Key finding:

- Some inter-agency approaches, particularly those building on national systems, contributed to the strengthening of national and local disaster response mechanisms. Attention to these increased after the immediate, emergency response phase, and benefits are particularly evident at local levels. More attention is needed for the strengthening of national and local systems beyond workshops and training.

## 4.4 The transition from emergency response to recovery

91. The IAHE found that coordination over the transition to recovery phase was complicated by different understandings by national authorities and the international community of the terms “emergency response” and “early recovery”, and of the boundaries between them.

Figure 4. Emergency response and recovery linkages



92. The graphic above shows that GPH legislation<sup>32</sup> clearly defines three phases of response, with, most importantly, disaster response ending at the moment that immediate life-saving threats are stabilised. The Filipino perspective has a very short “disaster response” phase and recognizes a fast evolution towards recovery. For the GPH, the scope of humanitarian action ends when the extraordinary displacement and disruption caused by the disaster are ended. There is no concept of early recovery in the Filipino system.
93. For the international community, while the intention is to consider early recovery from the beginning of the response the IAHE found the focus of activities tended to be on emergency response activities for much of the first three-six months. The international humanitarian response includes early recovery activities so was planned to extend to November 2014 with its associated coordination systems. This approach extends into what the Philippine system describes as recovery, and early recovery.

<sup>32</sup> Republic Act 101211

94. The SRP was initially designed to be a 12 month plan. The Government's RAY has now been subsumed into the Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, which covers both the early portion of the response and extends forward to 2017. The SRP and the CRRP focus on different ends of the relief to recovery spectrum, although there is an area of overlap in the middle, and that is precisely the transition zone that has caused some discomfort to both the national and international actors, with national actors feeling a strong sense of sovereignty, and international actors feeling a sense of responsibility towards the affected population, and particularly to the vulnerable core for whom solutions have not yet been identified and made available. Broadly-speaking, some of the frustration expressed by the national government comes from their perception that the international community involvement extended too far beyond the emergency response, and that they were continuing to operate in "emergency mode" and with a largely separate planning and coordination system.
95. To some extent, the Haiyan response is victim of its own success: the immediate response was effective, the move to begin self-recovery was quick and national systems were capable. But the IAHE found there was a lack of guidance and tools for transition and exit. Somewhat symptomatic of this is that the L3 emergency was de-activated after three months (the first time this has ever happened), but apart from demobilising the surge teams it was not at all clear to people on the ground what this meant for programming – and so programming and its associated coordination machinery pretty much continued unchanged until the Government precipitated closure.
96. The turning point came with the Government announcement on 4 July 2014 of the end of the humanitarian phase and that OPARR was to become the coordinating body for the next phase of recovery. Most organisations are managing the practical implications of this change, though there are challenges for areas such as shelter and protection that do not fit easily in the new system.
97. There remains a deeper conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. This was made more complicated by the absence of a full assessment of the remaining humanitarian needs and the hasty way in which the SRP was ended.

## Key finding:

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- There is a lack of agreed procedures and guidance for HCTs to steer the transition process and evolution of the international-national relationships from humanitarian to recovery phases, particularly in places where there is a strong, competent government experienced in disaster response management.
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## 4.5 International response engagement with national civil society

98. A number of efforts were made by international agencies to engage with national civil society. A national NGO umbrella body - the UN Civil Society Assembly - is a member of the HCT. There were early attempts to deliberately reach out to national NGOs (NNGOs): an OCHA-financed national NGO liaison officer position was operational for some time, and special briefing sessions were convened for NNGOs by OCHA. OCHA raised the issue in inter-agency meetings at regional levels a number of times, where agencies agreed on the need to engage more with national NGOs and local civil society, but struggled to work out a strategy to take it further.

OCHA proposed the creation of an Emergency Response Fund with an NNGO focus (as exist in 20 other countries), but donors were not interested.

99. A complicating factor was the limited capacity of local CSOs. Some international humanitarian agencies with pre-existing NNGO programmes and relationships have continued working with them throughout the Haiyan period, and there are examples of the Haiyan response being used by them as a vehicle to strengthen local capacities in disaster management. A few national NGOs were able to fully participate in the cluster system but, on the whole, the IAHE heard that there has only been increased participation of national and local NGOs in clusters and working groups recently, with the decrease of international organisations and staff.
100. Overall, the IAHE heard that often NNGOs felt that they were not trusted (especially financially) by INGOs or UN agencies. Some NNGOs felt the international relationships were “extractive” and not true partnerships. They also struggled with the high turnover of expatriate staff, which meant that durable relationships could not be established. Generally speaking, Filipino NGOs operated separately from the International NGOs and from the HCT system. There was little evidence of new relationships or capacity being built in the humanitarian field, a situation that was well-described by the title of a report written by a consortium of International NGOs: “Missed Again.”<sup>33</sup>

## Key finding:

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- There was limited engagement with national NGOs and civil-society at both national and, to a lesser extent, at local levels. There is little if any evidence so far of the international response contributing to the strengthening of national civil society and its role in disaster management.
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## 4.6 Key lessons and issues

- There is a need for more flexibility in the international system to modify and fit with national disaster response systems
- At times, when the scale of crisis puts a national disaster response system under intense pressure, some parallel structures maybe needed for a limited period. But there also need to be mechanisms to ensure both national and international systems stay closely in tandem and re-merge as soon as possible
- There is a need for international responders to learn more about national systems before they arrive in country, as well as for the key actors at all levels in the national system to better understand the international response mechanisms
- Transition places particular demands on international-national coordination and was further challenged by differences in understanding of key concepts and phases of emergency response or relief, early recovery and recovery
- In a situation where capable national staff are available, maximise their capacity sooner to reduce the need for international surge personnel less familiar with the context.
- There is a need to consider, in preparedness plans, how to build civil society capacity for disaster preparedness, and its links with national and international responses

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<sup>33</sup> Featherstone, A. (2014) Missed again: Making space for partnership in Typhoon Haiyan response.

## 5. COORDINATION: WAS THE ASSISTANCE WELL-COORDINATED, SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDING DUPLICATION AND FILLING GAPS? WHAT CONTEXTUAL FACTORS HELP EXPLAIN RESULTS OR THE LACK THEREOF?

*Coordination mechanisms were well funded and rapidly established, and the cluster system functioned as planned. While there is some unevenness in the geographical distribution of the response in relation to needs, the IAHE found no evidence of serious, sustained gaps. Cross-cutting issues provide opportunities for more joined up inter-cluster approaches. Cash-based approaches present considerable opportunities but also coordination challenges to ensure positive impacts at individual, household, community and local economy levels, particularly when there are simultaneous CTPS in different sectors addressing different, but inter-linked objectives.*

101. The IAHE addressed the third evaluation question concerning coordination by considering the:

- Coverage of the response
- Lessons from the coordination of cross cutting issues<sup>34</sup>
- Collective management and leadership of the HCT in relation to transition and collective challenges affecting response effectiveness.

102. The previous section considered how the international response worked with the government and national civil society. This section is concerned primarily with coordination within the inter-agency response.

### 5.1 Coverage

#### 5.1.1 Geographical coverage

103. The Haiyan response was a challenge to coordinate: activities took place in three regions (and five main coordination hubs) with a large range of active responders including government, private sector and charitable foundations. The IAHE estimates that at least 84% of the total response did not flow through the inter-agency coordinated systems.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> In the inception phase, it was agreed that cash, gender and AAP were the cross-cutting issues the IAHE would consider. Some comment is also given here to civil-military and private sector engagement. AAP and gender are dealt with more fully in Section Three. Environment was not an issue focused on in this IAHE.

<sup>35</sup> We approximate the total response at \$2.882 billion. At least \$1.25 billion was allocated for special Yolanda recovery programmes by the Government in the last budget amendment of 2013 and the first budget period of 2014 (as with all these estimated contributions, not all of this was disbursed in the 10 months under review); \$468m reported in FTS as contributions against the SRP (not to Government or to the Red Cross); \$350m reported by the Government of Philippines as received from private donors to the Government of the Philippines; \$336m raised by all the agencies of the Red Cross including ICRC; \$297m reported in FTS as provided to non-SRP partners that are not Red Cross or National Government; \$76m from the Canadian “matching fund” above and beyond their immediate contributions recorded in FTS; \$60m from members of the US Chamber of Commerce; and \$45m to MSF. This very approximate scan does not include funds provided by Filipino Line Ministries or LGUs, donations from the Filipino private sector (which were conspicuous throughout the affected region), costs of the national and international military assets, Haiyan-related remittances (nationally year-on-year remittances rose \$600m in the November-January period), or concessional early recovery loans of at least \$500m provided by Japan and the Multilateral Development Banks.

104. In the case of food assistance, the blanket coverage ensured that assistance reached all affected areas, although community consultations and interviews revealed that some areas waited much longer to receive assistance, particularly areas which were more remote or not initially identified as severely damaged. IAHE analysis of all inter-agency activities compared to need,<sup>36</sup> found there was a concentration of activity around coordination hubs and, in Region VI, in coastal areas. Interviews confirmed there were imbalances and that it was difficult to shift agency plans to address these. Agencies told the IAHE they were locked into their plans early on, that they were reluctant to request changes from donors (concerned that a request for a major change would reduce donor confidence in their needs assessment and planning), and also reluctant to target areas which were more difficult to access, for example where there are insurgents in Region VI, because time-consuming liaison would prevent them meeting tight time schedules. A lesson here is for donors to make it clear that programming adjustments are acceptable in the interest of effectiveness and results. However, overall there is no evidence of major sustained geographic gaps.

### 5.1.2 Performance of the cluster system

105. Coordination was well-funded with 89% of the SRP coordination budget covered and coordination architecture rapidly established. Most clusters were well-resourced, especially in the initial surge, with national cluster coordinators, information management officers, as well as a number of regional and sub-regional coordination staff. On the whole, those clusters with dedicated cluster coordinators (not double-hatting as agency leads) were more effective, as were those clusters that had pre-established relationships with government counterparts.
106. One of the main coordination challenges facing most clusters was that the very magnitude and visibility of the disaster attracted high level and sustained attention from the heads of Agencies, nearly all of whom visited the field at least once, and who allocated some of their most senior staff as surge personnel. While, on the one hand, this high level of attention provided the benefits of more resources, the disadvantage was that agency staff in the field were pressed to meet agency demands for profile and performance, and in some cases these vertical agency allegiances prevailed at the expense of horizontal cluster relations. In some sectors, the pressure to report up along Agency lines using Agency templates and metrics also inhibited the collection of cluster-level reporting data using cluster metrics.

### 5.1.3 Tools to support coordination

107. The key tool used by clusters to address gaps and avoid duplication was the 3W/4Ws mapping. The IAHE found that agencies considered this a useful tool, particularly on arrival and when designing their programmes. However it was limited, as it only mapped activities to the municipality level and not to barangay level (which would have been time absorbing and challenging given the lack of data on boundaries). But it is at barangay level where the IAHE heard from communities, agencies and local authorities that there was duplication, particularly in the emergency phase when large-scale distributions of food and non-food items were under way. It was not possible to assess the scale of this duplication, nor the extent to which this was due to organisations operating outside of the cluster system. A second significant drawback of the coordination mechanisms was that agencies found them to be time-consuming in their demands for information and for participation in frequent – sometimes overlapping coordination meetings. That being said, there is no doubt that coordination processes managed by staff experienced in coordination improved connectedness and coverage, and enhanced results.
108. Cluster-wide assessment is another tool to support coordination. All clusters did some initial, rapid assessments in the first weeks of the response, but many were focused on damage rather

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<sup>36</sup> Using data on extent of damage and pre-existing poverty See Annex 8.4.

than needs. Beside the MIRA, UNOCHA made available a prioritization tool to all the clusters in early December. It included primary data on damage, needs and vulnerability at the municipal level.<sup>37</sup> The IAHE found that in terms of assessment, agency and project-specific assessments soon prevailed, using different methodologies and not producing data that can be aggregated. As a result, in most clusters there was little reliable, standardised, primary data on the extent and more precise location of needs and vulnerability. Other than shelter, which contracted out a monitoring process to REACH and which also considered areas of WASH, only in March-April did most clusters begin more detailed sector-wide assessments and baselines studies, with WASH and protection carrying out detailed assessments at this point. But, by this time, planning was complete and there was limited opportunity to change course in light of new evidence.

#### 5.1.4 Quality of coverage

109. In terms of consistency and quality of assistance, clusters worked to establish and promulgate standards, guided by SPHERE and with country-specific detail for instance in the case of shelter. Agencies and cluster coordinators reported that it was difficult to ensure agency adherence to common standards and approaches given that they have only powers of persuasion, peer pressure and encouragement as leverage. Most effective were those standards which were pre-agreed before Haiyan and harmonised between the international and national systems, for example in health, or when national standards were adopted, such as in the quality of seeds for distribution.

### Key finding:

- The IAHE found no evidence of serious geographical gaps. There was some concentration of assistance around coordination hubs and signs that the response was slow to adapt to new information on gaps. Coordination mechanisms including data provision for information products were viewed as heavy. The cluster system worked well, although cluster discipline sometimes found itself challenged by agency allegiances. The coordination system struggled to fulfil its role in the presence of so many non-participating organisations.

## 5.2 Cross cutting issues

### 5.2.1 Cash

110. The scale of cash-transfer programming in the Haiyan response was unprecedented in humanitarian response. At least 45 agencies working towards the SRP objectives are known to have used cash based responses, and four agencies alone provided \$34 million to 1.4 million Haiyan-affected people. There is no information that comprehensively captures the total distribution within, nor the substantial cash distributions outside, the SRP. Early phase unconditional cash transfers tended to be replaced by conditional cash transfers, usually cash for work or other emergency employment.
111. A number of factors contributed to the relevance of cash-based responses in the Philippines: (a) the remittance economy meant everyone was accustomed to cash transfers, (b) the system of Financial Service Providers (FSPs) is highly developed, and (c) there is a pre-existing 5-year old GPH cash transfer program including a poverty targeting mechanism (4Ps) supported by the World Bank.
112. The experience of the Philippines illustrates the potential effectiveness of CTPs as a flexible means to support people's self-recovery, as demonstrated by post-distribution monitoring, which shows very diverse expenditure patterns that cannot be easily replicated by in-kind

<sup>37</sup> Banani, B and Chatainger P. (2014) , Composite Measure for Local Disaster Impact- Lessons from Typhoon Yolanda Philippines. A note for ACAP. [http://www.acaps.org/img/documents/c-140527\\_compositemeasures\\_philippines.pdf](http://www.acaps.org/img/documents/c-140527_compositemeasures_philippines.pdf) . This includes a review of four prioritisation matrices the authors identified as produced by agencies in the response.

assistance. This gives more power to individuals to manage their own recovery. However, cash transfers for emergency employment (cash for work) tended to be sufficient to meet only immediate household needs, and the appropriate level of cash transfer to support recovery further (without distorting markets) remains an area for further investigation.

113. The presence of a CTP advisor was found to have been extremely useful in promoting more coordinated approaches to cash across clusters and agencies. However, it is also clear that there is much more to be done to ensure that simultaneous use of cash in various clusters provides maximum impact at household, community and local economy levels.
114. The extensive use of cash would benefit from much greater research and analysis than was possible in this IAHE. Some areas for further investigation and development include:
- **Identifying the collective impact of CTPs on household recovery** - projects tend to track expenditure patterns and achievement of their own objectives e.g. food security, shelter. However, given that expenditure patterns are diverse, a broader review of cash's impact on the recovery of (a) households, (b) communities, and (c) local economies would be beneficial. This could include impact on labour markets as well, which the IAHE heard had been distorted, though it was not clear to what extent. Stronger monitoring of these dimensions would be valuable in future responses.
  - **Linking the meeting of immediate needs to more sustainable livelihoods** - cash is (rightly) used as a modality to achieve different objectives in relation to the SRP, in this case particularly for food security and livelihoods. However while these are inter-related, more research is needed into how support for food security can be shifted to support for more sustainable livelihoods, i.e. beyond emergency employment.
  - **Standardisation of monitoring** - aggregating results in the Haiyan response is challenged by the lack of comparability of data - as different agencies report on different units of account (household, family, individual). Standard monitoring systems are needed.
  - **Quality standards** - there are no existing quality standards (e.g. within SPHERE) to guide CTP. Groups such as CaLP are working on good practice guides. Further work on this would be beneficial.
  - **Dealing with debit and credit** - the Philippines illustrates how quickly people may begin to self-recover but often this is through borrowing money at very high interest rates. The IAHE heard repeatedly of people struggling to cope with their debt. Discussions began in Haiyan about how to respond to this through humanitarian assistance (for example allowing people to apply a new conditional transfer for shelter against debt previously incurred for shelter needs), but much more work needs to be done to consider (a) how assistance can be used to extend credit to people to support their recovery, and (b) levelling the playing field by allowing conditional transfers provided later in the response to be used to pay off loans that were taken for recovery purposes earlier in the response.
  - **Linkages with existing social protection mechanisms** - WFP quickly adapted to GPH's 4Ps system and, instead of setting up a parallel system, simply topped up the existing GPH 4Ps allocations. Similarly, UNDP and ILO payments were executed by the LGU treasurer's office. But not everyone did this. There is more to learn regarding how to link effectively with existing social protection mechanisms.
  - **The experience of modalities such as cash highlight the need for very close** - ideally integrated planning, implementation and monitoring, to ensure the response contributes to positive results for affected people. This should be explored further. 5.2.2 Private sector coordination

## Key finding:

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- ➔ The scale of the use of cash in the response was unprecedented. It demonstrates the significant contribution CTP can make to a response and recovery, but also many coordination challenges in its use. Further work is needed to develop consistent approaches to CTPs and to understand better how to use CTPs in a harmonised way across clusters for positive response and recovery results.
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### 5.2.2 Private sector coordination

115. The private sector was a significant player in the Haiyan response.<sup>38</sup> For the first time, OCHA deployed a private sector adviser who provided early briefs for the private sector on their potential role in different stages of the response (produced 19 November). The extent to which private sector actors linked to clusters seems to have varied, and to have been highest in the early stages of the response. The experience of Haiyan highlights a number of issues that could be best addressed through preparedness measures. These include the need to (a) increase awareness in the private sector of humanitarian principles and standards; (b) build mutual understanding in the humanitarian sector and private sector of ways of working together and potential partnership approaches; and (c) the potential of cooperation with the private sector to anticipate and address supply chain problems, as well as to support pre-positioning of key commodities.

## Key finding:

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- ➔ The private sector played a significant role in the Haiyan response. The presence of an advisor helped facilitate links and understanding between the private sector and humanitarian communities, though there is much work to do to take this further. Key preparedness measures can enable more effective cooperation between the private sector and humanitarian communities in response and recovery, and more work is needed in this area particularly in conducive contexts like the Philippines.
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### 5.2.3 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

116. Civil-military cooperation played a major role in the emergency stage of the Haiyan response particularly in initial logistics and securing access to remote locations. The GPH welcomed the deployment of foreign military assets from 22 States in the first two months of response. Earlier reviews of coordination found a key success factor was pre-existing professional relationships formed in training, previous deployments and simulations ( Full summary of the review in Annex 8.10). The experience in Region VI of co-location in Roxas City has been universally commended

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<sup>38</sup> The term covers a wide spectrum of actors from multi-national companies and their charitable foundations; financial service providers and telecommunications companies which were partners in cash-based responses and communication activities; national private sector groups such as the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDP) which all play active roles in disaster response, coordinating members' support and also have roles in emergency preparedness, as well as small-scale local businesses directly providing charitable donations in their local community. The PDRF runs its own clusters for shelter, WISH (water, infrastructure, sanitation and health), livelihoods, education and environment. While there is no comprehensive assessment of the private sector contribution to the response it was significant, forming for instance the second largest donor for WFP. The US Chamber of Commerce "Corporate Aid Tracker" indicates that the private sector contributed US\$ 58.9 million towards the response. OPARR anticipates the private sector will play a significant role in the reconstruction and recovery plans.

as good practice. In line with the recommendations that came out of the Haiyan UN-CMCoord After Action Review (AAR) jointly organised by OCD and OCHA, OCHA has started work with OCD to develop a tailored Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) training course that specifically caters to humanitarian, civil and military actors in-country. It is envisioned that the training course will be incorporated into the NDRRMC's training program.

## Key finding:

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- Effective humanitarian civil-military coordination made a significant contribution to the speed and effectiveness of the early stages of the response. Key to effective humanitarian-military interaction were investments in preparedness activities which included joint training, simulations and exercises that built professional relationships, mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities, and trust.
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### 5.2.4 Technical advisors

117. The Haiyan response saw an unprecedented number of technical advisors dealing with cross-cutting issues: in cash, environment, gender, private sector relations, communication with communities, accountability to affected populations, civil-military relations as well as the inter-cluster coordination function. Over time, these evolved into a team within inter-cluster coordination. The potential of these thematic advisers to consider needs, experiences of assistance and the response across clusters was unique, as they were able to engage with individuals, households and communities as a whole rather than through a sectoral lens. The advisers were mainly recruited externally and were part of international surge mechanisms, but as time went on, they shifted over to increased use of national expertise. Given the cultural dimensions of many of the cross-cutting themes where local knowledge and understanding is vital, the presence of established national capacity in the Philippines will be of great benefit to the efficiency and effectiveness of future responses.
118. Consistent lessons for effective cross-cutting assistance heard by the IAHE were:
- For technical advice to be very practical and close to the operations (not based in Manila)
  - To be clear from the outset about what they can practically contribute to operations and be careful not to draw energy away from operational capacity (for example by minimising demands for time, information and data)
  - To coordinate with each other for closer cooperation, evolving into a team as they did over time, within the domain of inter-cluster coordination

## Key finding:

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- Cross-cutting approaches enabled the needs, experiences and perspectives of affected populations to be considered as a whole, i.e. beyond a specific sector. New coordination mechanisms are needed to build on this possibility, without placing further demands on already -stretched operational capacity.
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## 5.3 Collective management and leadership

### 5.3.1 Transition

119. HCT transition planning began in February, in clusters and at regional level, following a recommendation of the OPR. However, this focussed more on transition of the coordination machinery at regional and cluster levels - the number of organisations and scale of activities to coordinate - rather than on transition of the content of programming taking into consideration the extent to which humanitarian needs had been met or SRP objectives reached. Plans were updated in June. No overall transition plan was produced which mapped out the HCT's transition to the UNCT, nor was there a "remaining needs" assessment by cluster or sector, and a formal agreement with the relevant government agencies of their readiness to take over until later in the year following the closure of the SRP. The IAHE found that agencies had no clear, collectively understood and owned transition plan to guide the evolution of their work under the twelve month plan. Such a plan might have helped in dealing with the complex situation outlined in the previous chapter of the report as the response shifted from emergency response to recovery.

### Key finding:

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- ➔ Transition planning began in February at a sectoral and regional level which rightly allowed for the different needs and paces of transition in each cluster and region but was not brought together into a collective plan. Transition planning focused more on coordination structures and less on adjusting the response to meet the rapidly changing needs of the affected population. There could have been a more strongly collective HCT-led approach to transition planning, which would have supported organisations to adapt better to a rapidly changing context, both in terms of needs as people self-recovered and in terms of government capacity as new structures were established.
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### 5.3.2 Dealing with obstacles to effective response implementation

120. Bunkhouses and land - including relocation to new permanent settlement areas - are major issues which have challenged the implementation of the Haiyan response and cut across clusters, including shelter, livelihoods, protection and WASH, and which required a coherent response from all agencies. Land issues relate mainly to changing government policy on the 40 metre no-build zone, later redefined as an unsafe zone. The HCT did take an advocacy position on the bunkhouse question, which contributed to improvements in the quality of living conditions there. In relation to the unsafe zone, over time and partially in response to advocacy from the HCT based on sound advice developed by an inter-agency working group considering the rights of citizens and legality of the approach, the government has shifted to an approach based on hazard mapping (not yet complete) and local government discretion. These land issues were identified in the SRP and in fact existed and were well known in the Philippines well before Haiyan. The 40 metre no-build policy is a long-standing issue in Filipino disasters, and there is a history before Haiyan of attempts to enforce the zone rule as well as attempts to relocate coastal populations that have often failed because of their involuntary character and the absence of livelihood opportunities in relocation sites. While the HCT advocacy eventually had some positive effect, and the advice produced by HCT was appreciated by agencies working in the field, the decision-making process was slow. The IAHE found that housing, land and property issues should have been given much more HCT policy and advocacy attention early on, and that this would have benefited from a stronger policy push by the HCT.

Picture: Notice of No-build zone, Region VIII



## Key finding:

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- Land was correctly identified as a critical issue at the beginning of the response, however, the HCT was slow to agree on a way to address it. In the end, the HCT did provide this leadership and this had a positive impact on the overall response for affected people.
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## 5.4 Key Lessons and Issues

- Coordination processes and tools were helpful in guiding agencies to avoid duplication, but were resource-intensive and struggled to deal with the range of organisations working in the Philippines outside of the coordination mechanisms.
- In very high-visibility emergencies, agencies need to maintain cluster discipline within a collective response, and not divert their attention to advancing agency goals.
- Cash provides a key means to support a more integrated approach to support households and communities in emergency response and early recovery but presents coordination challenges.
- HCT leadership in dealing with tough, cross-cutting issues was assisted by the provision of solid, technical advice.
- Successful coordination with other sectors, notably the private sector and the military, is enhanced by effective preparedness measures to build understanding and trust.

## 6. TO WHAT EXTENT WERE IASC CORE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMING PRINCIPLES AND GUIDANCE APPLIED?

*The components of the HPC were applied rigorously. Under exceptionally tight timeframes, outputs were produced on time, and of high quality. However, many tools were not widely used for the purposes for which they were intended, and most interlocutors questioned whether the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them were justified. The SRP, in particular, seems to be ill-suited to the realities and needs of a sudden onset natural disaster.*

121. The HPC sets out a logical sequence starting with needs assessment, leading to identification of strategic priorities and an overall results framework, from which cluster plans are derived, then projects are developed, and finally costed (Figure 5). In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated (see Annex 8.5 for details of the first six weeks' timeline).

### 6.1 Preparedness

122. At the time of the Haiyan response, the Protocol on the Common Framework for Preparedness and the Emergency Response Preparedness guidance were both in draft but had not been released. Nevertheless, key members of the HCT were aware of them, and the IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness seized the opportunity of the Haiyan response to assess preparedness in Haiyan, with a view to informing the finalisation of the guidance.
123. In comparison with most situations of sudden onset natural disaster, the Philippines was very well-prepared. The HCT and Government had worked together on a number of simulations and on two ongoing emergency responses (Zamboanga and Bohol earthquake) in the weeks preceding Haiyan, and had benefited from After Action Reviews after Typhoon Bopha. Meteorological early warning systems worked well, and regional communications were strong so that quality regional resources could be pulled in at short notice and pre-deployed to the field. Unsurprisingly, the IASC assessment was that the immediate preparedness was very good, as well as the overall inter-agency coordination of the initial response. Some areas for improvement were noted however, including an apparent underestimation of the risks and scale of storm surge (most deaths occurred due to storm surge in Tacloban, where local evacuation to safe havens was incomplete when the storm struck), and the need to restock emergency relief supplies as soon as they are depleted (especially if a high-risk weather season is approaching). The main recommendation for the global level was that the "no regrets" policy should be modified to include a more complete package of initial assistance, beyond the rapid mobilisation of key staff. The IAHE was not able to observe these factors directly (although new preparedness work was taking place during the mission in anticipation of future events in provinces that seemed to be underprepared), but has no doubt that preparedness measures combined with the experience of the international and national field teams were important factors in the successful initial response.

### 6.2 The Assessment Tools

124. The two main assessment tools deployed in Haiyan were a Multi-cluster/sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA -finalized 29 November 2013) intended to capture the scope of needs at community level, and a second MIRA (finalized 20 December) designed to get a more qualitative sense of impacts at household level. In addition, several agencies conducted their own initial

needs assessments. More thorough cluster-based needs assessments were conducted in March-May in some sectors.

125. MIRA 1 was generally considered to be useful by the international community, including donors, although some actors felt it was too driven by UN agency agendas. It provided data at the provincial level that for the most part confirmed the aggregate planning assumptions that clusters were already using. It provided reassurance to donors and to field actors that the response was aligned with needs, but there was little evidence that MIRA 1 was used by clusters or donors to make targeting or allocation decisions. MIRA 2 was generally felt to have told agencies what they already knew. There was no evidence of the MIRA 2 having shaped action.

## Key finding:

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- Due largely to the time pressures of the planning document timetable, assessments were conducted at too general a level, and too late, to usefully inform operational planning.
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## 6.3 The Planning tools


126. A 6-month, \$301 million, Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan) was produced 4 days after the Typhoon made landfall.<sup>39</sup> The IAHE considered the quality of the HAP to be very high. It was used to frame initial planning by the HCT, its six month timeframe was appropriate, the identified financial needs were realistic (generally equivalent to the total amounts of funding raised against the SRP by mid-2014), and the document was widely used by donors to shape their initial pledging.<sup>40</sup>
127. The Strategic Response Plan was produced 30 days after the Typhoon. It was generally informed, or at least validated, by MIRA 1, but did not benefit from a Humanitarian Needs Overview of the depth that is envisaged in the HPC and in the SRP guidance, which clearly and correctly states that “strategy development follows needs analysis.”<sup>41</sup> Specifically, there was insufficient time to consult in depth with the national government or with the operational hubs, or to consult with communities. Instead, clusters were pressed into developing cluster plans in a week, based upon incomplete data, and the cluster plans became the basis upon which the Strategic Plan was constructed. While understandable, given the circumstances (and the final product is remarkably coherent), the SRP and cluster plans were developed simultaneously, after initial projects had been developed (at the HAP stage), and before cluster needs assessments.

<sup>39</sup> Given that the needs in sudden-onset sudden onset, large-scale “natural” disasters are very similar and differ mainly in quantity, it was suggested that the HAP could have been produced even more quickly if there were (a) a globally standard pre-drafted text for sudden onset natural disasters into which an HCT simply has to plug the situation narrative, the contextualized priorities, and the specific variables regarding the affected population and the cluster targets, and (b) if budgetary estimates were based on beneficiary/unit costs (“activity-based costing”), rather than preliminary project proposals.

<sup>40</sup> Somewhat overlooked in the HPC guidance, and considered highly valuable for planners and donors alike in the few days before and after a sudden onset disaster, are the daily Situation Reports. In Haiyan, a Situation Analysis was reportedly drafted by the HCT but not released, as it duplicated information already in the Situation Reports

<sup>41</sup> SRP Guidance 2015

Figure 5. Humanitarian Programme Cycle<sup>42</sup>



<sup>42</sup> For more information consult: <http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/programme-cycle>

128. With regard to cluster planning, beyond the summaries provided in the SRP, there were few cluster response plans that integrated needs assessment with agency activities and reporting into a coherent cluster-based management framework, and which thereby formed the bridge between the SRP and agency projects. Opinions were divided as to whether operational planning should be done on a cluster or a sub-regional geographic basis, but most interlocutors felt that (a) operational planning at a level below the SRP was a missing link in the response, and (b) that greater investment at that level, ideally following operationally-oriented needs assessment, would have been more worthwhile than the effort spent on developing the SRP.

## Key finding:

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- It was not possible to follow the HPC planning sequence. The SRP became less of a planning document, and more of a synthesis that brought together, in a single coherent framework, elements of preliminary assessment, cluster planning and agency programming intentions.
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129. The Strategic Response Plan was appreciated and widely used as a reference by donors, but was not used to determine resource allocation to clusters, agencies or projects. 60% of all funding allocated by donors against the Haiyan appeal was already allocated before the SRP was issued.<sup>43 44</sup>
130. The SRP's purpose is "to support country-based decision makers". It is a management tool which articulates a shared vision of how to respond to the expressed and assessed needs.<sup>45</sup> The Strategic Response Plan covered a twelve-month period and envisaged supporting recovery through to "sustainability", "self-sufficiency", "restoration" and "strengthened environment,"<sup>46</sup> although many actors argued at the time of drafting that it should have been a six-month document with emphasis on relief and the early end of the recovery spectrum. This tension between an emergency and a recovery focus is evident within the document; it carried through into the construction of the results framework, and into the relationship between the international community and the national government. Perhaps as a result of this uncertainty, the SRP was not fully "owned" by the HCT, and there were examples of HCT members favouring their agency interests over the collective interest of the humanitarian response.
131. In the absence of a clear and agreed plan for scaling back from L3 status and for shifting programming more firmly into early recovery, there was some confusion as to whether the SRP should be revised at the six month mark (as recommended in the HPC guidance at the time),<sup>47</sup> and there was a lag of several months (depending on the cluster and location) between the recognition of the need to change direction, and actual programming changes. Contributing factors to this were the inflexibility of surge personnel (many working in a three month frame to a pre-established pattern of emergency response), and the reluctance of some agencies to return to their donors and seek agreement for emergency funds to be redirected to early recovery.

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<sup>43</sup> FTS, extracted 17 September 2014

<sup>44</sup> Agency websites and press releases

<sup>45</sup> SRP Guidance 2015

<sup>46</sup> SRP strategic objectives

<sup>47</sup> The HCT made the decision, correctly in the view of the evaluation team, that revision of the SRP at the six-month mark would have entailed significant effort for little benefit, and that the re-focussing which had taken place should be reflected in the successive PMRs

132. In the end, while the pace of recovery took international actors by surprise, many elements of the SRP and of the results framework were overtaken by events. Following a declaration by the Government that the humanitarian phase was over, the decision was taken to end the SRP effective 31 August 2014. While the SRP did explicitly expect recovery to gain momentum over time, the actual speed of recovery was considerably underestimated - despite ample experience from previous typhoon responses in the Philippines. Two factors might have contributed to this oversight: firstly, the fact that the SRP was drafted by a dedicated team of surge experts from outside the Philippines, and, secondly, the momentum of the international fund-raising machinery that was still successfully raising unprecedented resources from the public. While tools can assist in dealing with operational choices, it is important to note that any set of tools need judgement in their application, and that effective operational decision-making by experienced staff remains the key to effectiveness.

## Key finding:

- In a sudden-onset emergency in a middle-income country with significant experience and capacity for managing sudden onset large-scale disasters, the SRP should (a) have a short timeframe, and (b) anticipate how the strategy and the related coordination machinery would transition to early recovery and local ownership. It needs to be flexible.

Figure 6. A possible revised HPC planning cycle for a large-scale sudden-onset disaster

Document/Product	Main audience/purpose of the revised products	New Timeframe	Existing Timeframe
Situation analysis	All agencies and donors: approximate scope and scale of needs	Day 2	Day 2
Strategic Statement	All agencies	n/a	Day 3
Preliminary Response Plan	All agencies and donors (trigger for initial donor funding allocations/broad planning parameters)	Day 4	Days 5-7
SRP	Shorter, more strategic than current template, sets broad objectives and outcome-level results based on small set of tested global indicators, no outputs, cluster plans or projects, updated costing using per capita unit costs not projects	Day 20	Day 30

Document/Product	Main audience/purpose of the revised products	New Timeframe	Existing Timeframe
MIRA/needs assessment	Detailed assessment oriented to support cluster/area planning	45 days (at end of one-month collective assessment process)	Day 14
Cluster work plans/area operational plans (depending on the context)	Specific cluster or area work plans with true baselines, full results frameworks at output and activity levels, with SMART indicators and targets based on the detailed needs assessments	60 days	Not required, covered by cluster annexes to current SRP sometimes complemented by cluster plans
PMR 1	Initially reporting only outputs and changes in the overall situation	90 days	90 days
OPR	As now	90 days	90 days
PMR 2	True outcome results reported, and additional reporting columns for adjustments to targets in light of current funding expectations, includes analysis of changes in overall situation	180 days	180 days

## 6.4 The Response Monitoring and Results Measurement tools

133. Under the challenging circumstances outlined earlier, the SRP settled on five, well-considered strategic objectives, each with a set of indicators and targets but many of which were difficult to measure, and the baselines were a mix of pre-emergency and post-emergency figures. The indicators and targets were substantially revised in each PMR. By the second PMR covering February-April (and released in July), the results framework was complete. Unfortunately (from a results reporting viewpoint) the transition to early recovery was well under way just as PMR 2 was finalized, and, because many operations were wound up, clusters combined and hubs closed, there was a critical gap in the coordination and reporting system, resulting in little outcome-level data being available for the third and final PMR. The consequence of this is that, as the SRP is closing, there is a wealth of output data, and almost no outcome-level information against which to assess overall programme performance.
134. The measurement of results in Haiyan was further complicated by six factors: (a) the evolution of indicators and targets over time meant that the goalposts were constantly moving; (b) due to the early wind-up of activities, reporting became so inconsistent that the levels of data aggregation evolved over time, from municipal to provincial to regional over the three PMRs; (c) some agencies had dual reporting frameworks: agency reporting (aligned with the agency/country programme and with agency/global reporting) and cluster reporting - and when pressed the agency reporting was given preference; (d) PMRs did not account for the respective

underfunding of activities – although it was suggested by the country team that an additional column could be added to the reporting matrix to reflect resource-adjusted targets; (e) some clusters reported results of non-SRP partners;<sup>48</sup> and, (f) the results framework was not adjusted when the understandable decision was made to shorten the SRP by three months.

## Key findings:

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- Despite the response occurring in a data-rich and well-resourced response to a sudden onset disaster, with adequate government data systems, and despite a substantial effort on the part of clusters to meet the expectations of improved humanitarian response monitoring, it was not, in the end, possible to develop robust outcome indicators at the outset, nor was it possible to meaningfully measure outcome-level change before the humanitarian machinery started to dismantle. A simpler system would have been more appropriate.
  - Rather than requiring a revision of the SRP at a pre-determined point in time, regular monitoring and adjustment is critical and advised by PMR guidance. The PMRs, as well as being a tool to report progress - which they do well (if produced on time) - should be used by the HCT as the basis for periodic inclusive reviews that consider (a) performance to date, (b) the evolution in the humanitarian context, and (c) funding trends. After each PMR, an HCT management response could have the effect of a mid-course correction to the SRP.
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## 6.5 The Evaluation tools

135. The Operational Peer Review was timely and well-executed, identifying, at the 60-day mark, most of the major issues of coordination and transition to early recovery that were encountered by the IAHE team six months later. It contained two sets of recommendations: one for global level action and addressed to the IASC principals, the Emergency Director's Group and Global Cluster Coordinators; and another addressed specifically to the HC/HCT. The HC/HCT took prompt and appropriate action on all of the recommendations that were not superseded by events; the global recommendations seem to have been considered at a later point.

## Key finding:

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- The OPR is a valuable addition to the HPC, and its peer character and recommendations strengthened both its relevance and the quality of HCT response.
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## 6.6 The impact of L3 status

136. Haiyan was the first large-scale sudden onset disaster since the L3 protocols of the Transformative Agenda were developed, the first time that an L3 emergency has been deactivated, and the first time that a Strategic Response Plan has been shortened by three months from the original planned period. The view expressed by many observers in the Philippines is that the L3 status created its own momentum: an international surge that to some extent overwhelmed national systems and side lined at least some of the incumbent HCT, followed by a sudden and somewhat disorderly closure and transition.

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<sup>48</sup> This is important if the PMR is regarded as a planning tool, especially in a situation like Haiyan, where the SRP only accounts for at most 16% of the total response, but misleading if it is seen as a reporting tool. The same tool might better serve both purposes if the on-SRP and off-SRP results data is differentiated in the reporting matrix.

### 6.6.1 Inter-agency rapid response mechanism (IARRM) and the surge

137. Haiyan was a disaster where the international system delivered an astonishing amount of support in a very short time-frame, helping to stabilize a vulnerable situation quickly by responding to emergency humanitarian needs. Some of the key success factors underlying the rapidity and scale of response included the mobilization of a Philippines-experienced UNDAC team to Manila before the Typhoon struck, the ability of in-country humanitarian teams (international and national) to redeploy from two existing emergencies in Mindanao and Bohol (though these along with other intense emergencies of the past two years had also absorbed much existing international response capacity), rapid mobilization of international military assets, immediate allocation of \$25 million from CERF, the direct involvement of the Emergency Relief Coordinator on two field visits in the earliest days of the response, and the fielding of 462 international surge-capacity staff within three weeks. The swift response was also built on preconditions for success that included local preparedness, HCT readiness, national response capacity, easy access, and both global and local public interest.
138. However, the immediate surge could have been better. With regard to the surge personnel, the IAHE consistently heard that many were insufficiently knowledgeable about the existing Filipino emergency response system, and, in many instances, insensitive to local culture, in particular to local political culture. The net effect of the surge was to deliver an effective response, but one that side-lined many in-country staff, failed to adequately join up with national systems, and ended up creating parallel structures built upon a global model that was not well-suited to the national-led, middle-income country context of the Philippines. It would have been more efficient if it had truly adapted to the context. This may well have involved down-scaling and “nationalising” the surge capacity earlier. In the end, the L3 surge response did not follow one of its own guiding principles of “taking into consideration the context of the response ... including the existing capacity on the ground.”<sup>49</sup>
139. Areas where the in-country team had difficulty in meeting the needs, and where specific surge capacity skills could be envisaged in an emergency with a similar profile, are (a) civil-military liaison – this could have been deployed along with the UNDAC, (b) a senior liaison officer devoted entirely to maintaining communications and relations between the national authorities and international agencies, and (c) a senior liaison officer to coordinate, brief, accompany and support the constant stream of senior visitors (agency heads, foreign ministers, heads of state).

### 6.6.2 Empowered Leadership

140. The concept of empowered leadership is still evolving, and in the Haiyan situation it does not seem to have been understood or accepted in the same way by all the key actors. The concept paper on Empowered Leadership (revised in March 2014, after the main Haiyan response was over), places considerable emphasis on the HC: it summarises the duties and responsibilities of the HC in relation to the HCT and the HPC, and the main new “power” component seems to be the authority of the HC to “take decisions on behalf of the HCT in circumstances where there is no consensus”. In recent HPC discussions, it has been suggested that the concept should extend to the HCT being able to use their contextual knowledge to determine the appropriate nature and timing of HPC components. In both cases, the implication is that the exercise of empowered leadership is local. It does not consider that in a major L3 emergency, according to the IASC’s own L3 protocols on System-Wide Activation, the main decisions on whether and how to activate the L3 response are made outside the country, by the ERC in conjunction with the Emergency Directors and the IASC, after consultation with the HC.
141. What was widely reported in the Haiyan response is that the importance of this emergency, combined with a broadly-shared desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Transformative Agenda and the L3 protocols, attracted the highest levels of interest in the HQs of UN and other agencies, and also resulted in the mobilization to the field of a number of D1 and D2

<sup>49</sup> IARRM reference document

deployed personnel. The consequence of this is that the attention of the in-country teams of some agencies, in Manila and in the regional hubs to which senior staff were also deployed, was reportedly often focussed upwards along the line of the respective agency management hierarchies, at the expense of horizontal attention across the clusters and collective response, or a 'downwards' focus on operations. This in turn encouraged agency-centric behaviour.

142. Thus it seems that the HC and HCT at times were placed in an uncomfortable situation with regard to leadership. On the one hand, the HC and HCT were encouraged to make decisions according to the empowered leadership model, but on the other hand some of the very same HCT members were being disempowered, to the extent that they were receiving constant attention and direction from their agency heads (who were in some cases making country-level management decisions while visiting the country).

## Key finding:

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- In a highly visible and significant sudden-onset emergency, the pressure from HQs can distract HCT members from a collective *modus operandi* and pull them instead in the direction of agency allegiances.
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143. In the midst of this, the HC was provided with some, but insufficient, support. The fielding of an experienced Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC), as envisaged by the L3 protocols, was delayed. Delays were due, in part, to difficulties in securing agreement regarding who should be appointed the DHC. In the end, the DHC function was carried out by three different people for between two and six weeks at a time, with consequent interruptions in approach and continuity. There was limited support directly for the HC's own office.
144. At its core, the principle of empowered leadership seems to imply that, in time of crisis when decisions need to be quick and evidence-based, those managers who are most aware of the context and closest to operations should have greater authority. This could apply at the sub-national level (heads of sub-offices, cluster co-leads) as well as at the national level.

## 7. Conclusions and recommendations

### 7.1 Overall assessment

145. The key evaluation criteria agreed at the inception phase were relevance, effectiveness and efficiency (in terms of timeliness – value for money was not included in the scope). Other evaluation criteria are referenced in this concluding section where there is evidence.
146. Taken together with the responses of other major actors, including government, the private sector and the diaspora, which form the major part of the response, *the inter-agency emergency response was timely and effective in meeting immediate humanitarian needs*, across a wide geographic area and initially in very difficult conditions. Government and HCT readiness, the pre-deployment of UNDAC and other agencies' personnel as well as effective civil-military coordination all contributed significantly. However, the extent to which the inter-agency response contributed to overall results is difficult to assess in the absence of full data on assistance outside of the inter-agency coordinated system (and beyond the scope of this IAHE).
147. The *inter-agency response was slower to adapt to the circumstances of early recovery*, a process begun by the Filipino people within days of Haiyan. Some individual agencies did respond, in many cases developing plans beyond the timeframe of the SRP on the basis of both needs and resources available. However, the overall inter-agency and cluster approaches missed opportunities to enhance early recovery by not adapting quickly enough. The transition to early recovery was complicated by the fact that sectors and regions recovered at different paces. In addition, uncertainty regarding the government's capacity and timetable to begin large-scale recovery programmes made it more difficult to link the inter-agency response to longer-term recovery.
148. When the SRP ended on 31 August 2014, humanitarian needs remain for 5,400 households (24,785 individuals) displaced by Haiyan, and who were still living in tents, evacuation centres or bunkhouses. 95,000 households remain particularly vulnerable to extreme weather because of the poor quality of shelter -- though their shelter conditions may pre-date Haiyan.

### Factors contributing to results and performance

149. A number of characteristics of the Philippines created highly favourable conditions for an effective disaster response. These include its lower middle-income country status, relatively good health and education indicators, a vibrant local economy, an established and experienced national disaster management system and a government which accepts its responsibility to protect the rights of citizens. Furthermore, in the affected area there was an absence of significant civil conflict. Key external factors included large-scale public sympathy, media coverage, significant diaspora support, long-standing links with important aid donors, and the absence of a high profile "competing" disaster at that time. The combination of these underlying contextual factors contributed to its overall relatively high level of funding and to the effectiveness of the early response.

## Assessment of the inter-agency response by SRP objective

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>50</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
1. Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production, and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.	High	There is clear evidence that people have met their food needs and avoided nutritional deterioration. The mixed response of cash and food was appropriate and followed a differentiated approach according to market conditions. Early support to restart agricultural production notably in rice was an important contribution. Current progress is vulnerable to future shocks if livelihoods are not restored to pre-Haiyan levels quickly.
2. Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.	Medium-Low	The response addressed emergency shelter needs, and has improved the quality of shelter for people in transitional housing. The focus on self-recovery was appropriate, but more attention was needed to the supply of quality materials, and to measures to ensure that the well-crafted shelter cluster messages on safer building techniques translated into safer shelter. Overall, the response was underfunded and fell short of its targets.
3. Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.	Medium-Low	The response addressed immediate needs through extensive emergency employment programmes which enabled people to meet urgent household needs and also contributed to restoring basic infrastructure and access. But long-term use of such programmes is not appropriate and does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods. The development of programmes to support more sustainable, non-agricultural livelihoods beyond emergency employment has been slow and under-funded. Direct support for farming and fishing helped a portion of the affected population begin to resume their livelihoods though numbers are below target. A lack of sustainable livelihood options is a key obstacle to the relocation of families in displacement centres.
4. Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and health services.	Medium	The response addressed emergency health and sanitation needs, successfully contributing to the prevention of outbreaks of any communicable diseases despite the high risk environments. Early recovery targets are behind schedule, although ambitions go beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues.

<sup>50</sup> Ratings are based on the IAHE team's judgement taking into account IAHE findings on inter-agency response effectiveness, relevance and timeliness. Ratings go in order of High/high-medium/medium/medium-low/low.

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>50</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
5. Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.	High-Medium	The initial education response was effective at getting girls and boys back to school in temporary learning spaces two months after Haiyan, but consolidation with teacher training and government-led permanent construction has since lagged. The initial protection focus on resolving lost documentation as well as Child Protection and GBV was appropriate, but insufficient attention was accorded at the outset to land and property rights – which have emerged as one of the main obstacles to both protection and durable solutions for a significant population.

## 7.2 Conclusions and recommendations regarding the four evaluation questions

### 7.2.1 Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster?

150. The inter-agency response effectively contributed to emergency needs being met through a timely and relevant response. Earlier and more tailored approaches to support recovery and particularly to restore livelihoods would have been beneficial to meet early recovery targets. The use of different approaches for beneficiary targeting by agencies caused community confusion and dissatisfaction. Innovations, notably in scaled-up cash based approaches and engagement with communities through accountability and communication mechanisms were largely effective. The priority remaining humanitarian needs are the 5,400 households still displaced by Haiyan.

Recommendation	Priority <sup>51</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<b>1. Remaining humanitarian needs</b> In coordination with the government, maintain an overview of the remaining humanitarian needs, with a particular focus on the 5,400 households in tents and displacement centres, and be ready to offer assistance if needed.	Critical	HCT	Immediate

<sup>51</sup> Recommendations are categorized as Critical (top urgent priority), Important (high priority), or Learning Opportunity.

Recommendation	Priority <sup>51</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>2. Cash transfer</b></p> <p>Set up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large scale use of cash-transfer programme approaches in the Haiyan response. Include consideration of a) the results of CTPs for communities and local economies; b) benefits and challenges of different modalities; c) areas where standards would add value and d) consistent monitoring approaches to support inter-cluster approaches that benefit households and communities as a whole.</p>	Learning opportunity	IASC Working Group	Short-term
<p><b>3. Restoring livelihoods</b></p> <p>Build up livelihoods capacity in the international response system e.g. through a roster of livelihoods experts, to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods. Focus on transfer from emergency employment to sustainable livelihoods, and on solutions for non-agricultural contexts. Develop a range of flexible assessment and programme instruments.</p>	Important	EDGs	Medium-term

### 7.2.2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

151. At the preparedness stage and in the immediate days following the typhoon the international community engaged well with Government disaster response and risk reduction systems. However, the overall magnitude of the disaster and the strength of the inter-agency response overwhelmed some government units and, as a result, the international and national coordination mechanisms diverged along separate paths for quite some time. While there are many examples of excellent cooperation, and government officials at all levels appreciated both the assistance and the extra technical and coordinating capacity provided by the international community, there was also a strong sense that some international surge staff did not understand national systems or capacity. While inter-agency operational priorities drove the response, its structures and processes were not adjusted sufficiently nor early enough to take account of the international community's complementary role in this middle income country with an established, albeit stretched, government disaster management system.

Recommendation	Priority	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>4. Preparedness for major emergencies (L3)</b></p> <p>In middle-income countries which are highly vulnerable to sudden onset disasters and have strong national capacity in disaster management, international actors should prepare together with the government for major disasters and a possible L3 response. Use detailed scenario planning to work through how the international response needs to adapt in order to play its complementary role in these contexts. Start with and document the Filipino scenario planning and in it clarify, among other factors: the roles of international personnel e.g. as cluster co-leads; gaps in the capacity of national systems to take on their coordination responsibilities; mechanisms to trigger scaling down of international personnel; and information resources and mechanisms to brief surge personnel on national response systems and capacities.</p>	Critical	EDGs and HCT	Medium term, and short-term in the Philippines

### 7.2.3 Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

152. The IAHE found no significant sustained geographical gaps though the inter-agency response was slow to adapt to new information due in part to perceptions of funding inflexibility. The cluster system worked well for those participating in it but struggled in the presence of so many non-participating organisations. Lighter coordination mechanisms and technical advice tailored to the local operational priorities were more effective.
153. Four features of the Haiyan response highlight the value of inter-cluster coordination beyond the conventional cluster system: the extensive use of cash by several clusters, the dynamic needs of communities moving rapidly into early recovery, the success of AAP/CWC mechanisms at gathering community-wide (rather than sector or agency-specific) feedback, and the multiple challenges (access to services, livelihoods, protection) faced by families without a shelter solution. Land issues were correctly identified as critical at the beginning of the response, and HCT advocacy had a positive impact on the overall response for affected people. However, the HCT was slow to agree on how to address these admittedly difficult issues.
154. Importantly, differences between the international and national planning timeframes, and different views on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, together contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. In this, the international system's limited range of programming modalities to flexibly support early recovery are a shortcoming. Transition includes change in (a) the nature of affected people's needs (emergency to early recovery); (b) the type of programme approaches to meet changing needs (humanitarian to recovery to development); (c) structures and systems for coordination of assistance (HCT to UNCT, closure of clusters). There is a lack of guidance to support HCTs to manage processes of transition.

Recommendation	Priority	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>5. Transition</b></p> <p>Transition needs to be considered in responses from the outset. Develop measures including practical global guidance to support HCTs on a) how to ensure transition is considered and addressed from the beginning of a response, particularly in L3 emergencies, and b) how to manage transition as a collective HCT and in cooperation with government. Include consideration of how to manage issues such as potential tensions between national government's sovereignty in disaster management, and the international community's (and governments') principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC Team	Medium term
<p><b>6. Preparedness and the private sector</b></p> <p>As part of the Philippine preparedness process, set up agreements with private sector actors to ensure that systems are in place before the next emergency for a more coherent and linked-up response, including agreements to facilitate cash transfer programming, the establishment of a basis for partnerships between clusters and private sector partners, and support for supply chains for the most commonly-needed relief and early recovery supplies.</p>	Important	HCT	Short-term
<p><b>7. Housing, land and property</b></p> <p>In large-scale, sudden-onset natural disasters, place a higher strategic and operational priority on working with national authorities, to anticipate and resolve property rights and land issues that could stall early recovery and stand in the way of durable solutions. Housing, land and property rights and solutions should figure prominently in the SRP, and HLP legal and technical expertise should be fielded early to support the HCT. As part of preparedness planning at country level, consider how a response will cope with property and land issues for at least transitional measures to meet humanitarian needs.</p>	Important	EDGs, Global Protection and Shelter clusters	Medium term

#### 7.2.4 To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?

155. The components of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) were applied rigorously, and in many cases newly-developed tools were applied for the first time. Under exceptionally tight timeframes they were produced on time, and outputs were high quality. However, interlocutors questioned their suitability to the realities of a large-scale sudden onset disaster, and whether

the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them, particularly in the SRP, were justified. The HPC outlines a logical sequence for the response from needs assessment to strategic frameworks, operational plans and costed projects. In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated and some tools were developed in isolation. In particular, assessment and planning documents were not causally connected and the SRP was issued before the results framework was fixed, contributing to the challenge of reporting the results. Adaptations are needed to make them more suitable for large-scale sudden onset disasters. The L3 status significantly supported the rapid scaling-up and resourcing of the response. Greater attention to adapting to local conditions and collective approaches would have further strengthened the response.

Recommendation	Priority	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>8. HPC and planning in large-scale sudden onset emergencies</b></p> <p>Review HPC guidance to further differentiate between the planning and reporting processes of protracted emergencies vs sudden onset large scale disasters. In sudden onset emergencies (especially natural disasters) modify the pathway for the HPC assessment and planning tools with (a) a lighter, more analytical SRP at around the 20-day mark (following a preliminary response plan in line with the current HPC guidance), followed by (b) a suite of (connected) cluster response plans at the 60-day mark, based on (c) operationally-oriented needs assessments conducted in the 15-45 day period.</p>	Important	IASC Working group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>9. HPC and needs assessments</b></p> <p>Redesign assessment processes to ensure they support operational planning. In a sudden onset emergency, after an initial “scale and scope” assessment (preferably conducted in conjunction with the national government) such as the MIRA, needs assessments should be conducted collectively and on a cluster basis, with a clear view to informing operational planning.</p>	Critical	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>10. HPC and empowered leadership</b></p> <p>Further develop the guidance on empowered leadership to reflect the respective authorities and responsibilities of IASC members, Emergency Directors, the HC, and sub-national managers in an L3 emergency. Be clear if the mandate of surge capacity is to support and not replace the HC/HCT, and if the concept of empowered leadership extends below the national level.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group	Short-term

# LIST OF ANNEXES

**Annex 1:** Matrix - summary evaluation findings and recommendations

**Annex 2:** IAHE terms of reference

**Annex 3:** Detailed methodological note

**Annex 4:** Evaluation matrix

**Annex 5:** IAHE itinerary

**Annex 6:** Evaluation tools

**Annex 7:** List of persons interviewed

**Annex 8:** Qualitative and quantitative analysis

**Annex 9:** Bibliography

# ANNEX 1: MATRIX OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (SUMMARY)

Findings (summary)	Recommendations (summary)
<p><b>1. Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Emergency relief needs were effectively addressed. Immediate assistance was appropriately prioritised with key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection addressed.</li> <li>■ Humanitarian needs remain for 5,400 households which are still displaced. 95,000 further are vulnerable due to unsafe or inadequate shelter.</li> <li>■ Timeliness of the emergency response was aided by pre-deployments and in-country preparedness measures.</li> <li>■ Communities reported high levels of dissatisfaction with the range of beneficiary targeting approaches and want more consistent approaches.</li> <li>■ Vulnerable groups were given some priority in assistance but with some exceptions e.g. measures in health and protection for women and children, there was little evidence of assistance being tailored to the needs of vulnerable groups particularly for older and disabled people.</li> <li>■ The scale of cash-transfer programming was an appropriate and significant element of the response.</li> <li>■ The sustainability of the positive results is now largely dependent on how effectively livelihoods are restored and other recovery measures progress.</li> <li>■ More customised approaches to support the restoration of livelihoods should have started earlier.</li> <li>■ Integrated approaches at operational level to promote accountability to and communication with affected populations provided effective mechanisms to contribute to programmes' effectiveness. But systems should have started sooner and provided greater feedback to communities.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1. Remaining humanitarian needs.</b></p> <p>In coordination with the government, maintain an overview of the remaining humanitarian needs in Haiyan affected areas and be ready to provide assistance.</p> <p><b>Priority:</b> Critical  <b>Who:</b> HCT  <b>Timeframe:</b> Immediate</p> <p><b>2. Cash transfer</b></p> <p>Set up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large- scale use of cash transfer programming approaches in the Haiyan response.</p> <p><b>Priority:</b> Learning opportunity  <b>Who:</b> IASC Working Group  <b>Timeframe:</b> Short-term</p> <p><b>3. Restoring livelihoods</b></p> <p>Build up livelihoods expertise in the international response system e.g. through a roster of livelihood expertise to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods with a focus on transfer from emergency employment to sustainable livelihoods and solutions for non-agricultural contexts.</p> <p><b>Priority:</b> Important  <b>Who:</b> IASC Working Group  <b>Timeframe:</b> Medium term</p>

## Findings (summary)

## Recommendations (summary)

**2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?**

- After good cooperation in preparedness, the international community and the government followed largely separate paths of assessment and planning in the early phases.
- There was successful cooperation in implementation.
- There are different perspectives between the international and the Filipino systems on concepts of emergency response, early recovery and recovery.
- The magnitude of the disaster, operational priorities and the initial strength of the international response as well as a lack of understanding of each others' systems contributed to divergence between international and local planning and coordination processes.
- There is good alignment between the national and the international cluster systems. But roles and responsibilities in co-leadership were not clearly defined particularly for a disaster and response of this scale.
- The international response, and surge mechanisms in particular, did not adapt sufficiently to their role, which is a complementary role to the government-led response in a middle income country with disaster management capacity and communities that recover quickly.
- Strong leadership, practical measures such as co-location, former institutional working relationships and a focus on implementation helped bring the national and international systems back together for some very successful cooperation.
- Some approaches within the international response contributed to the strengthening of national and local disaster response mechanisms particularly at the local level.

**4. Preparedness for major emergencies (L3)**

In middle-income countries which are highly vulnerable to sudden onset disasters and have strong national capacity in disaster management prepare together with the government for major disasters and an L3- international response. Use detailed scenario planning to work through how the international response needs to adapt to play its complementary role in these contexts. Document the Filipino scenario planning.

**Priority:** Critical

**Who:** EDGs and HCT

**Timeframe:** Short-term in the Philippines/ Medium term elsewhere

## Findings (summary)

## Recommendations (summary)

### 3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- The IAHE found no evidence of serious geographical gaps in emergency assistance coverage, but there was some concentration of assistance around coordination hubs and signs that the response was slow to adapt to new information on gaps, due in some cases to inflexible or perceived inflexibility of donor funding.
- Coordination mechanisms were well funded and rapidly established.
- The coordination system struggled to fulfil its role in the presence of so many non-participating organisations.
- Partners reported very heavy coordination mechanisms, particularly in the early phase in some locations. The provision of data for information products and number of meetings were most time-consuming. Lighter coordination mechanisms were more effective.
- Effective humanitarian civil-military coordination made a significant contribution to the speed and effectiveness of the response.
- Thematic advisors working as a team within an ICC are effective. Technical input was most effective when based near and relating directly to operational needs.
- There is a lack of agreed procedures to guide the international-national relationship in transition from humanitarian to recovery phases.
- Land issues were correctly identified as a critical issue at the beginning of the response and related advocacy had a positive impact on the overall response for affected people. The HCT was slow to agree on a way to address these issues.
- Clearer definition of roles in a model led by government, and preparation for emergencies on a scale of Haiyan are needed.

#### 5. Transition

Transition needs to be considered in responses from the outset. Develop measures including practical global guidance to support HCTs to ensure transition is considered from the outset and managed as a collective.

**Priority:** Important

**Who:** IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC Team

**Timeframe:** Medium term

#### 6. Preparedness and the private sector

As part of the Philippine preparedness process, set up agreements with private sector actors to ensure that systems are in place before the next emergency for a more coherent and linked-up response.

**Priority:** Important

**Who:** HCT

**Timeframe:** Short-term

#### 7. Housing, land and property

In large-scale, sudden-onset disasters, place a higher strategic and operational priority on working with national authorities, to anticipate and resolve property rights and land issues that could stall early recovery and stand in the way of durable solutions.

**Priority:** Important

**Who:** EDGs, Global Protection and Shelter Clusters

**Timeframe:** Medium term

## Findings (summary)

## Recommendations (summary)

**4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?**

- The components of the HPC were applied rigorously. Under exceptionally tight timeframes, outputs were produced on time, and of high quality. But it was not possible to follow the HPC sequence where assessment informs planning. The SRP became less of a planning document, and more of a synthesis document.
- In a sudden-onset emergency in a middle-income country with significant experience and capacity for managing sudden onset large-scale disasters, the 12-month SRP was ill-suited to provide the flexibility required to respond to a changing context.
- Despite good resourcing, it was not possible to develop robust outcome indicators at the outset, nor to measure them within six months. A simpler system would have been more appropriate.
- Greater use of the PMR as a tool to support revisions of the strategy would have been beneficial.
- The OPR is a valuable addition to the HPC.
- The IARRM was effective in delivering a rapid response at scale but did not adapt adequately to the country context.
- In a highly visible and significant sudden-onset emergency, the pressure from HQs can distract HCT members from a collective *modus operandi* and pull them instead in the direction of agency allegiances.
- The new concept of empowered leadership was not well understood.

**8. HPC and planning in large-scale sudden onset emergencies**

Review HPC guidance to further differentiate between the planning and reporting processes of protracted emergencies vs sudden onset large scale disasters, and to generate a lighter more strategic SRP.

**Priority:** Important

**Who:** IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team

**Timeframe:** Short-term

**9. HPC and assessments**

Redesign assessment processes to ensure they support operational planning.

**Priority:** Critical

**Who:** IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team

**Timeframe:** Short-term

**10. HPC and empowered leadership**

Further develop the guidance on empowered leadership to reflect the respective authorities and responsibilities of IASC members, Emergency Directors, the HC, and sub-national managers in an L3 emergency.

**Priority:** Important

**Who:** IASC Working Group

**Timeframe:** Short-term

# ANNEX 2: IAHE TERMS OF REFERENCE

## Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

MARCH 2014

### I. Introduction

1. On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) hit the Philippines. The intensity of the typhoon resulted in more than 6,000 deaths, more than 4.1 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 14.1 million people in 36 provinces affected. The most affected areas were the east coast of Leyte and the south coasts of Samar and Eastern Samar, in the Eastern Visayas regions. These areas were affected by a tidal surge comparable to a tsunami. Devastation from extreme winds and rain was also catastrophic.
2. After consultations with the IASC Principals and the Government of the Philippines, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) formally activated an IASC system-wide level 3 (hereafter: L-3) emergency response to the disaster on 13 November 2013. Measures accompanying the L-3 declaration included providing the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) with empowered leadership, allocating USD 25 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and sending enhanced surge capacity through the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM).
3. The establishment of a L-3 emergency response requires that an operational peer review (OPR) of the response be undertaken within 90 days of the crisis, as well an inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) to be undertaken between 9-12 months after from declaration.<sup>1</sup> The OPR in the Philippines was conducted from 13 to 19 January 2014. It considered four areas: leadership arrangements, application of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle, use of appropriate coordination mechanisms and accountability to affected people. The IAHE of the response to Haiyan will build from the findings and recommendations of the OPR.

### II. Inter-agency humanitarian evaluations

4. In December 2012, the IASC Principals endorsed the Transformative Agenda (TA) Protocols, composed of five reference documents<sup>2</sup> that include a set of actions to address acknowledged challenges in leadership, coordination and enhance accountability for the achievement of collective results. The Protocols are composed of five reference documents<sup>3</sup> and include a set of actions to address acknowledged challenges in leadership and coordination, and to enhance accountability for the achievement of collective results. These actions are:
  - ➔ Establishing a mechanism to deploy strong experienced senior humanitarian leadership from the outset of a major crisis;
  - ➔ The strengthening of leadership capacities and rapid deployment of humanitarian leaders;

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<sup>1</sup> A report will be available between 12-15 months of the same.

<sup>2</sup> The five Protocols are: Empowered Leadership; Humanitarian System wide Emergency Activation; Responding to Level 3 Emergencies What empowered leadership looks like in practice ; Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level; and Responding to Level 3 Emergencies: The Humanitarian Programme Cycle

<sup>3</sup> The five Protocols are: Empowered Leadership; Humanitarian System wide Emergency Activation; Responding to Level 3 Emergencies What empowered leadership looks like in practice ; Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level; and Responding to Level 3 Emergencies: The Humanitarian Programme Cycle.

- Improved strategic planning at the country level that clarifies the collective results the humanitarian community sets out to achieve and identifies how clusters and organizations will contribute to them;
  - Enhanced accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator and members of the Humanitarian Country Team for the achievement of collective results and of the humanitarian community towards the affected people; and
  - Streamlined coordination mechanisms adapted to operational requirements and contexts to better facilitate delivery.
5. The fifth TA Protocol relates to the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC), which is defined as a coordinated series of actions undertaken to help prepare for, manage and deliver humanitarian response. The HPC consists of five elements: needs assessment and analysis; strategic response planning; resource mobilization; implementation and monitoring; and operational review and evaluation. OPRs and IAHEs are tools to assess and reflect on the extent to which the collective response has met its objectives and to provide information on areas of work that need to be improved in the future to make the response more effective.
  6. OPRs and IAHEs complement each other and are substantively different. OPRs are management reviews and their main purpose is learning for course correction at an early stage of the humanitarian response. They are not an accountability tool. IAHEs, on the other hand, are conducted at a later stage of the humanitarian response and their main purpose is to promote accountability to donors and affected population. The promotion of accountability includes the consistent application of quality standards, adherence to core humanitarian principles,<sup>4</sup> and fostering strategic learning for the humanitarian system. IAHEs are conducted in adherence to the international evaluation principles of independence, credibility and utility.
  7. The present evaluation will be the first IAHE to be conducted since their creation.<sup>5</sup> As such, it is an important exercise that is expected to provide feedback on the usefulness of the IAHE guidelines, as well as reflect on the utility and feasibility of IAHEs overall, in addition to the specific objectives related to the response in Philippines.

### III. Purpose, objectives, scope and use of the Philippines IAHE

8. The purpose of this IAHE is two-fold. First, it will provide an independent assessment of the extent to which planned collective objectives set in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) to respond to the needs of affected people have been met. Secondly, the evaluation aims to assess the extent to which response mechanisms, including the HPC and other key pillars of the TA have successfully supported the response, and recommend improvement-oriented actions.
9. In addition, the IAHE will also aim to:
  - Assess to what extent the collective response to the emergency met objectives as established in the SRP;
  - Assess how effectively humanitarian needs were identified and to what extent the collective response adequately met those needs;
  - Capture lessons learned and good practices in order to enable collective learning from this humanitarian response;

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<sup>4</sup> Humanitarian principles provide the foundation for humanitarian action and they are: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. For more information on humanitarian principles, please see: [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM\\_HumPrinciple\\_English.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Prior to 2014, a number of inter-agency real time evaluations were conducted, but the scope, methodology and objectives of such exercises were significantly different from those of IAHEs.

- Provide actionable recommendations at both the policy and operational levels on how collective response mechanisms might be strengthened, particularly in light of changes in the humanitarian context, including the Humanitarian Program Cycle and the three pillars of the Transformative Agenda.
10. The evaluation will also constitute an opportunity to test the recently approved IAHE guidelines, and provide feedback on the appropriateness of the guidelines, their application, and the IAHE process, and suggest possible ways to improve them.
  11. The evaluation will present findings that provide a transparent assessment of progress achieved against the objectives established in the Philippines response SRP. Evidence and findings of the IAHE will also include the views of disaster-affected people with regard to the overall quality and appropriateness of the assistance received.
  12. The evaluation will be global in scope, in that it will cover all sectors of the emergency response to Haiyan. In terms of time, the evaluation will consider the collective response provided from the time of the L3 Declaration (November 2013) until the time in which the field visits are conducted (approximately August 2014).
  13. The primary users of the IAHE will be the Philippines Humanitarian Coordinator and Humanitarian Country Team, which will use the results to ensure accountability and to learn for future similar response. Findings from the IAHE may, where relevant, identify areas that need to be addressed to improve the response, as well as inform longer-term recovery plans and support preparedness efforts. Evaluation results<sup>6</sup> are expected to be available before the completion of the preparation of the new SRP. Findings and lessons from this IAHE will therefore serve as inputs to the upcoming SPR. The IAHE is also expected to generate information and analysis relevant to actors engaged in the on-going response, including local, national and donor stakeholders.
  14. The secondary users of the IAHE are the IASC Principals, the IASC Working Group and Emergency Directors group, who are expected to use IAHE results and lessons learned as part of their overall monitoring strategies on key strategic issues at the global level, policy-making and conceptualization of the approach to future emergencies. The audience and potential users of the evaluation also include donors, the Government of the Philippines and other national responders, and affected population, which might use the evaluation results for learning, awareness and advocacy purposes.

## IV. Evaluation questions and criteria

15. As per the guidance document “Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations of Large Scale System-Wide Emergencies (IAHEs): Guidelines”<sup>7</sup>, the following key areas of inquiry must be addressed by all IAHEs:
  1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?
  2. To what extent have national and local stakeholders been involved and their capacities strengthened through the response?
  3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?
  4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

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<sup>6</sup> Either as a preliminary draft of the evaluation report, or a final version.

<sup>7</sup> See “Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations of Large Scale System-Wide Emergencies (IAHEs): Guidelines” Developed by the IAHE Steering Group, April 2014.

16. In addition to these four core questions, the evaluation team will develop context-specific sub-questions during the inception phase of the individual IAHEs. To this purpose, during the inception mission the evaluation team will conduct ample in-country consultations with all key response stakeholders, to ensure that their views on issues that need to be considered, potential sub-questions, etc. are incorporated in the IAHE.
17. The evaluation will draw evidence-based conclusions in relation to internationally established evaluation criteria drawn from UNEG norms and guidance,<sup>8</sup> OECD/DAC<sup>9</sup> and the ALNAP criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian action,<sup>10</sup> including: i) relevance, ii) coherence, iii) coverage, iv) connectedness, v) efficiency, vi) effectiveness, vii) impact, viii) sustainability, ix) coordination and x) protection. Not all criteria may necessarily be applicable, and the evaluation team will need to assess which criteria are most relevant during the inception phase of the IAHE.

## V. Methodology

18. The evaluation will use mixed method analysis, employing the most appropriate qualitative and quantitative approaches, data types, and methods of data analysis. To ensure maximum validity and reliability of data, the evaluation team will ensure triangulation of the various data sources.
19. The evaluation team will be guided by the major analytical frameworks that form the basis for drawing final conclusions and generating forward-looking recommendations, namely: the IAHE key questions, the SRP, as the main reference to assess whether the response objectives have been achieved, and the IAHE impact pathway, which outlines the components of an “ideal humanitarian response”.<sup>11</sup>
20. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will propose a detailed methodology that the evaluation team will use to address key questions, develop sub-questions, and assess the results of the collective humanitarian response. The proposal should include a description of data sources, data collection and analysis methods/tools, indicators, triangulation plan, financial overview, factors for comparative analysis, and validation strategy, as well as how the team intends to incorporate the views of affected people.
21. Methods of analyses may include, among others: the review of various sources of information, including review of monitoring data; field visits; interviews with key stakeholders (affected population, UN, NGOs, donors, government representatives and civil society organizations); (gendered) focus groups and cross-validation of data. Consultations will ensure that diverse stakeholder groups are included, paying specific attention to adequately engage women, men, boys and girls of different ages, and taking into consideration the existence of disadvantaged groups, such as people with disabilities. The evaluation approach will be in line with UNEG guidance on integrating human rights and gender equality, with ALNAP guidelines on evaluating humanitarian action, UNEG norms and standards and the International Humanitarian Principles.
22. In line with the System-wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on gender equality and the IASC Gender Equality Policy Statement<sup>12</sup>, the evaluation will use gender analysis, and will specifically assess the extent to which gender considerations have been taken into account in the provision of the response. The final report should acknowledge how inclusive stakeholder participation was ensured during the evaluation process and any challenges to obtaining the gender equality information or to addressing these issues appropriately.

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<sup>8</sup> See UNEG's website: [www.uneval.org](http://www.uneval.org).

<sup>9</sup> See the DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance Factsheet at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/49756382.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> See the *ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies: Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD/DAC criteria* at [www.alnap.org/pool/files/eha\\_2006.pdf](http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/eha_2006.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> See Annex 1 of the ToR - Impact Pathway for IAHEs.

<sup>12</sup> Approved by the IASC Working Group on 20 June 2008.

23. The evaluation team will conduct field visits to the affected areas. The team should seek to spend the necessary amount of time during the field mission to conduct direct consultations with local communities affected by the disaster and that have received international assistance. The evaluation should, wherever possible, undertake systematic data gathering from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the appropriateness and quality of the assistance provided. In deciding the amount of time to be spent in consultations with communities in the affected areas, it is important that the evaluation team keeps a balance in the need to identify high level and strategic themes, and the need to ensure sufficiently ample consultations. The IAHE guidelines establish an approximate duration of 3 weeks for the evaluation field mission. However, given the geographical spread of affected areas, during the inception field visit a final proposal for the duration of the evaluation field mission will be made, to ensure that there is sufficient time to collect the necessary data.
24. The inception report will also provide a detailed stakeholder analysis and a clear indication of on how/who of national entities and communities will be (a) consulted (b) engaged with (c) involved in the evaluation process as relevant. The evaluation team should explicitly describe in the inception report the approaches and strategies that will be used to identify and reach response beneficiaries and affected people, and to adequately engage women, men, boys and girls of different ages, taking into consideration the existence of disadvantaged groups. These strategies may include, among others, the selection of key informants, use of snowball sampling strategies, use of focus groups, etc. The advantages and limitations of the use of these methods should also be clearly explained.
25. Adherence to a code of ethics in the gathering, treatment and use of data collected should be made explicit in the inception report.
26. An evaluation matrix will be prepared during the inception phase in which sources of data, methods and criteria will be defined for each evaluation question.

## VI. Management arrangements and stakeholder participation<sup>13</sup>

27. The evaluation will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation Unit and the Philippines IAHE Management Group, who will provide sustained support and guidance to the evaluation process and ensure quality assurance throughout. The Chief of OCHA's Evaluation Unit will act as the Chair of the IAHE Management Group. As per IAHE Guidelines, the IAHE Steering Group will provide final approval to the Terms of Reference and the final evaluation report.
28. OCHA will appoint an Evaluation Manager, who will be the main point of contact for the evaluation and will ensure day-to-day support and consistency throughout the evaluation process, from drafting the Terms of Reference to the dissemination of the report. The evaluation manager will also be the contact person for administrative and organizational issues, and will coordinate activities of the different stakeholders involved in the evaluation. He/she will organize and supervise the different phases of the evaluation process and ensure the quality of all deliverables submitted by the evaluation team.
29. The HC for the Philippines will appoint an in-country focal point for the evaluation to act as point of contact in the country for the evaluation, facilitate access to pertinent information and relevant documents and to help organize the field visits.

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<sup>13</sup> For further details on the specific roles and responsibilities of the different IAHE stakeholders, please see "Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations of Large Scale System-Wide Emergencies (IAHEs): Guidelines, developed by the IAHE Steering Group, April 2014.

### A. Philippines Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Management Group (IAHE MG)

30. The Philippines IAHE Management Group will guide the evaluation, contribute to its relevance, independence and transparency, and promote the utilization of evaluation results. The Group will be chaired by OCHA Evaluation Unit and comprised of the following organizations: WFP, UNICEF and FAO.
31. The IAHE Management Group members will act as point of contact for the evaluation for their organizations, and provide quality control and inputs to the IAHE (including during the development of the TORs, evaluation team briefing, review and approval of the inception report, and review of the draft report and presentations) and will facilitate dissemination and follow up of the final evaluation report cleared by the IAHE SG.

### B. Philippines IAHE In-country Advisory Group

32. An in-country Advisory Group for the IAHE will also be formed, to represent country-level stakeholders that have been directly involved in the response or affected by the disaster. The roles and responsibilities of this group include: to serve as the main link between the IAHE evaluation team and key stakeholder groups, to help the evaluation team identify priority questions for the evaluation, to provide feedback on key evaluation issues and evaluation deliverables such as the inception and draft evaluation reports, to help promote ownership of respective stakeholder groups, and to assist in the development and implementation of a communication strategy for the IAHE findings.
33. The membership of the In-Country Advisory group will be based on a “mapping” of key stakeholders. Stakeholders in the IAHE In-Country Advisory Group may include UN Agencies, international and local NGOs, key donors, national entities, government representatives, private sector representatives and civil society representatives. OCHA’s Country Office will assist in the mapping exercise of these stakeholders, and, if no other member of the IAHE In-Country Advisory Group volunteers, Chair and convene the Group. Members of the In-Country Advisory Group will be appointed by the HC.

## VII. Deliverables and reporting requirements

34. The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed according to the UNEG Evaluation Standards and the OCHA Quality Assurance System for Evaluations.
35. The inception and draft reports will be produced jointly by the members of the evaluation team and reflect their collective understanding of the evaluation. All deliverables listed will be written in good Standard English. If in the estimation of the Evaluation Manager the reports do not meet required standards, the Evaluation Team will ensure at their own expense the editing and changes needed to bring it to the required standards.

### A. Inception Report

36. The Evaluation Team will produce an inception report not to exceed 15000 words, excluding annexes, setting out:
  - The team’s understanding of the issues to be evaluated (scope), questions that the IAHE intends to answer, and their understanding of the context in which the IAHE takes place;
  - Inclusion of a comprehensive stakeholders mapping and analysis;
  - Any suggested deviations from the ToRs, including any additional issues raised during the initial consultations;
  - Evaluation framework, selected criteria of analysis and sub-questions;
  - An evaluation matrix showing, for each question, the indicators proposed and sources of information;

- Methodology, including details of gender analysis and triangulation strategy;
- Data collection and analysis tools that will be used to conduct the IAHE (survey, interview questions, document with the preparation of field visit and schedule of interviews, etc.);
- Any limitations of the chosen methods of data collection and analysis and how they will be addressed;
- How will the views of the affected populations as well as protection and gender issues be addressed during the evaluation;
- Data collection and analysis plan;
- Detailed fieldwork plan;
- Detailed timeline for the evaluation;
- Interview guides, survey instruments, and/or other tools to be employed for the evaluation;
- Draft dissemination strategy of the evaluation findings (including with the IAHE Philippines Management Group and the IAHE In-Country Advisory group).

## B. Evaluation Report

37. The Evaluation Team will produce a single report, written in a clear and concise manner that allows readers to understand what are the main evaluation findings, conclusions and corresponding recommendations, and their inter-relationship. The report should be comprised of:
- Executive summary of no more than 2500 words;
  - Table of contents;
  - Summary table linking findings, conclusions and recommendations, including where responsibility for follow up should lie;
  - Analysis of context in which the response was implemented;
  - Methodology summary – a brief chapter, with a more detailed description provided in an annex;
  - Main body of the report, including findings in response to the evaluation questions, conclusions and recommendations;
  - Annexes will include: (1) ToR, (2) Detailed methodology, (3) List of persons met, (4) Details of qualitative and quantitative analysis undertaken, (6) Team itinerary, (7) All evaluation tools employed, (8) List of acronyms; and (9) Bibliography of documents (including web pages, etc.) relevant to the evaluation; (10) Assessment of the usefulness of the IAHE guidelines and process and main recommendations for their improvement.
38. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should follow logically from the evaluation findings and conclusions, and be:
- Categorized as a) Critical, b) Important, or c) Opportunity for learning.
  - Relevant, realistic and useful and reflect the reality of the context;
  - Specific, measurable, clearly stated and not broad or vague;
  - Realistic and reflect an understanding of the humanitarian system and potential constraints to follow-up;
  - Suggest where responsibility for follow-up should lie and include a timeframe for follow-up.

The draft report will be reviewed by the IAHE Management Group and the final version cleared by the IAHE Steering Group prior to dissemination.

### C. Other evaluation products.

39. The Evaluation Team will also produce presentations, as requested by the Evaluation Management Group, including presentations to HC/HCT, IASC members, in-country presentations to local communities and affected people, etc.
40. The Evaluation Team will also provide regular feedback on the appropriateness of IAHE guidelines and the IAHE process, for each of the IAHE phases (inception, evaluation, reporting, dissemination), and suggest possible ways to improve them through conference calls with the IAHE Steering Group and Management Group, as well as a document to be included as an annex to the evaluation report. Lessons learned on the use of the IAHEs guidelines will be synthesised in a final written aide-memoire.
41. Additional evaluation products such as briefs, video presentations or précis may be proposed in the inception report.

## VIII. Dissemination and follow up

42. The Evaluation Team will conduct the following presentations:
  - At the end of the field visit, the evaluation team will conduct an exit brief with the IAHE Philippines In-Country Advisory Group and the IAHE Philippines Management Group to share first impressions, preliminary findings and possible areas of conclusions and recommendations. The brief will also help clarify issues and outline any expected pending actions from any stakeholders, as relevant, as well as discuss next steps;
  - Upon completion of the draft evaluation report, the results of the IAHE will be presented by the evaluation team (or evaluation manager) to the IASC in New York and Geneva;
  - Once the evaluation is completed, presentations of the main findings and recommendations will be made available to various fora as decided by OCHA and the IAHE Management Group. The Evaluation Team may be requested to assist with these presentations.
43. The IAHE final report will also be submitted to the IASC Working Group, the EDG and the Principals.
44. Once the evaluation results are finalized, national evaluators will help feed back results to communities who participated in the evaluation and to affected people and communities.
45. In addition to the Evaluation Report and oral briefings, the evaluation findings and recommendations can be presented through alternative ways of dissemination, such as video. The Evaluation Team will consider possible ways to present the evaluation and include a dissemination strategy proposal in the Inception Report.
46. The recommendations of the evaluation will be addressed through a formal Management Response Plan (MRP). The preparation of the MRP will be facilitated by the IASC Working Group Chair. Three months after the issuance of the IAHE report, the HC in Philippines will provide the ERC, the IASC Working Group and the IASC Emergency Directors with an update on the implementation of follow-up plans.

## IX. The Evaluation Team

47. The Evaluation Team will be recruited through a competitive bidding process. The evaluation will require the services of an Evaluation Team of four members with the following collective experience and skills:
  - ➔ Extensive evaluation experience of humanitarian strategies and programmes, and other key humanitarian issues, especially humanitarian finance and funding instruments;

- ➔ Experience with and institutional knowledge of UN and NGO actors, inter-agency mechanisms at headquarters and in the field;
- ➔ Extensive knowledge of humanitarian law and principles, and experience with using human rights, protection and gender analysis in evaluations (at least one of the team members should have experience in gender analysis);
- ➔ Good understanding of cross-cutting issues, such as gender, resilience, transition, etc.;
- ➔ An appropriate range of field experience;
- ➔ Experience in facilitating consultative workshops involving a wide range of organizations and participants;
- ➔ The team leader should have excellent writing and communication skills in English.

All efforts should be made so that at least two of the evaluation team members are nationals of Philippines, as they are to play a key role in ensuring that the views of local communities and affected people are incorporated in the evaluation. They will also play a key role in disseminating the evaluation results to affected communities.


48. The Evaluation Team will include a Team Leader, who is responsible for the overall conduct of the evaluation in accordance with the ToR, including:
  - ➔ Developing and adjusting the evaluation methodology;
  - ➔ Managing the evaluation team, ensuring efficient division of tasks between mission members and taking responsibility for the quality of their work;
  - ➔ Undertaking the inception field mission;
  - ➔ Representing the Evaluation Team in meetings;
  - ➔ Ensuring the quality of all outputs; and
  - ➔ Submitting all outputs in a timely manner.
49. The Team Leader will have no less than 15 years of professional experience in humanitarian action, including experience in management of humanitarian operations. S/he will, further, have at least seven years of experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian operations and demonstrate strong analytical, communication and writing skills.
50. To the extent possible, the Evaluation Team will be gender balanced and represent geographical diversity.

## Timeline and phases of the evaluation

Evaluation Milestones	
<b>Preparation</b>	<b>Feb-April 2014</b>
Constituting the Management Group	February 2014
Development of Terms of Reference	March 2014
Recruitment of the Evaluation Team (selection and contracting)	April-May 2014
<b>Inception</b>	<b>June-July 2014</b>
Inception Field Mission	1-7 June 2014
Formation of In-Country Advisory Group	10 June 2014
Production of draft Inception Report	20 June 2014
Finalized Inception Report	5 July 2014
<b>Data collection, fieldwork</b>	<b>August 2014</b>
Field mission with full team	3-4 weeks August 2014
<b>Reporting</b>	<b>Sept. - Oct. 2014</b>
Production of draft report	September 2014
Finalized version of the report	October 2014
Final approval of the report by IAHE SG	November 2014
<b>Communications/Dissemination/Use</b>	<b>July-Dec. 2014</b>
Feedback to the IAHE on testing of the IAHE guidance (TOR and IR)	July 2014
Feedback to the IAHE on testing of the guidelines (ER)	November 2014
Presentation of final report to ERC and EDG	December 2014

### Annex 1 - IAHE Impact Pathway

#### COORDINATED HUMANITARIAN ACTION THEORY OF CHANGE/IMPACT PATHWAY



# ANNEX 3 DETAILED METHODOLOGY

## 1. Introduction

The evaluation is organised around the four evaluation questions.

1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?<sup>1</sup>
2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?
3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?
4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

An evaluation matrix was developed with identifies sub-questions and criteria and evidence sought which guided both data collection and analysis.

The main phases of the evaluation are below.

Phase	Main activities
<b>Inception phase</b> June-July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• Interviews</li> <li>• Country visit 10-18 June including meetings with communities, government, humanitarian agency stakeholders and in-country advisory group</li> <li>• Report writing, discussion and finalisation</li> </ul>
<b>Data Gathering</b> August-Sept	<b>Phase 1 Data Collection</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community survey -Region VI</li> <li>• HCT survey</li> <li>• Document review</li> </ul> <b>Phase 2 Data Collection</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IAHE team field work -community consultations, interviews, group discussions, validation workshop</li> </ul>
<b>Data Analysis</b> Sept	<b>Data Analysis and Report writing</b>
<b>Report</b> October	<b>Draft report</b> submitted 7 October

<sup>1</sup> During the inception phase of the evaluation the IAHE guidelines were adapted to ask "To what extent are SRP objectives appropriate and relevant to meet humanitarian needs, and have systems been established to measure their achievement? To what extent are the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster? This broader question is addressed through the evaluation in EQ1 and 4.

## 2. Approach

The inception phase, and particularly advice from the in-country advisory group, highlighted the need for focus in the IAHE, guided by three considerations:

- Where the nature of the IAHE means it can add value over and above other learning processes i.e. due to its inter-agency, inter-sectoral nature and its timing at month ten of the response;
- Aspects of the response where there can be learning for the future;
- On areas raised as concerns in earlier reviews and/or by stakeholders in the inception mission to explore in more depth their validity and how concerns and challenges were managed.

*The scope of the evaluation* was guided by the following parameters:

- HCT-coordinated response: the focus of the IAHE is on the response detailed in the SRP, co-led and implemented by the 14 UN organisations and 39 NGOs and international organisations appealing through the SRP. However, this is done with acknowledgement that this group and the SRP is only one part of the wider response led by the government of the Philippines, and which also involved many organisations including civil society and private sector organisations as well as individual support to families e.g. from the diaspora through direct financial transfers.
- The ten months from November 8th 2013 to August 2014.
- Performance, results and learning at country level. Agency headquarters issues are better assessed in agencies' own assessments which this evaluation was not intended to replace.
- Issues that cut across the whole response. The IAHE was not intended to replace sector, agency or cluster specific assessments and evaluations but rather, where possible, to draw on these. Primary data collection focused on relevance, timeliness and overall effectiveness of the overall response along with coordination and system-strengthening elements of the response.
- The evaluation considered documentation from across all the strategic response plan objectives, sectors and the regions the SRP covers. It looked in more depth at selected sectors e.g. in considering how beneficiary identification was carried out, how common standards across agencies were promoted and how cross-cutting issues were treated. The selection ensured a spread across the five SRP objectives and includes those which have been responsible for use of the most significant resources and /or those for which concerns have been raised e.g. due to under-funding, in the OPR or lack of progress has been reported. As such, the evaluation focused on food security and agriculture; emergency shelter; early recovery and livelihoods; WASH and protection. The budgets for these five make up over 70% of the total SRP budget. They span the five SRP objectives. However, the evaluation does consider all five of the strategic objectives and thus, to some extent, the results and performance of all 11 clusters.
- The IAHE builds on and does not intend to duplicate other processes but took into consideration data and findings from other processes.
- The evaluation carried out field work in the three affected regions which are the focus of the inter-agency response: Regions VI, VII and VIII. In phase 1, a community-level survey of 19 communities was carried out in Region VI including communities considered hard-to-reach. In phase 2 field work, the team worked in four sub-regions: Leyte in Region VIII; Samar in Region VIII; Region VII and Region VI. Field work included systematic community consultations in a further 18 communities across the regions. Municipalities and communities for field work were selected to meet the following criteria:

- areas that were most damaged
- where there were high levels of poverty before Typhoon Haiyan
- areas in receipt of inter-agency assistance
- a spread of communities to include rural, urban and coastal including also some displaced communities.

**Phasing of the response** - The evaluation considered the overall response through a lens of two phases: a) Month 1-3, which coincides with the L3 status and was characterised by a greater focus on emergency response and relief activities and b) Months 4-10, which was after the L3 was de-activated and the response was characterised by greater focus on early recovery.

**Gender** - To ensure a gender sensitive approach, the team considered the extent to which gender disaggregated data was gathered, and then used to influence the design and implementation of the response. In data gathering, the IAHE ensured that interviews and group discussions with each stakeholder group included men and women and, when appropriate, that these took place separately. Gender was also considered as one of the evaluation's cross-cutting issues.

### 3. Methods for data collection

A range of methods were used to collect data. Community consultations were inclusive and involved women, men, older people, people with disabilities, youth and children. Communities were selected to include a range of locations including rural, urban, coastal, inland and highland. They included areas that were difficult to reach.

#### 3.1 Community Survey

A survey was carried out across 19 communities in Region VI. The purpose of the beneficiary satisfaction survey was to gather feedback regarding the post-typhoon humanitarian response from the perspective of marginalised people and communities from a sample of barangays purposively selected based on their location and level of vulnerability. Specifically, the survey aimed to:

- Gather community feedback on the relevance, timeliness and effectiveness of assistance;
- Increase the range of community voices in the evaluation particularly to include more marginalised people and places;
- Provide opportunities for input from areas considered hard-to-reach and vulnerable groups and;
- Provide initial findings to feed into main phase of field work in mid-August.

The survey was carried out in Region VI, chosen because it was badly damaged and also because the team were informed during the inception phase that there was less data available from the Region. Barangay selection was done purposively such that barangays chosen exemplified different strata based on consideration of location (inland, coastal and island barangays) and accessibility (easy and hard to access). This selection would allow for inter-barangay comparisons between those in different strata.

The survey team was formed on the 28<sup>th</sup> of July 2014, and composed of eight (8) surveyors, three women and five men. Four survey teams with two members each were reinforced by four volunteers to assist in the logistics and groundwork and, more importantly, to serve as advanced parties in relaying information to target areas or validating targets, and in allowing flexibility to allow the survey teams to cover the widest survey target possible. An encoder was also hired to encode data on a daily basis, to make sure that data gathered in the survey was immediately processed.

The survey teams were trained on the first day. Surveyors/enumerators were oriented about the general context and objectives of the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) on Yolanda response and the specific objectives, targets and the survey instrument. Pre-testing of the survey instrument was then

done immediately after the training. Testing was done in a nearby barangay that was not one of the barangays selected for the survey. The pretesting was a simulation of the official community survey to be undertaken and a dry-run of the standard operating procedures in conducting the survey. This included a courtesy call to the barangay officials, testing of the survey tools, locating the respondents based on the design of data gathering and identifying problems that might arise in the actual survey. A discussion on results of the pre-test was held soon after and the survey instrument was further refined and protocols were adjusted accordingly.

The survey interviewed a total of 692 respondents from 18 barangay and 1 internally displaced bunkhouse made up of 364 females and 328 males. Of these totals respondents were made up 168 adult men, 207 mothers of reproductive age with children age 5 years and under, 178 senior citizens and 140 youth.

### 3.2 Online survey

An online survey was circulated to 119 contacts that are or had been members of the humanitarian country team or coordination clusters. The survey requested feedback on:

- The quality of the outputs associated with the HPC - MIRA, OPR , SRP, PMR, information products
- The use of the outputs
- The appropriateness of the process to create the tools in terms of time inputs from agencies
- The timeliness of outputs
- The extent to which the HCT had provided clear strategic direction to the operation e.g. on key issues land, relocation
- The timeliness of direction
- The extent to which the HCT has fulfilled its leadership functions.<sup>2</sup>

15 responses were received.

### 3.3 Systematic community consultations

In the phase two field work, the IAHE team divided into two sub-teams for community visits with one Filipino and one international team member in each sub-team. In each community visit, the team used a participatory tool to develop a timeline of assistance and to gather community feedback on key evaluation questions. The IAHE sub-team facilitated community meetings with participation from across the community and including women, men, youth and older people. The team created symbolic cards representing key components of assistance including water, food, shelter, healthcare, school, protection symbols/safety, cash, sanitation and work. Additional cards were created when needed at the suggestion of the community. All the community meetings were held in local languages. The timeline of assistance was constructed from the day Haiyan struck until September.

<b>First week - day 0-7</b>	<b>First month Week 2-4</b>	<b>First months 2-3</b>	<b>Month 4 to now</b>
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The team then used the timeline to prompt and guide discussion regarding relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of assistance. The communities were finally asked to give a collective rating to the assistance against criteria of its relevance; timeliness; immediate effectiveness (in terms of helping people cope in the first month); medium -term effectiveness (in terms of people getting back on their feet- early recovery); the extent to which it took account of different needs in the community, and; quality of the information and feedback mechanisms (e.g. complaints and feedback) they experienced.

<sup>2</sup> Responsibilities were laid out in the revised ToR 27 Feb 2014 and Reference Module for the Implementation of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle.

## Community Questions

Key Elements		English	Local Language	Ratings	Comments
<b>Relevance</b>		Did the assistance meet your needs? What are the things that you needed that you did not receive?	Yong mga tulong ba ay tumutugma sa actual pangngangailangan?  Ano pa yong mga pangngangailangan na hindi nyo pa na tangap sa loob ng isang buwan pagkatapos nang Yolanda?	1 Good ---3-- ---5 Bad	
<b>Efficiency</b>		Timeliness? Emergency	Delayed ba o maaga yong mga tulong-relief dumating?		
		Recovery	Matagal ba yong mga tulong para maka balik sa normal na situasyon?		
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Emergency	Has the emergency assistance helped you cope with the immediate effects, first month after Haiyan	Yong mga tulong na relief of emergency naka tulong ba sa pag ahon ninyo sa loob nang isang buwan?		
	Recovery	Has the assistance received till now helped you to come back to stand on your feet?	Yong mga tulong ba na natanggap hangang ngayon nakatulong ba sa pagbalik normal katulad ng sitwasyon nyo bago mag Yolanda?		
<b>Accountability and Transparency</b>		Did you receive information about assistance and are there complaints and feedback systems?	May consulta ba sa inyo kung ano ang ibigay na tutugma sa inyong pangngangailangan at merong bang sistema na makapag bigay kayo ng rekomendasyon?		

Key Elements	English	Local Language	Ratings	Comments
<b>Gender/Ages/Special needs</b>	Did the assistance and the content considers different needs?	Ang mga tulong ba at ang napaluob nito ay ayon sa pangnangailan ng angkop sa nangailangan katulad ng bata, may sakit, kapansanan, mga matanda, buntis, mga babae at lalaki?		

During the community visit, the IAHE team also undertook a transect walk through the community and held small group discussions and interviews with members of the community including barangay captains, members of different livelihood groups and other community members (male and female).

A further 22 key informant interviews and 14 focus group discussions were held in Ormoc and Iloilo. The group discussions included three discussions with children in Guiuan (2) and Ormoc (1). A further six FGDS were held in Iloilo (3 male and 3 female) with farming, fishing folk and people in service industry e.g. petty trade plus ten key informant interviews.

### 3.4 Key Informant interviews

A stakeholder analysis undertaken as part of the inception phase guided the selection of interviewees. Key informant interviews were undertaken with government and humanitarian agencies at local, provincial, regional and national levels. They were guided by standard interview checklists and guides developed by the team. All interviews were written up. Over 210 people took part in interviews and group discussions in total (annex 7 has full list).

### 3.5 Group discussions

Group discussions were held with humanitarian agencies, national NGOs and government disaster risk reduction and management committees at regional and national levels.

### 3.6 Document review

The team collected considerable documentation which was reviewed as part of the IAHE. The full list is attached in Annex 10. The document review focused on looking for evidence in relation to the criteria and evaluation questions laid out in the evaluation matrix.

## 4. Data analysis

Data was collated and analysed against the evaluation criteria and questions laid out in the evaluation matrix. The team held a meeting in Tacloban following the first phase of field work in Region VIII in Leyte area to refine all evaluation tools and to identify initial findings for this first region of field work. A second all-day team meeting was held following field work in Samar in Region VIII and Region VI. Finally, the team held a two day meeting in Manila to identify initial findings and develop draft recommendations to present to the feedback and validation workshops in Tacloban and Manila. The three feedback workshops involved government representatives, HCT members, humanitarian agency staff and the in-country IAHE advisory group (96 participants in total). The workshops themselves were participatory in nature and provided opportunities for all participants to feed back on findings and recommendations in writing, anonymously. This feedback was incorporated into the analysis carried out by the evaluation team.

## 5. Constraints

The evaluation faced a number of constraints. These included:

- **Data for many of the indicators, particularly outcome level targets was not available.**  
 The evaluation is not a sector-specific evaluation and is not intended to replace sector specific evaluations. The inception report highlighted that it would not be collecting primary data on specific sectors such as nutrition surveys, income surveys etc. but rather would be reliant on the data being collected by agencies and clusters for their reporting against the SRP to address this question. The evaluation found that data was missing for a significant number of outcomes. The assessment of results was further challenged by the changing selection of targets and indicators for the SRP objectives at each reporting phase. The team used the most up-to-date available supplementing this with other data it could gather from agencies as well as qualitative data gathered on the overall response in community consultations and interviews.
- **Timing** - The evaluation took place in month ten of the response. This had advantages in terms of being a time when it was possible able to see more clear some of the results of the overall response, phases of implementation and how the response had evolved. It meant that respondents provided a more reflective perspective on some of the issues that were important in the early months and maybe lost some of the detail of the early phases. Timing of IAHEs is something being considered by the IAHE steering committee.
- **Challenge of staff turnover** - The IAHE team made strong efforts to involve people who were involved in the early stages of the response and who had already left the Philippines e.g. through interviews and the online survey. The team succeeded in involving sufficient people involved in this early stage to gain a good overview of the first phases of the response but the overall balance of interviews with international personnel lies weighted with people who are currently in the Philippines. For national personnel and affected communities, no such imbalance exists.
- **The community survey in Region VI** provided valuable feedback on the timeliness and quality of the overall response as well as highlighting differences between experiences of communities according to their location. It aimed to target communities that had received assistance and liaised with OCHA in this regard. However, while all communities surveyed had received assistance, communities had received insufficient levels of some types of assistance to allow analysis of the specific components of assistance e.g. shelter, livelihoods and WASH. The IAHE sought to compensate for this with additional focus group discussions in Region VI and also in Region VIII which focused on areas where there was more limited data.

Given the limited scale and purposive selection of the communities, the survey answers are not used as standalone data in the report unless triangulation processes supported their findings. However, they do provide some valuable data on trends and this was also an excellent way for the IAHE to include communities which are more remote and to ensure significant input from people often considered marginalised in the response e.g. people living with disabilities and older people.
- **Cluster performance monitoring** was underway through an independent process at the time of the IAHE. Some clusters shared their results. However, not all clusters completed the process. This excluded the possibility of under-taking another survey as planned as part of the IAHE given the extent of “survey fatigue” reported to the IAHE.
- **The level of response to the IAHE HCT online survey** was not sufficient (15 responses) for the results to be statistically significant but they did help to guide the team towards areas to probe in more depth.

- **The extent of the assistance provided by organisations** outside of the inter agency response posed a challenge. The inter-agency response itself is only contributing to the strategic response objectives but these are not objectives that are held or reported on by any other organisation so makes it difficult to weight the contribution of the inter-agency response vis-a-vis the wider response. In addition, stakeholders including communities will not always differentiate between the various sources of assistance.
- Finally, even the coordination of the response was led by the government and agencies providing the co-lead to clusters, and much of the inter-agency response was implemented in cooperation with or through the government, the performance of the government was not evaluated.

## 6. Evaluation team

The evaluation was carried out by Valid International through a 4-person IAHE team made up of two Filipino and two international team members. The team collectively brought a wide range of experience in humanitarian and development work from roles in national and international NGOs, Government of Philippines, donor governments, UN organisations and the Red Cross Movement. All team members are independent of IASC organisations.

Team members focused on specific sectors/clusters and issues as far as possible, but on the whole adopted a flexible approach to data gathering given logistical challenges presented by the geographical spread of the response and stakeholders. Rustico (Rusty) Binas and Balthazar (Baltz) Tribunalo respectively led the community consultation processes in Regions VI/VII and VIII. They both brought community facilitation skills and considerable knowledge of government and civil society roles in Filipino disaster risk reduction and management in general, as well as in the Haiyan response in particular. Team member Julian Murray, bringing extensive humanitarian experience including from a donor agency and UNHCR, focused on question one (shelter and protection) as well as evaluation question four on the Humanitarian Programme Cycle. The team leader, Teresa Hanley with more than twenty years humanitarian, development as well as evaluation experience with the Red Cross Movement, UN, DFID and a range of international NGOs focused on evaluation question one regarding results (food security, livelihoods and WASH) and evaluation questions two and three regarding international/national coordination and internal SRP coordination. The IAHE's overall analysis, conclusions and recommendations were developed collectively. In addition, a Filipino team survey specialist, Ernest Guevarra, helped with the design, implementation and analysis of the Region VI survey. The survey team was managed in-country by Danny Carranza who also participated in the inception field visit. The team was supported by the Valid International project and administrative team.

## 7. Quality assurance was provided by:

- a. Use of standard templates for data collection, aggregation and synthesis to ensure consistency across team members and places. Data and findings were triangulated through the use of a mixed range of methods without reliance on any one data source for findings.
- b. Peer review by both the VALID director - Alistair Hallam - and QA independent adviser - James Darcy.
- c. Use of an ethical approach which adhered to principles of:
  - A commitment to producing an evaluation of developmental and practical value
  - A commitment to avoid harm to participants
  - A respect for cultural norms

- A commitment to an inclusive approach ensuring access and participation of women and socially excluded groups
  - A commitment to ensure participation in the evaluation is voluntary and free from external pressure
  - A commitment to confidentiality and anonymity of participants.<sup>3</sup>
- d. An in-country evaluation advisory group as well as an inter-agency Evaluation Management Group (EMG). Emerging findings were shared with both these groups. The in-country advisory group, with whom the team met at the inception phase as well as the start up of the August field work, also participated in one of three feedback and validation workshops which the team held in Manila and Tacloban for humanitarian agencies, government representatives and the HCT.

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<sup>3</sup> Adapted from DFID Ethics and Principles for Research and Evaluation, 2011. [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf)

## ANNEX 4 EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
<b>EQ1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?</b>		
1.1. To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended results?	1.1.1. Extent to which the SRP targets have been reached.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of PMR reports and individual cluster reports behind these (all objectives)</li> <li>Phase 1 community survey in communities with different levels of accessibility (Region VI, VIII)</li> <li>Phase 2 community systematic consultations - Regions VI, VII, VIII on relevance, timeliness, effectiveness of assistance</li> </ul>
	1.1.2. Evidence that risks and challenges were well managed (predicted, identified, planned for, ongoing identification; assumptions correct?) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SRP, cluster plans, HCT and ICC minutes</li> <li>Analysis through selected cluster/agency interviews of reasons for delays/shortfalls and how these were managed</li> </ul>
	1.1.3. Quality of the targets and indicators to monitor progress towards results (extent to which they enable monitoring of outputs and outcomes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of SRP and PMRs</li> <li>Review of selected cluster plans and reports</li> <li>Interviews with cluster coordinators, leads, co-leads, OCHA responsible for M&amp;E</li> </ul>
1.2. How relevant is the collective response to the priorities and needs of the affected communities?	1.2.1. Evidence that assessments were of high quality [ <i>criteria of timeliness; relevance, validity, transparency, continuity</i> ]. <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of MIRA documents (1 and 2)</li> <li>Interviews with clusters/partners of quality of MIRA process and subsequent needs and gaps analysis to ensure relevance of assistance</li> <li>Analysis of selected cluster/agency additional assessments undertaken in selected sectors and geographical</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> SRP planning assumptions are that a) the situation will continue to improve across key sectors although the speed of improvement will vary across affected regions b) Recovery efforts continue to gain momentum c) Access is fully restored including to remote hard-to-reach barangays and d) typhoon season ends without further devastation to areas affected by Haiyan of the Bohol earthquake.

### <sup>2</sup> Characteristics of a good assessment

A good assessment tool should have the following key characteristics:

- Timeliness: providing information and analysis in time to inform key decisions about the response.
- Relevance: providing information and analysis addressing questions which will influence decisions on what is to be done.
- Coverage: adequate to develop an understanding of the range of experiences of various groups.
- Validity: using methods that can be expected to lead to sound conclusions.
- Transparency: being explicit about the assumptions made, methods used and information relied on to reach conclusions, and the limits of the data.
- Continuity: providing relevant information throughout the course of a crisis. In case of a reassessment, there should be comparability with the data generated by previous assessments. This will require skill in information management to be able to identify changes and trends.

From ODI *Common needs assessments and humanitarian action* by Garfield, R. et al. (2011). ODI.

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
	1.2.2. Extent the SRP objectives, targets and cluster/ agency aims and operational approaches match needs and priorities identified in MIRA and later analyses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of SRP</li> <li>• Review of selected agency and cluster programme plans and reports against SRP objectives and plan</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster leads, co-lead and/ or coordinators, partners</li> </ul>
	1.2.3. Evidence of programme monitoring and programme adaptation in light of new information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of selected cluster monitoring systems</li> <li>• Interviews with selected cluster co-leads and coordinators regarding progress, obstacles, adjustments to programme</li> </ul>
	1.2.4. Evidence of community satisfaction with assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Phase 1 community survey in communities with different levels of accessibility (Region VI, VIII)</li> <li>• Phase 2 community visits - Regions VI, VII, VIII on relevance, timeliness, effectiveness of assistance</li> <li>• Analysis of cluster and agency monitoring and reviews of beneficiary satisfaction. Review of AAP minutes and reports</li> </ul>
	1.2.5. Evidence that differential needs were considered and addressed in operations i.e. evidence that gender and age disaggregated data has been gathered, analysed and influenced programme design; evidence of equal access for men, women, girls and boys to range of response interventions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of MIRA 1 and 2</li> <li>• Analysis of selected cluster further assessments</li> <li>• Analysis of selected cluster monitoring data</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster and agency leads regarding data use</li> <li>• Review of PMR reports</li> </ul>
	1.2.6 Evidence of establishment of effective <i>two-way</i> communication with affected communities across regions and sectors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of AAP minutes.</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster co-lead and/or coordinators</li> <li>• Community survey and phase 2 consultations</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
1.3. How timely was the response?	1.3.1. Evidence that immediate, life-saving assistance reached communities promptly.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of cluster response reports month 1- all clusters</li> <li>• Interviews - government officials (local and national), partners, civil society</li> <li>• Community feedback on timeliness of assistance</li> </ul>
	1.3.2. Evidence that immediate assistance was appropriately prioritised i.e. clear criteria for what resourced first.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with HCT members, clusters, OCHA heads of office, government official (local and national)</li> <li>• Review of inter-cluster and HCT minutes</li> <li>• Other documentation documenting criteria for priorities?</li> </ul>
	1.3.3. Evidence that response transition to recovery and phase out in line with needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exit strategies - February and June 2014 - selected clusters and ICC/whole response</li> <li>• Interviews- government, partners</li> <li>• Community feedback - survey and systematic consultations</li> </ul>
1.4. What learning is there from the response about how to address cross-cutting issues?	1.4.1. Evidence of added value of technical advisors in gender, cash and accountability.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advisor end of mission reports and selected outputs</li> <li>• Interviews with clusters, HCT</li> </ul>
	1.4.2. Learning and examples of approaches that were successful and those that were not.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advisor end of mission reports.</li> <li>• Cluster partners and coordinators assessment of added value</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
<b>EQ2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?</b>		
2.1. To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems?	2.1.1. Evidence of harmonisation of HCT-coordinated response with government protocols, systems and procedures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review of SRP. L3 mechanisms and analysis for coherence with government systems initiated under Declaration of Calamity and structure laid out in NDRMC relevant memos and government policy, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 10121 and implementing guidelines</li> <li>• Interviews - government - LGU (disaster response officers, mayors), regional, national including OPARR, Selected NDRRMC member agencies including OCD, DSWD</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster coordinators, agencies and partners about engagement with government</li> </ul>
	2.1.2. Evidence of preparedness for national-international cooperation for a large scale crisis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with cluster leads and co-lead and/or coordinators; RC/HC; Government - NDRRMC member agencies including OCD, DSWD</li> </ul>
2.2. How well did the international response work with local level government structures?	2.2.1. Evidence that the response has strengthened the government's disaster response systems at municipal, provincial and regional levels.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews and group discussion with LGUs and government departments at regional and provincial levels plus national Government - selected NDRRMC member agencies including OCD, DSWD</li> <li>• Interviews with clusters and partners.</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster coordinators, agencies and partners about engagement with local government</li> </ul>
2.3. How effectively has the HCT-coordinated response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?	2.3.1. Evidence that agencies have engaged with national NGOs throughout the response.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews and group discussions with civil society organisations at national, regional and local levels</li> <li>• Interviews with clusters and partners</li> </ul>
	2.3.2. Evidence of cluster engagement with local organisations responding to the disaster.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews and group discussions with civil society organisations at national, regional and local levels</li> <li>• Interviews with clusters and partners</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
<b>EQ3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?</b>		
3.1. How effectively have coordination mechanisms been able to ensure the HCT-coordinated/managed response reached areas of most need?	3.1.1. Evidence that the response has focused on areas of most vulnerability i.e. poorest and/or most damaged.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with key government and other stakeholders, cluster coordinators and partners regarding coverage and their use of cluster information</li> <li>• Community feedback on gaps/duplication (survey and phase 2 consultation).</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster coordinators and partners</li> </ul>
	3.1.2. Evidence of consistent approaches across organisations and clusters to identify the most vulnerable and beneficiaries within the HCT-coordinated response and with government.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review of selected clusters plans and reports</li> <li>• Interviews with clusters co-ordinators and co-leads, partners' government representatives (cluster leads, LGU, disaster response officer and municipal or regional levels)</li> </ul>
3.2. How effectively have coordination mechanisms been able to ensure the HCT-coordinated/ managed response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?	3.2.1. Evidence that clusters have produced consensus of standards to strive for.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review- cluster plans and strategy</li> <li>• Interviews with selected cluster coordinators and partners regarding standards used</li> </ul>
	3.2.2. Evidence that standards e.g. SPHERE, government baselines, government standards such as minimum wage have been achieved.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with cluster coordinators on monitoring of standards and quality</li> <li>• Interviews with government representatives on consistency of standards</li> <li>• Direct observation in field</li> </ul>
3.3. How effectively have coordination mechanisms enabled the transition of the HCT-coordinated response activities to a focus on recovery and exit.	3.3.1. Evidence of exit and transition plans exist and being implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review of cluster and overall programme exit strategies February and June 2014.</li> <li>• HCT and ICC minutes</li> <li>• PMRs, selected cluster reports</li> <li>• Interviews with selected government cluster lead , cluster coordinators, cluster co-lead and/or coordinators, OPARR, DWSD</li> <li>• Interviews with local government- disaster response officers, mayors, DSWD, OPARR</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
	3.3.2. Evidence that activities across clusters support transition to recovery.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with selected government cluster lead , cluster coordinators, cluster co-leads, OPARR, DWSD</li> <li>• Interviews with local government- disaster response officers, mayors, DSWD, OPARR</li> <li>• Community survey and consultations</li> <li>• Plans for HCT coordination with OPARR</li> </ul>
3.4. How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?	3.4.1. Evidence of effective cluster and inter-cluster coordination at national levels i.e. participation rates, cluster fulfilling 6 functions <sup>3</sup> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cluster survey- national coordinators and partners</li> <li>• Group discussions/interviews with cluster leads (government), coordinators, co-leads and partners (national level)</li> </ul>
	3.4.2. Evidence of effective cluster and inter-cluster coordination at regional and sub-regional levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of inter-cluster coordination minutes</li> <li>• Group discussions/interviews with cluster coordinators/partners, OCHA heads of office and sub-office at regional/sub-regional level</li> </ul>
	3.4.3. Evidence of effective of HCT leadership and advocacy on key issues (land, relocation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of HCT minutes and documentation on advocacy and guidance</li> <li>• Government interviews regarding advocacy impact</li> <li>• Partner interviews regarding use of guidance</li> </ul>

<sup>3</sup> **Cluster core functions as defined in Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level**

1. Supporting service delivery
  - Provide a platform to ensure that service delivery is driven by the agreed strategic priorities
  - Develop mechanisms to eliminate duplication of service delivery
2. Informing strategic decision-making of the HC/HCT for the humanitarian response
  - Needs assessment and response gap analysis (across sectors and within the sector)
  - Analysis to identify and address (emerging) gaps, obstacles, duplication, and cross-cutting issues including age, gender, environment, and HIV/AIDs
  - Prioritization, grounded in response analysis
3. Planning and strategy development
  - Develop sectoral plans, objectives and indicators that directly support realization of the HC/HCT strategic priorities
  - Apply and adhere to existing standards and guidelines
  - Clarify funding requirements, prioritization, and cluster contributions for the HC's overall humanitarian funding considerations (e.g. Flash Appeal, CAP, CERF, Emergency Response Fund/Common Humanitarian Fund)
4. Advocacy
  - Identify advocacy concerns to contribute to HC and HCT messaging and action
  - Undertake advocacy activities on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population
5. Monitoring and reporting the implementation of the cluster strategy and results; recommending corrective action where necessary
6. Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building in situations where there is a high risk of recurring or significant new disaster and where sufficient capacity exists within the cluster.

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria/ evidence sought	Method and sources of information
<b>EQ4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?</b>		
4.1. To what extent did the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the HCT-coordinated operation be better coordinated and effective?	4.1.1. Evidence that tools were used by donors, HCT, clusters, partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey - donors, HCT, cluster, partners</li> <li>• Interviews with donors, HCT and partners regarding use of tools.</li> <li>• Interviews with cluster coordinators and partners regarding use of tools.</li> <li>• Review of minutes of HCT, ICC and other meetings to identify changes to programmes based on PMR data.</li> </ul>
	4.1.2. Evidence of action based on the recommendations of the OPR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update on OPR recommendations action.</li> <li>• Interviews with HC/RC; HCT members</li> </ul>
4.2. What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response ?	4.2.1. Evidence that the surge capacity made a difference to the speed and quality of the response in the first three-month phase and later.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with government representatives - national and local, HCT members, agency heads</li> </ul>
	4.2.2. Evidence of speedy decision-making by the leadership (HC and HCT).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of HCT minutes and other documentation to identify decision-making.</li> <li>• Interviews with RC/HC, HCT members, cluster coordinators regarding decision making.</li> <li>• Review of terms of reference of HCT and revision</li> </ul>
	4.2.3. Evidence that in-country decision-making was located appropriately between Manila, Tacloban, other.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with HTC members, regional coordinators, cluster leads, government at national and regional level regarding location of decision-making</li> </ul>
4.3. To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP, PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?	4.3.1. Evidence of agency and cluster commitment to the SRP objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey of donors and HCT members</li> <li>• Interviews with agency heads, cluster coordinators. HCT members.</li> </ul>

# ANNEX 5 IAHE ITINERARY

## Field schedule - 21st August -10th September 2014

Full list of participants with names and position in Annex 7

21-23 August, Manila	
<b>21-Aug</b>	Arrival in Manila
	Team Meeting
<b>22-Aug</b>	Meetings with RC/HC, OCHA, UNDP
	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Advisory Group Introductory Meeting
23 Aug.-1 Sept., Region VIII and VI -Tacloban / Leyte / Samar / Cebu / Iloilo	
	<b>Team A and B: Leyte</b>
<b>23-Aug</b>	Meeting with INGOs and UN Agencies in Tacloban
	Project visits : Team A: WHO (Hygiene Clinic Rehabilitation Project) and ILO Team B: UNFPA (Women Friendly Space and Maternity House)
<b>24-Aug</b>	Team A: Plan Intl (Shelter Project), IOM (Evacuation Center and Transitional Center for CCCM Support), Plant Intl (Youth Reporters who were trained on basic media literacy)
	Team B: CFSI (Psychosocial Care Project), World Vision (Municipal Officials and Community Volunteer Interaction)
<b>25-Aug</b>	Team A: Meeting with WASH cluster lead (UNICEF), Meeting with Health cluster lead (WHO)
	Meeting with Protection cluster lead (UNHCR), Meeting with CCCM (IOM), Meeting with Nutrition Cluster
	Team B: Meeting with ERL lead (UNDP), Meeting with OPARR, Travel to Palo and Meeting with Palo LGU, Mayor Remedios Petilla
<b>26-Aug</b>	Team A: Meeting with Provincial Authorities, Meeting with Tacloban LGU Mayor Alfred S. Romualdez, Meeting with Shelter cluster lead (IFRC), Travel to Tanauan and Meeting with Tanauan LGU, Mayor Pelagio Tecson, Meeting with Education Cluster (Working Group)
	Team B: Meeting with DSWD (as lead for Protection, CCCM, Food/NFI and Livelihood), Travel to Palo
	Meeting with DOH (lead for quad cluster: WASH, Health, MHPSS and Nutrition)
	Meeting with OCD, Meeting with FSAG
<b>27-Aug</b>	<b>Team A: Region VIII- Samar</b>
	Travel to Guiuan
	Meeting with NGOs (ACTED, CRS, PIN & OXFAM )
	Meeting with Guiuan LGU, UNICEF and UNDP, ICRC (TBC) and IOM - CCCM & Shelter

	<b>Team B: Region VI</b>
	Travel to Capiz :Tacloban-Manila-Capiz flights
	Meeting with Capiz Provincial Administrator and with Capiz PDRRMC in Roxas City
	Meetings with Humanitarian organizations and with Cluster Coordinators (CCCM, Child Protection, EP&L, FS&A, Education)
<b>28-Aug</b>	<b>Team A: Region VIII</b>
	Meeting with Girpolos LGU
	Meeting with Barangay 1 - Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Project
	Meeting with residents in the Tent City at ESSU
	Meeting with beneficiaries of transitional shelters in Barangay Surok
	<b>Team B: Region VI</b>
	Community Consultation in Bray.Guba
	Meeting with Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO in Ponidivedra municipality
	Meeting with Municipal Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO in Estancia
	Meeting with Humanitarian organisations
<b>29-Aug</b>	<b>Team A: Region VIII</b>
	Meeting with Youth Reporters and Barangay Bubon in Mercedes LGU - WASH Project
	Travel Hernani LGU and projects
	Meeting with Barangay Poblacion 3 - Shelter project Site by TDH
	Meeting with the Provincial Authorities in Borongan
	Meeting with partners in Borongan - PLAN, TDH, Caritas, UNFPA, Samaritan Purse, Dioceses of Borongan
	<b>Team B: Region VI</b>
	Community Consultation at Bunkhouse Gogo
	Meeting with Municipal Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO at Municipal hall in Lemery
	Community Consultation at Bray. Hall in Milan
	Meeting British Red Cross
<b>30-Aug</b>	<b>Team A: Travel back to Tacloban</b>
	<b>Team B: Region VI</b>
	Meeting with Municipal Administrator of Ajuy, Iloilo
	Meeting with OCD+ RDRRMC at OCHA Office in Iloilo
	Meeting with PDRRMC + Vice Governor at OCHA Office in Iloilo
	Meeting with Humanitarian organizations based in Iloilo at OCHA Office in Iloilo
	Debriefing to OCHA at OCHA Office in Iloilo

<b>31-Aug</b>	<b>Team B: Travel back to Tacloban - Flight Iloilo-Manila-Tacloban</b>
	Team Meeting
<b>01-Sep</b>	<b>Team A: Region VIII</b>
	Meeting with DFID, OCD in Palo and CWC and AAP Working Group
	Debriefing with OCHA Head of Office (Kasper Engborg) - Tacloban
	Team A - Travel to Manila
	<b>Team B: Travel to Region VII- Cebu</b>
	Meeting with Cebu Provincial Administrator and Cebu PDRRMC at Provincial Capitol
	Meeting with humanitarian organisations at Provincial Capitol
	Meeting with Shelter Cluster Coordinator Region VI and Region VII
<b>02-Sep</b>	<b>Team A: Manila</b>
	Interview with WHO
	Phone Interview with Hannes Goegel BKK
	Interview with Department of Agriculture
	Interview with OXFAM
	Interview with NEDA (Deputy director-general Esguerra)
	Phone Interview with John Long GNV
	Meeting with UN HC/RC Advisor for recovery and rehabilitation (Toby Monsod)
	<b>Team B: Region VII</b>
	Meeting with Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO in Santa Fe
	Community Consultation, Santa Fe
	Meeting with Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO at Municipal hall in Bantayan
	Community Consultation, Bantayan
	Meeting with humanitarian organisations, Santa Fe
<b>03-Sep</b>	<b>Team A: Manila</b>
	Interview with Japan Embassy in Manila, Philippine Red Cross and Department of Health
	Meeting with HC/RC
	Team 1: Interview with USAID Embassy
	Team 2 :Meeting with UNICEF Head of Office
	Interview with UN Habitat
	Interview with OCHA CwC and AAP
	Team 1: Gil Francis Arevalo and Team 2: Sutapa Howlader

	<b>Team B: Region VII</b>
	Meeting with Mayor, MSWDO and MDRRMO at Municipal hall in Daan Bantayan
	Community Consultation at Daan Bantayan Municipality
	Meeting with humanitarian organisations in the area
<b>04-Sep</b>	<b>Team A: Manila</b>
	Interview with DSWD (Sec. Corazon "Dinky" Juliano Soliman)
	Interview with Save the Children
	Interview with EU Delegation
	Team 1: Interview with DILG
	Team 2: Interview with OCD
	Interview with ACF-Spain
	Meeting with Inter-Cluster Coordinator
	Team 1: Phone Conversation with Chris Kaye Rome 13:00)
	<b>Team B: Region VII</b>
	Meeting with Provincial Governor
	Meeting with national non-governmental organisations
	Meeting with ex-cluster coordinators
<b>05-Sep</b>	<b>Team A: Manila</b>
	Team 1: Interview with CIDA
	Team 2: Interview with ILO
	Team 1: Group Discussion with Government / NDRRMC Member Agencies
	Team 2: Group Discussion with NGOs
	Team 1: Interview with United Nations High Commission on Refugees
	Team 2: Interview with World Food Program
	Interview Shelter Cluster Coordinator
	Team 1: Interview with FAO
	Team 2: Interview with UNFPA
	Team 2: Meeting ERL Coordinator
	Team 1: Phone conversation with Sebastian Rhodes-Stampa BKK
	Team 2: Phone conversation with Markus Werne
<b>06-07 Sep</b>	Team Meetings: Write up and Data Analysis. Preparation for feedback session.

<b>8-9 September, Tacloban and Manila</b>	
	<b>Manila</b>
<b>08-Sep</b>	Meeting with UNICEF (Margaret Sheehan)
	Interview with Department of Trade and Industry (Haiyan Focal points)
	Meeting with HoO (David Carden)
	Phone Interview with Jesper Lund and Sebastian Trives
	Team A - travel to Tacloban
<b>09-Sep</b>	Tacloban Feedback and Validation workshop - Agencies.
	Tacloban Feedback and Validation workshop - Government
	Travel to Manila
	<b>Manila</b>
<b>10-Sep</b>	Feedback Session and Validation Workshop with HCT, IAHE In-Country Advisory Group, Cluster Coordinators,
	Debriefing with RC/HC and OCHA HoO
<b>11-Sep</b>	End of Mission

# ANNEX 6 EVALUATION TOOLS

6.1 Phase 1 survey

6.2 Community consultation process

6.3 Interview and group discussion guides

6.4 Template for interview notes

6.5 Humanitarian Country Team online survey

## 6.1 Phase 1 survey

### Inter-agency humanitarian evaluation

#### Community survey, Region VI

Province ID:

Barangay ID:

Municipality ID:

Respondent ID: (0001 - 9999)

### I. Demographic Data:

Age (years: 00 - 99):

Gender:

Male  Female

Marital status:

Single  Civil partnership  Married

Separated  Widow / widower

Do you have any serious difficulty in hearing?

Yes  No

Do you have any serious difficulty in seeing even when wearing glasses?

Yes  No

Because of physical, mental, or emotional condition, do you have any serious difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions?

Yes       No

Do you have any serious difficulty in walking or climbing stairs?

Yes       No

Do you have any serious difficulty in dressing or bathing?

Yes       No

Do you have any serious difficulty in performing errands?

Yes       No

## II. Main questionnaire

1. Did you receive any assistance?

Yes       No

2. When did you first receive assistance? One answer only.

First Week       Within the first month

After one month       Can't remember

3. Are you still receiving assistance now.

Yes       No

4. Which organisations provided assistance first? Check all that apply

Local government       Local organisation

International organisation       Corporate/private company

Don't know       Others

Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

5a. Was lack of food for your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

5b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 6a

5c. Was the food provided sufficient to help meet your immediate food needs?

Yes       No

5d: How satisfied were you with the food assistance you received?

Very satisfied     Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied     Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

5e. Is lack of food still a problem for you?

Yes       No

6a. Was lack of shelter for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

6b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 7a

6c. Was the shelter provided adequate to meet your immediate shelter needs?

Yes       No

6d. How satisfied were you with the shelter assistance you received?

Very satisfied     Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied     Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

6e. Is lack of shelter still a problem for you?

Yes       No

7a. Was loss of livelihoods more of a problem for you following Yolanda?

Yes       No

7b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 8a

7c. Was the livelihoods assistance provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

7d. How satisfied were you with the livelihoods assistance you received?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

7e. Is loss of livelihood still a problem for you?

Yes       No

8a. Was lack of access to safe water and sanitation facilities for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda (than before)?

Yes       No

8b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 9a

8c. Were the water and sanitation facilities provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

8d. How satisfied were you with the water and sanitation facilities provided?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

8e. Is lack of access to water and sanitation still a problem for you?

Yes       No

9a. Was lack of access to health services for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

9b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 10a

9c. Were the health services provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

9d. How satisfied were you with the health services provided?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

9e. Is lack of access to health services still a problem for you?

Yes       No

10a. Was the lack of government services such as education more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

10b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No

10c. Were the available government services following Yolanda adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

10d. How satisfied were you with the government services available following Yolanda?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

10e. Are lack of usual government services still a problem for you?

Yes  No

11. Is there any other assistance you did not receive that would have been important?

Food ration  Non-food items  Shelter  Cash

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

12. After the typhoon, were you asked / consulted as to what assistance you needed?

Yes  No

13. From what source did you get information regarding the assistance being provided to those affected by typhoon Yolanda? Check all that apply.

Newspaper  Radio  TV  Government

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

Don't know  No information received

14. How did the assistance you received help you cope with the immediate effects of Yolanda?

Helped a lot to cope  Helped a little to cope

Did not help me a at all  No opinion / can't say

15. How did the assistance you received help you recover from the effects of Yolanda?

Helped a lot to recover  Helped a little to recover

Did not help me a at all  No opinion / can't say

16. Are you satisfied with the assistance you received?

Yes  No

17. Do you have any complaints about the assistance provided?

Yes  No » go to 18

17a. If YES, who did you make these complaints to?

Newspaper  Radio  TV  Government / officials

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

No complaints made formally » go to 17c

17b. What response did you get from your complaint?

The issue was resolved  Still waiting for response

No response  Government / officials

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

Don't know

17c. If NO complaints made formally, why?

Scared to complain  Did not know who to complain to

Did not think it was important  Can't be bothered


Can't be bothered  Nothing will be done

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_


18. Overall, how would you grade the quality of assistance that you have received as a whole with 0 being lowest quality to 5 being highest quality?

Helped a lot to recover [0 - 5]


Location of communities surveyed




Municipality of Calinog	Barangay
a	Garangan
b	Cahigon
c	Supanga



Municipalities of Pontevedra and Panay	Barangay
a	Bonga
b	Agdalipe
c	Guba
d	Lanipga
e	Manapao



Municipalities of Carles and Estancia	Barangay
a	Tupaz
b	Pantalan
c	Goge
d	Paon
e	Loguingot
f	Botongan, Botongan IDP
g	Tanza
h	Bayas
i	Alipata
j	Buaya



## 6.2 Phase 2 Community consultation process

In the phase two field work, the IAHE team divided into two sub-teams for community visits with one Filipino and one international team member in each sub-team. In each community visit, the team used a participatory tool to develop a timeline of assistance and to gather community feedback on key evaluation questions. The IAHE sub-team facilitated community meetings with participation from across the community and including women, men, youth and older people. The team created symbolic cards representing key components of assistance including water, food, shelter, healthcare, school, protection symbols/safety, cash, sanitation and work. Additional cards were created when needed at the suggestion of the community. All the community meetings were held in local languages. The timeline of assistance was constructed from the day Haiyan struck until September.

First week - day 0-7	First month Week 2-4	First months 2-3	Month 4 to now
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The team then used the timeline to prompt and guide discussion regarding relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of assistance. The communities were finally asked to give a collective rating to the assistance against criteria of its relevance; timeliness; immediate effectiveness (in terms of helping them cope in the first month); medium -term effectiveness (in terms of getting back on their feet- early recovery); the extent to which it took account of different needs in the community, and; quality of the information and feedback mechanisms (e.g. complaints and feedback) they experienced.

## Community Questions

Key Elements		English	Local Language	Ratings	Comments
Relevance		Did the assistance meet your needs? What are the things that you needed that you did not receive?	Yong mga tulong ba ay tumutugma sa actual pangngangailangan?	1 Good --- 3-----5 Bad	
			Ano pa yong mga pangngangailangan na hindi nyo pa na tangap sa loob ng isang buwan pagkatapos nang Yolanda?		
Efficiency		Timeliness? Emergency	Delayed ba o maaga yong mga tulong-relief dumating?		
		Recovery	Matagal ba yong mga tulong para maka balik sa normal na situasyon?		
Effectiveness	Emergency	Has the emergency assistance helped you cope with the immediate effects, first month after Haiyan	Yong mga tulong na relief o emergency naka tulong ba sa pag ahon ninyo sa loob nang isang buwan?		
	Recovery	Has the assistance received till now helped you to come back to stand on your feet?	Yong mga tulong ba na natanggap hangang ngayon nakatulong ba sa pagbalik normal katulad ng sitwasyon nyo bago mag Yolanda?		

Key Elements	English	Local Language	Ratings	Comments
Accountability and Transparency	Did you receive information about assistance and are there complaints and feedback systems?	May consulta ba sa inyo kung ano ang ibigay na tutugma sa inyong pangngailangan at merong bang sistema na makapag bigay kayo ng rekomendasyon?		
Gender/Ages/ special needs	Did the assistance and the content considers different needs?	Ang mga tulong ba at ang napaluob nito ay ayon sa pangnangailan ng angkop sa nangailangan katulad ng bata, may sakit, kapansanan, mga matanda, buntis, mga babae at lalaki?		

During the community visit, the IAHE team also undertook a transect walk through the community and held small group discussions and interviews with members of the community including barangay captains, members of different livelihood groups and other community members (male and female).

## 6.3 Interview and group discussion guides

### IAHE Haiyan - Interview and Group Discussion Guides

- ➔ Cluster-co-ordinators, co-leads and partners
- ➔ Government (national, regional, provincial, local)
- ➔ NGOs/civil society organisations
- ➔ HCT members
- ➔ Donors
- ➔ Technical advisors

### Introduction

- Provide a brief introduction to the evaluation (purpose and how findings will be used)
- Provide introduction to the interview i.e. responses will be treated confidentially and not quoted without permission.
- These interviewed and group discussion guides are intended to steer interviews and discussions, not to be a script. The guide details the areas that interviews need to cover to collect data to address the IAHE evaluation questions.

- Wherever possible interviews and discussions should ask for specific examples and substance to back up views rather than general opinions.

### Questions and areas to cover

- Ask interviewees to describe their role(s) in the response
- Focus on areas that are most relevant to the interviewees
- Ensure interviewees provide examples in their responses - opinions are not sufficient.
- Steer questions to constructive feedback e.g. if there were problems or short-comings, what can be done differently in the future to address these?
- Use the evaluation matrix to guide interviews to areas where we want data.

### Writing up interviews and storage

- Interviews should be written up within the agreed templates and format. See IAHE/Team/Data/Interviews/Interview\_template....
- Notes from interviews/group discussions should be listed in the table accessible in the IAHE/Data/Team/Interviews/. This includes data gathered in response to the evaluation questions and also details of any documents gathered and follow up needed.
- List interviews with the spreadsheet(s) in the Dropbox - IAHE/Team/Data/Interviews/Interviews... noting name, organisation, position, date of interview, contact details, other.

### Other

- In advance, if possible send some of the overall areas for discussion to enable participants to prepare.
- Question guides will be refined during the evaluation process.

### Cluster Co-Leads/Cluster Partners - Interview checklist

#### 1. Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved? And what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?

- What have been the key achievements or major shortcomings of the inter-agency response- (including in terms of strategies as well as results. )
- How effective was the SRP in capturing needs and presenting priorities? How proportionate to need and Inter-agency capacity.
- To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended targets?
- Were cluster priorities a focused subset of those presented in the SRP? What assessment process used and how updated over time (linkage with MIRA)
- Did the SRP allow for a well-managed and timely response? How did it relate to wider response e.g. in terms of scale?
- How were beneficiaries identified? How consistent was this across agencies?
- How are your programmes monitored?
- What type of gender disaggregated data was gathered to design and monitor the programme? How did this data affect the design of the programmes.
- Can you provide examples of how programmes have been adapted in the light of monitoring data and other feedback systems?
- What benefits, if any did the presence of gender, cash and accountability advisers make to your programme?
- What key learning can we take from the SRP and its implementation?

## 2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

- How (well) did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems? And local government structures?
- How effectively has the international response engage with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?
- How well prepared were the systems (international and national; national and local ) to work together? What preparedness measures had been taken?
- What learning is there for the future, for how an international response can effectively strengthen national and local systems for disaster response?

## 3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/ managed) response reached areas of most need? Gaps/duplication?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in determining sectoral priorities?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/ managed) response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in enabling the transition of the response activities to a focus on recovery and exit?
- How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?
- How effective was inter-cluster coordination and what, if any, successes can be attributed to this?
- What have been the transactional costs (e.g. time) in coordination mechanisms? To what extent have they proved worth the investment?
- What learning is there from this response of how coordination can be effective in terms of process and structures?

## 4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

- How did you use the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the (HCT-coordinated)?
- To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP, PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?
- To what extent were HPC processes understood and disseminated?
- What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in a) the first three and b) later stages of the response (when L3 status deactivated)?
- To what degree did the HCT and Humanitarian Coordinator fulfil their functions as stated in the Transformative Agenda?
- What learning can be taken from the Haiyan experience for future L3 situations?

## Government- National and local - Interview checklist

### Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved? And what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?

- Please outline your role in the response and in relation to the international agency response.
- What have been the key achievements or major shortcomings of the inter-agency response- (including in terms of strategies as well as results. )
- How effective was the SRP in capturing needs and presenting priorities?
- To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended targets?
- How timely was the inter-agency response?
- How consistent was beneficiary identification across agencies and with government approaches?

### 1. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

- To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems?
- How well did the international response work with local level government structures?
- How effectively has the (HCT-coordinated) response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?
- How well prepared were the systems (international and national) to work together? What preparedness measures had been taken?
- To what degree did the international response draw on the experience and capacities of national partners? In your view were these fully utilised?
- How would you characterise the relationship between international and national partners?
- Did individual clusters reach out and engage national partners? What were the positive/negative outcomes of this?
- What learning is there for the future, in terms of what went well or challenges for how an international response can effectively strengthen national and local systems for disaster response?

## 2. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/managed) response reached areas of most need?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in determining sectoral priorities?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/managed) response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in enabling the transition of the response activities to a focus on recovery and exit?
- How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?
- What learning is there from this response of how coordination can be effective in terms of process and structures?

## 3. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

- How did you use the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the (HCT-coordinated) ? What learning is there for their use and effectiveness??
- To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP, PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?
- To what extent were HPC processes understood and disseminated
- What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response?
- To what degree did the HCT and Humanitarian Coordinator fulfil their functions as stated in the Transformative Agenda?
- What learning can be taken from the Haiyan experience for future L3 situations?

## INGOs/NNGOs/CSOs

### 1. Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved? And what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?

- Please outline your organisation's role in the response and relationship to the inter-agency response.
- What have been the key achievements or major shortcomings of the inter-agency response- (including in terms of strategies as well as results.)
- Were the needs and priorities of affected communities adequately reflected in the inter-agency plans (SRP)?
- To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended targets?
- How timely was the inter-agency response?
- How were beneficiaries identified? How consistent was this across agencies?
- Did the inter-agency response adequately consider differences in needs e.g. between men and women, older people.
- What key learning can we take from the SRP articulated response?

### 2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

- To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems?
- How well did the international response work with local level government structures?
- How effectively has the (HCT-coordinated) response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?
- To what degree did the international response draw on the experience and capacities of national partners? Were these fully utilised?
- How well prepared were the systems (international and national) to work together? What preparedness measures had been taken?
- How would you characterise the relationship between international and national partners?
- Did national partners typically serve as implementing partners for UN agencies and INGOs? Were national partners able to access donor funding directly?
- What learning is there for the future for how an international response can effectively strengthen national and local systems for disaster response?

### 3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/ managed) response reached areas of most need?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in determining sectoral priorities?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/ managed) response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in enabling the transition of the (HCT-coordinated) response activities to a focus on recovery and exit?
- What learning is there from this response of how coordination can be effective in terms of process and structures?

### 4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

- To what extent did the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the (HCT-coordinated) operation be better coordinated and effective?
- What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response?
- To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP, PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?
- To what extent were HPC processes understood and disseminated?
- To what degree did the HCT and Humanitarian Coordinator fulfil their functions as stated in the Transformative Agenda?
- What learning can be taken from the Haiyan experience for future L3 situations?

## HCT Members- Heads of agency

### 1. Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved? And what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?

- What have been the key achievements or major shortcomings of the inter-agency response- (including in terms of strategies as well as results. )
- Were the needs and priorities of affected communities adequately reflected in the SRP?
- To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended targets?
- How were beneficiaries identified? How consistent was this across agencies?
- How did you monitor the SRP implementation?
- What type of gender disaggregated data was gathered to design and monitor the programme?
- Can you provide examples of how programmes have been adapted in the light of monitoring data and other feedback systems?
- What benefits, if any did the presence of gender, cash and accountability advisers make to your programme?
- What key learning can we take from the SRP articulated response?

## 2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

- To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems? And local?
- How well prepared were the systems (international and national) to work together? What preparedness measures had been taken?
- How effectively has the (HCT-coordinated) response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?
- To what degree did clusters - at a central and field level - reach out and engage national actors? What were the positive/negatives outcomes of this?
- How would you characterise the relationship between international and national partners?
- What learning is there for the future for how an international response can effectively strengthen national and local systems for disaster response?

## 3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/managed) response reached areas of most need?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in determining sectoral priorities?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/managed) response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in enabling the transition of the (HCT-coordinated) response activities to a focus on recovery and exit?
- How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?
- Has inter-cluster coordination functioned effectively?
- What learning is there from this response of how coordination can be effective in terms of process and structures?

## 4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

- To what extent did the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the HCT-coordinated) operation be better coordinated and effective?
- What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response?
- To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP , PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?
- To what extent were HPC processes understood and disseminated?
- To what degree did the HCT and Humanitarian Coordinator fulfil their functions as stated in the Transformative Agenda?
- What learning can be taken from the Haiyan experience for future L3 situations?

## Donors

### 1. Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved? And what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?

- What have been the key achievements or major shortcomings of the inter-agency response- (including in terms of strategies as well as results. )
- How effective was the SRP in capturing needs and presenting priorities?
- Did the SRP guide donor funding allocations?
- Were the needs of affected communities adequately reflected in the SRP?
- To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended targets?
- What benefits, if any did the presence of gender, cash and accountability advisers make to your programme?
- What key learning can we take from the SRP articulated response?

### 2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?

- To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems? Local levels?
- How effectively has the (HCT-coordinated) response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations
- How well prepared were the systems (international and national) to work together? What preparedness measures had been taken?
- Has the largely international funded response made adequate use of national partners in delivering assistance? How would you characterise the relationship between international and national partners?
- What learning is there for the future, in terms of what went well or challenges for how an international response can effectively strengthen national and local systems for disaster response?

### 3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in ensuring the (HCT-coordinated/ managed) response reached areas of most need?
- How effective have coordination mechanisms been in enabling the transition of the (HCT-coordinated) response activities to a focus on recovery and exit?
- How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?
- Were you kept abreast of changing priorities? Were the priorities associated with an evolving crisis discussed at HCT level? Were donors sufficiently engaged?
- Was there consensus amongst donors as to sectoral priorities? Has this been reflected in cluster funding?
- What learning is there from this response of how coordination can be effective in terms of process and structures?

#### 4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?

- To what extent did the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the (HCT-coordinated) operation be better coordinated and effective?
- What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response?
- To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP, PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?
- To what extent were HPC processes understood and disseminated?
- To what degree did the HCT and Humanitarian Coordinator fulfil their functions as stated in the Transformative Agenda?
- What learning can be taken from the Haiyan experience for future L3 situations?

## 6.4 Interview notes template

Name of interviewee(s), organisation and position

Contact details - email/phone

Name of interviewer

Date and location of interview

Role of interviewee in the response

### **EQ1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?**

- 1.1 To what extent is the response on track to reach its intended results?
- 1.2 How relevant is the collective response to the priorities and needs of the affected communities?
- 1.3 How timely was the response?
- 1.4 What learning is there from the response about how to address cross-cutting issues?

### **EQ2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?**

- 2.1 To what extent did the international response complement and strengthen national government disaster response systems?
- 2.2 How well did the international response work with local level government structures?
- 2.3 How effectively has the HCT-coordinated response engaged with and strengthened national and local NGOs and civil society organisations?

**EQ3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?**

- 3.1 How effectively have coordination mechanisms been able to ensure the HCT-coordinated/ managed response reached areas of most need?
- 3.2 How effectively have coordination mechanisms been able to ensure the HCT-coordinated/ managed response ensures consistency in standards and quality of response?
- 3.3 How effectively have coordination mechanisms enabled the transition of the HCT-coordinated response activities to a focus on recovery and exit.
- 3.4 How effective was the HCT's leadership of the response?

**EQ4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principals and guidance applied?**

- 4.1 To what extent did the tools associated with the humanitarian program cycle (Flash appeal, MIRA, SRP, OPR, PMR) support the HCT-coordinated operation be better coordinated and effective?
- 4.2 What were the positive and negative results of the L3 status and its associated mechanisms and resources (flexible funding, surge capacity, empowered leadership, decision-making close to operations) for the effectiveness of the response in the first three and later stages of the response?
- 4.3 To what extent did the HPC processes (MIRA, SRP , PMR) build a collective ownership and commitment to shared aims of the response?

**5. Other comments****6. List any documents obtained**

Location stored on Dropbox

**7. Follow up required (if any)**



## 7. Please rank how useful you have found the following products

	Extremely useful	Very useful	Moderately useful	Slightly useful	Not useful
Flash Appeal/Philippines Action Plan issued 12 November 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MIRA (Multiclustert/sector rapid assessment)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strategic Response Plan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Operational Peer Review	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Periodic Monitoring Report 1 (covering November 2013 January 2014)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Periodic Monitoring Report 2 (covering FebruaryApril 2014)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please provide any comments on how you used the products.

## 8. Please rank the quality of the following products produced as part of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle

	Excellent	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
Flash Appeal/Action Plan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MIRA	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strategic Response Plan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Operational Peer Review	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Periodic Monitoring Report 1	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Periodic Monitoring Report 2	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. Please provide any recommendations for how these products can be improved?

10. Effectiveness of processes to create Humanitarian Programme Cycle products

	Flash Appeal/Plan of action (issued 12 November 2013)	MIRA	Strategic Response Plan	Operational Peer Review	Periodic Monitoring Report 1 (Nov-Jan 2014)	Periodic Monitoring Report 2 (Feb-April 2014)
a) Did your organisation/ cluster participate in the production of this product?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b) Did participation in the process affect your organisational/cluster decision-making?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c) Did the process to create this product build a shared sense and understanding of collective aims among the Humanitarian Country Team?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d) Were the benefits to your organisation/ cluster worth the inputs you provided to create this product?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. How effective has the Humanitarian Country Team been at providing direction to implementing organisations on the following key issues?

	Extremely effective	Very effective	Quite effective	Only slightly effective	Not effective
a) Bunkhouses	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b) Relocation of affected people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c) Access to land for affected population	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d) Clarity on land use for affected population	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please provide any comments on how you used the products.

12. How effective has the Humanitarian Country Team been in advocacy for resolution of key issues?

	Extremely effective	Very effective	Quite effective	Only slightly effective	Not effective
a) Bunkhouses	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b) Relocation of affected people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c) Access to land for affected population	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d) Clarity on land use for affected population	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comments on strengths or how advocacy could be more effective

13. How effectively has the Humanitarian Country Team performed its leadership functions?

	Extremely effective	Very effective	Quite effective	Only slightly effective	Not effective
a) Setting common strategic objectives and priorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b) Reviewing and agreeing the architecture of the cluster system for Haiyan response	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c) Monitoring the implementation of strategic response plan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d) Providing corrective action when needed for implementation of the SRP	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e) Ensuring clusters carry out performance monitoring	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f) Providing clear and timely answers to questions- raised from clusters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g) Providing clarity to the donor community and other key stakeholders on humanitarian response needs and progress	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Extremely effective	Very effective	Quite effective	Only slightly effective	Not effective
h) Defining advocacy issues which the Humanitarian Coordinator will take forward with leadership-within government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i) Sharing information to facilitate coordination	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
j) Promoting adherence by organisations to humanitarian principles and standards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
k) Ensuring effective HCT meetings i.e. the extent to which they were strategic, actionoriented and focused on clear objectives, produce realistic decisions that are followed up	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

14. Has the performance of the HCT changed over time?

	Extremely effective	Very effective	Quite effective
Has the performance of the Humanitarian Country Team changed over time?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

15. Other please add any other comments you would like to make

16. Please indicate if you are willing to be contacted in case of any follow up to these questions and appropriate email and phone contacts

Thank you for your time!

## ANNEX 7 LIST OF PERSONS MET AND CONSULTED THROUGH INTERVIEWS AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS; LIST OF COMMUNITIES

Interviews International		
Organization	Interviewee	Title
Dialogue on Disaster Response	Charles Antoine Hoffman	CEO
ICVA	Nan Buzzard	CEO
OCHA	Valeria Amos	USG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
OCHA	Zola Dowell	Section Chief Region Asia-Pacific
OCHA	Jessica Alexander	Humanitarian Effectiveness Project
OCHA	Markus Werne	Deputy Regional Director
OCHA Bangkok	Hannes Goegele	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
OCHA Bangkok	Sebastien Trives	Chief, CAPALAC, Coordination and Response Division. Former DHC
OCHA Bangkok	Sebastien Stampe	UNDAC Team Leader
OCHA Geneva	John Long	Programme Cycle Readiness Unit, Programme Support Branch
UNDP	Neil Buhne	Director of Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNDP	John Wylie	Head, Program Support Branch
WFP	Chris Kaye	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
Interviews, Manila		
Organization	Interviewee	Title
Department of Agriculture, Manila	Renato Manantan	Director
Department of Trade and Industry, Yolanda project office	Ruby Aguas	Co-team head
Department of Trade and Industry, Yolanda project office	Ronelle Gatchalian	Staff
Department of Social Welfare and Development	Corazon (Dinky) Juliano-Soliman	Secretary
Department of the Interior and Local Government	Austere Panadero	Undersecretary for Local Government

Department of Health, Manila	Jeanette Garin	ASG for Women, Children, Family and Health
National Economic Development Authority	Emmanuel Esguerra	Deputy Director-General
OPARR Manila	Hazel Alfon	Private Sector Coordinator
ACF, Spain	Javad Amoozegar	
Canadian Embassy, Manila	Luke Myers	Head of Cooperation
Canadian Embassy, Manila	Suzette Gamindo	Program Officer
ECHO	David Sevcik	Head of Office
Embassy of Japan	Takuya Akiyama	Second Secretary (Economic)
Embassy of Japan	Koji Otani	Second Secretary (Infrastructure)
FAO, Manila	Jose Luis Fernandez	FAO Representative
FAO, Manila	Alessia Anibaldi	Emergency Operations manager
IFRC	Victoria Stodart	National Shelter Cluster Co-Lead
ILO	Jeff Johnson	Country representative
ILO	Ruth Georget	ERL cluster coordinator (livelihoods) and Programme manager
OCD	Alexander Pama	Undersecretary: Administrator of OCD + Director of NDRRMC
OCD	Gen. Romeo Fajardo	Deputy Administrator of OCD
OCHA	David Carden	Head of Office
OCHA	Mel Schmidt	Civil -military coordinator
OCHA	Fotini Rantsiou	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
OCHA	Akiko Yoshida	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
OCHA, Manila	Ashley Clements	Inter cluster coordinator
OCHA, Manila	Ata Ur Rehman	Monitoring and Evaluation
OCHA, Manila	Fe Kagahastian	Cash Coordinator
OCHA, Manila	Gil Francis Arevalo	CWC officer
OCHA, Manila	Sutapa Howlader	AAP coordinator
OCHA, Manila	Agnes Palacio	National Disaster Preparedness Advisor
OCHA, Manila	Anu Pillay	Gender Advisor
OCHA, Manila	Catherine Lefebvre	Information Management Coordinator
Oxfam, Manila	Dani Lustig	
Philippines Red Cross	Roderic M. Salve	Manager, Disaster Management Services

Philippines Red Cross Society	Resty Lou Talamayan	Manager, Yolanda Operation,
Philippines Red Cross Society	Norwina D. Eclarinal	Head Movement Coordination
Save the Children, Manila	Ned Olney	Country Director
Save the Children, Manila	Krista Zimmerman	Humanitarian Advocacy Manager
UN Habitat	Christopher Rollo	Country Programme Manager
UNDP	Luiza Carvalho	Humanitarian Coordinator /Resident Coordinator
UNDP	Toby Monsod	Adviser to the RC/HC on Recovery and Rehabilitation
UNDP	Maurice Dewulf	Country Director
UNFPA Philippines	Klaus Beck	Country Representative
UNFPA Philippines	Miriam Ciscar-Blat	Humanitarian Programme Coordinator
UNHCR Manila	Bernard Kerblat	
UNHCR Manila	Yasser Saad	Senior Protection Officer
UNHCR Manila	Keshab Shrestha	Senior Admin/Programme Officer
UNICEF	Lotta Sylwaner	Country Representative
UNICEF	Margaret Sheehan	Head of Programmes
USAID, Bangkok	Ben Hemingway	Regional Advisor for East Asia and the Pacific, OFDA
USAID, Manila	Muhammad Khan	Disaster Assistance and Reconstruction Manager
WFP	Pareen Agrawal	Representative and Country Director
WFP	Bernard Murewa	Food Security Cluster coordinator
WHO, Manila	Julie Hall	Country Representative

### Group Discussions, Manila – Meeting of National NGOs

Organization	Interviewee	Title
Caritas Manila	Ms. Avedillo	
Caritas Manila	Radyo Veritas	
Phil Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRRM)	Leonora Lava	
National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace (NASSA)	Luje Sypkes	

<b>Group Discussions, Manila – NDRRMC</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Title</b>
Department of Education	Reynaldo Laguna	Assistant Secretary, CoS, focal point for DRR and Education
UN and other International Organizations	Jesus R.S. Domingo	Assistant Secretary
Department of Education	Marian Anibar	Technical Advisor
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)	John Patrick A. Dayao	
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)	Marie Angela De Los Santos	Technical Assistance
DCRO	Catherine Jonne Licudine-Dalen	Assistant Secretary
EA 4, PIA	Red Avendano	
Head for the Regional Operations Division	Guulie Guyong-Bangunaz	P/A
Philippines Information Agency	Carlo Gallanes	
ASEC, DOST	Mon Liboro	
AFP	Major Rizaldo N. Laurena	PA, Chief operations divisions
<b>Region VI, Interviews</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Title</b>
British Red Cross	Kunhaliali Muttaje	Manager of Operation in Ajuy
Municipality of Ajuy Iloilo	Glenn Ticzon	Administrator
Municipality of Ponteverta, Capiz	Esteban Jos B Contreras MD	Mayor
PDRRMC, Iloilo	Jerry Biona	PDRRMC staff
Province of Capiz	Paula Arlante	PDRRMC staff
Province of Capiz	Victor Tanco	Jr Governor
Province of Capiz	Atty Jose Villanueva	Provincial Administrator
Province of Capiz	Expedition Palae	PDRRMO Save the Children
Save the Children	Gonzalo Atxaerandio	Field Manager

### Region VI, Group Discussion, Iloilo Humanitarian Organisations

Organization	Interviewee	Title
Caritas Austria	Mike Bonke	Head of Mission
Habitat for Humanity	Marivic Abello	Project manager
Iloilo Code NGO/Christian Aid	Emanuel Arenó	
Philippine Red Cross	Gilbert Valderama	Administrator
UNFPA	Sally Esuatin	Coordinator
UNFPA	Gina Pangalinan	RHC
UNFPA	Hector Fallosa	HC

### Region VI, Group Discussion, RDRRMC

Organization	Interviewee	Title
OCD 6	Rosario Cabrera	RD
DILG	Margie Biligan	ARD
OCD 6	Melissa Baniás	Planning Officer II
DOST 6	Ryan Vilmor Dumpit	SRSII
DOST 6	Rowen Gelonga	RD
DILG	Rex Patamrang	LG00 II
DA	Carmelita Fantilanan	Senior Agriculturist
DSWD	Rosario Sanagustin	Social Welfare Officer V
NEDA	Lourdes Miado	
Philippine Red Cross	Gilbert Valderama	
Philippine Red Cross	Gilbert Valderama	Administrator

### Region VI, Group Discussion, Roxas Humanitarian Organisations

Organization	Interviewee	Title
ACF	Jsabel Ordonez	Head of BASG
ACF	Shield Cabigas	Nutrition HOP
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee	Maya Kroitoru	Representative
Capizned	John Clemente Basa	Facilitator
Capizned	Leo Aranzado	Facilitator
Care-Philippines	Araceli Mercado	Program MEAL Officer
Childfund	Joy Ayupan	Team Leader Capiz

FAO	Brenda Saquing	Area Coordinator
FAO	Jacquelyn Dinat	PQ and AAP Adviser
Field Technical Offices	Archemedec Docena	CEO
Humanity First Canada	Hasan Shahid	Project Manager
Humanity First Canada	Tonwar Saqib	Project Manager
IOM	Rose Marie Bagious	Health Operation Coordinator
JDC	Hannah Gaverta	Philippine Coordinator
JDC	Maya Koitoru	Philippines Rep
Tear Fund	Jayrose Plana	Project Officer
Tear Fund	Pauline Arada	Monitoring and Accountability Officer
UNDSS	Andes Agabao	LSA
UN-Habitat	Robert Deutsch	Project Manager
UNICEF	Martin Tacloban	Education Officer
World Vision	Jesha Atiga	ZM's Technical Assistant
World Vision	Bandix M. Calapan Stacey Panozzo Marianne Deleon	OIC Panay Zone Project support Officer

## Region VII, Interviews

Organization	Interviewee	Title
Bantayan Municipality, Bantayan Cebu	Ian Christopher Escario	Mayor
Cebu Chamber of Commerce	May Ybanez	Executive Director
Cebu Province	Hilario P. Davide III	Governor
Daan Bantayan Municipality, Cebu	Augusto Corro	Mayor
Department of Trade and Industry	Juliet Banogon	Officer
HEMS, DOH	Rauell Thaj	Coordinator
ILO	Ivan Ledesma	Team Leader, Cebu and Negros, Emergency Employment and Livelihood
Maguugmad Foundation	Leonardo Moneva	Coordinator
MDRRMO	Sonny Luche	MDRRM Officer
MDRRMO	Edgardo Leyese	Officer
MDRRMO	Leah Escarlan	Coordinator

MSWDO	Magdalena Derecho	Municipal Social Welfare Officer
MSWDO	Heide Altese	Municipal Social Welfare Officer
MSWDO	Alfamina Saagundo	Municipal Social Welfare Officer
Oxfam	Jose Arnel Orlleres	Wash Officer
Philippine Red Cross	Anton "Jay" Edillor	Coordinator, Shelter and Livelihood
Province of Cebu	Mark Tolentino	Provincial Administrator Cebu
Province of Cebu	Marivic Calderon	Livelihood cluster point person
Rafi Foundation	Constantine Samson	Project Officer
Shelter Cluster, Region 6 and 7	Javier Cidon Martinez	Shelter Coordinator
Sta. Fe Municipality, Cebu	Jose Bantiancila Esgana	Mayor
Task Force Pglig-on Cebu	Carmel Pami-Ulanday	Consultant, Rehab and Recovery, Deputy Task Force Coordinator
VICSAL Foundation	Mars Rubica	Project Coordinator
WHO	Dr. Lester Sam Geroy	Coordinator

### Region VIII, Interviews

Organization	Interviewee	Title
CCCM	Pauline Nadera	Sustainable livelihood project, food and non-food
CCCM	Manuel Pereira	Deputy Shelter program manager
DFID	Sallee Gregory	Field Team leader
DFID	Francois	DFID funded programmes
Department of Health	Dr. Jose R. Llacona	Regional Director
Department of Health	Dr. Paula Paz H. Sydiongo	OIC Director
Department of Health	Santiago Gloria	Assistant to HEMS, Regional Coordinator
Department of Health		Medical Officer, Tacloban City
FAO	Samoa Perucca	Coordinator Region VIII
FAO	Peter Agnew	Programme Coordinator
ICRC Guiuan Office	Sebastian Sujabert	Deputy to the ICRC Country Representative
IFRC	Arnaud de Coupigny	Shelter Cluster Coordinator Region VIII
IOM	Mathilde Gueho	Shelter cluster coordinator, Guiuan
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Department	Jenny	Head

OCHA	Victor Lahai	Head of Office, Guiuan,
OCHA	Kasper Engborg	Head of office
OCHA	Andrew Martin	Deputy Head of office
OCHA	Christie Bacal	AAP
OCHA	Catherine Alcaraz	CwC
OPARR	Gen. Edwin Corvera	Provincial Rehabilitation + Recovery Coordinator
Peace and Conflict Journalism Network	Len Manriquez	
People in Need	Maciej Perczynski	Country Director
Plan International	Angelo Melencio	Accountability Project Manager
Plan International	Margarito Guasis	Response Coordinator
Protection	Nelda Oliva	GBV and child protection
Save the Children	Hiasma Gani	Education Cluster Co - Coordinator
Save the Children	P. Krishna Kumar	Education Cluster Co-Coordinator
TDH	Nelly Jane	Project Staff
TDH	Leonor Crisostomo	Project coordinator for shelter
Timex Fishermen Multipurpose Cooperative	Losanto Pilapil Castillo Jr.	
UNDP Tacloban	Eden Garde	
UNDP	James Abdul	Guiuan
UNFPA	Roy Dunayuga	Project Coordinator
UNFPA	Delbert Marquez	Health Coordinator
UNFPA	Irene Quizon	Project Coordinator
UNFPA	Mark Anthony Kong	Project Staff
UNFPA	Natsnet G.	GBV AOR Coordinator, Region VIII
UNFPA	Amador Catacutan	Reproductive health coordinator
UNHCR	Eilish Hurley	GPC Coordinator, Region VIII
UNICEF	Aisling Falconer	Education Cluster Co-Coordinator
UNICEF	Mannan Rana	CPWG Coordinator, Region VIII
UNICEF	Matthew Swift	Education Cluster Co-Coordinator
UNICEF	Nicole Hahn	Coordinator, WASH CLUSTER
WFP	Geovani F. Lapina	Programme Support and data management

WHO	Allison Gootano	Technical coordinator
World Vision	Arnold Salvador Elnidoro Retiracion Rey Gozon Blanche T. Gobenciong Leopoldo Petilla Candida Gabornes Alfred Romualdez Remedios Petilla Paulina Nayra Marelo Picardal	Accountability Coordinator    Governor of Leyte Province Mayor of Lawaan City Mayor, Tacloban City Municipal Mayor, Palo, Leyte Coordinator Vice-governor, Eastern Samar
Unicef	Dominic Koepel	Nutrition, IM officer, health and nutrition
Unicef	Prem Chand	WASH cluster-coordinator, Guiuan

### Region VIII, Group Discussions, Humanitarian Agency Meeting, Tacloban

Organization	Interviewee	Title
CFSI	Fae Esperas	
CFSI	Rabia Mustapha	
IEDA	Jennifer Padual	
ILO	Sukumar Mishra	
IOM	Tidarat Kularb	
IOM	Manuel Perner	
Plan	Margarito Guasis	Response Coordinator
Save the Children	Joana Watson	
TDH	Nelly Jane	Project Staff
TDH	Leonor Crisostomo	Project coordinator for shelter
UNFPA	Roy Dimayuga	Project Coordinator
UNFPA	Delbert Marquez	Health Coordinator
UNFPA	Irene Quizon	Project Coordinator
UNFPA	Mark Anthony Kong	Project Staff
UNFPA	Natsnet Ghebrebrhan	
UNHCR	Eilish Hurley	

## Region VIII, Group Discussions, Humanitarian Agency Feedback and Validation workshop, 9 September

Organization	Interviewee	Title
UNFPA	Ronnel T. Villas	Humanitarian Coordinator
ACTED	Emily Beadle	Country Representative
Action Aid	Sheila Cabusao	Communications Advisor
CFSI	Mertz Certifico	Project Officer
Child Fund	Renzo Benfatto	Emergency Director
FAO	Samoa Perucca	Area Coordinator
FAO	Charles P. Hopkins	Food Security Office
FSA	Jubert Tarre	UNDSS
IEDA Relief	Jennifer C. Padual	Regional F.C.
ILO	Cecille B. Colarina	F.C.
IOM	Consuelo Tangara	Operations Coordinator
IOM	Tidarat Kularb	OIC
Medair	Heidi Cockram	Project Manager
Nazarene Disaster Response	Leo Mahanlad	PM
OCHA	Lawrence A. Aporto	IMA
OCHA	Dan Carlo Samoza	Coordinator
OCHA	Mylene Militante	FA
OCHA	Victor Lahai	HAO
OCHA	Irene Talam	IMA
OCHA	Christie Bacal	Accountability
OCHA	Bovi Murla	Admin & Finance
OCHA	Mayen N. Olmedo	RO
OCHA	Catherine S. Alcaraz	CWC Officer
OCHA	Preciosa Derro	HAA
OCHA	Rodilito Labalan	ICT
OCHA	John Leo Avila	Messenger
OCHA	Vincent Omuga	HXO
OCHA	Kasper Engborg	Hoso
Oxfam	Rejve Kaiser	Project Manager

Plan	Richard Sandison	ERM
Relief International	Karen Terado	M&E Assistant
Relief International	Beverly Ann Kalingag	M&E Officer
Save the Children	David Broska	Operations Manager
Shelter Working Group	Arnaud de Coupigny	Coordinator
Solidarites Int	Nicolas Deron	Country Director
SP	Jim Barbee	CD
UNDP	Eden P. Garde	Project Manager
UNFPA	Natsnet Ghebrebrhan	GBV Coordinator
UNFPA	Amador Catacutan	RH Coordinator
UNHCR	Eilish Hurley	OIC
UNICEF	Jayroselyn Amancio	IMO
UNICEF	Mannan Rana	CPWG Coordinator
UNOCHA	Kumudu Sanjeewa	IMO
UNOCHA	Andrew Martin	DHOSO
WHO	Mark Jackson	Operations Manager
World Vision	Roberto V. Dazo	Team Leader

### Region VIII, Group Discussions, Government Feedback and Validation Workshop, 9 September

Organization	Interviewee	Title
DCA	Perla Geruaciao-Ernacio	OIC, Rled
Deped VIII	Rey F. Poulawan	EPS
DOH 8	Dr. Paula Paz Sydiongco	Director
DOH NO8	Boyd Roderick Cerro	Nurse V
DOH NO8	Fidelita D. Dias	MS2
DRTF8, 8ID	COL. Arnulfo Matanguihan	Dep Coander
DRTF8, 8ID	2LT. Nheil Jay Garcia	Security Officer
DSWD 8	Resty Macuto	ARD
DSWD 8	Nilda J. Olwa	SWV
LGU - Guian	Felipe D. Padual	MDRRMO
LGU - Kananga	Judith Mediam C. Fontanoza	MDRRMO

LGU - Bazey	Ritchie A. Lacaba	Office
Neda Uni	Jay-Ar O. Ragub	EDS2
NNC RO8	Rina A. Ladrera	NO2
OPARR	Jake Carraga	DPRRC - Biliran
OPARR	Lovely L. Uyvico	CSS Leyte
OPARR	Joni A. Repulda	CSS Biliran
PCA	Erwin J. Aronales	PDO 3
PPOD- Leyte	Anna Laurice V. Jo	AAI
Tacloban	Jaime Opinion, Jr	CHO

### Manila – Validation and Feedback Workshop, Manila

Organization	Interviewee	Title
RC/HC	Luiza Carvalho	
CIDA	Luke Myers	
DFAT	Pablo Lucero	
FAO, Manila	Alessia Anibaldi	
FAO, Manila	Alberto Aduna	
IASC Gencap	Anu Pillay	
ICRC	Rolando Modina	
IFRC	Victoria Stodart	
IOM	Maria Motta	
OCD	Romeo Fagardo	
OCHA	David Carden	
OCHA	Fe Kagahastian	
OCHA	Akiko Yoshida	
OCHA	Fotini Rantsiou	
OCHA	Lynn Arojo	
OCHA	Fragkiska Megaloudi	
OCHA	Victoria Saiz-Omenaca	
OCHA-AAP	Sutapa Howlader	
Oxfam, Manila	Justin Morgan	
PLAN INT.	Carin van der Hor	
RCO	Toby Monsod	

Save the Children, Manila	Ned Olney	
UNDP	Maurice Dewulf	
UNFPA Philippines	Klaus Beck	
UNHCR Manila	Yasser Saad	
UNICEF	Lotta Sylwander	
WFP	Praveen Agrawal	
WHO, Manila	Gerrie Medina	
WHO, Manila	Sasha Peiris	

## List of Communities Consulted in IAHE

Region VI Survey		
Barangay	Category	Source/s of Livelihood (Pre-Yolands)
<b>Province of Capiz, Municipalities of Pontevedra and Panay</b>		
Manapao, Pontevedra	Island (boat)	Fishing as main
Guba, Pontevedra, Capiz	Inland	Rice farming. Duck raising; fish vendors
Lanipga, Pan-ay	Hard-to-reach	Nipa roof production, crab raising/fishing
Agdalipe	Inland	Mainly Riceland
Bunga, Panay	Mainlad	Farming
<b>Province of Iloilo, Municipality of Calinog</b>		
Supanga, Calinog (IP area)	Inland -2 hours of travel during summer; at least half day during rainy season	Farmers (banana, coffee, jackfruits, upland rice and corn (mainly for consumption), rattan native products)
Cahigon, Calinog	Inland - as above	Farmers (as above)
Garangan, Calinog	Inland	Farmers (as above)
<b>Province of Iloilo, Municipality of Carles and Estancia</b>		
Tupaz, Carles	Coastal	Fishing, farming, and farm workers
Gogo, Estancia	Coastal, inland	Mainly fishing or workers in fishing boats; farming
Tanza, Estancia	Coastal	Fishing, small portion in farming; dried fish
Pantalan, Carles	Island	Fishing and farming;

Buaya, Carles	Island	Fishing mainly
Alipata	Hard to reach, island	Mainly fishing
Botongon	Inland, with coastal- Urban	Fishing
Gogo ( Bunkhouse)	Coastal, inland	Fishing, Fish Vendor , Laborer
Loguingot (Estancia)	Island	Main is fishing, farming is secondary
Paon (Estancia)	Coastal	Fishing (primary source); farming secondary
Bayas	Island	Fishing village

## Systematic community consultations

Region VIII	
Province	Barangay /Community
Leyte	Libertad, Palo
Leyte	Bunkhouse, Barangay 62A, Tacloban
Leyte	Barangay 62A, Tacloban
Leyte	Rizal, Dagami
Leyte	Burauen
Samar	Jimanoc, Salvacion
Samar	ESSU (Eastern Samar State University) Tent City, Guiuan
Samar	Landing, Barabgay 1, Giporlos Municipality, Eastern Samar
Samar	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Community
Samar	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Bunkhouse
Samar	Barangay 3, Hernani, Eastern Samar Region
Region VI	
Province	Barangay /Community
Capiz	Community Exercise Brgy. Guba, Pontevedra Municipality
Iloilo	Taytay Integrated School: Guiuan
Iloilo	Bangkal, Carles Municipality
Iloilo	Community Exercise Brgy. Gogo bunk house, Estancia Municipality

Region VII	
Province	Barangay /Community
Cebu	Brgy. Okoy, Sta. Fe
Cebu	Brgy. Tikad, Bantayan
Cebu	Sitio San, Vicente, Poblacion Daanbantayan

#### **Additional community visits - focus group discussions and project visits**

Region VI , Estancia, Barangay Binuntucan, Roxas City

Region VI, Estancia, Barangay Lonoy

Region VI, Barangay Bacjawan Norte, Estancia

Region VI , Ajuy, Brarangay Pedada

Region VI , Ajugy, Barangay Luca

Region VIII , Ormoc city- key informant interviews (livelihoods)

Region VIII, : Marasbaras, Tacloban City, Hygiene clinic rehabilitation project

Region VIII, Tolosa, Poblacion, Women friendly space

Region VIII, Palo, Barangay Libertad, Palo livelihoods and maternity house projects

## ANNEX 8.1 STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN - OUTCOME AND OUTPUT DATA

### Source: OCHA -Background data for periodic monitoring report 3

(September 2014)

#### Outcome data

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target
1	FSAC	1.1. Percentage of target population with a minimum household food consumption score >42	93%	80%
1	FSAC	1.2. Level of rice, maize, vegetable production compared to a normal year in affected areas		
1	Nutrition	1.3. Prevalence of global acute malnutrition in girls and boys 6-59 months		
2	Shelter	2.1. Number of households that sustained house damage that are currently living in safe, habitable emergency shelter	20,256	
2	Shelter	2.2. Number of households that sustained house damage from the typhoon that are currently living in safe, habitable dwelling	263,325	
2	CCCM	2.3. Percentage of population living in displacement sites with improved shelter, living conditions and displacement management		
3	ERL	3.1. Percentage reduction of affected people in vulnerable employment (Includes own-account workers and contributing family workers as defined by ICSE)		
3	FSAC	3.2. Percentage of affected women and men in rural areas who have regained pre-typhoon livelihoods (farming/fisheries).		77% of men and women in rural areas severely affected (partial or total loss of livelihoods)

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target
4	WASH	4.1. Percentage of displaced women, men and children of all ages, with access to basic WASH services to maintain public health		
4	Health	4.2. Percentage of the population that is functioning poorly and is likely to be in need of services, including those with severe or extreme difficulties in functioning in different aspects of day to day life		
5	Protection	5.1% of affected people who express that they feel secure		
5	Protection	5.2% of girls and boys with access to adequate primary and secondary education		

## Output data (September 2014)

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
1	FSAC	1.1.1. # of affected population who received immediate food assistance	3,684,427	3,500,000	49.00%	51.00%	105.00%
1	FSAC	1.1.2. # of persons identified as the most food insecure and vulnerable who received continued food assistance					
1	OCHA	1.1.3. # of persons reached with cash transfers	1,400,000	2,000,000	N/A	N/A	70.00%
1	FSAC	1.2.1. # of hectares of land cleared in targeted areas, and planted	12%	100%	N/A	N/A	12%
1	Nutrition	1.3.1. # of pregnant women and caregivers of children 0-23 months reached with BF/IYCF counselling and support	82,026	167,401	N/A	100%	49%
1	Nutrition	1.3.2. # of severely acutely malnourished (SAM) boys and girls 6-59 months admitted for SAM treatment	990	1,237	43%	57%	80%

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
1	Nutrition	1.3.3. # of boys and girls aged 6-59 months receiving blanket supplementary feeding	189,985	138,892	51%	49%	137%
1	Nutrition	1.3.4. # of moderately acutely malnourished (MAM) boys and girls 6-59 months admitted for targeted Supplementary Feeding Programmes	2,496	5,903	40%	60%	42%
1	Nutrition	1.3.5. # of boys and girls 6-59 months received micronutrient powder supplementation	152,550	149,559	51%	49%	102%
2	Shelter	2.1.1. Number # of households that have been provided emergency shelter (tents/tarpaulins)	571,206	300,000	N/A	N/A	190%
2	Shelter	2.1.2. Number of households that have been provided a durable roofing solution	157,686	500,000	N/A	N/A	32%
2	Shelter	2.2.1. Number of supplementary hardware interventions that contribute to durable housing (tools, structural materials)	373,163	300,000	N/A	N/A	124%
2	Shelter	2.2.2. Percentage households exhibiting one or more observed construction features that will reduce the risk of catastrophic failure (wind, storm surge, seismic)	24%	100%	N/A	N/A	24%
2	Shelter	2.2.3. Percentage households exhibiting one or more design features that promote privacy (partitions) and security for the family (lockable door)	61%	100%	N/A	N/A	61%
2	CCCM	2.3.1. Percentage of displacement sites with site manager or male-female focal points in case of absence of site manager	100%	100%	N/A	N/A	100%

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
2	CCCM	2.3.2. Number and percentage of gaps in services identified by DTM referred, monitored and followed up for response	100%	100%	N/A	N/A	100%
2	CCCM	2.3.3. Percentage of IDPs with sustainable return/relocation sites identified and assessed	5,922	18,289	N/A	N/A	32%
2	CCCM	2.3.4. Proportion of vulnerable IDPs reached through information campaigns	400,000	360,250			111%
2	CCCM	2.3.5. Number of vulnerable IDPs allocated with transitional shelters while waiting for durable solutions	26,838	26,838	51%	49%	100%
2	CCCM	2.3.6. Number of vulnerable IDPs occupying transitional shelters while waiting for durable solutions	20,066	26,838	51%	49%	75%
3	ERL	3.1.1. Number of affected vulnerable workers employed in debris clearing and in the repair and restoration of public and economic infrastructure disaggregated by sex and age	162,238	136,000	60%	40%	119%
3	ERL	3.1.2. Number of affected men and women provided with skills and enterprise support in order to regain livelihood	166,014	120,000	56%	44%	138%
3	ERL	3.1.3. Number of public and economic infrastructure restored disaggregated by type	9,486	10,000	N/A	N/A	95%
3	ERL	3.1.4. Number of affected local government units with capacity strengthening support being provided to plan and/or undertake risk reduction measures	58	43	N/A	N/A	135%

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
3	FSAC	3.2.1. Number of affected farmers receiving agricultural inputs (such as seeds and tools)	103,021	50,000	N/A	N/A	206%
3	FSAC	3.2.2. Number of affected farmers with key agricultural assets repaired (such as irrigation and drainage structures, storage spaces, machinery etc.)					
3	FSAC	3.2.3. Number of affected fishermen receiving fishing inputs and gear	11,470	31,000	N/A	N/A	37%
3	FSAC	3.2.4. Number of fishermen with boats repaired and built	23,991	30,000	N/A	N/A	80%
3	FSAC	3.2.5. Number of Barangays with support infrastructures repaired					
3	FSAC	3.2.6. Number of women trained in food conservation, fish processing and seaweed farming	1,192	30,000	N/A	N/A	4%
4	WASH	4.1.1.a Number of people receiving Water Kits	1,755,579	1,500,000	49%	51%	117%
4	WASH	4.1.1.b Number of people served by rehabilitated water systems (could be community, private or others- include Levels 1,2,3 )	976,674	900,000	49%	51%	109%
4	WASH	4.1.2. Number of people with new or rehabilitated latrines	349,976	650,000	49%	51%	54%
4	WASH	4.1.3.a Number of people receiving Hygiene Kits	1,891,963	1,500,000	49%	51%	126%

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
4	WASH	4.1.3.b Number of people in camps and barangays with established committee/group with a mandate covering WASH	811,049	800,000	49%	51%	101%
4	Health	4.2.1. Average consultations per person (Regions VI, VII, VIII)	0.10	0.25	N/A	N/A	40%
4	Health	4.2.2. # of functional health facilities per 10,000 population	1.78	2.89	N/A	N/A	61%
4	Health	4.2.3. % of Municipalities with 1 or more hospital or RHU with non-specialized OPD for mental disorder	0.17	0.80	N/A	N/A	22%
4	Health	4.2.4: % of reported disease alerts verified (of total 897 reports)	1.00	1.00	N/A	N/A	100%
5	Protection	5.1.1. Number of girls & boys participating in structured activities that promote their psychosocial well being	76,173	131,536	N/A	N/A	58%
5	Protection	5.1.2. Number of municipalities with functional GBV referral mechanisms (includes health, psychosocial, & security services)	10	15	N/A	N/A	67%
5	Protection	5.1.3. # of trainings including on UNGPID, CP, GBV	283	300	N/A	N/A	94%
5	Protection	5.1.4. # of protection monitoring visits conducted to identify protection risks and advocate response to protection issues	1,200	500	N/A	N/A	240%
5	Protection	5.1.5. Number of established protective mechanisms CFS, WFS, FTR, WCPU to promote safety and protection to IDPs	350	535	N/A	N/A	65%

SO	Cluster	Outcome Indicator	Reached	Target	Male %	Female %	Total %
5	Education	5.2.1. Number of damaged schools/classrooms /learning spaces established/rehabilitated in affected areas	4,911	5,000	N/A	N/A	98%
5	Education	5.2.2. Number of students provided with learning materials (M/F)	545,030	550,000	48%	52%	99%
5	Education	5.2.3. Number of teachers provided with teaching and learning materials	8,088	10,000	N/A	N/A	81%
5	Education	5.2.4. Number of teachers trained on at least one emergency-related topic	5,397	10,000	N/A	N/A	54%

## ANNEX 8.2 NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROCESSES

A summary of needs assessment processes applied in Haiyan response by clusters and in relation to SRP objectives is outlined below.

### SRP Objective 1 The need

Initial food security needs were estimated by WFP based on existing government data on population demographics and poverty levels, combined with information on the path of the typhoon. Food security needs were further analysed through MIRA 1 and 2, and supported by market assessments at the local level. There was no comprehensive food security assessment carried out to inform household level targeting.

### SRP Objective 2 The need

Extensive shelter damage was clear immediately after Haiyan though initial Government estimates greatly underestimated it, and even nine months later accurate numbers continue to be difficult to pin down. MIRA as well as other rapid assessment processes confirmed the widespread shelter needs. The absence of a fully comprehensive door-to-door assessment means no baseline exists for the actual numbers affected, and without this the precise size of the gap/unmet needs is not known. Qualitative assessment of shelter needs and cluster progress have been monitored through an out-sourced service by REACH. A protection needs assessment in May in Region VIII identified a protection risk for people who are living temporarily with other families, and who are neither on track to return home nor included in the shelter solutions system for IDPs.

### SRP Objective 3 The need

The most visible economic impact of Haiyan was on agricultural livelihoods – as the assets of farmers and fishing household were destroyed or damaged. However, the MIRA also highlighted the extent to which non-agricultural livelihoods were affected, including wage-labourers in coconut plantations, general labourers, petty traders, small and medium enterprises. There was no sector-wide assessment of livelihood needs or opportunities. However, more recently BFAR has led a detailed study of needs for fishery assistance. Other ad hoc exercises have helped fill in a few blanks, for example FSAC undertook a listening exercise in Region VI, and some agencies have undertaken assessments for their own projects which, as in the case of Save the Children's household economy analysis, have provided outputs useful to other agencies and to the cluster at large.

### SRP Objective 4 The need

A DoH/WHO rapid health assessment confirmed the extensive damage to health services across the affected area, and MIRA 2 showed extensive WASH needs. WASH facilities were monitored through the combined REACH process reviewing shelter and WASH sectors every quarter. Only in May was a barangay-by-barangay WASH assessment carried out.

### SRP Objective 5 The need

MIRA 1 highlighted protection needs including the loss of legal documents, lack of adequate communication between family members and lack of adequate physical protection. The specific needs for Child Protection and GBV services were based on demographic data. MIRA 2, which includes more household level engagement, registered a general feeling of insecurity among men and women, especially in evacuation centres, but also throughout the affected areas. On average, across all geographical areas, sex and wealth categories, 40 percent of households interviewed indicated a feeling of insecurity. A more detailed baseline for protection activities was established in the May protection needs assessment. This established at 46% the percentage of people who felt

insecure, a small increase from MIRA 2. This sense of insecurity was higher among IDPs and linked for some to lack of shelter and livelihood solutions.

In relation to education good baseline data for damage assessment was available quickly from the Department of Education due to its strong, decentralised system. Education needs were monitored in part through UNICEF's electronic humanitarian programme monitoring system which tracked indicators including numbers of children with access to temporary learning spaces, satisfaction with this, receipt of learning materials, and reasons for non-attendance at school.

## ANNEX 8.3 CLUSTER SYSTEMS - GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINES AND HAIYAN RESPONSE

Both the international community and the Government use the cluster system as their main vehicles for coordination. However, the cluster system institutionalised in the Philippines in 2007 has some differences from that which has evolved in the global cluster system.

Table 1. The Government of the Philippines cluster system

Cluster	Government lead <sup>1</sup>	International co-lead <sup>2</sup>
Food and non food items	DSWD	WFP and UNICEF (for non-food items)
Camp/IDP management, emergency shelter and protection	DSWD	UNHCR IOM
Permanent shelter and livelihood	DSWD	Habitat ILO
WASH, health, nutrition and psychosocial services	DoH	WHO UNICEF
Logistics and emergency telecommunications	OCD	WFP
Education	DoEd	UNICEF
Agriculture	Department of Agriculture	FAO
Early recovery <sup>3</sup>	OCD	UNDP

<sup>1</sup> NDCC memo number 8 :2008

<sup>2</sup> based on GoP presentation on Tropical Storm Washi with UNHCR at Symposium on Humanitarian Coordination, 11 April 2012

<sup>3</sup> The Government 's 2008 directive on clusters includes a note discouraging an ER cluster activation, but rather urges that ER be considered within other clusters and if necessary a working group. It also clarifies that Agriculture will include Agricultural Livelihoods and that the Livelihood cluster is reserved for non-agricultural livelihoods

Table 2: Clusters active for Haiyan with named lead agencies and co-leads

Cluster	Lead	Co-lead
Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM)	DSWD	IOM
Early recovery and livelihoods <sup>4</sup>	OCD and DSWD	UNDP and ILO
Education	Department of Education	UNICEF and Save the Children
Emergency shelter	DSWD	IFRC


Cluster	Lead	Co-lead
Emergency Telecommunications	OCD	WFP
Food security and Agriculture	DSWD and Dept of Agriculture	FAO, WFP
Health	Dept of Health	WHO
Logistics	OCD	WFP
Nutrition	Dept of Health	UNICEF
Protection	DSWD	UNHCR
Water, sanitation and hygiene	Department of Health	UNICEF


The two systems align relatively well though with a few important differences:

- a. The greater number of clusters in the "international system" increases the pressure on some national lead agencies to run multiple processes, notably DSWD which has responsibility for lead of 5 clusters in the international system as opposed to three in the "national system" though DSWD has taken on this role in earlier disasters, but not at the scale of Haiyan.
- b. The establishment of food security and agriculture cluster in the "international system" merges two "national system" clusters of food/non-food items with agriculture.
- c. Livelihoods is not a cluster in the "international system" but is a key component in the national system in the shelter and livelihood cluster.
- d. The "national system" clearly separates responsibility for agricultural livelihoods from non-agricultural livelihoods, with the agriculture and shelter/livelihoods clusters taking respective responsibilities. This is consistent to some extent with the approach eventually taken in the Haiyan response but not formally articulated until the development of the revised Early Recovery, Livelihoods and Agriculture Plan in March 2014.
- e. Efforts to bridge the asymmetry of the two systems resulted in new working relationships within the international community as well as between national and international organisations e.g. UNDP and ILO have shared responsibility for ERL; FAO and WFP for FSAG; DSWD and IFRC for Shelter.

<sup>4</sup> Merged in December 2013 for Haiyan response


# ANNEX 8.4 MAPS TO SHOW THE INTER-AGENCY ACTIVITIES WITH DETAILS OF DAMAGE AND PRE-EXISTING POVERTY





# ANNEX 8.5 TIMELINE OF HAIYAN RESPONSE - APPLICATION OF HPC TOOLS (FIRST SIX WEEKS)

## PHILIPPINES: Typhoon Haiyan Timeline - as of 18 December



### Glossary

UNDAC - United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination  
 IASC - Inter-agency Standing Committee  
 IHP - International Humanitarian Partnership

HC - Humanitarian Coordinator  
 DHC - Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator  
 ERC - Emergency Relief Coordinator



Emergency  
Roster

es in

Action plan  
d

visit

appointed  
an

**\$** CERF submitted to HQ

Start of MIRA process  
- 16 Nov

Final MIRA report

**\$** OCHA Emergency Cash Grant disbursed

UNDAC and IHP to Guiuan  
- 17 Nov

HCT draft Strategic Objective  
- 28 Nov

SRP presented  
- 10 Dec

WEEK 2

WEEK 3

WEEK 4

WEEK 5

NOV 13

NOV 14

NOV 15 - NOV 21

NOV 22 - NOV 28

NOV 29 - DEC 6

DEC 7 - DEC 14

First IASC Principals' meeting

3W product released

All CERF projects approved

Joint MIRA assessment started

ERC's second visit  
- 25 Nov

UNDAC to Ormoc  
- 17 Nov

DHC arrives  
- 25 Nov

Start of MIRA 2 process  
- 29 Nov

HQ Review of SRP  
- 6-8 Dec

Official SRP Launch as part of Global Event  
- 16 Dec

MIRA 2 presented  
- 20 Dec

# ANNEX 8.6 COMMUNITY SURVEY-ANALYSIS

## Report on beneficiary satisfaction survey conducted in selected barangay in Capiz and Iloilo provinces in Region 6, Philippines

August 2014

Valid International

Danny Carranza

Ernest Guevarra

### Table of Contents

<b>List of Tables.....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Figures .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Maps.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Objectives .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Indicators.....</b>	<b>1</b>
Needs.....	1
Food.....	1
Shelter.....	1
Livelihoods.....	1
Water and sanitation .....	1
Health .....	2
Community services .....	2
Coverage .....	2
Contact coverage.....	2
Responsive coverage.....	2
Appropriate coverage.....	2
Adequate coverage .....	3
Satisfaction.....	3
Recovery.....	3
Unmet needs .....	4
Complaints.....	4
Coping .....	4
Quality.....	4

<b>Methods</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Selection of barangays.....	5
Selection of households.....	5
Survey instrument.....	5
Survey implementation.....	5
Data management.....	6
Data analysis.....	6
<b>Results</b> .....	<b>8</b>
Sample characteristics.....	8
Indicator 1: Need.....	11
Indicator 2: Coverage.....	16
Contact coverage.....	16
Responsive coverage.....	18
Appropriate coverage.....	20
Adequate coverage.....	32
Satisfaction.....	36
Recovery.....	42
Coping through assistance received.....	54
Recovered through assistance received.....	56
Unmet needs.....	58
Complaints with assistance received.....	65
Quality.....	67
<b>Discussion</b> .....	<b>70</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>73</b>
<b>Appendix 1: Survey instrument</b> .....	<b>75</b>

## List of Tables

Table 1: Per barangay and overall survey sample by gender, by survey grouping and by disability.....	8
Table 2: Survey sample marital status by gender, by survey grouping and overall.....	10
Table 3: Respondents who reported having food needs.....	11
Table 4: Respondents who reported having shelter needs.....	12
Table 5: Respondents who reported having livelihoods needs.....	12
Table 6: Respondents who reported having water and sanitation needs.....	13
Table 7: Respondents who reported having health needs.....	13
Table 8: Respondents who reported having services needs.....	14
Table 9: Respondents who were consulted on assistance needed or received any form of assistance by barangay.....	16
Table 10: Respondents who report having received assistance of any kind within the first week after the typhoon.....	18
Table 11: Respondents who report having received all the assistance they needed.....	20

Table 12: Respondents who report having received at least 50% of the assistance they needed.....	20
Table 13: Respondents reporting having received food assistance that they needed.....	23
Table 14: Respondents who report having received shelter assistance that they needed.....	23
Table 15: Respondents who report having received livelihoods assistance that they needed.....	24
Table 16: Respondents who report having received water and sanitation assistance that they needed.....	24
Table 17: Respondents who report having received health assistance that they needed.....	25
Table 18: Respondents who report having received services assistance that they needed.....	25
Table 19: Respondents who report having received adequate assistance for all their needs.....	32
Table 20: Respondents who report having received adequate assistance for at least 50% of their needs .....	32
Table 21: Respondents who reported having received adequate food assistance .....	33
Table 22: Respondents who reported having received adequate shelter assistance .....	33
Table 23: Respondents who reported having received adequate livelihoods assistance.....	34
Table 24: Respondents who reported having received adequate water and sanitation assistance .....	34
Table 25: Respondents who reported having received adequate health assistance.....	35
Table 26: Respondents who reported having received adequate services assistance.....	35
Table 27: Respondents who reported being satisfied of all the assistance they have received.....	37
Table 28: Respondents who reported being satisfied with at least 50% of the assistance they have received .....	37
Table 29: Respondents who reported being satisfied with the food assistance they received.....	40
Table 30: Respondents who reported having recovered from all their assistance needs.....	42
Table 31: Respondents who reported having recovered from at least 50% of all their assistance needs.....	42
Table 32: Respondents who reported having recovered from their food assistance needs.....	45
Table 33: Respondents who reported having recovered from their shelter assistance needs.....	45
Table 34: Respondents who reported having recovered from livelihoods assistance needs.....	46
Table 35: Respondents who reported having recovered from water and sanitation assistance needs.....	46
Table 36: Respondents who reported having recovered from health assistance needs .....	47
Table 37: Respondents who reported having recovered from services assistance needs.....	47
Table 38: Respondents who reported having coped through the assistance they received.....	54

Table 39: Respondents who reported having recovered through the assistance received.....	56
Table 40: Respondents who reported that all their needs are met .....	59
Table 41: Respondents who reported that at least 50% of all their needs have been met .....	59
Table 42: Respondents who reported having food assistance needs unmet.....	62
Table 43: Respondents who reported having shelter assistance needs unmet .....	62
Table 44: Respondents who reported having livelihoods assistance needs unmet.....	63
Table 45: Respondents who reported having water and sanitation assistance needs unmet.....	63
Table 46: Respondents who reported having health assistance needs unmet .....	64
Table 47: Respondents who reported having services assistance needs unmet.....	64
Table 48: Respondents who reported having complaints about assistance received.....	65
Table 49: Respondents who reported quality of assistance received as either a 4 or a 5.....	67

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Algorithm for a three-class simplified LQAS classifier .....	7
Figure 2: Overall survey sample age structure .....	9
Figure 3: Per barangay survey sample age structure .....	10
Figure 4: Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents .....	14
Figure 5: Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents by barangay .....	15
Figure 6: Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by all respondents .....	67
Figure 7: Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by respondents by barangay .....	68

## List of Maps

Map 1: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having been consulted on assistance needed or having received any assistance.....	17
Map 2: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received any assistance within 1 week of the typhoon.....	19
Map 3: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received assistance they needed.....	21
Map 4: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received at least 50% of the assistance they needed .....	22
Map 5: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received food assistance they needed.....	26
Map 6: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received shelter assistance they needed.....	27
Map 7: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received livelihoods assistance they needed.....	28
Map 8: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received water and sanitation assistance they needed .....	29
Map 9: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received health assistance they needed.....	30
Map 10: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received services	

assistance they needed.....	31
Map 11: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with all assistance received .....	38
Map 12: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with at least 50% of assistance received.....	39
Map 13: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with the food assistance they received .....	41
Map 14: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported not requiring assistance for all needs .....	43
Map 15: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported not requiring assistance for at least 50% of all needs .....	44
Map 16: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from food assistance needs .....	48
Map 17: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from shelter assistance needs.....	49
Map 18: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from livelihoods assistance needs.....	50
Map 19: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from water and sanitation assistance needs.....	51
Map 20: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from health assistance needs.....	52
Map 21: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from services assistance needs .....	53
Map 22: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having coped through assistance received .....	55
Map 23: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered through assistance received.....	57
Map 24: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having all needs met.....	60
Map 25: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having at least 50% of all needs met .....	61
Map 26: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having complaints with assistance received.....	66
Map 27: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received good quality assistance.....	69

## Objectives

The purpose of the beneficiary satisfaction survey is to gather feedback regarding the post-typhoon humanitarian response from the perspective of marginalised people and communities from a sample of barangays (districts) purposively selected based on their location and level of vulnerability.

Specifically, the survey aims to:

- Gather community feedback on the relevance, timeliness and effectiveness of assistance;
- Increase the range of community voices in the evaluation particularly to include more marginalised people and places;
- Provide opportunities for input from hard-to-reach areas and people; and,
- Provide initial findings to feed into main phase of field work in mid-August

## Indicators

The survey focused on six components of humanitarian aid outlined in the strategic response namely food, shelter, livelihoods, water and sanitation, health and government services (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2013). Of these six components, the following indicators were assessed or measured through the survey:

### Needs

**Need** is defined as a respondent reporting the lack of a particular basic necessity or requirement related to the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed. An indicator of need is measured for each of these requirements as a proportion of the total number of respondents as shown in the following equations:

---

#### Food

$$\text{Food needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of food}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

---

#### Shelter

$$\text{Shelter needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of shelter}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

---

#### Livelihood

$$\text{Livelihood needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack or loss of livelihoods}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

---

#### Water and sanitation

$$\text{Water and sanitation needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of water and sanitation facilities}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

---

### Water and sanitation

$$\text{Water and sanitation needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of water and sanitation facilities}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$


---

### Health

$$\text{Health needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of health services}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$


---

### Community services

$$\text{Community services needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting lack of community services}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$


---

## Coverage

A hierarchical coverage indicators set has been devised based on the principles of Tanahashi's (Tanahashi 1978) coverage of health services model. The coverage indicators developed for the set are:

### Contact coverage

**Contact coverage** is defined as a respondent reporting having been consulted or having received any kind of assistance as a proportion of the total number of respondents. This indicator measures the initial response to the typhoon in terms of assessing need and providing assistance. This indicator is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Contact coverage} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having been consulted or having received any assistance}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

### Responsive coverage

**Responsive coverage** assesses the rapidity of the response to the typhoon at the first instance. It is defined as respondents reporting having received assistance within 1 week from the typhoon. It is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Responsive coverage} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having received any assistance within 1 week of the typhoon}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

### Appropriate coverage

*Appropriate coverage* assesses the targeting of assistance and shows whether those who report needing a type of assistance has reported receiving the specific assistance they required. This is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Appropriate coverage} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting needing assistance and having received the assistance}}{\text{Total number requiring assistance}}$$

This coverage indicator has been calculated on each of the six focus components of humanitarian aid mentioned above and as an overall indicator. For the overall indicator, assistance has been considered appropriate if the respondents report having received all the assistance they needed. A second appropriate coverage indicator is used to assess how many respondents report having received at least 50% of all the assistance they needed.

### Adequate coverage

*Adequate coverage* measures the proportion of those requiring assistance who report having received assistance that is sufficient to their needs. This is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Adequate coverage} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having received adequate assistance}}{\text{Total number requiring assistance}}$$

This coverage indicator has been calculated on each of the six focus components of humanitarian aid mentioned above and as an overall indicator. For the overall indicator, assistance has been considered adequate if the respondents report having received adequate assistance on all of the assistance they needed. A second adequate indicator is used to assess how many respondents report having received adequate assistance for at least 50% of all the assistance they needed.

### Satisfaction

*Satisfaction* indicator is based on respondents' self-report on whether they have been satisfied with the assistance they have received. This is calculated as:

$$\text{Satisfaction} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting being satisfied with assistance received}}{\text{Total number who received assistance}}$$

This indicator has been calculated on each of the six focus components of humanitarian aid mentioned above and as an overall indicator. For the overall indicator, respondents who report being satisfied with all of the assistance they received has been considered satisfied overall. A second satisfaction indicator is used to assess how many respondents report being satisfied with at least 50% of all the assistance they received.

## Recovery

Recovery indicator is based on respondents' self-report on whether the needs they report as having immediately post-typhoon are no longer concerns that they have currently at the time of interview. This is calculated as:

$$\text{Recovery 1} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting not having specific needs/problems currently}}{\text{Total number who reported having needs /problems}}$$

This indicator does not take into account of whether or not the respondent has received any assistance. This indicator has been calculated on each of the six focus components of humanitarian aid mentioned above and as an overall indicator. For the overall indicator, respondents who report having recovered from all the issues / needs / problems they have immediately post-typhoon has been considered as recovered overall. A second recovery indicator is used to assess how many respondents report having recovered with at least 50% of all the assistance they received.

A final recovery indicator is based on respondents' answer to a direct question asking whether they have recovered through assistance they have received. This indicator is calculated as:

$$\text{Recovery 2} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having recovered through assistance received}}{\text{Total number who received assistance}}$$

## Unmet needs

*Unmet needs* indicator is based on respondents' who report having not received any assistance and still having issues / problems / needs requiring assistance. This indicator is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Unmet needs} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting not having received any assistance and currently still having problems / issues}}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

This indicator has been calculated on each of the six focus components of humanitarian aid mentioned above and as an overall indicator.

## Complaints

*Complaints* indicator is based on respondents' reporting that they have complaints regarding the assistance they have received. This is calculated as:

$$\text{Complaints} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having complaints with assistance received}}{\text{Total number of who received assistance}}$$


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## Coping

*Coping* indicator is based on respondents' who report having coped through assistance they have received. This indicator is calculated as:

$$\text{Coping} = \frac{\text{Respondents reporting having coped through assistance received}}{\text{Total number of who received assistance}}$$

## Quality

*Quality* of assistance received is based on respondents' who grade quality of assistance as either 4 or 5. This indicator is calculated as:

$$\text{Quality} = \frac{\text{Respondents grading quality of assistance as either a 4 or a 5}}{\text{Total number of who received assistance}}$$

## Methods

The survey was designed such that results are representative of each barangay surveyed. This was made possible through the analysis approach selected for the survey (see section on data analysis below).

### Selection of barangays

Selection of barangays was done purposively such that barangays chosen exemplified different strata based on consideration on location (inland, coastal and island barangays) and accessibility (easy and hard to access). This selection would allow for inter-barangay comparisons between those in different strata.

### Selection of households

Within the selected barangays, sample households were selected using a map-segment-sample (MSS) approach. The barangay is roughly mapped in terms of its extent and the centre of the barangay identified. The barangay is then quartered along the centre with each quadrat representing a sampling domain within the barangay. In each quadrat, a specific criteria for household selection was used based on the type of household respondent that was to be focused on. Given the survey's aim of getting feedback from those whose views are generally not taken into account in typical surveys, four specific categories of respondents were used. First group was that of older people defined as men or women aged 60 years old and above. Second group was youth defined as men and women aged 15 to 30 years old. Third group was women of child-bearing age (15 - 49 years old) with a child aged under-five years old. The final group was adult men (aged 31 to 59 years old). Each of these categories of respondents were sampled from a specific quadrat of the sampled barangay. A target of 10 households with each of the respondent category was selected in the respective quadrats using a random walk method (Bennett et al. 1994; Thompson 2006). The quartering of the barangay ensures a geographical spread of the sampled households within the barangay and the random walk ensures a geographical spread within the quadrats. A total of 40 households was the target sample size for each barangay. This sample size requirement is discussed in the data analysis section below.

## Survey instrument

A survey instrument was designed to be able to provide data to calculate the indicators of interest. The survey instrument is found in Appendix 1.

## Survey implementation

The survey team was formed on the 28<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 composed of eight (8) surveyors. Four survey teams with two members each were formed reinforced by four volunteers to assist in the logistics and groundwork and more importantly serving as advanced parties in relaying information to target areas or validating targets, and in allowing flexibility to increase the number of survey teams to cover the widest survey target possible. An encoder was also hired to encode data on a daily basis, to make sure that data gathered in the survey is immediately processed.

The survey teams were trained on the first day. Surveyors/enumerators were oriented about the general context and objectives of the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) on Yolanda response and the specific objectives, targets and the survey instrument. Pre-testing of survey instrument was then done immediately after the training. Testing was done in a nearby barangay that was not one of the barangays selected for the survey. The pretesting was a simulation of the official community survey to be undertaken and a dry-run of the standard operating procedures in conducting the survey. This included courtesy call to the barangay officials, testing of the survey tools, locating the respondents based on the design of data gathering and identifying problems that may arise in the actual survey. A discussion on results of the pre-test was held soon after and the survey instrument was further refined and protocols were adjusted accordingly. Selection of sample barangays was then done by the team based on the criteria described in the section on barangay selection.

## Data management

Enumerators recorded the responses onto the questionnaires. The completed questionnaires were handed over to the overall survey coordinator who then passes on the questionnaires to the data encoder. A spreadsheet was developed on which data was to be encoded on a daily basis. Data was then sent for checking and verification. Any errors or inconsistencies were corrected and updated accordingly. Each barangay's data was encoded in their own spreadsheet and saved in comma separated value (CSV) format in preparation for data analysis.

## Data analysis

In order to be able to report results representative of each barangay, a statistically sound analytical approach was selected that would require small sample sizes per barangay but still provide robust results that will allow comparisons between barangays. A lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS) approach was chosen as the method that would suit these requirements. LQAS is a statistical analysis technique (Pagano & Valadez 2010; Olives & Pagano 2010) developed for industrial quality control purposes. LQAS is a classification technique which is able to determine whether an indicator is above or below a certain threshold value or standard. This technique has been adapted in the recent past for use in assessment of health programmes (Valadez et al. 2003; Robertson & Valadez 2006; Hedt et al. 2008; Biedron et al. 2009). For the purposes of this survey, a modified and simplified LQAS method based on work by Myatt et al (Myatt et al. 2012).

Applying the simplified LQAS to the survey data involves examining the denominator (n) and the numerator (a) of each of the indicators described in the previous section.

- If the number in the numerator exceeds a threshold value (d) then the indicator is classified as being satisfactory.
- If the number in the numerator does not exceed this threshold value (d) then the indicator is classified as being unsatisfactory.

Simplified LQAS also involves determining or setting standards or thresholds by which to calculate the threshold value  $d$ . For this survey, a two-standards, three-tier classification scheme was adapted. This classification scheme minimises gross classification errors.

Two sets of two-standards were used for this survey. The first pair of standards is 50% and 80% which creates three classes labelled as “low” ( $\leq 50\%$ ), moderate (between 50% and 80%) and high ( $> 80\%$ ). This set of standards was used for indicators that go from low to high with high classification considered as good. Examples of these indicators are coverage, satisfaction and recovery.


The other pair of standards is 20% and 50% which creates three classes labelled as “low” ( $\leq 20\%$ ), “moderate” (between 20% and 50%), and “high” ( $> 50\%$ ). This was used for indicators that go from high to low with high classification considered as bad. Examples of these indicators are needs and complaints.

Using these standards, calculation of two threshold values can be performed as follows:

$$d_1 = \lfloor n \times \text{lower threshold} \rfloor \text{ and } d_2 = \lfloor n \times \text{upper threshold} \rfloor$$

The classification is then done using the following algorithm:

Figure 1: Algorithm for a three-class simplified LQAS classifier



The sample size implications of a simplified LQAS is the other important characteristic of this analysis approach that makes it ideal for this survey. In general, a sample size of 40 is more than enough in most cases to be able to classify using a 20% and 50% or a 50% and 80% classifier scheme with alpha (type I) and beta (type II) errors no more than 310%. The sample size calculations for LQAS is based on a hypergeometric distribution model without replacement<sup>1</sup>. The following table

LQAS data analysis was automated using bespoke analytical scripts written in R language for statistical programming (R Core Team 2014). Choropleth maps showing the spatial distribution of the indicator classifications were also generated using R.

<sup>1</sup> A sample size calculator for simplified LQAS can be found in <http://www.brixtonhealth.com/hyperLQAS.html>.

## Results

### Sample characteristics

The survey interviewed a total of 692 respondents from 18 barangay and 1 internally displaced bunkhouse with 364 females and 328 males. Of these total respondents, 168 are adult men, 207 mother of reproductive age with children age 5 years and under, 178 senior citizens and 140 youth. There are a total of 243 respondents who self-reported having any physical inabilities or difficulties or mental problems. Table 1 characterises per barangay and overall survey sample by gender, survey grouping and self-reported disability.

**Table 1: Per barangay and overall survey sample by gender, by survey grouping and by disability**

Barangay	Female	Male	Adult men	Mother and child	Senior citizens	Youth	Disabled
Agdalipe	14	18	10	8	9	5	12
Alipata	26	13	9	15	7	8	10
Bayas	21	19	10	11	11	8	20
Botongon IDP	23	15	11	10	9	8	12
Botongon	20	16	7	12	10	7	12
Buaya	23	15	8	14	10	6	13
Bunga	19	17	7	11	10	8	11
Cahigon	17	14	7	10	7	7	10
Garangan	15	16	7	7	10	7	13
Gogo	22	17	10	13	10	6	11
Guba	21	17	9	10	10	9	10
Lanipga	21	18	9	11	10	10	10
Loguingot	17	19	8	10	9	9	8
Manapao	19	21	10	14	9	7	16
Pantalan	17	17	8	11	9	6	13
Paon	19	20	10	13	10	6	11
Supanga	15	20	10	8	9	8	16
Tanza	18	16	8	10	9	7	13
Tupaz	17	20	10	9	10	8	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>328</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>243</b>

The survey sample is relatively young with a mean age of 42 years old and ages ranged from as low as 15 years old to as high as 95 years old with slightly more females than males. Figure 2 shows the overall age structure by gender of the survey sample and Figure 3 shows the per barangay age structure by gender.

**Figure 2: Overall survey sample age structure**




Figure 3: Per barangay survey sample age structure



The respondents are predominantly partnered or married with more than half being either married or in civil partnership.

Table 2 shows marital status of respondents by gender, by survey grouping and overall.

**Table 2: Survey sample marital status by gender, by survey grouping and overall**

Marital Status	Female	Male	Adult men	Mother and child	Senior citizens	Youth	Disabled
Single	50	70	9	5	6	100	120
Civil partnership	51	35	18	43	5	20	86
Married	201	201	136	156	90	20	402
Separated	4	3	1	3	3	0	7
Widow / widower	58	19	4	0	73	0	77

### Indicator 1: Need

As can be expected, all barangays report high levels of food (Table 3), shelter (Table 4), livelihoods (Table 5), health (Table 7) and services (Table 8) while 16 out of the 19 barangay report high levels of water and sanitation requirements and the remaining three barangay reporting moderate water and sanitation requirements (Table 8). Overall, the survey shows high requirements across all six components of humanitarian aid assessed with majority of respondents per barangay reporting 5 or more needs out of a total of 6 (Figure 4 and Figure 5).

**Table 3: Respondents who reported having food needs**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	31	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	39	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	40	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	36	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	36	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	36	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	35	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Garangan	31	30	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	38	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	35	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	38	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	35	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	39	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	34	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	32	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	35	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	31	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	37	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

Table 4: Respondents who reported having shelter needs

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	27	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	39	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	40	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	35	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	34	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	36	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	29	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	29	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	38	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	28	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	39	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Loguingot	36	35	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	40	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	33	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	32	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	34	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	33	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	37	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

**Table 5: Respondents who reported having livelihoods needs**

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	26	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	38	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	39	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	37	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	34	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	37	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	26	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	30	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	37	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	29	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	38	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	32	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	39	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Pantalan	34	32	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	36	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	35	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	32	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	31	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

Table 6: Respondents who reported having water and sanitation needs

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	25	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	18	7	Yes	19	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	40	38	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	30	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	29	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	31	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	25	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	16	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	12	6	Yes	15	NO	MODERATE
Gogo	39	31	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	28	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	35	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	33	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	31	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	26	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	18	7	Yes	19	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	35	29	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	24	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	32	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

Table 7: Respondents who reported having health needs

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	25	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	31	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	37	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	30	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	30	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	32	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	22	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	22	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	20	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	26	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	30	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	38	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	25	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	35	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	30	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	20	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	32	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	27	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	26	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

Table 8: Respondents who reported having services needs

Barangay	$n$	Need (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	22	6	Yes	16	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	37	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	31	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	31	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	29	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	33	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	21	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	26	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	26	6	Yes	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	27	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	32	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	36	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	24	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	35	8	Yes	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	32	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	25	7	Yes	19	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	33	7	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	23	6	Yes	17	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	35	7	Yes	18	YES	HIGH

Figure 4: Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents

HISTOGRAM OF QUALITY GRADE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE




Figure 5: Histogram of sum of all needs reported by respondents by barangay



## Indicator 2: Coverage


### Contact coverage

Contact coverage is high in all barangays surveyed with just three barangays classified as moderate (Table 9). All islands surveyed are classified as high contact coverage. One of the coastal and 2 of the more inland barangays are classified as moderate (Map 1). The bunkhouse where internally displaced people (IDP) stay and its hosting barangay both show high contact coverage (Table 9).

**Table 9: Respondents who were consulted on assistance needed or received any form of assistance by barangay**

Barangay	$n$	Contact (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	29	16	Yes	25	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	34	19	Yes	31	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	38	20	Yes	32	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	38	19	Yes	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	33	18	Yes	28	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	33	18	Yes	30	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	35	18	Yes	28	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	23	15	Yes	24	NO	MODERATE
Garangan	31	28	15	Yes	24	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	38	19	Yes	31	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	32	19	Yes	30	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	40	20	Yes	32	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	35	18	Yes	28	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	39	20	Yes	32	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	34	17	Yes	27	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	30	19	Yes	31	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	35	28	17	Yes	28	NO	MODERATE
Tanza	34	32	17	Yes	27	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	36	18	Yes	29	YES	HIGH

Map 1: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having been consulted on assistance needed or having received any assistance




## Responsive coverage

Response time of 1 week after the typhoon is classified as moderate in 12 out of the 19 barangays surveyed while the rest of the barangays show low classification (Table 10). Both IDP bunkhouse and hosting barangay are classified as moderate (Table 10). All coastal and island barangays are classified as moderate except for Barangay Tupaz and Barangay Pantalan which are classified as low (Map 2). The more inland barangays (Cahigon, Supanga and Garangan) are classified as low (Map 2).

**Table 10: Respondents who report having received assistance of any kind within the first week after the typhoon**

Barangay	$n$	Response time (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	29	3	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Alipata	32	19	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	38	24	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	38	26	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	33	22	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	32	17	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	35	21	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	23	1	11	NO	18	NO	LOW
Garangan	28	3	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	27	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Guba	31	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	40	7	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	23	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	39	29	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	34	17	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	30	16	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	28	4	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Tanza	31	19	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	34	8	17	NO	27	NO	LOW

Map 2: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received any assistance within 1 week of the typhoon



### Appropriate coverage

All barangays surveyed are classified as low in terms of respondents who report having received all the assistance they needed (Table 11). Four of the 19 barangays surveyed are classified as moderate in terms of respondents who report having received at least half of the assistance they needed with the rest of the barangays still classified as low (Table 12).

**Table 11: Respondents who report having received all the assistance they needed**


Barangay	$n$	Appropriate (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	1	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	1	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	5	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	5	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	1	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	0	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	2	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	2	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	0	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 12: Respondents who report having received at least 50% of the assistance they needed


Barangay	<i>n</i>	Appropriate (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	37	8	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	22	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	38	23	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	35	9	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	9	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	30	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	23	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	14	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	3	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	20	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	40	20	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	10	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	33	12	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	5	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Barangay Gogo, Loguingot and Bayas which are coastal or island areas and the Botongon IDP bunkhouse are the only ones to be classified as moderate in terms of respondents who report having received at least 50% of the assistance they needed (Map 3 and Map 4). This indicates an extremely low coverage of assistance based on reported need.

Map 3: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received assistance they needed



**Map 4: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received at least 50% of the assistance they needed**



When disaggregated by each of the six different components of humanitarian aid reviewed, appropriate food assistance is significantly better than the others with 12 out of the 19 barangays classified as moderate and the rest as high (Table 13). None of the other five components of humanitarian aid have had a barangay classified as high (Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17 and Table 18). Appropriate shelter and livelihoods assistance are significantly poorer than all the other components of humanitarian aid reviewed. Appropriate shelter assistance has 15 of the 19 barangays classified as low with the rest moderate (Table 14) while appropriate livelihoods assistance has 18 of the 19 barangays classified as low with a single barangay classified as moderate (Table 15). Except for appropriate livelihoods assistance, the IDP bunkhouse generally has a higher classification of appropriate assistance in each of the components of humanitarian aid reviewed and more respondents reported having received at least 50% of all the assistance needed compared to that of their originating barangay. On the other hand, the IDP bunkhouse generally had the same high or moderate classification of appropriate assistance as with the hosting barangay.

Table 13: Respondents reporting having received food assistance that they needed

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Appropriate (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	37	8	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	22	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	38	23	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	35	9	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	9	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	30	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	23	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	14	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	3	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	20	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	40	20	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	10	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	33	12	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	5	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 14: Respondents who report having received shelter assistance that they needed

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Shelter (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	27	3	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	3	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	31	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	35	27	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	34	5	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Buaya	36	5	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Bunga	29	6	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	4	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	29	2	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	16	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Guba	28	6	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Lanipga	39	10	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	23	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	40	26	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	33	6	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Paon	32	11	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Supanga	34	2	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tanza	33	11	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	3	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 15: Respondents who report having received livelihoods assistance that they needed

Barangay	$n$	Livelihood (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	26	3	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Alipata	38	11	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bayas	39	16	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	37	11	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Botongon	34	6	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Buaya	37	5	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bunga	26	0	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	1	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	30	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	37	11	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Guba	29	0	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Lanipga	38	3	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	32	18	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	39	4	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Pantalan	32	6	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Paon	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	32	4	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Tupaz	31	4	15	NO	24	NO	LOW

Table 16: Respondents who report having received water and sanitation assistance that they needed

Barangay	<i>n</i>	WASH (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	25	12	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Alipata	18	6	9	NO	14	NO	LOW
Bayas	38	24	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	30	23	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	29	10	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Buaya	31	12	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Bunga	25	5	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Cahigon	16	3	8	NO	12	NO	LOW
Garangan	12	0	6	NO	9	NO	LOW
Gogo	31	19	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Guba	28	16	14	YES	22	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	35	17	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	33	24	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	31	18	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	26	14	13	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Paon	18	7	9	NO	14	NO	LOW
Supanga	29	3	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Tanza	24	12	12	NO	19	NO	LOW
Tupaz	32	11	16	NO	25	NO	LOW

Table 17: Respondents who report having received health assistance that they needed

Barangay	$n$	Health (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	25	13	12	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	31	13	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Bayas	37	28	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	30	22	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	30	15	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Buaya	32	12	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Bunga	22	2	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Cahigon	22	0	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Garangan	20	3	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Gogo	26	18	13	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Guba	30	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	38	12	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	25	15	12	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	35	10	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Pantalan	30	11	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Paon	20	5	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Supanga	32	1	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Tanza	27	22	13	YES	21	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	26	14	13	YES	20	NO	MODERATE


Table 18: Respondents who report having received services assistance that they needed

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Services ( <i>a</i> )	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	22	8	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Alipata	37	18	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bayas	31	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	31	20	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	29	7	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Buaya	33	13	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Bunga	21	8	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Cahigon	26	8	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Garangan	26	8	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Gogo	27	17	13	YES	21	NO	MODERATE
Guba	32	14	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Lanipga	36	17	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	24	13	12	YES	19	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	35	18	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	32	19	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Paon	25	17	12	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	33	7	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tanza	23	15	11	YES	18	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	35	11	17	NO	28	NO	LOW


Map 5, Map 6, Map 7, Map 8, Map 9 and Map 10 show the spatial distribution of each of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed. The maps show that in terms of spatial distribution of appropriate coverage, coastal and island areas generally are classified higher than inland areas in terms of appropriate coverage of most of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed. Specifically, the island Barangay of Loguingot is classified as moderate in terms of appropriate coverage in five of the six components of humanitarian aid and high in appropriate coverage in food assistance. It is also the only barangay to be classified as moderate in livelihoods assistance.

On the other hand, inland areas generally are classified low in terms of appropriate coverage of almost all components of humanitarian aid reviewed. In particular, Barangay Garangan, Cahigon and Supanga which are the furthest inland barangays have been classified as low in terms of appropriate coverage in all but one of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed.


Map 5: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received food assistance they needed




Map 6: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received shelter assistance they needed




Map 7: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received livelihoods assistance they needed




Map 8: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received water and sanitation assistance they needed



Map 9: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received health assistance they needed



Map 10: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received services assistance they needed



### Adequate coverage

Adequate coverage is classified as low in all of the 19 barangays surveyed (Table 19). Adequate coverage for at least 50% of needs is also classified as low in all of the 19 barangays surveyed (Table 20).

Table 19: Respondents who report having received adequate assistance for all their needs

Barangay	$n$	Adequate (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	1	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	0	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	1	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	0	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	1	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	4	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	0	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 20: Respondents who report having received adequate assistance for at least 50% of their needs

Barangay	$n$	Adequate (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	2	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	5	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	15	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	8	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	3	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	3	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	9	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	6	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	1	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	12	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	2	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	6	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	8	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	1	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

When disaggregated by each of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed, adequate coverage is still classified as low in all of the barangays surveyed (except for a moderate classification for adequate food assistance in Barangay Loguingot).

**Table 21: Respondents who reported having received adequate food assistance**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Food (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	9	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	14	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	18	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	36	18	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	13	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	36	7	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Bunga	35	7	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	9	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	30	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	12	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Guba	35	16	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Lanipga	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	25	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	39	8	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	13	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	32	10	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	4	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	31	14	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	8	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 22: Respondents who reported having received adequate shelter assistance

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Shelter (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	27	1	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	1	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	7	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	35	13	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Botongon	34	3	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Buaya	36	3	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Bunga	29	3	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	4	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	29	1	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	9	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Guba	28	2	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Lanipga	39	1	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Loguingot	35	12	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	12	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	33	5	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Paon	32	5	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Supanga	34	2	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tanza	33	4	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	1	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 23: Respondents who reported having received adequate livelihoods assistance

Barangay	$n$	Livelihood (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	26	1	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Alipata	38	7	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bayas	39	9	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	37	6	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Botongon	34	4	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Buaya	37	2	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bunga	26	0	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	30	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	37	8	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Guba	29	0	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Lanipga	38	1	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	32	11	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Manapao	39	2	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Pantalan	32	3	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Paon	36	4	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	32	1	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Tupaz	31	2	15	NO	24	NO	LOW

Table 24: Respondents who reported having received adequate water and sanitation assistance

Barangay	$n$	WASH (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	25	6	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Alipata	18	3	9	NO	14	NO	LOW
Bayas	38	19	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	30	14	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Botongon	29	5	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Buaya	31	6	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Bunga	25	2	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Cahigon	16	3	8	NO	12	NO	LOW
Garangan	12	0	6	NO	9	NO	LOW
Gogo	31	13	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Guba	28	7	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Lanipga	35	7	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	33	12	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Manapao	31	5	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Pantalan	26	7	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Paon	18	4	9	NO	14	NO	LOW
Supanga	29	0	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Tanza	24	3	12	NO	19	NO	LOW
Tupaz	32	2	16	NO	25	NO	LOW

Table 25: Respondents who reported having received adequate health assistance

Barangay	$n$	Health (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	22	3	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Alipata	37	6	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bayas	31	11	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	31	10	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Botongon	29	3	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Buaya	33	6	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Bunga	21	2	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Cahigon	26	4	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Garangan	26	0	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Gogo	27	10	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Guba	32	7	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Lanipga	36	4	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	24	11	12	NO	19	NO	LOW
Manapao	35	2	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Pantalan	32	6	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Paon	25	11	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Supanga	33	1	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tanza	23	11	11	NO	18	NO	LOW
Tupaz	35	4	17	NO	28	NO	LOW

Table 26: Respondents who reported having received adequate services assistance

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Services (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	22	3	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Alipata	37	6	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Bayas	31	11	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	31	10	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Botongon	29	3	14	NO	23	NO	LOW
Buaya	33	6	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Bunga	21	2	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Cahigon	26	4	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Garangan	26	0	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Gogo	27	10	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Guba	32	7	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Lanipga	36	4	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	24	11	12	NO	19	NO	LOW
Manapao	35	2	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Pantalan	32	6	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Paon	25	11	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Supanga	33	1	16	NO	26	NO	LOW
Tanza	23	11	11	NO	18	NO	LOW
Tupaz	35	4	17	NO	28	NO	LOW

## Satisfaction

Respondents' satisfaction with all the assistance they have received is classified as low with only 3 of the 19 barangays classified as moderate in terms of satisfaction with all assistance received with the rest classified as low (Table 27). On the other hand, respondents' satisfaction with at least 50% of the assistance they have received is generally positive with 4 barangays classified as high and 11 barangays classified as moderate with only 4 classified as low (Table 28). This indicates a fairly good respondents' satisfaction with most of the assistance received.

As with the coverage indicators, there is a notable difference between the IDP bunkhouse and its originating barangay in terms of the respondents' satisfaction with at least 50% of the assistance they received with the IDP bunkhouse classified as high and the originating barangay classified as moderate (Table 28). When compared to its hosting barangay, however, the IDP bunkhouse classifies as the same in terms of satisfaction. Another result of note is that of Barangay Loguingot, the only barangay to be classified as moderate to high in terms of appropriate coverage for each of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed, which is classified as moderate for satisfaction with all the assistance received and high for at least 50% of all assistance received.

In terms of spatial distribution, coastal and island barangays generally have higher satisfaction with all assistance received compared to the inland barangays (Map 11 and Map 12).

Disaggregating the satisfaction indicator by the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed is only possible for the satisfaction to food assistance received. The satisfaction indicator is only applicable if respondents report having received the assistance. Of the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed, food assistance is the one that most respondents have reported receiving. Hence, food assistance is the only one with enough sample on satisfaction to apply the LQAS analysis on. Table 29 shows the per barangay classification of respondents who reported being satisfied with the food assistance they received. Satisfaction with food assistance received was generally good with 10 of the 19 barangays being classified as moderate or high. The difference between the IDP bunkhouse and the originating barangay persists in the satisfaction with food assistance. The IDP bunkhouse is classified as high while the originating barangay classified as moderate. This difference is also noted between the IDP bunkhouse and its host barangay.

As for spatial distribution, coastal and island barangays generally have higher satisfaction with food assistance received compared to inland barangays (Map 13).


Table 27: Respondents who reported being satisfied of all the assistance they have received

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Satisfaction (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	23	3	11	NO	18	NO	LOW
Alipata	34	17	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Bayas	37	17	18	NO	29	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	36	17	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Botongon	27	9	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Buaya	31	11	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Bunga	26	8	13	NO	20	NO	LOW
Cahigon	25	8	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Garangan	27	5	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	17	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Guba	31	9	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Lanipga	38	8	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	33	18	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	38	10	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Pantalan	30	9	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Paon	37	19	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	25	5	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Tanza	31	10	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Tupaz	33	17	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE

Table 28: Respondents who reported being satisfied with at least 50% of the assistance they have received

Barangay	$n$	Satisfaction (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	23	12	11	YES	18	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	34	25	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	37	29	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	36	32	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Botongon	27	18	13	YES	21	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	31	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	26	15	13	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	25	12	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Garangan	27	7	13	NO	21	NO	LOW
Gogo	38	31	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Guba	31	22	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	38	18	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Loguingot	33	30	16	YES	26	YES	HIGH
Manapao	38	23	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	30	16	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Paon	37	32	18	YES	29	YES	HIGH
Supanga	25	5	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Tanza	31	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	33	25	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE

Map 11: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with all assistance received



Map 12: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with at least 50% of assistance received





Table 29: Respondents who reported being satisfied with the food assistance they received

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Food (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	20	5	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Alipata	28	20	14	YES	22	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	34	30	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	29	25	14	YES	23	YES	HIGH
Botongon	21	15	10	YES	16	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	21	8	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Bunga	24	10	12	NO	19	NO	LOW
Cahigon	21	8	10	NO	16	NO	LOW
Garangan	25	4	12	NO	20	NO	LOW
Gogo	30	22	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Guba	30	17	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	35	16	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Loguingot	30	28	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Manapao	32	16	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Pantalan	22	10	11	NO	17	NO	LOW
Paon	22	17	11	YES	17	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	18	4	9	NO	14	NO	LOW
Tanza	27	20	13	YES	21	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	28	17	14	YES	22	NO	MODERATE

Map 13: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported being satisfied with the food assistance they received



## Recovery

Recovery from all the assistance needs is uniformly classified as low across all the barangays surveyed (Table 30). Recovery from at least 50% of all assistance needs is generally good with 17 of the 19 barangays classified as either moderate or high (Table 31).

**Table 30: Respondents who reported having recovered from all their assistance needs**


Barangay	<i>n</i>	Recovery (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	9	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	2	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	2	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	1	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	4	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	12	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	2	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	2	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	3	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	2	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	2	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	3	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	7	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	3	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	1	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 31: Respondents who reported having recovered from at least 50% of all their assistance needs


Barangay	$n$	Recovery (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	22	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	39	27	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	40	19	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	20	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	36	31	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	37	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	33	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	28	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	27	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	29	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	26	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	40	30	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	36	18	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	28	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	34	26	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Paon	39	32	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	33	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	24	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	37	27	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE

Spatial distribution of respondents who reported not requiring assistance is quite even between coastal, island and inland barangays (Map 14 and Map 15) except for two island barangays (Loguingot and Bayas) that are classified as low in terms of recovery from at least 50% of all assistance needs compared to the rest of the barangays that are classified as either moderate or high (Map 15). Barangay Loguingot and to some extent Barangay Bayas has been classified as moderate to high coverage and satisfaction.

Map 14: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported not requiring assistance for all needs



Map 15: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported not requiring assistance for at least 50% of all needs



Disaggregation of the recovery indicator by the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed show that recovery from food and services assistance is poor (Table 32 and Table 37). Recovery from shelter, livelihoods, water and sanitation and health assistance is generally good with most barangays classified as moderate (Table 33, Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36). The difference between IDP bunkhouse and originating barangay persist with the respondents from the IDP bunkhouse reporting lower levels of recovery compared to the originating barangay. This same difference of IDP bunkhouse reporting lower levels of recovery is noted compared with the host barangay.

Table 32: Respondents who reported having recovered from their food assistance needs

Barangay	$n$	Food (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	15	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	11	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	6	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	8	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	16	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	17	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	16	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	10	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	5	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	9	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	4	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	5	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	8	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	8	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	17	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	13	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	16	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	10	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	11	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 33: Respondents who reported having recovered from their shelter assistance needs

Barangay	$n$	Shelter (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	25	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	39	36	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	12	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	11	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	33	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	31	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	24	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	31	27	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	27	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	31	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	22	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	40	31	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	36	19	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	40	23	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	34	27	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Paon	39	22	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	35	31	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	25	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	37	33	18	YES	29	YES	HIGH

Table 34: Respondents who reported having recovered from livelihoods assistance needs

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Livelihoods (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	24	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	39	27	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	40	25	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	38	28	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	36	30	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	33	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	26	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	31	30	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	30	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	27	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	29	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	40	37	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	20	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Manapao	40	36	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	27	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Paon	39	29	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Supanga	35	35	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	29	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	27	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE

Table 35: Respondents who reported having recovered from water and sanitation assistance needs

Barangay	<i>n</i>	WASH (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	18	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	39	16	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	26	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Botongon IDP	38	18	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	19	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	38	27	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	36	21	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	31	14	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	12	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	20	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Guba	38	20	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Lanipga	40	21	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	36	10	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	17	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	24	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Paon	38	16	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	26	17	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Tanza	34	18	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Tupaz	37	23	18	YES	29	NO	MODERATE

Table 36: Respondents who reported having recovered from health assistance needs


Barangay	<i>n</i>	Health (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	17	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	39	21	19	YES	31	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	40	18	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	21	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Botongon	36	21	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	38	26	19	YES	30	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	36	20	18	YES	28	NO	MODERATE
Cahigon	31	21	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Garangan	31	16	15	YES	24	NO	MODERATE
Gogo	39	17	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	17	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	30	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	36	13	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	26	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	34	23	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE
Paon	39	18	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	31	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	10	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	14	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 37: Respondents who reported having recovered from services assistance needs


Barangay	<i>n</i>	Services (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	5	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	5	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	9	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	7	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	4	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	5	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	2	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	7	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	5	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	1	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	4	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	2	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	5	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	4	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	3	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	2	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	2	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Spatial distribution of recovery from shelter assistance is good with almost all barangays classified as either moderate or high with the only exception being the island barangay of Bayas which is classified as low (Map 17). Spatial distribution of recovery from livelihoods assistance is good with all barangays classified as either moderate or high (Map 18). Spatial distribution of recovery from water and sanitation assistance is mixed with some island barangays and some inland barangays being classified as low in terms of recovery. The rest are classified as moderate (Map 19). Spatial distribution of recovery from health assistance is also mixed with coastal and island barangays generally classified as low and inland barangays generally classified as moderate to high (Map 20).


Map 16: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from food assistance needs




Map 17: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from shelter assistance needs




Map 18: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from livelihoods assistance needs




Map 19: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from water and sanitation assistance needs



Map 20: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from health assistance needs



Map 21: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered from services assistance needs



### Coping through assistance received


A good number of respondents report that they have been able to cope with the aftermath of the typhoon through the assistance they have received. Out of the 19 barangays surveyed, 15 are classified as high in terms of coping through assistance received (Table 38). The difference between the IDP bunkhouse and the host barangay is again notable here with the IDP bunkhouse classified as high while the host barangay classified as moderate.

In terms of spatial distribution, the barangays that are classified as moderate are inland barangays (Map 22)

**Table 38: Respondents who reported having coped through the assistance they received**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Cope (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	27	19	13	YES	21	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	32	27	16	YES	25	YES	HIGH
Bayas	38	36	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	36	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon	33	26	16	YES	26	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	32	30	16	YES	25	YES	HIGH
Bunga	35	31	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	23	17	11	YES	18	NO	MODERATE
Garangan	28	24	14	YES	22	YES	HIGH
Gogo	38	37	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Guba	32	30	16	YES	25	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	38	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	35	31	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Manapao	39	36	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	31	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Paon	28	27	14	YES	22	YES	HIGH
Supanga	28	19	14	YES	22	NO	MODERATE
Tanza	31	31	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	34	30	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH

Map 22: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having coped through assistance received




### Recovered through assistance received

Nearly all of the barangays surveyed report good recovery from the effects of the typhoon through the assistance received with 13 of the 19 barangays surveyed classified as high. However, two inland barangays (Cahigon and Supanga) are classified as low (Table 39 and Map 23). The results of the self-report on recovery through assistance received follows a similar pattern as with the results of recovery based on currently not requiring anymore assistance presented earlier (Table 31 and Map 17). However, the responses to the direct question on whether or not respondents have recovered through the assistance they received used in this current indicator are more optimistic and depict a much higher level of recovery and a much higher contribution of assistance received towards this recovery.

**Table 39: Respondents who reported having recovered through the assistance received**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Recover (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	28	21	14	YES	22	NO	MODERATE
Alipata	32	26	16	YES	25	YES	HIGH
Bayas	38	34	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	36	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon	33	28	16	YES	26	YES	HIGH
Buaya	32	25	16	YES	25	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	35	29	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	23	11	11	NO	18	NO	LOW
Garangan	28	24	14	YES	22	YES	HIGH
Gogo	38	37	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Guba	32	28	16	YES	25	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	32	20	YES	32	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	35	31	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Manapao	39	35	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	30	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Paon	28	25	14	YES	22	YES	HIGH
Supanga	28	11	14	NO	22	NO	LOW
Tanza	31	27	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	34	27	17	YES	27	NO	MODERATE

Map 23: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having recovered through assistance received



### Unmet needs

All barangays surveyed are classified as low in terms of respondents reporting that all their needs have been met (Table 40). However, all barangays surveyed are classified as high in terms of respondents reporting that at least 50% of all their needs have been met (Table 41).

Disaggregating by the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed, the level of unmet needs is high in all components and in all barangays surveyed (Table 42, Table 43, Table 44, Table 45, Table 46 and Table 47)


**Table 40: Respondents who reported that all their needs are met**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Met needs (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	1	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	0	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	0	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	1	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	0	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	0	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	0	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Table 41: Respondents who reported that at least 50% of all their needs have been met

Barangay	$n$	Met needs (a)	$d_1 \left[ \frac{d_1}{n} = 0.2 \right]$	$a > d_1?$	$d_2 \left[ \frac{d_2}{n} = 0.5 \right]$	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	28	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	39	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	35	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	38	37	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	35	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Buaya	38	36	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Bunga	36	36	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Garangan	31	31	15	YES	24	YES	HIGH
Gogo	39	36	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Guba	38	34	19	YES	30	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	40	39	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	36	32	18	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	39	20	YES	32	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	31	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Paon	39	39	19	YES	31	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	35	17	YES	28	YES	HIGH
Tanza	34	31	17	YES	27	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	36	18	YES	29	YES	HIGH

Map 24: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having all needs met



Map 25: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having at least 50% of all needs met




Table 42: Respondents who reported having food assistance needs unmet

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Food (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	31	27	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	39	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	40	8	YES	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	36	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Botongon	36	34	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Buaya	36	34	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Bunga	35	30	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	30	30	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	38	38	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	35	32	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	38	38	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	35	33	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Manapao	39	38	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	34	29	6	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Paon	32	30	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	35	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	31	28	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH

Table 43: Respondents who reported having shelter assistance needs unmet

Barangay	$n$	Shelter (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	27	26	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Alipata	39	39	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	40	37	8	YES	20	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	35	32	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Botongon	34	30	6	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Buaya	36	36	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Bunga	29	28	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	29	29	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Gogo	38	29	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Guba	28	28	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	39	37	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	35	28	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Manapao	40	31	8	YES	20	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	33	33	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Paon	32	31	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Supanga	34	34	6	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	33	30	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	37	37	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH

Table 44: Respondents who reported having livelihoods assistance needs unmet

Barangay	$n$	livelihoods (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	26	25	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Alipata	38	38	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Bayas	39	37	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	37	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Botongon	34	32	6	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Buaya	37	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Bunga	26	26	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	31	31	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Garangan	30	30	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Gogo	37	36	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Guba	29	29	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	38	36	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	32	26	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Manapao	39	38	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	32	31	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Paon	36	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Supanga	35	35	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Tanza	32	31	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	31	31	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH

Table 45: Respondents who reported having water and sanitation assistance needs unmet

Barangay	$n$	WASH (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	25	20	5	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Alipata	18	14	3	YES	9	YES	HIGH
Bayas	38	26	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	30	19	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Botongon	29	29	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Buaya	31	22	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Bunga	25	24	5	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	16	15	3	YES	8	YES	HIGH
Garangan	12	12	2	YES	6	YES	HIGH
Gogo	31	23	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Guba	28	20	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	35	32	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	33	31	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Manapao	31	27	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	26	14	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Paon	18	13	3	YES	9	YES	HIGH
Supanga	29	29	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Tanza	24	18	4	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	32	30	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH

Table 46: Respondents who reported having health assistance needs unmet

Barangay	$n$	Health (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	25	20	5	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Alipata	31	28	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Bayas	37	28	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	30	17	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Botongon	30	24	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Buaya	32	26	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Bunga	22	21	4	YES	11	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	22	22	4	YES	11	YES	HIGH
Garangan	20	20	4	YES	10	YES	HIGH
Gogo	26	17	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Guba	30	25	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	38	34	7	YES	19	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	25	21	5	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Manapao	35	34	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	30	26	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Paon	20	17	4	YES	10	YES	HIGH
Supanga	32	32	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Tanza	27	22	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	26	24	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH

Table 47: Respondents who reported having services assistance needs unmet

Barangay	$n$	Services (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	22	20	4	YES	11	YES	HIGH
Alipata	37	36	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Bayas	31	25	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Botongon IDP	31	27	6	YES	15	YES	HIGH
Botongon	29	29	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Buaya	33	32	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Bunga	21	20	4	YES	10	YES	HIGH
Cahigon	26	24	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Garangan	26	25	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Gogo	27	23	5	YES	13	YES	HIGH
Guba	32	29	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Lanipga	36	35	7	YES	18	YES	HIGH
Loguingot	24	20	4	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Manapao	35	33	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH
Pantalan	32	30	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Paon	25	23	5	YES	12	YES	HIGH
Supanga	33	30	6	YES	16	YES	HIGH
Tanza	23	21	4	YES	11	YES	HIGH
Tupaz	35	33	7	YES	17	YES	HIGH


## Complaints with assistance received

Respondents have generally reported low levels of complaints with assistance received with 12 of the 19 barangays surveyed classified as low (Table 48). One inland barangay (Supanga) is classified as high in terms of complaints by respondents with assistance they received.

**Table 48: Respondents who reported having complaints about assistance received**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Complaints (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.2 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	29	2	5	NO	14	NO	LOW
Alipata	31	12	6	YES	15	NO	MODERATE
Bayas	38	5	7	NO	19	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	2	7	NO	19	NO	LOW
Botongon	33	10	6	YES	16	NO	MODERATE
Buaya	32	10	6	YES	16	NO	MODERATE
Bunga	35	5	7	NO	17	NO	LOW
Cahigon	23	4	4	NO	11	NO	LOW
Garangan	28	8	5	YES	14	NO	MODERATE
Gogo	38	6	7	NO	19	NO	LOW
Guba	32	5	6	NO	16	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	17	8	YES	20	NO	MODERATE
Loguingot	35	4	7	NO	17	NO	LOW
Manapao	39	14	7	YES	19	NO	MODERATE
Pantalan	34	6	6	NO	17	NO	LOW
Paon	28	3	5	NO	14	NO	LOW
Supanga	28	16	5	YES	14	YES	HIGH
Tanza	31	6	6	NO	15	NO	LOW
Tupaz	34	5	6	NO	17	NO	LOW

Map 26: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having complaints with assistance received



## Quality

Quality of assistance received is considered by the respondents as below 4 on a 0 to 5 scale with 5 the highest grade (Table 49 and Map 27). The median grade given by all the respondents is 2 (Figure 6). Majority of the barangays have reported the same median grade of 2 with a few reporting a median grade of 3 (Figure 7).

**Table 49: Respondents who reported quality of assistance received as either a 4 or a 5**

Barangay	<i>n</i>	Quality (a)	$d_1$ [ $d_1 = 0.5 \times n$ ]	$a > d_1?$	$d_2$ [ $d_2 = 0.8 \times n$ ]	$a > d_2?$	Classification
Agdalipe	32	2	16	NO	25	NO	LOW
Alipata	39	0	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Bayas	40	7	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Botongon IDP	38	8	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Botongon	36	2	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Buaya	38	3	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Bunga	36	0	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Cahigon	31	3	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Garangan	31	0	15	NO	24	NO	LOW
Gogo	39	10	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Guba	38	3	19	NO	30	NO	LOW
Lanipga	40	2	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Loguingot	36	5	18	NO	28	NO	LOW
Manapao	40	0	20	NO	32	NO	LOW
Pantalan	34	2	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Paon	39	4	19	NO	31	NO	LOW
Supanga	35	1	17	NO	28	NO	LOW
Tanza	34	1	17	NO	27	NO	LOW
Tupaz	37	1	18	NO	29	NO	LOW

Figure 6: Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by all respondents





Figure 7: Distribution of quality grade of humanitarian assistance reported by respondents by barangay



Map 27: Spatial distribution of respondents who reported having received good quality assistance



## Discussion

The results of the beneficiary satisfaction survey indicate the following key findings:

***High levels of needs in all of the barangays surveyed.*** The reported needs in all of the barangays surveyed are high. This level of reported need is uniform across all the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed in the survey. This result is to be expected given that all barangays surveyed are categorised as typhoon-affected and as priority areas falling within the 50 km radius of the typhoon path (DSWD 2014a, DSWD 2014b). This is also supported by findings of the initial multi-cluster/sector initial rapid assessment (MIRA I) and the subsequent rapid assessment (MIRA II) conducted by the humanitarian cluster (WFP, UNOCHA, REACH, et al. 2013b; WFP, UNOCHA, ACF, et al. 2013a). It should be noted however that these assessments done early in post-typhoon period have identified the general areas in which the barangays surveyed in this beneficiary satisfaction survey belong as having lesser need relative to that of Eastern Visayas region (Region 8) where the initial landfall of the typhoon took place hence experienced the greatest impact of the destruction caused by the typhoon.

***Contact coverage of humanitarian aid is generally high. Responsive coverage of humanitarian aid is moderate at best and geographically heterogeneous.*** Contact with humanitarian aid (including consultation on assistance needed and provision of any assistance) is high and this is generally uniform through all the barangays surveyed with some further inland barangays having a little lesser contact than coastal and island barangays. Humanitarian aid provided within 1 week of the typhoon is classified as moderate in about half of all the barangays surveyed with the other half classified as low. Those classified as moderate are generally coastal and island barangays and most of those classified as low are inland barangays. MIRA II, which was conducted about a month post-typhoon, support this as majority of the areas in which the surveyed barangays belong have been provided assistance of any type ((WFP, UNOCHA, ACF, et al. 2013a). The geographical disparity between coastal / island barangays and inland barangays in terms of responsiveness is most likely due to findings in the initial rapid assessment that indicated greatest impact and destruction hence greatest need in coastal areas (WFP, UNOCHA, REACH, et al. 2013b).

***Appropriate and adequate coverage of humanitarian aid is generally low. IDP have moderate to high levels of appropriate coverage reported as compared to their originating barangay.*** Appropriate coverage of humanitarian aid as a whole is low but appropriate coverage for humanitarian food aid alone is high. Adequate coverage of humanitarian aid is low in all barangays and in all six components of humanitarian aid reviewed. MIRA II again supports this finding as food aid has been the first and foremost assistance provided to majority of affected areas ahead of all other components of humanitarian aid reviewed (WFP, UNOCHA, ACF, et al. 2013a).

The difference between IDP and originating barangay in terms of appropriate coverage is an important finding and would be valuable to investigate further. This disparity can lead to reluctance of IDP to return to their original barangay as they may perceive that they will not continue to get the same level of assistance they are receiving or for those who have remained to feel dissatisfied and disenfranchised as they have not been receiving the same level of assistance as their IDP counterparts.

***Satisfaction with humanitarian aid received is moderate at best and geographically heterogeneous. Disparity in satisfaction levels also exist between IDP and its originating barangay.*** Respondents who reported being satisfied with at least 50% of all the assistance they received is generally moderate with more than three-quarters of the barangays surveyed classified as moderate or high. Those classified as moderate or high are coastal and island barangays while those classified as low are inland barangays. Satisfaction reported by those in IDP bunkhouse is higher than what is reported by those from its originating barangay. There were very few respondents who report having had any complaints.

This finding seem to indicate that satisfaction as reported by the respondents is not directly and entirely related to appropriate or adequate assistance (though these factors are most likely contributory). It is likely that most respondents associate satisfaction with just the fact that they have been helped or assisted in any way (contact coverage). This is also likely to be due to respondents feeling they have recovered already from some or most of their needs at this stage and that they attribute this with the assistance (whatever it may have been) they have received (see next finding). Further investigation into this notion of satisfaction and to what factors beneficiaries associate with it would be of great value.

The geographical disparity and the difference between IDP and its originating barangay in terms of satisfaction is also an important finding. The geographical disparity between inland and coastal / island barangays may be due to perceived lesser assistance provided to the inland barangays or an actual discrepancy in the level of aid provided to inland barangays. As mentioned earlier, the initial MIRA pointed to greatest impact and need in coastal and island areas and most likely this has influenced the prioritisation of response (immediate response to the most affected areas) and the intensity or level of response (more assistance to the areas with most need).

This finding from the assessment is not at all controversial and is a fully acceptable assertion. However, dissatisfaction, in any form, is 'viral' and spreads quite easily as a fomenting attitude or behaviour among beneficiaries. Whether the dissatisfaction felt by beneficiaries is objective or not, it is important to note this finding and to find out why there is dissatisfaction so as to be able to respond to them appropriately. Whilst satisfaction as assessed by this survey can be argued as highly subjective, these findings establish a starting point from which to gauge and calibrate future investigations and evaluations of beneficiaries' satisfaction of humanitarian aid received. These can take the form of either re-assessing need and determining whether earlier needs assessment were able to capture the actual needs of the beneficiaries or whether their current condition now six months after the typhoon has changed for the worse and they are now more in need than they were earlier or whether a discussion and communication on how the provision of aid is determined and why the barangay has received the amount and type of assistance it did.

As for the IDP and originating barangay divide in terms of satisfaction, it is quite understandable for those that continue to be in a displaced condition six months after the typhoon to be dissatisfied. This underscores the importance of the return of IDPs to their original area as part of their recovery and as the underlying aim for any assistance provided to them.

A further investigation into the types of engagement conducted by both the government and the humanitarian community with the beneficiaries would be valuable in understanding further the pattern of satisfaction found in this survey.

***Recovery from at least 50% of all humanitarian assistance needs is generally high but differences exist between the six components of humanitarian aid reviewed.*** Recovery from food, water and sanitation, and services assistance needs is generally low in most of the barangays surveyed while recovery from shelter and livelihoods assistance needs is generally high.<sup>2</sup> Recovery from health assistance needs is mixed with inland barangays reporting high levels of recovery while coastal barangays reporting low levels of recovery.

These findings on recovery is a point of interest in relation to the findings of MIRA II conducted about a month post-typhoon. Specifically, MIRA II anticipated livelihoods recovery will take about 6 to 8 months post-typhoon (WFP, UNOCHA, ACF, et al. 2013a). This prediction is consistent with what respondents are reporting nine months later in this survey. The high level of recovery from shelter needs is also noteworthy. This requires further investigation given and may mean that respondents refer to their own self-recovery (not necessarily safe shelter). The low levels of recovery from food and water and sanitation assistance needs is a critical issue at nine months post-typhoon.

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<sup>2</sup> This finding needs further investigation given that it is different from other data available. Discussion of recovery is difficult to untangle from pre-existing levels of poverty and expectations. More in-depth investigation is needed as this finding also contradicts the surveyors' expectation from discussion and other data in the findings regarding shelter and livelihood needs.

For food assistance, this seems to indicate that it is still needed by respondents to be able to fulfil their food consumption needs and this despite reporting having recovered their livelihoods already. The possible reason for this is that recovery from livelihoods is in such an early stage that earnings gained is yet not enough to wholly satisfy food requirements of the household. Further investigation of livelihoods and food assistance relationship would be useful in elucidating how one impacts on the other.

For water and sanitation, the generally low level of recovery is consistent with the findings of a recent WASH baseline assessment (WASH Cluster Philippines et al. 2014). This baseline assessment, done 5 months post-typhoon, covered all affected barangays from 81 municipalities across 6 provinces. Reporting of results are at municipality level but stratification of results by position of barangay relative to the sea (i.e., islands - sea access, coastal - within 2 km distance from sea and inland) has also been presented. The assessment has shown that variation in drinking water access is greatest in coastal and island areas and variation in access to sanitation facilities greatest in island and inland areas in the Provinces of Capiz and Iloilo.

*Coping and recovery through humanitarian assistance received is generally high.* Most respondents in almost all of the barangays report that the humanitarian assistance they received have helped them to cope and to recover from the impact of the typhoon. This is a more optimistic result compared with the previous indicator on recovery defined as not requiring assistance anymore. This requires further investigation.

*Quality of humanitarian assistance received is judged as poor.* Most respondents have graded the quality of assistance as 2 on a scale of 0 to 5 (with 5 the highest). This quality grade of humanitarian aid is uniform across all barangays surveyed.

# APPENDIX 1: SURVEY INSTRUMENT (for Annex 8.6)

## Inter-agency humanitarian evaluation

Province ID:

Barangay ID:

Municipality ID:

Respondent ID: (0001 - 9999)

### Community survey, Region VI

#### I. Demographic Data:

Age (years: 00 - 99):

Gender:

Male  Female

Marital status:

Single  Civil partnership  Married

Separated  Widow / widower

Do you have any serious difficulty in hearing?

Yes  No

Do you have any serious difficulty in seeing even when wearing glasses?

Yes  No

Because of physical, mental, or emotional condition, do you have any serious difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions?

Yes  No

Do you have any serious difficulty in walking or climbing stairs?

Yes  No

Do you have any serious difficulty in dressing or bathing?

Yes       No

Do you have any serious difficulty in performing errands?

Yes       No

## II. Main questionnaire

1. Did you receive any assistance?

Yes       No

2. When did you first receive assistance? One answer only.

First Week       Within the first month

After one month       Can't remember

3. Are you still receiving assistance now.

Yes       No

4. Which organisations provided assistance first? Check all that apply

Local government       Local organisation

International organisation       Corporate/private company

Don't know       Others

Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

5a. Was lack of food for your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

5b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 6a

5c. Was the food provided sufficient to help meet your immediate food needs?

Yes       No

5d: How satisfied were you with the food assistance you received?

Very satisfied    Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied    Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

5e. Is lack of food still a problem for you?

Yes    No

6a. Was lack of shelter for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes    No

6b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes    No » go to 7a

6c. Was the shelter provided adequate to meet your immediate shelter needs?

Yes    No

6d. How satisfied were you with the shelter assistance you received?

Very satisfied    Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied    Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

6e. Is lack of shelter still a problem for you?

Yes    No

7a. Was loss of livelihoods more of a problem for you following Yolanda?

Yes    No

7b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes    No » go to 8a

7c. Was the livelihoods assistance provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

7d. How satisfied were you with the livelihoods assistance you received?

Very satisfied     Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied     Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

7e. Is loss of livelihood still a problem for you?

Yes       No

8a. Was lack of access to safe water and sanitation facilities for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda (than before)?

Yes       No

8b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 9a

8c. Were the water and sanitation facilities provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

8d. How satisfied were you with the water and sanitation facilities provided?

Very satisfied     Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied     Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

8e. Is lack of access to water and sanitation still a problem for you?

Yes       No

9a. Was lack of access to health services for you and your family more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

9b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No » go to 10a

9c. Were the health services provided adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

9d. How satisfied were you with the health services provided?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

9e. Is lack of access to health services still a problem for you?

Yes       No

10a. Was the lack of government services such as education more of a problem following Yolanda?

Yes       No

10b. Did you receive assistance to help cope with this problem?

Yes       No

10c. Were the available government services following Yolanda adequate to meet your immediate needs?

Yes       No

10d. How satisfied were you with the government services available following Yolanda?

Very satisfied       Somewhat satisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied       Somewhat dissatisfied

Very dissatisfied

10e. Are lack of usual government services still a problem for you?

Yes  No

11. Is there any other assistance you did not receive that would have been important?

Food ration  Non-food items  Shelter  Cash

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

12. After the typhoon, were you asked / consulted as to what assistance you needed?

Yes  No

13. From what source did you get information regarding the assistance being provided to those affected by typhoon Yolanda? Check all that apply.

Newspaper  Radio  TV  Government

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

Don't know  No information received

14. How did the assistance you received help you cope with the immediate effects of Yolanda?

Helped a lot to cope  Helped a little to cope

Did not help me a at all  No opinion / can't say

15. How did the assistance you received help you recover from the effects of Yolanda?

Helped a lot to recover  Helped a little to recover

Did not help me a at all  No opinion / can't say

16. Are you satisfied with the assistance you received?

Yes  No

17. Do you have any complaints about the assistance provided?

Yes  No » go to 18

17a. If YES, who did you make these complaints to?

Newspaper  Radio  TV  Government / officials

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

No complaints made formally » go to 17c

17b. What response did you get from your complaint?

The issue was resolved  Still waiting for response

No response  Government / officials

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

Don't know

17c. If NO complaints made formally, why?

Scared to complain  Did not know who to complain to

Did not think it was important  Can't be bothered

Can't be bothered  Nothing will be done

\_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_  \_\_\_\_\_

18. Overall, how would you grade the quality of assistance that you have received as a whole with 0 being lowest quality to 5 being highest quality?

Helped a lot to recover [0 - 5]

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## ANNEX 8.7 COMMUNITY SURVEY - FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY BY GROUP<sup>1</sup>

### Q 12: After the typhoon, were you asked / consulted as to what assistance you needed?

Response	Proportion
1. Yes	39%
2. No	61%

No difference at all by gender. Disabled people were more likely to say that they had not been consulted. Only 31% of disabled answered 1 (yes) against 39% overall. As expected, from the fact that there is a close correlation between elderly and disabled, elderly were also less likely to say they had been consulted with (Only 28%).

### Q 14: How did the assistance you received help you cope with the *immediate* effects of Yolanda?

Response	Proportion
1. Helped a lot to cope	9%
2. Helped a little to cope	75%
3. Did not help me at all	13%
4. No opinion / can't say	2%

Women were slightly more likely to answer with a 3 than men (16% of all women as opposed to 10% of all men), and correspondingly slightly less likely to answer with a 2 (72% of all women as opposed to 78% of all men), so they were generally a little less happy than men with the assistance received.

<sup>1</sup> Selected questions were analysed by group. Selection guided by sufficient responses being available to make analysis informative.

## Q 15: How did the assistance you received help you *recover* from the effects of Yolanda?

Response	Proportion
1. Helped a lot to recover	6%
2. Helped a little to recover	72%
3. Did not help me at all	19%
4. No opinion / can't say	2%

Virtually none with no. Women were again slightly more likely to answer with a 3 than men (23% of all women as opposed to 16% of all men), and correspondingly slightly less likely to answer with a 2 (68% of all women as opposed to 76% of all men), so they were again generally a little less happy than men with the assistance received.

## Q 16: Are you satisfied with the assistance you received?

Response	Proportion
1. Yes	29%
2. No	71%

No difference by gender; those with disabilities were only a little less likely to say that they were satisfied. Only 26% of disabled respondents answered 1 (yes) against 29% overall. There was an age gradient with satisfaction: 43% of those under 20 were satisfied, 28% of those 20-59 and only 26% of those over 60 answered 1 (yes).

## Q 17: Do you have any complaints about the assistance provided?

Response	Proportion
1. Yes	22%
2. No	78%

Small difference by gender - 26% of women had complaints and only 18% men. No real difference by disability. There were some age differences, with only 11% of those under 20 having a complaint. Also, only 19% of those over 60 had a complaint. The biggest proportion of those complaining was from those aged 20-59 (26%) but none of these are huge differences.

## Q 18: Overall, how would you grade the quality of assistance that you have received as a whole with 0 being lowest quality to 5 being highest quality?

Score	Proportion
0	1%
1	19%
2	28%
3	34%
4	6%
5	2%



There were 10% with no opinion. No gender differences to speak of. Responses varied with respect to disability: disabled individuals being less likely to rate the response as highly as non-disabled individuals. So, 26% of total disabled respondents graded the quality as 1, against 16% of non-disabled, 29% of total disabled respondents graded the quality as 2, against 28% of non-disabled, 27% of total disabled respondents graded the quality as 3, against 38% of non-disabled, and 3% of total disabled respondents graded the quality as 4, against 7% of non-disabled. Youth graded the response more highly, whereas the elderly graded it lower.

6% of those under 20 defined themselves as disabled, as opposed to 20% of those of working age and 84% of the elderly. So, there is a big overlap between elderly and disabled.

## ANNEX 8.8 COMMUNITY CONSULTATION PROCESSES - SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY SCORINGS

Scoring - 1 is high; 5 is low

Some communities separated scores for emergency phase (E) and recover (R).

Day	Community	Time for inter-agency <sup>1</sup>	Time to external assistance <sup>2</sup>	Relevance	Efficiency/timeliness
23-Aug	Libertad, Palo, Leyte	14	14 <sup>3</sup>	4	5
24-Aug	Bunkhouse, Barangay 62A, Tacloban	5	5	2	2
24-Aug	Barangay 62A, Tacloban	5	5	3	4
24-Aug	Rizal, Dagami, Leyte	18	4	3	5
24-Aug	Jimanoc, Salvacion, Samar	7	3	3	4
24-Aug	Burauen, Leyte, Region VIII	10	7	1	3
28-Aug	ESSU (Eastern Samar State University) Tent City, Guiuan, Eastern Samar	7	7	3	3
28-Aug	Landing, Barabgay 1, Giporlos Municipality, Eastern Samar	14	7	2	3
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Community			1	2
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Bunkhouse	5	3	1	1
28-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Guba, Pontevedra Municipality, Capiz	14	7	3E and 3R	5 in E and 4 in R
29-Aug	Barangay 3, Hernani, Eastern Samar Region	14	7	1	3
29-Aug	Taytay Integrated School: Guiuan, Region VIII	7	7	2	3

<sup>1</sup> Scored after development of timeline of assistance received from Day 1 to present. Knowledge of source of assistance varied.

<sup>2</sup> Usually MSWD food.

<sup>3</sup> Immediate food after 2 days then disturbances and more came after 2 weeks.

Day	Community	Time for inter-agency <sup>1</sup>	Time to external assistance <sup>2</sup>	Relevance	Efficiency/timeliness
29-Aug	Bangkal, Carles Municipality, Iloilo	12	4	1	4 in E and 5 in R
29-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Gogo bunk house, Estancia Municipality, Iloilo	14	2	5R and 3E	1/5 in E and 3 in R
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Okoy, Sta. Fe, Cebu	17	2	1E and 5R	3 and 3
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Tikad, Bantayan, Cebu	7-10	2	2 E and 2R	2 R and 5E
03-Sep-14	Sitio San, Vicente, Poblacion Daanbantayan, Cebu	5	2	1E and 3R	1E and 3R

Day	Community	Effectiveness short term	Effectiveness medium term
23-Aug	Libertad, Palo, Leyte	5	4
24-Aug	Bunkhouse, Barangay 62A, Tacloban	3	5
24-Aug	Barangay 62A, Tacloban	3	2
24-Aug	Rizal, Dagami, Leyte	3	3
24-Aug	Jimanoc, Salvacion, Samar	3	3
24-Aug	Burauen, Leyte, Region VIII	2	4
28-Aug	ESSU (Eastern Samar State University) Tent City, Guiuan, Eastern Samar	1	5
28-Aug	Landing, Barabgay 1, Giporlos Municipality, Eastern Samar	1	3
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Community	1	3
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Bunkhouse	1	3
28-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Guba, Pontevedra Municipality, Capiz	3	3
29-Aug	Barangay 3, Hernani, Eastern Samar Region	1	2
29-Aug	Taytay Integrated School: Guiuan, Region VIII	2	4
29-Aug	Bangkal, Carles Municipality, Iloilo	1	5
29-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Gogo bunk house, Estancia Municipality, Iloilo	1	3
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Okoy, Sta. Fe, Cebu	3	3
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Tikad, Bantayan, Cebu	1	3
03-Sep-14	Sitio San, Vicente, Poblacion Daanbantayan, Cebu	3	3
	<b>Average</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>3.39</b>

Day	Community	Accountability	Differential needs/ gender/age	Quality of targeting	Comments
23-Aug	Libertad, Palo, Leyte	4	4	4	ILO coconut labourers CfW and timber mill: rural
24-Aug	Bunkhouse, Barangay 62A, Tacloban	2	2	1	Evacuees from unsafe zone to Astrodome,
24-Aug	Barangay 62A, Tacloban	3	3	3	Plan urban slum area: rebuilding own shelters
24-Aug	Rizal, Dagami, Leyte				Agricultural community
24-Aug	Jimanoc, Salvacion, Samar			5	Island
24-Aug	Burauen, Leyte, Region VIII	2	2	2	Inland village affected by wind: PLAN youth reporter project
28-Aug	ESSU (Eastern Samar State University) Tent City, Guiuan, Eastern Samar	5	1	3	Displaced Population awaiting relocation away from "unsafe zone"
28-Aug	Landing, Barabgay 1, Giporlos Municipality, Eastern Samar	3	5	1	Hilltop coastal hamlet: wind damage: CRS project
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Community	3	2	3	Community retruning from bunkhouse to own homes in semi-urban area / IOM
28-Aug	Surok Bunkhouse, Guiuan, Region VIII - Bunkhouse	2	1	2	Displaced community - bunkhouse semi-urban area / IOM
28-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Guba, Pontevedra Municipality, Capiz	5	3		Agricultural community, floods

Day	Community	Accountability	Differential needs/ gender/age	Quality of targeting	Comments
29-Aug	Barangay 3, Hernani, Eastern Samar Region	3	3	3	Coastal town damaged by storm surge: all rebuilding own homes /TdH
29-Aug	Taytay Integrated School: Guiuan, Region VIII	4	3	4	Youth group in school setting Reporters /PLAN
29-Aug	Bangkal, Carles Municipality, Iloilo	3	3		Urban, coastal community
29-Aug	Community Exercise Brgy. Gogo bunk house, Estancia Municipality, Iloilo	5	5		Displaced population
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Okoy, Sta. Fe, Cebu	3	1		Mix of fishing and agricultural
02-Sep-14	Brgy. Tikad, Bantayan, Cebu	3	2		coastal - mix of fishing and agricultural
03-Sep-14	Sitio San, Vicente, Poblacion Daanbantayan, Cebu	4	1		Mix of fishing and agricultural
	<b>Average</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>2.56</b>	<b>2.82</b>	

## ANNEX 8.9: CLUSTER AND FUNDING

Cluster	% funded as of 21 July 2014
Camp Coordination and Camp Management ( CCCM)	55
Coordination <sup>1</sup>	83
Early recovery and livelihoods	28
Education	62
Emergency shelter	41
Emergency Telecommunications	Complete May 2014 57.4
Food security and Agriculture	76
Health	66
Logistics	Complete May 2014 113.2
Nutrition	96
Protection	49
Water, sanitation and hygiene	76

<sup>1</sup> Coordination is not a cluster but is listed here so table covers the overall areas of SRP budget.

# ANNEX 8.10 HAIYAN UN-CMCOORD AAR REPORT - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## After Action Review on the Humanitarian-Military/Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, Philippines

25 March 2014

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

#### Introduction

1. On 9 November 2013, the Government of the Philippines accepted the UN offer of international assistance and welcomed the receipt of foreign military assets (FMA). Twenty-two (22) Member States deployed FMA in the first six weeks of the response, consisting of various air, sea, medical, engineering and communication assets, including personnel.
2. The sizeable FMA presence following the devastation of Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda created significant civil<sup>2</sup>-military coordination needs in the hardest-hit areas in Regions VI, VII and VIII. Given the enormous challenges, the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) After Action Review (AAR) focused on the humanitarian- military/police interaction and associated coordination mechanisms, to include the tasking and use of foreign military assets (FMA) in support of national/regional authorities during the first two months of the emergency response operation.
3. The objectives of the UN-CMCoord AAR were: a) to review the humanitarian- military/police coordination mechanism in the first two months of the emergency and to assess how coordination for using FMA plugged into the overall coordination process; b) to evaluate the usefulness of the Oslo Guidelines<sup>3</sup> for FMA commanders; and c) to look at the prioritization of available FMA in supporting humanitarian priorities in the hardest-hit areas in support of national and local authorities.
4. The UN-CMCoord AAR was the result of a collaborative effort between the: National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), Office of Civil Defence (OCD), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Member States, Australian Government – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed UN-CMCoord AAR report is available at : <https://sites.google.com/a/dialoguing.org/humanitarian-military-dialogue/activities>

<sup>2</sup> Civil is inclusive of the police.

<sup>3</sup> Oslo Guidelines – Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1, November 2007

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Recommendation 1: **ESTABLISH A HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION MECHANISM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL TO:**

- Assist and inform the **National Disaster Management Authority**, as well as the humanitarian Clusters, to establish and maintain **common situational awareness**;
  - **Prioritize the use** of FMA in supporting humanitarian activities and operations.
- 5. Civil-military coordination models and mechanisms are historically different and tailored to context-specific situations. The ability to establish, adjust and innovate creatively will always play a central role to the success of any civil-military coordination mechanism.
- 6. The centrality of the affected State's controlling authorities and of the existing *National Disaster Management Authority* increases the effectiveness of civil-military coordination mechanisms. In addition, knowledge and application of national Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) frameworks and legislation was recognised to enhance accountability in civil-military coordination and the appropriate use of FMA. National frameworks and legislation should specify under what conditions military assets can be deployed in natural disasters. In the case of the Philippines, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) is the Governmental body responsible for ensuring the protection and welfare of the affected people during disasters or emergencies. The Council is composed of various government, non-government, civil and private sector organizations; the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is the counterpart of the UN present in the NDRMCC. Therefore, in the particular case of the Philippines, leadership of civil-military coordination was recognized to be most effective if placed within the NDRRMC structure.
- 7. The civil-military interface might be established and then gradually withdrawn as *other coordination mechanisms* come into effect (for example, Clusters). In this perspective, foreign military forces should develop a transition strategy and plan. The plan should detail conditions and criteria under which the support provided by military forces to humanitarian operations, including through the deployment and use of unique assets and capability, will be transitioned to disaster relief and development actors with longer-term presence. The transition plan should be developed at the planning stage of foreign military forces deployment and should be shared with all key stakeholders.
- 8. The establishment of a humanitarian civil-military coordination mechanism contributes to a *common situational awareness/common operating picture* (COP) among all actors involved in emergency responses. Situational awareness/COP is based on an initial joint needs assessment (to agree on humanitarian needs and priorities); continuous monitoring of the situation on the ground and refinement of assessed needs; coordinated information sharing; common understanding of regional and national structures; coordination architecture and disaster management frameworks.
- 9. Dedicated humanitarian civil-military coordination capacity (UN-CMCoord) placed in civil-military coordination centres can ensure monitoring and communication of humanitarian issues, *prioritization for the use of FMA*, as well as de-confliction within specific area of the response, such as logistics.

*“The real strength of the Haiyan response was the collective desire to help”*

- Undersecretary Eduardo del Rosario Executive Director  
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)

Recommendation 2: **INSTITUTIONALIZE A HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CAPACITY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RAPID RESPONSE MECHANISMS TO:**

- Optimize **interaction** and **interoperability** and contribute to the establishment of a **common situational awareness**;
  - Contribute to informed **decision-making** and response activities;
  - Facilitate **integration with response actors** and activities.
10. Having a common understanding of *decision-making processes* in civil-military coordination is essential. For example, all stakeholders involved in an emergency response need to be aware that some foreign militaries do not have delegated decision-making authority and need to consult with their capital prior to making decisions about presence of personnel in affected areas or allocation of resources in the field. The effectiveness for civil- military coordination further increases if delegated authority is paired with the possibility, within a permissive and stable environment, of adopting co-location as the civil-military coordination strategy.
  11. Closer cooperation should take place between military and humanitarian actors in *operational planning*. Developing a status of forces agreement (SOFA), an agreement between a host country and a foreign nation stationing military forces in that country, was considered a facilitating factor for effective civil-military coordination. Additional pre- existing operational arrangements related to specific areas of the disaster response, for example logistics or the use of FMA, can optimize *interaction and interoperability* among key respondents and contribute to effective civil-military coordination. The failure to plan for the potential need and use of MCDA specific to a given context can create obstacles to the effective and rapid conduction of emergency response operations, in particular in relation to key areas such as logistics.
  12. Foreign military forces and organizations deployed to support relief activities should be *self-supporting for the duration of their mission* in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors.

Recommendation 3: **DEPLOY FMA WITH COMPETENT LIAISON OFFICERS TO:**

- Explain available capabilities and limitations;
  - Extract valuable information to define *priorities*;
  - Keep the *line of communication* or coordination simple;
  - Determine the *capabilities and complementary* support needed;
  - Provide geographical, situational and actual *information and awareness*; Avoid duplication;
  - Prevent confusion.
13. Disaster-stricken countries, as well as the international community, organize their work around a pre-defined coordination mechanism at the national/operational and sub- national/tactical level. To match and fully integrate dedicated foreign military *Liaison Officers* with the adopted coordination mechanisms at all administrative levels leads to highly effective humanitarian civil-military coordination.
  14. Regular meetings of liaison officers and/or liaison visits were a key component of the Haiyan response in order to review the ongoing operations; in addition, military liaison officers actively participated in the Logistics Cluster meetings. The absence of *competent Liaison Officers* from

foreign and national armed forces in civil-military coordination mechanisms can hinder effective sharing of information, establishment of a common operating picture and agreement on the identification of priorities. Effective communication skills, as well as knowledge and respect of cultural values and norms, should be distinctive traits of deployed Liaison Officers; the lack of effective communication or communication breakdown took place because of different organizational cultures, personalities or language barriers that can hinder effective civil-military coordination at different levels (strategic, operational and tactical).

15. Effective *liaison with the humanitarian Cluster System* can also increase accountability of civil-military coordination. For example, liaison of military actors with the Logistics Cluster can ensure predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies by clarifying the division of labour among civil and military organizations and actors and better defining their roles and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 4: ADOPT A CO-LOCATION STRATEGY (AS APPROPRIATE) FOR HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION TO:**

- Understand host nation priorities based on humanitarian needs through open, efficient, fast, transparent *sharing of information*;
  - Increase humanitarian *civil-military coordination effectiveness and efficiency*;
  - Enhance deliberate planning;
  - Ensure rapid *coordination, cooperation, prioritization* and decision-making based on needs;
  - Maximize communication and sharing of information to all stakeholders, actors and key players from national and local government levels, foreign and local NGOs, as well as Foreign and Local Military Units;
  - Optimize utilization of *unique resources*.
16. In a permissive and stable environment, *co-location of international humanitarian organizations*, foreign military forces and the domestic disaster management authority improves the establishment of a common situational picture, facilitates unity of efforts and allows pooling of resources for the affected areas.
  17. The civil-military coordination set up in Roxas was noteworthy. The interaction between the Government, humanitarian actors and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) from the Canadian forces was also an effective model of civil-military coordination in disaster relief operations. With almost full integration and interoperability under a UN- CMCoord strategy of cooperation, the humanitarian aid community optimally benefited from the *unique assets*.
  18. Managing information during a humanitarian emergency is a crucial part of any operation. Failure to have clear information and initial coordinated needs assessments leads to a lack of situational awareness. *Effective information-sharing* was identified as a facilitating factor for decision-making in civil-military coordination. The open and transparent sharing of information among responders is critical to successful international disaster response operations and is a shared responsibility. A clear *information management structure* also ensures that all the organizations involved work with the same or complementary information, and that this information is as relevant, accurate and timely as possible.

*“Coordinators need to spend less time on sophisticated approaches, and devote more time to improving and practicing the basic functions of managing coordination. We need to get back to the fundamentals, and build from there.”*

- United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos February 2012

Recommendation 5: **ESTABLISH A SIMPLE, TRANSPARENT TRACKING SYSTEM TO:**

- Keep national and subnational level informed about military air transport and activity;
- Contribute to the situational awareness of the humanitarian community;
- Inform humanitarian community on **movements of relief items;**
- De-conflict operations with civil aviation ;
- Control direct ground time of military aircraft.

19. Simple systems must be put in place that can greatly contribute to *simplified and transparent tracking* of foreign and domestic military air, sea and road transport of humanitarian relief. For the first time in the history of natural disaster relief operations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), along with foreign militaries, used advanced technology to increase the *transparency and predictability of military air movements*. The approach was of significant importance for future civil-military coordination logistics operations since it ensured transparency and visibility of available air assets; it also allowed for prioritization of incoming relief assistance.

Recommendation 6: **INVEST IN HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CAPACITY-BUILDING TO:**

- Improve interoperability;
- Increase mutual **understanding;**
- Achieve/strengthen **unity of efforts.**

20. Awareness and understanding of global, regional and country-specific civil-military coordination guidelines can represent an additional important tool to ensure accountability of civil-military coordination mechanisms, systems and procedures. The Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, as well as context-specific guidance such as the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use Of Foreign Military Assets In Natural Disaster Response Operations, (APC-MADRO) establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign military and civil defence teams and expertise in international disaster relief operations. The lack of *understanding and knowledge* of key civil-military coordination concepts, principles and guidelines from both military and civilian stakeholders can prevent the adoption of a common language related to civil-military coordination (“last resort”, “complementarity”, “exit strategy”).
21. One of the factors that contributed to an effective level of civil-military coordination during the Haiyan response in the Philippines was largely the direct result of experts establishing previous professional and personal relationships during former deployments and/or training events. Therefore, simulation exercises and joint trainings can provide excellent opportunities in terms of fostering *mutual knowledge, trust and unity of efforts* among all the key stakeholders that would be involved in a disaster response. Financial and human resources need therefore to be taken into account and allocated to preparedness activities such as civil-military and emergency response training.

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## Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group

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